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The main aim of this thesis is to provide a sustained and in-depth comparison of the 
theatre and thought of Jean-Paul Sartre and Eugene Ionesco, and in so doing to fill the 
void in an astoundingly neglected field of criticism. The thesis explores the rich 
contrasts and surprising similarities emanating from the different slants of Sartre’s 
Existentialism and Ionesco’s Absurdism, which are juxtaposed under the umbrella term 
of Humanism. The intention of this comparative survey is to trace the ontological, 
metaphysical, and ethical implications o f Humanist thought evident in the theory and 
theatre of the two dramatists, and to assess the contribution made by Ionesco and by 
Sartre to the quest of contemporary Humanist philosophy to determine the significance 
of precisely what it is to be human.
To facilitate comparison, the dramatists’ subjects have been diametrically 
divided into agents and puppets. Much has been written on the Sartrean agent, based as 
it is on action and concrete engagement in its world; and the characters that people the 
stage and world of Ionesco, though less analysed, can be seen to emerge as puppet-like 
creations, pre-determined, controlled, and passive, and fashioned on the theatrical 
tradition of guignol. Such division is thus far from arbitrary, and it provides an ideal 
point of departure for the ensuing comparative exploration.
The focus lies in four main areas: firstly, the history and tradition of Humanist 
philosophy is reviewed, and the thought of Sartre and Ionesco placed into its context; 
secondly, the Sartrean agent is explored in the light of the Existentialist ontology of 
Freedom, consciousness and temporality, and of the ethical concepts of Engagement, 
responsibility, and Authenticity; thirdly, the Ionescan puppet is scrutinised with 
reference to Absurdist notions of Anguish, revolt, passivity, and despair; and finally, the 
complex world of Being-for-Others, o f relationships, coexistence, and society, is 
discussed in a contrapuntal analysis of the presence of others, the tensions between the 
Self and the Other, the search for a collective ethic, and the reality of individualism and 
isolation.
The methodology is based on the intensive textual analysis o f the dramatists’ 
theatrical works, supported by the non-fictional philosophy o f their lectures, essays, 
novels, treatises, and journals which offer a vital insight into their respective world­
views, interests, and intentions. The writers are placed into their philosophical and 
contemporary contexts, and the influences of both come under review.
The ultimate aspiration of the thesis is to prove that such a comparison is not 
only valid but of vital importance, and long overdue if the wealth of contrasts and 
similarities is ever to be uncovered, and if  light is to be shed on the timeless and thus 
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NOTES ON REFERENCES
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References are made according to the fifth edition o f the MHRA Style Book. For the 
sake of convenience, and following MHRA convention, footnote references are reduced 
to give the basic information which may be used in conjunction with the bibliography to 
provide a complete reference. This is particularly the case for the works o f Sartre and 
Ionesco themselves.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Puisque 1’artiste apprehende directement le reel, il est un veritable 
philosophe. Et c ’est de l’ampleur, de la profondeur, de l’acuite de sa vision 
philosophique, de sa philosophie vivante, que resulte sa grandeur. (Eugene 
Ionesco) 1
J’ai la passion de comprendre les hommes. (Jean-Paul Sartre) 2
In the words of Francis Jeanson, Sartre’s life-long Mend and critic, ‘exister, c’est etre un 
probleme pour soi-meme’ .3 This simple profundity could well have been scribed with 
Ionesco and Sartre in mind, for these two dramatists devoted their work, and even their 
lives, to the elucidation of the problem  that defines human existence on earth. Ionesco’s 
words above mark a valiant attempt to obliterate the misconceived and artificial gap 
between the artist and the philosopher, and serve to situate the Absurdist as a thinker in 
his own right; and Sartre’s impassioned admission places his thought too within the 
boundaries of the living philosophy cried out for by Ionesco. Both men undoubtedly 
share this ‘passion de comprendre les hommes’, and both display the ‘profondeur’ and 
‘acuite’ of their ‘vision philosophique’ in their successful transposition of philosophy to 
the stage. This shared passion, methodology, and talent form the basis for and 
justification of the forthcoming comparative survey.
Given the mutual disdain and disrespect displayed by Ionesco and Sartre towards 
one another, their political diversity, and artistic dichotomy, the particular choice of 
comparison may at first sight appear somewhat arbitrary; and in the light of La Legon, a 
doctoral thesis on Ionesco must certainly be viewed with some degree of irony. But 
originality is far from the greatest inspiration for a sustained comparison of Ionesco and 
Sartre. Even a brief perusal or audience of their respective plays reveals not only 
thought-provoking differences in outlook but, more significantly, an astounding degree 
o f convergence. This common ground makes the glaring critical void in this field all the 
more surprising: many critics, such as Bradby, Malachy, and Issacharoff, have dedicated 
two of the inevitable chapters of their books to Sartre and to Ionesco; some, including 
Esslin, Champigny, Coe, Hayman, Jacquart, Lamont, and Vemois, have made reference 
to the two for the purpose of brief comparison or, more usually, simplistic contrast; but 
rare indeed is the critic who has devoted time and energy to an all-encompassing and 
exclusive comparison of two of this century’s greatest philosophers and playwrights.
The current state of criticism is thus disappointingly sparse. Recent Sartre 
criticism, when not essentially biographical, has, particularly in the United States, 
focused on Sartrean ethics, attempting invariably to post-construct an Existentialist 
morality by weaving together often ill-fitting extracts from Cahiers pour une Morale, 
Critique de la Raison Dialectique, L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, L ’Etre et le 
Neant, etc .4 Sartre’s plays are often disregarded entirely in this process, seemingly 
willingly disendowed of any ethical portent and left to the attention of revivalist stage 
directors. Yet the achievements in this ethical field have been few and far between: there 
is much speculation but little controversy and, paradoxically, even less convergence.
1 Notes et contre-notes, p.71.
2 See Francis Jeanson, Sartre par lui-meme, preface.
3 Le Probleme moral et la Pensee de Jean-Paul Sartre, p.279.
4 Bell, Catalano, Fretz, Glynn, and Spiegelberg are obvious examples of this predominant preoccupation 
with Sartrean ethics.
7Thus, at the dawn of a new millennium, the time seems ripe for a new outlook and for 
vital reassessment of the Sartrean legacy. Enough time has elapsed since Sartre’s death 
and its aftermath for a genuine critical distance to be established; and, as pointed out by 
Howells, recent philosophical trends against Sartrean Existentialism have actually 
facilitated the task of reassessment:
If the vogue for existentialism in the 1940s led all but the most dedicated 
student to a facile, simplifying view of its tenets, its current lack o f 
popularity is already leading to a reappraisal o f its philosophical 
contribution and originality.5
Indeed, the combination o f the turn of the century and the twentieth anniversary of 
Sartre’s death has seemingly refocused attention on the philosopher’s huge significance, 
rekindling perhaps the extraordinary memories of the fifty thousand strong procession 
which followed his funeral cortege to his resting place in the Cimetiere de 
Montparnasse. The publication in January of Bemard-Henri Levy’s Le Siecle de Sartre: 
une enquete philosophique, the very title of which pays homage to the philosopher’s 
vastly influential legacy, was accompanied by television discussion programmes, the 
opening of a new ‘Sartre website’, and the apparition o f no fewer than three 
hebdomadaires dedicated to the ‘return’ of Sartre; and this in Paris, where Structuralism 
and deconstruction had seemed to have buried Sartre for ever. In the words o f the cover- 
title of Le Nouvel Observateur (13 January 2000), ‘Apres vingt ans de purgatoire Sartre 
revient’; and this resurrection was explained in L ’Evenement as a rehabilitation waiting 
to happen:
Depuis sa disparition, il y a vingt ans, il faisait figure de monument du 
passe: date, critique, raille. Oublie. Et voici que l’encombrant cadavre bouge 
enfin. Surprise! Sartre avait travaille pour un temps a venir: le notre. 
Rehabilitation. [...] La liberte est toujours a la croisee des chemins. Le 
sartrisme manque aux intellectuels.6
Howells’s prescience, already apparent in Britain, the United States, and Japan, is now 
finally being vindicated in the homeland of the intellectual. In Levy’s opinion, this new 
interest is far from pure nostalgia, for ‘il y a dans le Sartre de La Nausee et de L ’Etre et 
le Neant la philosophie antitotalitaire la plus feconde du XXe siecle’ .7
If there is a ‘philosophie antitotalitaire’ of equal fecundity in the twentieth 
century, it is surely that of Ionesco, concretised so perfectly in his Rhinoceros’, and, 
although a new wave of Ionesco criticism has sadly not yet materialised, Howells’s 
words hold equally true for Ionesco’s Absurdism -  a label which itself proves more 
problematic than Sartre’s due to the dramatist’s ambivalence towards it. Criticism of 
Ionesco appears to have reached an all-time low: if  disenchantment has affected 
Existentialism, it has certainly taken the sting out of the controversy sparked initially by 
the so-called Theatre o f the Absurd. Ionesco’s critics are an eclectic bunch of 
academics, mystics, theatre practitioners, formalists, and philosophers, and between 
them, they have covered the Ionescan legacy in comprehensive detail. But few have 
extracted the deeply philosophical aspects and influences of Ionesco’s oeuvre -  Dobrez 
is sadly the exception -  and none has thus far dared to juxtapose his work with the 
thought of his detested rival. Yet the connections are fundamental:
5 Sartre: The Necessity o f Freedom, p.201.
6 Petit, Philippe, ‘Quoi de neuf? Sartre!’, L ’Evenement du jeudi, no. 10, 20 January 2000, pp.8-9, (p.8).
7 Levy, Bemard-Henri, ‘Le retour de Sartre’, interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, no.1836, 13 January 
2000, pp.14-16, (p.14).
Les preoccupations de Ionesco et sa vision de la realite, en effet, rejoignent 
celles des ecrivains et des philosophes qui, au lendemain de la guerre, 
montraient l’individu ceme de toutes parts par l’inhumain, ‘etranger’ 
condamne a la lucidite, condamne au ‘huis clos’ ou le regard de l’autre est 
un enfer, assumant un destin qu’il n ’a pas choisi, voue a tous les echecs.8
The ‘relatively absolute objectivity’ foreseen and dreamt of by Ionesco, ‘apres 
les tempetes’ ,9 has now perhaps finally been accomplished at a time when the beckoning 
millennium calls out also for a review of contemporary Humanism: M an’s sense of 
divine abandonment and striving for an ethics in the wake of this abandonment are 
surely as acute as they were in the Left Bank cafes of the 1940s and ’50s, and the 
precise Humanist legacies of Sartre and of Ionesco remain to be fully assessed. The 
central aim of this thesis is therefore to compare and contrast the intertwining roots of 
Absurdism and Existentialism in order to elucidate their respective responses to the 
existential problems posed by the human condition: Why are we here? Why do we die? 
What is our condition? How should we live it? How can we coexist? The aim is 
certainly ambitious, for it focuses on the most basic fundamentals o f ontology, 
metaphysics, and ethics concerning the meaning of life and a possible modus vivendi. 
Other central aims include the ambitions to invoke a greater understanding o f Absurdist 
and Existentialist Humanism, to contribute to the current debate on the potential o f a 
Sartrean ethics, to refocus attention on the underlying philosophy of Ionescan drama, to 
explore the common ground in the realm of Being-for-Others, and ultimately to assess 
the combined achievements o f both dramatists in relation to existential and Humanist 
philosophy.
The methodology is based on intensive textual analysis o f the primary texts of 
the dramatists’ plays, and of the secondary texts which comprise their lectures, novels, 
essays, treatises, and journals. It juxtaposes these texts in a comparative analysis in a 
technique which is elaborated and justified by Fletcher:
Techniques special to comparative literature can help to clarify and situate 
accurately various literary relationships which are too often taken casually 
for granted or passed over without examination in an incidental phrase. [...]
When applied to specific texts, the comparatist technique which I term 
‘confrontation analysis’ can hope, through parallel and contrast, to define 
with a welcome degree of precision the specific qualities o f a representative, 
even exemplary writer. 10
For the purpose o f such comparatist technique, the exhaustive oeuvre of Sartre will be 
necessarily restricted to a predominant focus on his early philosophy, which lends itself 
to the present comparison more easily than socio-political texts, such as the Critique, or 
vast psychoanalytical portraits, the likes of L ’Idiot de la famille.
Chapter One is an introductory chapter, focusing on the similarities and 
discrepancies between Sartre’s Existentialist and Ionesco’s Absurdist Humanism, and 
attempting definitions of Humanism, the Sartrean agent, and the puppet of Ionesco. But 
who and what are these ‘agents’ and ‘puppets’, and what is their common connection 
with Humanism? The term agent naturally reflects the demands on the positive Sartrean
8 Abastado, Claude, ‘L’art reinvente’, in Les Critiques de notre temps et Ionesco, ed. Raymond 
Laubreaux, p. 170.
9 See Notes et contre-notes, p. 125.
10 Fletcher, J., ‘A Psychology Based on Antagonism: Ionesco, Pinter, Albee and Others’, in The Two 
Faces o f  Ionesco, ed. Rosette C. Lamont and Melvin J. Friedman, p. 175.
9character to act and to transcend its condition. Its theatrical debut is prefigured in La 
Nausee in a defence of human existence surprisingly subordinated by its accreditation to 
an author that the Autodidacte (the bad Humanist) has read: ‘La vie a un sens si l ’on 
veut bien lui en donner un. II faut d’abord agir, se jeter dans une entreprise. Si ensuite 
Ton reflechit, le sort en est jete, on est engage. ’ 11 Despite its lowly origins, this life 
philosophy clears the path for the advent of the Humanist agent, for the Promethean 
protagonists who will defend the Sartrean cause. This insight into action is picked up in 
the Cahiers, where we learn that: ‘Agir c’est poser que l’Etre a un sens [...]. Si Taction 
reussit, le sens est inscrit. Et fondamentalement on agitpour que l’Etre ait un sens. C ’est 
le but de tous les buts . ’12 However, Sartre goes on to discuss the implication o f the 
failure of action, providing a wonderful introduction to the role o f Ionesco: ‘Agir et 
echouer c’est prouver que le sens de l’Etre est de rendre impossible la vie humaine. Ici 
intervient le poete . ’ 13 Ionesco, the self-confessed ‘poete’, obligingly produces these 
‘anti-agents’, or puppets, who indeed fail in their action, revealing human life as 
impossible and Being as ultimately senseless.
The Ionescan motif of the puppet is both visual and metaphorical. Following the 
long history of puppet theatre, stemming back to the religious rituals o f the early 
Egyptians, Hindus, and Greeks, and more recently influenced by the guignol tradition o f 
France, Ionesco uses dolls and marionettes as a visual metaphor for the repressed and 
alienated condition of Man. It is likely that the dramatist was influenced by the 
European avant-garde including Maeterlinck, who claimed that ‘actors were too obtuse 
to convey his metaphysical concerns’, and the Russian symbolist Fyodor Sologub, who 
argued that ‘actors should simply perform what the playwright reads aloud, thus 
emblematizing the relationship of the helpless human being to fate’ . 14 The influence of 
Jarry is also central here. Philosophically, the m otif appears to be Platonic, for the 
references to puppets in The Laws bear close resemblance to Ionescan characterisation 
and even affect the ethical:
Let’s consider each of us living beings to be a divine puppet, put together 
either for their [the gods’] play or for some serious purpose -  which, we 
don’t know. What we do know is that these passions work within us like 
tendons or cords, drawing us and pulling against one another in opposite 
directions towards opposing deeds, struggling in the region where virtue and 
vice lie separated from one another. 15
The concepts of the puppeteer-God, of divine malevolence, and o f Manichaean spiritual 
forces are all familiar aspects of Ionescan Humanism, and they underline the 
effectiveness of the metaphor of the puppet. It is the symbol o f the puppet, then, which 
will be used in contrast to the agent of Sartre, for both the puppet and the agent will be 
shown to embody the Humanistic attributes of their respective creators.
The connection between Humanism, the Sartrean agent, and the Ionescan puppet 
is linked with the thesis’s central theme of Authenticity, which will be explored in the 
light of identity and ethical action. The quest for Authenticity, for ‘authentic existence’, 
is central to both Sartrean and Ionescan conceptions o f Humanism; and, in the world of 
Being-for-Others, where the subject is forced to build relationships, it will hopefully be 
shown to provide the common ethical ground for the agent and the puppet alike.
The first chapter thus aims to extrapolate a common Humanist ideal which will
11 La Nausee, p. 159.
12 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.502.
13 Ibid., pp.502-03.
14 See Martin Banham, The Cambridge Guide to Theatre, p.888.
15 Plato, The Laws, pp.24-25.
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prefigure the quest for Authenticity and therefore lay the foundations for a rich and valid 
comparison. The second chapter traces the ethical journey of Sartre’s agents from their 
perception of the Absurdity of their condition to the potential transcendence offered by 
their ontological freedom, and from their ethical freedom to the challenges o f heroism 
and Authenticity. It explores the central tenets of Sartrean Existentialism, and seeks to 
underline the problems of terminology and contradiction. Chapter Three explores the 
world o f Ionesco’s puppets and provides a comparative and hopefully complementary 
balance to the focus on the Sartrean agent. This choice o f structure consciously divides 
the dramatists’ stage characters into a crude dichotomy o f active and passive, agent 
versus puppet, and extends the metaphor to its full conclusion. Thus the puppet is 
regarded as a metaphysical marionette, a victim or plaything of the gods, and a rat on a 
wheel, before progressing (or rather mutating) to the heights o f the archetype, 
Everyman, and anti-hero, where the Ionescan ideal o f Authenticity is offered up for 
comparison with Sartre’s. The final chapter builds on the work o f the first three chapters 
to create the basis for a contrapuntal analysis, a direct comparative juxtaposition of 
thought. The individual experiences of the agent and puppet are broadened out into the 
world o f relationships, coexistence, and society, where their Humanist values are truly 
put to the test. This closing chapter seeks to determine the fate o f Sartre and Ionesco’s 
collective Humanism and to propose potential solutions to problems which remain 
unsolved.
The ultimate aspiration of the thesis is not so much to answer the metaphysical 
questions surrounding the meaning of life as to reawaken critical interest in Sartre, in 
Ionesco, and, more than anything, in the inseverable ties that exist between the two. 
This can only be effected by a successful rapprochement or even fusion o f the often 
crudely separated disciplines of philosophy and theatre. If the thesis succeeds in 
bridging these two unnecessary gaps, it will at least have achieved the most modest of 
its goals.
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CHAPTER ONE -  TOWARDS A HUMANIST IDEAL
Vous me reprochez d ’utiliser le mot humanisme. C’est parce que le 
probleme se pose ainsi. 1
Helas, l ’humanisme s’en va en morceaux.2
INTRODUCTION
The remarks above immediately situate the theatre and thought o f both Sartre and 
Ionesco within the broadest context of Humanism, and it is within this context that the 
philosophical approach of the thesis will be governed. Sartre’s comment reveals the 
necessity o f such an approach, and to explore Sartrean theatre beyond the boundaries o f 
Humanism would clearly be somewhat blinkered; and at first sight, it seems that 
Ionesco shares his contemporary’s philosophical outlook, bemoaning with typical 
desperation the steady disappearance of Humanist values. The aim of this chapter is then 
to analyse and attempt to define the Humanism of Ionesco and of Sartre, in order to 
create a solid philosophical base for subsequent comparison.
The greatest challenge at this early stage is o f course to define the term of 
Humanism itself, for there are undoubtedly as many forms of Humanism as there are 
Humanist thinkers. This task will be attempted with brief reference to the history of 
Humanism, to significant forerunners o f Ionesco and Sartre, and will undoubtedly 
culminate in an exploration of the terminological problems posed by the term. The other 
terms in need of definition are naturally those of the agent and the puppet -  concepts 
which give an early insight into the thinkers’ diverse forms of Humanism and which 
will be central to the thesis as a whole.
The ultimate aim of this introductory chapter is to point towards a Humanist 
ideal shared by both dramatists which will form a suitable point of departure for the 
thesis. At the heart of any Humanism lies a desperate search for ethics, and if  the thesis 
is, as stated, to be an ethical journey through the philosophical theatre of Ionesco and 
Sartre, its destination may well remain open, but its origin must be established as 
quickly and accurately as possible.
1 Sartre, L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, discussion, p. 102.
2 Ionesco, Antidotes, p. 18.
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0 Humanism
According to The Chambers Dictionary, Humanism is ‘any system which puts human 
interests and the mind of man paramount, rejecting the supernatural, belief in a god, 
etc.’. Although this may appear to be the broadest o f definitions, it is actually quite 
restrictive in precluding both religion and the supernatural. The definition is certainly 
helpful in underlining as the central tenet o f Humanism the primacy of the human being, 
but in simplistically overlooking any theistic or agnostic Humanism, it reveals itself to 
be grossly insufficient as a workable definition of the term. A more philosophical 
definition is provided by Heidegger, who uncovers the term’s etymology:
L ’“humanum”, dans le mot, signale l’humanitas, l’essence de l ’homme. 
L ’“...isme” signale que l’essence de l’homme devrait etre prise comme 
essentielle. C’est ce sens que le mot ‘humanisme’ a en tant que mot. Lui 
rendre un sens ne peut signifier que ceci: determiner a nouveau le sens du 
mot.3
The core of this philosophical definition replicates that of the first definition in placing 
humanness at the centre of its system of belief. In thus re-establishing the original sense 
o f the term, and in leaving the way open for religious and even mystical beliefs, it can 
be seen to provide a workable definition of Humanism. This definition is echoed in 
Ionesco’s Le Tableau, where behind the parodic truisms lies a simple affirmation of 
Heideggerian thought:
Le Peintre: Humanisme, c’est une grande chose!
Le Gros Monsieur: Oui... Dame, 9 a tient de l’humain. Et c’est
l’humain qui fait l’homme!4
Despite Heidegger’s success in redefining a sense for Humanism, his own 
relationship with the concept is far from easy. His 1946 letter to Jean Beauffet, Uber 
den Humanismus, betrays a definite reluctance to unite himself with Humanism, 
particularly in the context of the post-war fear of ideology:
Vous demandez: ‘Comment redonner un sens au mot “Humanisme”?’ Cette 
question denote 1’intention de maintenir le mot lui-meme. Je me demande si 
c’est necessaire. Le malheur qu’entrainent les etiquettes de ce genre n ’est-il 
pas encore assez manifeste? On se mefie certes depuis longtemps des 
“...ismes” .5
The problem of labelling highlighted by the German thinker certainly cannot be 
overlooked, but it will be remembered that, in the words of Sartre in his public lecture 
on Humanism, the problems to be explored present themselves in the context o f this 
concept o f humanness, and it seems that the broad definition proposed above succeeds 
in providing us with a sense, without the drawback o f the dangerous narrowness of 
labelled ideology.
The first recorded use of the term in France appears in an article by Abbe 
Baudeau in 1765.6 But European Humanism has emerged gradually, rather than
3 Lettre sur L ’Humanisme, p. 117.
4 Theatre III, p.236.
5 Lettre sur L 'Humanisme, pp.33-35.
6 See ‘Des sciences et des arts’, Ephemerides du Citoyen, 1, no.16 (1765), p.247.
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spontaneously, over a period of time stretching back to Cicero and Varro. The Italian 
Renaissance brought renewed interest in everything Classical, and Humanism was 
certainly no exception; and the post-Enlightenment flourishing in philosophy and 
philosophical literature, sustained by figures as diverse as Kant, Hegel, Goethe, and 
Voltaire, refocused thought on humanity after centuries of subordination to God. 
However, Humanism has never entirely freed itself from the shackles o f God and 
religion, and in France particularly, the tension between secular and religious 
Humanism subsists:
Secular Humanism tends to deny God in order to make room for human 
being, for instance in Feuerbach’s inversion of the usual conception o f the 
dependence of human being on God in favour o f a dependence o f God on 
human being. Human being seeks its salvation through its own works. 
Religious Humanism takes the contrary view, expressed by Kierkegaard, 
that human salvation must be sought in the return to God .7
French Humanism certainly has its Cartesian roots, but it has been greatly influenced by 
German Humanism: Proudhon can be credited with popularising Feuerbach’s secular 
Humanism in France, while more recently the French reception and interpretation of 
Heidegger, aided (or arguably hindered) by Sartre, Beauffet, and others, has 
reinvigorated the Humanist debate, causing rifts not only religious, but ontological, 
anthropological, and political. It is in this precarious context, then, that the Humanism 
of Sartre and of Ionesco has evolved, and in the diversity between their respective 
concepts of Humanism, the tension between religion and secularism lives on.
If Heidegger’s relationship with Humanism was not always exactly smooth, it 
was certainly not nearly as uncomfortable as those o f Ionesco and Sartre, both o f whom 
have been prone to reject and even parody the concept. Sartre’s early fiction, such as La 
Nausee and Erostrate, betrays a deep distrust for Humanism, misrepresenting its more 
serious tenets and exposing it to easy ridicule. This approach is personified in the 
character of L ’Autodidacte, whose very name is complicit in belittling his views; and, 
certainly, the Humanism entertained by the character is a ridiculous misconception of 
the notion -  the misconception indeed subsequently rejected in L Existentialisme est un 
Humanisme. Thus the Autodidacte basks in the reflected glory of the great artists, for he 
is a man, and the paintings he admires were painted by men .8 He is condemned by the 
narrator as a ‘humaniste de province’, since ‘son amour des hommes est nai'f et 
barbare’ .9 But the attack on Humanism is not restricted to the personal, and in 
Roquentin’s first general attack, the opposition between secular and religious 
Humanism comes once more to the fore:
L ’humaniste dit ‘de gauche’ a pour souci principal de garder les valeurs 
humaines; il n ’est d’aucun parti, parce qu’il ne veut pas trahir l’humain, 
mais ses sympathies vont aux humbles; c’est aux humbles qu’il consacre sa 
belle culture classique. [...] L ’humaniste catholique, le tard-venu, le 
benjamin, parle des hommes avec un air merveilleux. [...] II a choisi 
l’humanisme des anges; il ecrit, pour l ’edification des anges, de longs 
romans tristes et beaux . 10
The parody is already apparent, and lest we remain in any doubt as to Sartre’s initial
7 Rockmore, Tom, Heidegger and French Philosophy, p.68.
8 La Nausee, p. 154.
9 Ibid., p. 160.
10 Ibid., p .165.
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regard for Humanism, the attack is soon extended:
Qa, ce sont les grands premiers roles. Mais il y en a d ’autres, une nuee 
d’autres: le philosophe humaniste, qui se penche sur ses freres comme un 
frere aine et qui a le sens de ses responsabilites; l’humaniste qui aime les 
hommes tels qu’ils sont, celui qui les aime tels qu’ils devraient etre, celui 
qui veut les sauver avec leur agrement et celui qui les sauvera malgre eux, 
celui qui veut creer des mythes nouveaux et celui qui se contente des 
anciens, celui qui aime dans l’homme sa mort, celui qui aime dans l ’homme 
sa vie, l’humaniste joyeux, qui a toujours le mot pour rire, l ’humaniste 
sombre, qu’on rencontre surtout aux veillees funebres. Ils se haissent tous 
entre eux: en tant qu’individus, naturellement -  pas en tant qu’hommes.11
The startling diversity of Humanism is explored in this passage, which makes its 
ultimate condemnation particularly effusive and Sartre’s subsequent reconciliation with 
the concept all the more surprising.
Ionesco’s relationship with Humanism is not so neatly chronological. On the 
contrary, his feelings towards the movement are undulatingly ambivalent. Like 
Heidegger, Ionesco is concerned with the essence and the humanness o f Man, but he has 
never really developed this concern into a consistent or sustained philosophy. On two 
separate occasions, Ionesco is in clear contradiction with himself within the same work, 
betraying his obvious unwillingness to be uncompromisingly associated with 
Humanism:
La liberte de l’homme, l’humanisme, ce sont des idees ridicules.12
La grandeur de la France dans le monde est due a sa culture et a sa culture 
humaniste. [...] La qualite esthetique ou spirituelle d’une oeuvre s ’apprend 
ou plutot se decouvre, se reconnait, car tout le monde a en soi, peut-etre 
cache a lui-meme, le sens de la valeur.13
In Un homme en question, published two years later, the author moves from a 
committed humanist to an explicitly anti-humanist position within the space o f a mere 
five pages:
Nous tous, humanistes depuis quelques siecles, nous avons catalogue, mis 
en fiches ou dans des oeuvres, notre difficulte de vivre et nos egarements.14
Voila ce que les hommes et ce qu’on appelle l’humanisme se sont propose.
C’est de 1’abandon des soucis spirituels ou metaphysiques qu’il s ’agit la.15
On the one hand, Ionesco can be seen to support the ethical values o f humanist culture, 
situating himself at the end of a line o f pessimistic, or Absurdist, Humanists; and on the 
other, he rejects the optimistic Humanism of freedom propounded by Kant and Sartre, 
which he sees as destroying the spiritual and metaphysical. The finer details o f Ionescan 
Humanism remain to be elucidated, but for the moment we can safely assume that 
Ionesco is rather generally humanistic than specifically Humanist, and that his
11 Ibid., pp. 165-66.
12 Antidotes, p.46.
13 Ibid., p .175.
14 Un homme en question, p.67.
15 Ibid., p.72.
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conception of Humanism, while ambivalent, is closer to the religious than to the secular 
brand of the movement. Both Sartre and Ionesco have been shown to fluctuate in their 
respective responses to Humanism, and the terminology to be used in the thesis is thus 
bound to prove problematic. But it is to be hoped that a more detailed exploration of 
both thinkers’ conceptions o f Humanism will lessen the ambiguity and point towards a 
Humanist ideal that will provide a base for further comparison.
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ii) Sartrean Humanism
At the very core of Sartrean Humanism lies a committed and instinctive atheism. In 
L ’Etre et le Neant, one of Sartre’s early tasks is to try to show the ontological 
impossibility o f God. He sets about this with a full description o f the structures o f en-soi 
and pour-soi, concluding that God, as an ideal fusion of two structures of being which 
cannot be synthesised, can exist only as this ideal. 16 If  en-soi is total positivity and 
plenitude, and pour-soi exists as negation and nothingness, then any fusion o f the two 
(or soi) can be seen to be a logical impossibility, a contradiction in terms. In Sartrean 
terms, God would be the being which simultaneously is what it is, is not what it is, and 
is what it is not -  another ontological paradox. The creative process is also invoked to 
reveal the unsustainability of an eternal Creator, and, like Nietzsche before him, Sartre 
is open also to the notion of the death of God:
On peut concevoir une creation, a la condition que l ’etre cree se reprenne, 
s’arrache au createur pour se refermer sur soi aussitot et assumer son etre: 
c ’est en ce sens qu’un livre existe contre son auteur. Mais si l ’acte de 
creation doit se continuer indefmiment, si l’etre cree est soutenu jusqu’en 
ses plus infimes parties, s’il n ’a aucune independance propre, s’il n ’est en 
lui-meme que du neant, alors la creature ne se distingue aucunement de son 
createur, elle se resorbe en lui. 17
So according to Sartrean Humanism, Creation can only have taken place if  Man has 
subsequently assumed his own being. If  Creation is continual and infinite, then no 
distinction can be drawn between Man and God. Either way, human being achieves 
primacy: either Man is God, or Man is free and God does not exist.
The atheistic logic continues in L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, where 
Sartre reinforces the primacy of Man with a useful gloss of his philosophy:
L ’existentialisme athee [...] declare que si Dieu n ’existe pas, il y a au moins 
un etre chez qui 1’existence precede 1’essence, un etre qui existe avant de 
pouvoir etre defini par aucun concept, et que cet etre c ’est 1’homme ou [...] 
la realite humaine. 18
Sartre’s Humanism thus places Man back in the centre of his universe, but in so doing, 
removes itself philosophically from the focus on human essence to be found in the 
thought of Heidegger and Ionesco. La realite humaine, Sartre’s (mis)translation of 
Heidegger’s Dasein, is thrown into the world where it is inevitably bastardised by the 
absence of a Creative Father -  a condition acknowledged by the chorus o f Les 
Troyennes which laments, ‘L ’Aube est horriblement belle| et les Dieux nous ont 
abandonnes.’ However, it is not Sartre’s intention to prove the non-existence o f God, for 
the problem with which he is essentially concerned is one of human freedom and self­
salvation, one of Humanism rather than atheism:
L’existentialisme n ’est pas tellement un atheisme au sens ou il s ’epuiserait a 
demontrer que Dieu n ’existe pas. II declare plutot: meme si Dieu existait, 9 a 
ne changerait rien; voila notre point de vue. Non pas que nous croyions que 
Dieu existe, mais nous pensons que le probleme n ’est pas celui de son
16 See L ’Etre et le Neant, p. 133.
17 Ibid., p.25.
18 L 'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.21.
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existence; il faut que l’homme se retrouve lui-meme et se persuade que rien 
ne peut le sauver de lui-meme, fut-ce une preuve valable de l’existence de 
Dieu.19
Sartrean Humanism thus functions in spite o f and beyond the scope o f God rather than 
defiantly against his existence. But these fire-stealing words o f Sartre are in direct 
contradiction to his preceding comments on ethics: ‘L ’existentialiste [...] pense qu’il est 
tres genant que Dieu n ’existe pas, car avec lui disparait toute possibility de trouver des 
valeurs dans un ciel intelligible.’20 This blatant contradiction is notorious in criticism of 
Sartre’s ‘hastily contrived’ lecture, and it is certainly valid: the possible existence o f 
God cannot be simultaneously irrelevant and troublesome, and while Sartre’s atheistic 
stance may remain coherent, the relationship between his Existentialist Humanism and 
God has certainly become more ambiguous. The point is emphasised, in different terms, 
by Rockmore: ‘In our own time, no one has gone further toward the elaboration o f an 
atheistic philosophy than Sartre, although even he understands human being through a 
conception o f an absent God.’21
This dependence on the absence of God for the foundation o f Sartrean 
Humanism is borne out also in Sartre’s theatre, where the existence o f divinity is 
constantly an underlying source of conflict. From Les Mouches to Les Troyennes 
characters are distinguished as either atheistic (and so elevated to the Existentialist elite) 
or theistic (and thus denounced for their Bad Faith). The conflict between God and Man 
is ever pressing, and the point is reinforced that Man’s salvation rests solely in his own 
hands:
Frantz: Alors? Nous sommes impuissants?
Le Pere: Oui, si nous choisissons l’impuissance. Tu ne peux rien pour les 
hommes si tu passes ton temps a les condamner devant le 
Tribunal de Dieu.22
The freedom of choice is of course a central tenet of Sartre’s Humanist Existentialism, 
and it is clear here that any human impotence or helplessness, any divine power, can 
only materialise through a subject’s decision to effectively abdicate free choice. Indeed, 
as Georges reminds Jules, the only proof o f God’s existence is determined through the 
weakness of Man: ‘Avez-vous oublie votre catechisme? On prouvait Dieu par le besoin 
que l’homme a de lui.’23 The presence of God, it seems, is nothing but a fiction invented 
in the heads o f men.
The true Sartrean heroes such as Oreste and Goetz ultimately recognise that any 
supernatural power is given to divinities by Man, and they transform the Humanist 
debate into a mutually exclusive alternative between an invisible God and an all too 
concrete Man:
Tu vois ce vide au-dessus de nos tetes? C’est Dieu. Tu vois cette breche 
dans la porte? C’est Dieu. Tu vois ce trou dans la terre? C’est Dieu encore.
Le silence, c’est Dieu. L ’absence, c ’est Dieu. Dieu, c ’est la solitude des 
hommes. [...] Si Dieu existe, l’homme est neant; si l’homme existe...24
19 Ibid., p.95.
20 Ibid., p.35.
21 Heidegger and French Philosophy, pp.64-65.
22 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.77.
23 Nekrassov, p. 147.
24 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.238.
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Goetz, the ultimate Sartrean bastard, comes to accept his abandonment by God, and 
with it, the illegitimacy of both religion and prescribed ethical values. But, as Lafarge 
reminds us, the enlightenment was prefigured in Les Mouches, with the hero’s usurping 
of his supposed creator’s power: ‘We must [...] acknowledge that if  man exists -  and he 
does -  God does not exist. Orestes’ freedom is Jupiter’s death.’25 The existence o f Man 
is never in doubt in Sartrean Humanism, and in the binary opposition that it establishes 
between the human and the divine, it is the latter that crumbles into nothingness; such is 
the legacy of Sartre’s cherished atheism.
The catalyst for Sartre’s certainty in human existence is o f course the Cartesian 
Cogito, which can thus be regarded as the premise for his Humanism. The significance 
o f Descartes for the development of Sartrean Humanism is pointed out by Krell, who 
acknowledges the link between subjectivity and primacy: ‘Sartre reaffirms that m an’s 
freedom to act is rooted in subjectivity, which alone grants man his dignity, so that the 
Cartesian ‘cogito’ becomes the only possible basis for a humanism.’26 Human dignity 
and freedom are both dependent on subjectivity, and if  Sartre’s Existentialism is a 
Humanism, it is because it focuses on pour-soV s ability to exist rather than en-sof s 
capacity to be, on the human relationship with matter rather than materialism as an end 
in itself. The influence of Descartes should not be understated, for the independence o f 
human consciousness and thought established by the Cogito cleared the way for a clean 
break with religion, for the dominance of reason over faith. However, it must be 
acknowledged that Sartre’s interpretation of the Cogito marks a definite and defining 
break from Descartes, who of course appealed to the ‘certainty’ o f God’s existence and 
perfection to underpin the fundamental ‘truth’ of the Cogito: the starting point of 
Sartrean Humanism lies in the affirmation of subjectivity, based on the theory of 
reflection explored in La Transcendance de I ’Ego and in L ’Etre et le Neant, which 
leaves no room for the perfect synthesis of a creator-God which, in Sartre’s eyes, would 
diminish the freedom apparent in the Cogito.
The only precise definition of Sartre’s Humanism comes in his L Existentialisme 
est un Humanisme, even though the basis for this lecture is to be found in L Etre et le 
Neant. The subtitle to this seminal work -  essai d ’ontologie phenomenologique -  gives 
the first insight into Sartre’s approach to Humanism, which is based, accordingly, on 
Husserl’s phenomenology applied to the philosophy o f the modes o f being (in Sartre’s 
case, the relationship between pour-soi and en-soi, and the interrelationship between the 
Self and the Other). Though complex and subject to the usual inadequacy o f labelling, 
Sartre’s choice of subtitle does help to situate his Humanism, distinguishing it from the 
broader questions o f metaphysics to be found, for example, among religious and 
Absurdist Humanists alike. Unconcerned, then, with transphenomenal issues o f pre­
birth, birth, death, and the afterlife, Sartre concentrates on the Humanist problems o f the 
conscious human subject, and the definition of Humanism provided in the lecture 
remains true to the aims of L Etre et le Neant.
Sartre’s definition of his Humanism comes towards the end o f his lecture, and 
one of its aims is clearly to distinguish between two types of Humanism -  the one 
ridiculed in his early fiction, and the genuine form to be adopted into his Existentialism:
En realite, le mot humanisme a deux sens tres differents. Par humanisme on 
peut entendre une theorie qui prend l’homme comme fin et comme valeur 
superieure. [...] Cela supposerait que nous pourrions donner une valeur a 
l’homme d ’apres les actes les plus hauts de certains hommes. Cet 
humanisme est absurde, car seul le chien ou le cheval pourrait porter un
25 Lafarge, Rene, Jean-Paul Sartre: His Philosophy, p. 134.
26 See Heidegger, M., Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, p. 191.
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jugement d’ensemble sur l’homme et decider que l’homme est epatant [...]. 
L ’existentialiste ne prendra jamais l’homme comme fin, car il est toujours a 
faire. [...] Mais il y a un autre sens de l’humanisme, qui signifie au fond 
ceci: 1’homme est constamment hors de lui-meme, c ’est en se projetant et en 
se perdant hors de lui qu’il fait exister l’homme et, d ’autre part, c ’est en 
poursuivant des buts transcendants qu’il peut exister; l’homme etant ce 
depassement et ne saisissant les objets que par rapport a ce depassement, est 
au cceur, au centre de ce depassement. II n ’y a pas d ’autre univers qu’un 
univers humain, l’univers de la subjectivite humaine. Cette liaison de la 
transcendance, comme constitutive de l’homme [...] et de la subjectivite, au 
sens ou 1’homme n ’est pas enferme en lui-meme mais present toujours dans 
un univers humain, c’est ce que nous appelons l’humanisme existentialiste. 
Humanisme, parce que nous rappelons a l’homme qu’il n ’y a d ’autre 
legislateur que lui-meme, et que c’est dans le delaissement qu’il decidera de 
lui-meme; et parce que nous montrons que 9 a n ’est pas en se retoumant vers 
lui, mais toujours en cherchant hors de lui un but qui est telle liberation, telle 
realisation particuliere, que l ’homme se realisera precisement comme 
humain .27
The Humanism here advocated by Sartre, in an obvious retreat from his initial anti- 
Humanist stance, is a complex fusion of transcendence and subjectivity, and these terms 
need to be deconstructed before the Humanism they support can be fully understood. By 
transcendence, Sartre is referring to Man’s possibility, and even duty, to go beyond the 
Given, to defy and exceed the apparent limits o f the human condition or facticity. Man is 
defined by his ability to act, and it is only in acting beyond the confines o f any essence, 
Self, or personality that he can make himself and other men exist. He is free and 
condemned never to coincide with himself until he dies; and his relationship with 
matter, with objects, and with the world into which he is thrown, is one o f continual 
projection, of moving beyond. Subjectivity is a multifarious and thus confusing term, 
but its employment within this context is indicated clearly by Sartre. As discussed, it has 
obvious connotations with the Cogito, but here, its sense is to denote M an’s free and 
autonomous presence in an anthropocentric human universe. Existentialist Humanism is 
thus never based on value judgements o f  men by men, but on acceptance o f ethical 
autonomy and complete responsibility, on liberatory action which achieves its 
transcendent goal. Sartre’s own analysis of his theory emphasises the freedom that it 
expounds, and links back neatly to the interdependence of subjectivity and human 
worth: ‘Cette theorie est la seule a donner une dignite a l’homme, c ’est la seule qui n ’en 
fasse pas un objet. ’28
The specific sense of subjectivity as invoked by Sartre in relation to his 
Humanism is expanded upon by de Beauvoir, who introduces the connection between 
Humanism and the ethical goal of Authenticity:
Ce qui definit tout humanisme, c ’est que le monde moral n ’est pas un 
monde donne, etranger a 1’homme et auquel celui-ci devrait s’efforcer 
d ’acceder du dehors: c’est le monde voulu par 1’homme en tant que sa 
volonte exprime sa realite authentique.29
Again, the emphasis is placed on anthropocentrism and free choice, but by shifting the 
ground from the breadth of ontology to the specificity of the moral world, de Beauvoir
27 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, pp.90-94.
28 Ibid., p.63.
29 Pour une Morale de I ’Ambiguite, p.25.
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moves the discussion on towards the ethics of a Humanist ideal. The ethical impact of 
L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme was profound, and the critical response varied to 
say the least; but whatever the position of the critic, the ideological force behind Sartre’s 
doctrine has never been in doubt: ‘It is as a humanism that existentialism is most 
aggressive, both in its negative assertions and in its positive claims.’30 Its negative 
assertions, concerning essentially its instinctive atheism and its rejection of various 
other forms o f Humanism, have been discussed, and its positive claims, including its 
emphasis on subjective autonomy and transcendent action, can be seen to lay the 
foundations for a Sartrean ethics. However, the critical response was not always so 
positive, with some critics protesting that Sartre achieved very little by associating his 
philosophy with Humanism:
Sartre, toutefois, ne dit pas que 1’existentialisme soit le veritable 
humanisme, il dit que e ’en est un. Cela signifie qu’il y en a plusieurs, autant 
peut-etre que de conceptions de l ’homme? Nous ne sommes alors guere 
avances.31
The critique is certainly valid, particularly in the light of Sartre’s awkward relationship 
with Kantian universality, which is ultimately rejected in the Cahiers. Sartre’s answer to 
the charge would presumably have been that while recognising that other forms of 
Humanism exist, his own was the most coherent and applicable. But other, more 
justified, criticisms can and have been levelled at Sartre’s Humanism. Perhaps the most 
damaging of these came in Heidegger’s Uber den Humanismus, which emphasised the 
differences between Heidegger and Sartre, exposing the latter’s misinterpretation of the 
former in several key areas. In his letter, Heidegger points out that while Sartre places 
Man at the centre of Being, he himself regards Man as the ‘shepherd o f Being’, the 
entity to and through which Being is revealed.32 His second main objection concerns 
Sartre’s misinterpretation of the sentence: ‘L ’“essence” de l’etre-la reside dans son 
existence’ from Being and Time, by which he meant not that existence precedes essence, 
but that T’homme deploie son essence de telle sorte qu’il est le “la”, e ’est-a-dire 
l’eclaircie de l’Etre’.33 Concerned as ever predominately with Being itself, Heidegger 
also refuses to confirm or deny the philosophical possibility o f God: ‘II est [...] non 
seulement precipite, mais errone dans sa demarche meme, de pretendre que 
1’interpretation de l’essence de l’homme a partir de la relation de cette essence a la 
verite de l’Etre est un atheisme.’34 Heidegger’s contention is that if  Being has not yet 
begun to be understood, the existence o f the ultimate transcendent being can only 
remain undetermined. The critique of Sartre’s atheism is self-evident, and as 
Heideggerian philosophy became increasingly popular in France, the objections to 
Sartrean Humanism expressed in the Letter began to take their toll.
Another weakness of Sartre’s Humanism is that its emphasis on action, on the 
pursuit o f transcendent goals, leaves it open to the charge that it places no inherent value 
on human being, that in contrast to, say, Ionescan Humanism, it betrays a blatant 
disregard for inherent human essence, worth, or sufficience, concentrating solely on 
choices and deeds: ‘Chaque personnage ne sera rien que le choix d ’une issue et ne 
vaudra pas plus que Tissue choisie.’35 The ethical implication o f this is that Man is 
regarded as a means rather than an end, again conflicting somewhat with the focus on
30 Bames, Hazel E., The Literature o f  Possibility: A Study in Humanistic Existentialism, p.367.
31 Boutang, Pierre and Bernard Pingaud, ‘Sartre est-il un Possede ’ suivi de ‘Un Univers Fige ’, p.41.
32 Lettre sur L ’Humanisme, pp. 18-19.
33 Ibid., p.61.
34 Ibid., p. 133.
35 ‘Qu’est-ce que la Litterature?’, Situations II, p.313.
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dignity uncovered in Sartre’s discussions on subjectivity. It is this refusal to love and 
value Man regardless that most influences Sartre’s characterisation, and the now 
notorious stage character of the Sartrean agent is a powerful reminder o f the 
playwright’s interpretation of Humanism.
The first and one of the most memorable of these is Oreste, who accepts full 
responsibility for the outcome of his actions and exults in his role as Defender o f Man. 
Oreste represents a powerful symbol of freedom, of the subjectivity and transcendence 
demanded by Sartre, and as such he is the bane of Jupiter and the gods, whose power he 
systematically destroys:
Quand une fois la liberte a explose dans une ame d ’homme, les Dieux ne 
peuvent plus rien contre cet homme-la. Car c’est une affaire d ’hommes, et 
c’est aux autres hommes -  a eux seuls -  qu’il appartient de le laisser courir 
ou de l’etrangler.36
Jupiter is aware that his power is in the hands o f mortals, and in his reflection on human 
being, he inevitably associates freedom with action and thus with moral choice. Le 
Diable et le Bon Dieu continues the Humanist debate, focusing equally on human 
responsibility and agency. The play contains no fewer than three contrasting Humanist 
agents who come to realise the meaning of both transcendence and subjectivity in their 
respective Humanist stances:
Nasty: Je ne connais qu’une Eglise: c’est la societe des hommes.37
Hilda: Moi, je suis du parti des hommes et je ne le quitterai pas.38
Goetz: Je veux etre un homme parmi les hommes.39
Although Nasty, Hilda, and Goetz are placed in a triangle of mutual opposition for the 
greater part o f the action, their respective claims to hero status are established through 
their shared Humanist ideals. To be sure, they represent three different slants of 
Humanism -  perhaps Marxist, pacifist, and realist -  a fact which gives further credence 
to the objections of Boutang and Pingaud above; but they also reflect a Humanism 
which places Man as the sole source of ethical values and transcendence. According to 
Sartre, ‘il n ’y a rien de plus important pour les hommes que d ’etre des hommes’.40 It 
remains to be seen if  Ionesco will agree.
36 Les Mouches, p.203.
37 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.36.
38 Ibid., p. 158.
39 Ibid., p.245.
40 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.96.
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iii) Ionescan Humanism
Ionesco’s relationship with Humanism has already been shown to be ambivalent and 
contradictory, and this ambivalence is merely compounded by his attitude towards 
religion. At the heart of Sartrean Humanism lies a distinctive atheism, but Ionescan 
Humanism is characterised by an agnosticism which fluctuates between outrage at the 
imperfections o f God’s Creation and at the perceivable Fall from grace, and despair at 
the apparent lack of a divinity; between a longing for religion and an anti-theistic revolt. 
Ionesco’s approach to Humanism is metaphysical rather than ontological, and he is 
concerned primarily with the transphenomenal questions which Sartre disregards, such 
as the origins of Man, the existence o f a demiurge, and the prospect o f life after death. 
The playwright is ready to admit that his work is inspired by an anguished longing for a 
God-figure, by a neurosis fuelled by the terror that such a figure might not exist:
G.L.: Et si personne ne venait? Et si personne ne nous attendait au bout
du chemin? N ’est-ce pas la la question qui vous tourmente?
E.I.: C ’est la question qui me tourmente, c’est l’angoisse de mes
angoisses.
G.L.: Votre oeuvre n ’est-elle pas alors un dialogue avec une eventuelle
absence?
E.I.: Si. C’est cette absence dont j ’ai peur. Oui. Pour un quart, un
dixieme du temps que je vis, je  crois, le reste du temps je  suis 
agnostique.41
There is never a danger of atheism with Ionesco, just an oscillation between agnosticism 
and religious belief. However, the small amount of time governed by belief is eclipsed 
by the overwhelming sense of doubt: ‘J ’ai toujours essaye de croire en Dieu. Pas assez 
naif, pas assez subtil.’42 In this sense, Ionesco is a religious Humanist, for he combines 
an empathetic preoccupation with Man with a refusal to discount religion. Indeed, 
according to Esslin, Ionesco’s theatre functions as a genuine religious quest, for 
‘concerned as it is with the ultimate realities of the human condition, the relatively few 
fundamental problems of life and death, isolation and communication, the Theatre o f the 
Absurd [...] represents a return to the original, religious function of the theatre -  the 
confrontation of man with the spheres of myth and religious reality’.43 In this sense, 
Ionesco’s metaphysical Humanism can certainly be seen to depart from Sartrean 
Humanism, but confusion subsists in the uncertainty surrounding God’s existence, and 
Ionesco’s potential to focus on the primacy of Man is harnessed by his religious 
aspirations: ‘Ce que j ’admettrai, c ’est ceci: tout pour Dieu, si on est croyant; ou sinon, 
tout pout l’homme, pour les hommes, pour la joie de l’homme, pour le perfectionnement 
de l’homme.’44 Ionesco is hedging his bets, and his ‘si...sinon...’ is typical o f his failure 
to engage himself in a consistent and positive Humanism.
Ionesco is plagued with the desire for God to reveal himself to Man, much as 
Heidegger is desperate for Being to unveil itself through humanity. But, as his latest 
creations reveal, he is destined to permanent agnosticism and doubt:
Madame Simpson: Dieu est grand, plus grand que quoi? Je dis mon
Dieu, je ne sais pas qui c ’est.
41 ‘Tout finit dans 1’horreuT, interview with Gabriel Liiceanu, Magazine litteraire, no.335 (1995), p.22.
42 Present passe, Passe present, p.59.
43 The Theatre o f  the Absurd, p.402.
44 Present passe, Passe present, p .l 15.
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Arlette: C’est peut-etre la matiere, mais la matiere on ne
sait pas non plus ce que c’est.45
The link with Heidegger is again apparent, for the ignorance surrounding God and 
matter, and the possible monistic fusion of the two, indicates once again their common 
drive towards an elucidation of Being. If Ionesco is heard to cry, ‘Mon Dieu, que les 
Cieux sont tranquilles’,46 it is not merely to engage his irrepressible humour, nor to re­
work the Pascalian aphorism, but to convey his desperation for knowledge, for a sign or 
a sound from heaven which could assuage his metaphysical Angst. But, seemingly 
unimpressed by the philosophical approach to religious knowledge, Ionesco turns to the 
psychology of the unconscious for an answer to the problems of faith:
Peut-etre, suis-je moi-meme un incroyant plein de foi. La foi de la non foi, 
l ’esperance du desespoir. II est Celui que Ton croit avoir oublie et que l ’on 
peut rencontrer au coin de la rue. Les moments de croyance reels peuvent 
s’oublier comme s’oublient, au reveil, les reves de la nuit.47
It is likely that this linking of religious faith and dreams is an influence o f Jung, who 
dedicated one o f his published lectures to a study o f the relationship between religion 
and psychoanalysis. His findings, which point towards an inherently religious psychic 
archetype without proving the existence of God, are wholly consistent with Ionesco’s 
adopted position:
It would be a regrettable mistake if anybody should understand my 
observations to be a kind of proof of the existence o f God. They prove only 
the existence of an archetypal image of the Deity, which to my mind is the 
most we can assert psychologically about God.48
Jung’s analysis here provides a key to situating the Humanism of Ionesco -  a task which 
is proving highly problematic due to his incoherent relationship not only with 
Humanism itself, but also with religion and God. Following Jungian psychology, then, 
Ionesco’s Humanism is religious but not theistic; spiritual, archetypal, and even 
mystical, but certainly not Christian or theocentric in any guise.
Ionesco’s theatre bears witness to all these tendencies and to his underlying 
religious uncertainty. One of the most ostensible dream sequences in the plays involves 
Choubert’s desperate search for Mallot -  a scene reminiscent of Beckett’s En attendant 
Godot -  which inevitably ends in failure. Once again, religion is linked with the 
unconscious, and it is surely no coincidence that the instigator o f the search, the 
despotic Policier, is convinced of the existence o f an omnipotent and somewhat 
malevolent God:
Je fus reconnaissant a Dieu pour toute ma misere et pour toute la misere des 
siecles, pour tous les malheurs, pour tous les bonheurs, pour les 
humiliations, pour les horreurs, pour les angoisses, pour la grande tristesse.49
The Policier represents the tyrannical Ionescan father-figure who appears sporadically in 
the plays and who emanates not only from Ionesco’s own filial experience but also from
45 Voyages chez les Morts, p.66.
46 La Quite Intermittente, p. 107.
47 Le Blanc et le Noir, p.20.
48 Jung, C. G., Psychology and Religion, p.73.
49 Victimes du Devoir, Theatre I, p.206.
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his conception o f God -  a conception based, perhaps, on a combination o f the Cartesian 
hypothesis of an ‘evil demiurge’, o f Chestov’s portrayal o f the cruel God o f Job, and o f 
the Dostoevskian God of vengeance. But in a paradox typical of Ionescan Humanism, 
God is both longed for and blamed; his absence is lamented, his presence reviled. The 
ambiguity continues in Tueur sans gages with God’s apparent incarnation as the 
Architecte, the fatalistic creator who is, we are told, of an ‘age sans age’,50 and who 
watches almost apathetically as his Radiant City is systematically destroyed by the 
forces of evil.
The focus on evil is another guiding force behind Ionesco’s religious outlook 
and Humanism. At times it seems that the agnostic envies the position o f atheism and 
that he is unable to adopt this position not so much through religious belief as through a 
heightened perception of evil:
S’il n ’y avait pas Dieu, tout serait plus simple, peut-etre. Je me sens 
davantage tente de croire au diable plutot qu’a Dieu. Mais si je  crois au 
diable, je  crois alors aussi en Dieu. On ne peut comprendre l ’histoire des 
hommes sans la demonologie.51
The presence o f evil is always at least in the background in Ionescan drama, and the 
playwright’s mystical outlook tends to lend it an air of demonology, typified perhaps in 
Macbett. The result on the stage is often a Manichaean struggle between the forces o f 
good and evil, as in the powerful closing scene o f Tueur sans gages, and, as in this play, 
it is darkness and evil that prevail. Such predominance of evil reflects the deep sense o f 
abandonment which underlines Ionesco’s plays, the lack of identity and feeling of 
orphanage which accompanies the Second Fall:
A partir de quel moment les dieux se sont-ils retires du monde, a partir de 
quel moment les images ont-elles perdu leur couleur? [...] Nous avons ete 
abandonnes a nous-memes, a notre solitude, a notre peur, et le probleme est 
ne. Qu’est-ce que ce monde? Qui sommes-nous?52
This theme of Paradise Lost is central to Ionesco’s theatre and it is o f vital significance 
to his Humanism, for it links his religious ambivalence to his obsession with the 
universal problems of Man, to his pursuit o f metaphysical Truth. It also serves to situate 
Ionescan Humanism within the context of an Absurdist tradition stemming back to 
Nietzsche, to Jarry and ’Pataphysics, and then coloured by contemporaries such as 
Camus, Beckett, and even Sartre. However, Ionesco’s particular Humanism cannot be 
so neatly contextualised; it can be seen to have been influenced by sources as diverse as 
Plato, Sophocles, Shakespeare, Christianity, Mysticism, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, 
Chestov, and Heidegger, to name but a few, culminating in an eclectic conception of 
Humanism characterised by universality, scepticism, outrage, chaos, and nonsense. 
There is no place here for a formalistic discussion o f Absurdism, nor even for a 
comprehensive review of Ionesco’s philosophical sources, but to a very large extent, the 
dramatist’s journals and plays succeed in speaking for themselves.
The predominant Absurdist feature of Ionescan Humanism is certainly the sense 
o f outrage at the universal human condition, and it is focused most acutely on its silent 
artisan:
Dieu n ’aurait pas pu inventer un monde plus cruel. II a invente le monde le
50 Theatre II, p.61.
51 Un homme en question, p. 194.
52 Present passe, Passe present, p. 168.
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plus cruel possible. Cela veut dire que Dieu n ’est pas moraliste [...]. Dieu est 
l’artiste amoral par excellence. [...] Evidemment le monde est mauvais, plus 
qu’evidemment le monde est mauvais. Ou peut-etre mal fait, mal fabrique.53
Again, Ionesco’s religious ambivalence shines forth, but there is a significant 
development in his Humanism here in the recognition of the disassociation of the 
divinity and ethics. However, although Ionesco has placed Man back at the source o f his 
own values, the senselessness of Man’s condition has left him in an ethical and 
epistemological void:
Quelquefois, je me croyais religieux, d’autres fois je me croyais humaniste, 
mais en realite je  suis devant le monde comme devant un bloc opaque et j ’ai 
l’impression que je comprends rien a rien, et qu’il n ’y a rien a comprendre.
[...] Je suis comme Job, l’homme qui a perdu la divinite et qui, toume vers le 
vide, n ’y comprend plus rien. La seule force qui me reste, c ’est le refus.54
In describing his wavering relationship with Humanism, Ionesco conveys his 
Dostoevskian fear at the open fate of Man caused by the absence of God. The influence 
o f the Russian continues as the Mousehold o f the Underground Man is adapted into 
Ionesco’s Absurdist preoccupation with the symbolism of the wall o f reason, the 
destruction of which leaves Modem Man in the grasp o f the vacuum of chaos:
Ces murs qui s’elevent, ces murs impenetrables que je  m ’achame a vouloir 
trouver ou abattre ne sont peut-etre que la raison. La raison a eleve ces murs 
pour nous preserver du chaos. Car derriere ces murs, c ’est le chaos, c’est le 
neant. II n ’y a rien derriere les murs. Us sont la frontiere entre ce que nous 
avons reussi a faire de ce monde et le vide. De l’autre cote c ’est la mort.55
Though terrified by what lies on the other side of the wall, Ionesco’s achievement is to 
explore this unknown territory, to throw himself completely into the Absurd. What he 
indeed discovers there is not only the grim reality of death, but all the antitheses of 
reason -  the discourse of anti-logic, the chaos o f existence, and the senselessness of life 
itself.
The philosophical world was shaken in 1942 by the publications o f Camus’s 
L ’Etranger and Le Mythe de Sisyphe, both of which were inspired by the philosophy of 
the Absurd. In Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Camus succeeds in drawing together the 
philosophical traditions of the Absurd, including Jaspers, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and 
Chestov, and he invokes the mythical hero of Sisyphus to represent the condition of 
Modem Man, a condition embodied in L'Etranger's Meursault, whose Absurdist anti­
heroism is reflected in the fact that he is both sensitive to the world’s disharmony and 
the sole creator of his values. The impact of these works was formidable, and not least 
on Sartre and Ionesco. But where Sartre’s Humanism followed the established 
philosophical route of phenomenology, Ionescan Humanism took the more avant-garde 
route, converging somewhat inevitably with the anthropological Humanism of Camus. 
The outrage at the cmelty of an invisible Creator-God, the protest at the futility of the
53 Un homme en question, p. 100 and p.200. This is obviously also a parody on Leibniz’s viewpoint that 
God created the ‘best possible world’.
54 Ruptures de Silence, p.70 and p.90.
55 Journal en miettes, p.212. See also Chestov’s tracing of the development from Plato’s ‘grotto’ to 
Dostoevsky’s ‘underground man’, who discovers on the wall not the ‘reality’ o f the ‘average’ man, but 
merely shadows and phantoms. According to Chestov, this is indeed the only true reality. (Sur la balance 
deJob, p.38.)
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modem human condition, and the interest in the problems of coexistence and solidarity 
are features common to both Ionesco and Camus; and yet their respective paths to 
Humanism diverge as they digress into the spiritual:
Ionesco is a humanist, as is Camus. Both are lovers o f the world (if in 
diverse ways), both deplore the existence of suffering, both stand for 
tolerance, moderation, an end to violence, both are essentially moralists. [...]
The parallel breaks down at the point where Ionesco’s humanism shades off 
into the metaphysical and the religious. For Camus the difficulty is the 
divorce between man and his world. For Ionesco it is that between creature 
and demiurge, man seen as fallen angel and the diabolical authority in 
control over him.56
Once again, Ionesco’s relationship with religion can be seen to define his Humanism, 
and his refusal to reject the supernatural sets him apart not only from other Humanists, 
but also from other Absurdists. Unlike Heidegger and Sartre, Ionesco’s concerns are 
predominantly metaphysical, and his Humanism thus leaves room for spiritual 
speculation and contemplation. Indeed despite his occasional vilification o f the 
demiurge, he never quite loses hope in his quest for the divine: ‘Pour la plupart des 
Modemes, la metaphysique est devenue inacceptable, elle est a rejeter. C ’est parce 
qu’ils craignent que la metaphysique pourrait nous mener a Dieu. On a peur d’etre 
aliene par Dieu.57
The complexity and ambiguity of Ionesco’s Humanism is merely compounded 
by his interest in mysticism and spirituality. A central difference between himself and 
Sartre lies in the dichotomy between religion and ideology; where Sartre remains 
atheistic and the champion of ideology, Ionesco becomes both anti-ideological and 
theistic: ‘La religion humanise et les ideologies deshumanisent, c’est-a-dire qu’une 
ideologic totalitaire est exactement le contraire de la religion. [...] Pour moi, l’ideologie 
est comme une religion tres degradee, anti-mystique.’58 The dehumanising aspect of 
ideology is of course the inspiration behind Rhinoceros, and the mystical transcendence 
of religion the force behind plays like Le Roi se meurt and Le Pieton de I ’Air. Although 
Ionescan theatre lacks a conventionally religious character, spirituality itself is never too 
far removed from the action, and it seems that Humanism is indeed dependent on a 
Kierkegaardian recourse to the divine: ‘On ne peut aimer les hommes que s’ils ont Dieu 
en eux.’59 So when Choubert protests: ‘Je ne suis qu’un homme apres tout’, and the 
Policier replies: ‘II faut l’etre jusqu’au bout’,60 we are inclined to suppose that to be 
human is also to be divine, that Humanism is inevitably religious. This conception of 
Man explains Ionesco’s belief in the inherent value o f humanity which results in a 
profound regard for the sanctity of human life and in the perception of Man as an end in 
himself. In this sense, he opposes diametrically the Humanism advocated by Sartre, 
echoing indeed the theory rejected by the Existentialist which ‘prend l’homme comme 
fin et comme valeur superieure’.61 In this context, it is perhaps appropriate that Sartre 
dismissed the theory as absurd.62
Ionesco’s high regard for humanity leads him towards a Humanism which 
cherishes human life by opposing violence and which promotes humane values such as 
peace, love, and fraternity. Ionescan drama may well focus predominantly on the
56 Dobrez, L. A. C., The Existential and its Exits, p. 178.
57 Present passe, Passe present, pp.78-79.
58 Ionesco interviewed in Ahmed Kamyabi Mask, Ionesco et son Theatre, pp. 152-53.
59 Antidotes, p.245.
60 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.216.
61 L Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.90.
62 Ibid., p.91.
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repercussions of the absence of such values, but the overriding message of the plays is 
that Man must retain his humanity and strive to overturn the chaos o f destruction:
Seigneur, ecoutez-nous. Que la haine et la colere se dissipent comme la 
fumee dans le vent, que l’ordre humain renverse l ’ordre naturel ou sevissent 
la souffrance et 1’esprit de destruction. Que 1’ amour et la paix soient delivres 
de leurs chaines et que soient enchainees les forces negatives, que la joie 
resplendisse dans la lumiere celeste, que la lumiere nous inonde et que nous 
baignons en elle. Ainsi soit-il.63
This prayer of Le Moine captures perfectly the ambiguity o f the interrelationship 
between humanity and religion, calling on God to promote the values of Man. The 
invocation may be somewhat ironic, but the Manichaean terminology and the mystical 
imagery serve to create a fusion between the human, the spiritual, and the religious, and 
reflect once again the eclectic complexity of Ionescan Humanism. In the world of 
Being-for-Others, this eclecticism proves problematic, for the human in Humanism has 
become so broad that successful coexistence is placed under threat:
Vous avez un temperament diametralement oppose au mien. Les hommes 
sont tous des freres, bien entendu, ce sont des semblables qui ne se 
ressemblent pas toujours. II y a cependant un point commun. II doit y avoir 
un point commun, un langage commun... Lequel? Lequel?64
Berenger’s desperation to find communion with the Tueur is one of the most poignant 
moments in Ionescan theatre, for it shows the dramatist’s Humanism at its most 
vulnerable and tender. But the answer to Berenger’s question was perhaps foreshadowed 
by Heidegger in his vision o f the role of Humanism: ‘L ’humanisme consiste en ceci: 
reflechir et veiller a ce que l’homme soit humain et non in-humain, “barbare”, c ’est-a- 
dire hors de son essence. Or en quoi consiste l’humanite de l’homme? Elle repose dans 
son essence.’65 This focus on human essence is indeed adopted by Ionesco, and it is 
reflected in his portrayal of the universal human being to be found in his archetypes and 
Everymen. Like Heidegger, and in contrast to Sartre, Ionesco is concerned with being in 
general, and, if  anything, existence is subordinated to essence. This contrast is 
symbolised in the dichotomy between Sartre’s agent and Ionesco’s puppet, between the 
Sartrean character who is the free master of his action and the Ionescan victim who is a 
‘plaything of the gods’. The Shakespearean reference here is far from accidental, and it 
reinforces the eclectic and universal nature of Ionesco’s conception o f Humanism. 
Indeed it is not presumptuous to claim a direct link between Shakespearean and 
Ionescan Humanism, for we know that Ionesco’s theatre was greatly inspired by 
Shakespearean drama, and for the very reason that it encompassed the broadest portrayal 
o f the human condition. Ionesco’s humanism, then, is defined ultimately by ‘what it is 
to be human’; and if this involves a complex reworking o f philosophical responses to 
the question, a constant doubting of the demiurge, and a defiant rejection of a coherent 
‘-ism’, then so be it.
63 Macbett, Theatre V, p. 176.
64 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p. 167.
65 Lettre sur L 'Humanisme, p.45.
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ivl A Humanist Ideal
If  the agent and the puppet provide such suitable philosophical symbols for 
Existentialist and Absurdist Humanism, it is because each encapsulates the desperate 
search for ethics in the wake of an absent God. Sartre’s agent is confronted with the 
moral responsibility to act, in the knowledge that his freedom to act is boundless and 
that he is nothing but the sum of his actions. Ionesco’s puppet, on the other hand, is 
conditioned from above and fated to mortality and chaos, but his strings pull him in 
polar directions and he alone can decide which strings must be cut. Both the agent and 
the puppet are sensitive to their abandonment by God -  the agent is bastardised, the 
puppet orphaned -  and their challenge is to make their way successfully through an 
ethical journey in a moral vacuum.
Theirs is surely also the challenge of any valid Humanism, and the challenge is 
clearly set by Heidegger:
Le vceu d ’une ethique appelle d ’autant plus imperieusement sa realisation 
que le desarroi evident de l’homme, non moins que son desarroi cache, 
s’accroissent au-dela de toute mesure. A cet etablissement du lien ethique 
nous devons donner tous nos soins.66
Both Sartre and Ionesco respond to this challenge, and the agent and puppet are united 
in their respective pursuit o f the ethical. At this early stage, however, the only guiding 
force behind them is their Humanism, and thus their goal can only be characterised as a 
Humanist ideal. But what is the nature of this Humanist ideal? How can the agent and 
the puppet, the instruments o f two very different forms of Humanism, be in search of 
the same Humanist ideal? The answer to these awkward questions lies in the concept of 
Authenticity. For Sartre, Authenticity is linked with a conversion of consciousness to 
pure reflection, which involves a free acceptance of the ambiguous human condition 
and a rejection of Bad Faith. De Beauvoir defined Humanism as the development of 
subjectivity into the expression of authentic reality, and Sartre showed this authentic 
reality to be dependent on action. For without action, identity, existence, and any sense 
o f self are under threat; and without identity and Self, there can surely be no 
Authenticity. Ionesco, too, links Authenticity with identity, which he expresses, like 
Heidegger, in terms of essence and humanness; and as a religious Humanist, he 
presumably concurs with Kierkegaard’s contention that human salvation must be sought 
in the return to God. But his solution is to recognise the divine in Man, and then, as the 
Policier advises Choubert, to live out this condition to the full.
It seems that the common ground on Authenticity lies in the challenge to remain 
true to the human that lies within us. The only way to determine the human as conceived 
by Sartre and Ionesco is to search for a human identity among the agent and the puppet, 
and it is to be hoped that this human identity will provide the key to a viable ethics and 
turn a contested Humanist ideal into a shared Humanist value.
66 Lettre sur L ’Humanisme, p. 141.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this introductory chapter was to attempt a definition of the concept of 
Humanism and to situate the Humanist thought of Sartre and Ionesco within the 
philosophical and historical context o f the movement. The broad definition of 
Heidegger was adopted, according to which Humanism is any system which gives 
primacy to humanness, to human identity, to what it is to be human.
Two very different forms of Humanism were uncovered. Sartre’s Existentialist 
Humanism transpired to be a complex fusion of transcendence and subjectivity, an 
atheistic doctrine based on action and influenced predominantly by Descartes and 
Heidegger. Ionesco’s Absurdist Humanism proved to be ambivalent and paradoxical, an 
eclectically influenced collection of beliefs which, while agnostic, recognised the divine 
in Man and valued him per se. The strengths and weaknesses o f both systems were 
revealed. While Sartrean Humanism remained defiantly Humanistic and coherent, it was 
shown to be based on a misinterpretation of Heideggerian thought, and to place no 
intrinsic value on humanity; and while Ionescan Humanism underlined a commitment to 
humanity in the cruel absence of the divine and to a resolution therefore to seek the 
divine in the human, it betrayed a definite lack of coherence and a resistance to close 
definition. Ionescan Humanism can perhaps indeed be defined by its resistance to 
definition, by its individualistic, if  not anarchistic, characteristics, which reflect an 
ethical uncertainty so at odds with Sartre. Ionesco’s Humanism is predominantly 
instinctive; it does not know where its path will lead it.
According to Heidegger’s delineation of the desirable aims o f Humanism, it is 
perhaps to be expected that the systems of Ionesco and Sartre come into conflict:
Si Ton comprend par humanisme en general 1’effort visant a rendre 
l’homme libre pour son humanite et a lui faire decouvrir sa dignite, 
l’humanisme se differencie suivant la conception qu’on a de la Tiberte’ et de 
la ‘nature’ de l’homme.67
It has already been seen that Sartre and Ionesco differ widely in their conceptions of 
both freedom and human nature, and these differences seem to threaten any possibility 
of a shared ideal. But even Ionesco, at least retrospectively, recognises the Humanist 
link between himself and Sartre, and thus rekindles the hope o f common progress:
Par rapport a ce qui se passe actuellement dans le monde modeme des idees, 
structuralisme, scientisme, etc., profondement anti-humaniste, non 
seulement l ’existentialisme, mais encore le marxisme nous parait etre 
lumineusement humaniste.68
Lorsque Jean-Paul Sartre a ete ensuite humaniste et qu’il a voulu faire une 
troisieme position, je l’ai approuve.69
It is not just their common Humanist stance that unites Ionesco and Sartre, but a more 
precise concordance on the ideal o f Authenticity, on the necessity to elucidate the 
human identity. In this respect, the Existentialist and the Absurdist are at one: ‘Just as 
Descartes had used his intelligence to “argue” his way to God, so the Existentialists and
67 Lettre sur L ’Humanisme, p.49.
68 Present passe, Passe present, p. 82.
69 Ruptures de Silence, p.50.
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Absurdists argued their way towards a new transcendence. ’70 The transcendence referred 
to can be recognised in the Humanist goal of Authenticity, the common goal o f the 
agent and the puppet. But the path towards this goal is long and complex, and will 
inevitably involve an independent and comparative exploration o f the journeys taken by 
both the Sartrean agent and the Ionescan puppet. Such is the remit o f the forthcoming 
thesis.
70 Coe, Richard N., Ionesco: A Study o f his Plays, p. 162.
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CHAPTER TWO -  THE SARTREAN AGENT
INTRODUCTION
The discussion of Existentialist Humanism and the brief delineation o f the Sartrean 
agent undertaken in the previous chapter have opened the way for a detailed analysis o f 
Sartre’s conception and portrayal of the individual human being, the Pour-soi, and of 
the common human condition, the realite humaine. It was shown that Sartre’s 
Existentialism has justifiable claims to present itself as a Humanistic ideology in a 
number of significant ways: firstly, by revealing an exclusively anthropocentric 
Weltanschauung, in which Man is elevated to supremacy at the expense o f an extinct or 
absent God; secondly, by challenging itself to (re)invent or (re)create Man through 
phenomenological ontology, thereby revealing the paramount importance o f human 
freedom; thirdly, in its defiant, if  not parodic, rejection o f traditional forms of 
Humanism, which are replaced by an innovative synthesis of transcendence and 
subjectivity founded on Existentialist freedom and neo-Cartesian facticity; and finally, 
in its exhaustive search for a discernible and viable code o f ethics, which could govern 
the morality of modem Humanism and finally usurp the tired throne of Seriousness.
The figure at the centre of Sartre’s Humanism is the agent, who will be shown to 
be, to varying degrees of idealism, intellectual, ontological, ethical, and authentic/ 
heroic. Agents are defined by their actions, for Man is no longer viewed as a concrete 
end, but as a free, responsible existence, defined by what he does. The distinction has 
been made with Ionesco’s puppet, who represents a very different form of Humanism, 
and it is hoped that this exploration of the Sartrean agent will prepare the way for a rich, 
contrasting comparison with the Ionescan model of Man.
The aims of this chapter are both varied and ambitious, and my underlying 
contention is that this notoriously over-ploughed field o f criticism is in urgent need of 
reassessment, fresh outlook, and a challenging new direction. To this end, a uniquely 
balanced combination of Sartre’s philosophy and theatre will incite an original study of 
Sartrean characterisation and ethics, which will trace the progressive process of the 
agent, focusing on the human condition, personality, and code o f moral conduct. The 
use of theatre as the genre for the primary focus is justified not only in that it enables 
direct comparison with Ionesco; it is on the theatrical stage that the theoretical agent of 
philosophy is transposed and presented in practice, and it is in this world of action that 
he visibly comes to life: ‘The Sartrean hero, both an agent and an actor, belongs in the 
theatre. ’ 1
An attempt will be made, then, to demonstrate a consistency between the stage 
characters o f the plays and the complex creations who seem to walk the pages of 
philosophical treatises like La Transcendance de L ’Ego, L ’Etre et le Neant, 
L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme and Critique de la Raison Dialectique; it is theatre, 
more than any other genre, which definitively portrays ‘Man in situation’. This 
comparative methodology will highlight any inconsistencies and will inevitably lead 
into a critique of central concepts of Sartrean terminology.
Moreover, the new wave of Sartre criticism, which began, perhaps, in the 1980s 
with the death of Sartre and the posthumous publication of, among others, Cahiers pour 
une Morale (1983), will be reconstructed in the following ways: concepts will take 
precedence over characters, given Sartre’s destruction o f the psychologically consistent
1 McCall, Dorothy, The Theatre o f Jean-Paul Sartre, p. 152.
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personality’, Sartre’s contribution to contemporary Humanism will be reassessed, and 
not simplistically dismissed following the accepted failure o f L ’Existentialisme est un 
Humanisme or the relative decline in interest in Humanism itself; and the recent 
preoccupation with Existentialist ethics will be challenged, explored, and undermined. 
But the ultimate aims of the chapter are to delineate the characteristics o f the Sartrean 
agent, to extract and analyse the resulting problems and polemics, and to propose, in the 
light of the subsequent conclusions of Ionesco, a novel and illuminating conception of 
Sartre’s Existentialist philosophy and theatre.
0 Acknowledging the Absurd: The Intellectual Agent
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The recognition of the Absurd -  the strange and seemingly senseless, unjustifiable 
nature o f la realite humaine -  is Sartre’s point de depart philosophique and thus a vital 
precondition for the successful Sartrean agent. Without acceptance o f this basic fa c t  o f 
existence, it seems impossible to progress beyond the apparent restrictions o f our natural 
condition and define ourselves as human beings. Indeed, as Camus contends, our 
greatest actions and achievements all derive from the Absurd, and this philosophical 
origin must therefore form the very core of any form of Humanism: ‘Toutes les grandes 
actions et toutes les grandes pensees ont un commencement derisoire. ’2 It is o f course in 
this respect that Sartre most closely coincides with the more renowned Absurdists such 
as Camus, Ionesco, Beckett, and Genet, but he removes himself from their school of 
philosophy by projecting beyond despair towards transcendence, hope, and even 
salvation. However, though quick to level criticism at the Absurd movement, 
particularly as portrayed in the anti-theatre of Ionesco and Beckett, for its bourgeois 
passivity and elitism, it is on the solid foundations of the movement that he builds his 
philosophical empire; and it is ironic that a theatre aimed at the masses3 should 
presuppose a cerebral appreciation of the meaninglessness of existence embodied so 
effectively in Sartre’s early creation, the intellectual Roquentin. It is for this reason that 
the acceptance of the Absurd requires an intellectual agent: any given member o f the 
masses may well be able to feel or experience the Absurd, but a complete understanding 
o f its implications must be the prerogative of the privileged and lucid consciousness.
The first step o f the intellectual agent, therefore, is to accept his condition and 
situation -  the ambiguous reality o f pour-soi and its contingent position au-milieu-du- 
monde, where it battles for being and existence with en-soi and autrui. The ambiguity at 
the heart o f the structure of pour-soi, the constant tension between its facticity and 
transcendence, is its most defining feature, and its wider implications have a profound 
effect on all levels o f humanity -  intellectual, ontological, and ethical. This ambiguous, 
almost schizophrenic, tension imposes itself on the consciousness, and so compounds 
the burden of our initial conception of Absurdity: ‘Moi, je  suis agent double de 
naissance [...] et je  suis fait de deux moities qui ne collent pas ensemble: chacune des 
deux fait horreur a l’autre. ’4 In the realm of the Absurd, it is essentially with facticity  
that we are concerned, and this is to form the focus o f the present study.
The facticity of pour-soi is equivalent to its contingency or the Given -  that is, 
its gratuitous, unjustifiable existence, and the situation (world) into which it is ‘thrown’:
II est en tant qu’il est jete dans un monde, delaisse dans une ‘situation’, il est 
en tant qu’il est pure contingence, en tant que pour lui comme pour les 
choses du monde, comme pour ce mur, cet arbre, cette tasse, la question 
originelle peut se poser: ‘Pourquoi cet etre-ci est-il tel et non autrement? ’5
It is significant here that Sartre links pour-soi and en-soi: our facticity lies in our 
connection to en-soi -  to our world, its objects, and to our own past -  and attempts to 
justify human existence are no more valid or likely to succeed than those to explain the 
raison d ’etre o f the world around us. Sartre, then, is not concerned with the reasoning 
behind M an’s existence or ontological structure, which he leaves to metaphysics, but 
exclusively with the description of these realities, with the how and not the why. His
2 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.26.
3 See ‘Theatre populaire et theatre bourgeois’, in Un Theatre de Situations, pp.68-80.
4 Goetz in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.57.
5 L ’Etre et le Neant, p. 122.
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stage characters reflect this philosophical outlook, taking control o f the situations in 
which they find themselves and ideally making them their own. However, awareness of 
their contingent existence does not prevent Sartre’s characters questioning the origins of 
their being or the validity of their lives: ‘Est-ce que je  savais, moi, ce que je faisais sur 
terre? II faut bien justifier sa vie . ’6 Johanna’s doubt arises from her perception o f the 
Given, and although she has formed a cerebral conception o f the Absurd (evident in her 
rhetorical question), she has not yet determined a means o f escape. The problem of 
escaping the Absurd, of going beyond the Given, is highlighted by Camus, who 
concludes that Man’s only Given is that o f the Absurd itself: ‘L ’unique donnee est pour 
moi l’absurde. Le probleme est de savoir comment en sortir. ’7 Sartre unites the Given 
with the possibility of a universal human condition, which is once again contributive 
towards the synthesis of his Existentialism and his Humanist ideology:
S’il est impossible de trouver en chaque homme une essence universelle qui 
serait la nature humaine, il existe pourtant une universalite humaine de 
condition [...], l’ensemble des limites a priori qui esquissent sa situation 
fondamentale dans l’univers.8
Though as ever careful to distinguish between a human condition and a human nature, 
his acceptance of the former term has encouraged critics’ doubts about his dismissal of 
the latter.9 But here, it is purely Man’s condition that is in question, and it is the 
universal nature o f this condition, the shared experience, which, above all, contributes to 
the force o f Absurdist philosophy. Sartre’s characters succeed in adding both weight and 
prestige to this derisory view of the human condition, and the underlying sense of 
despair is particularly reminiscent o f Ionesco’s creations. Roquentin again serves as the 
true Absurdist example, declaring the ultimate pointlessness o f human existence: ‘Nous 
voila, tous tant que nous sommes, a manger et a boire pour conserver notre precieuse 
existence, et [...] il n ’y a rien, rien, aucune raison d ’exister. ’ 10 If  this metaphysical cry o f 
despair evokes Ionesco, his earlier discontent at the tedium of everyday life recalls 
Beckettian monotony:
Quand on vit, il n ’arrive rien. Les decors changent, les gens entrent et 
sortent, voila tout. II n ’y a jamais de commencements. Les jours s’ajoutent 
aux jours sans rime ni raison, c ’est une addition interminable et monotone .11
The theatrical metaphor ironically conveys the suitability o f the stage to portray 
Absurdist thought, despite Sartre’s expressed intention to do just the opposite. But 
however anxious to overcome, or perhaps overlook, the impasse of Absurdism, Sartre 
cannot prevent its influence on his characterisation. His last play, the somewhat 
neglected adaptation o f Euripides’ Trojan Women, is markedly different from his earlier 
plays in its dark tone and poetic structure, and it is thus particularly suited to the 
generally nihilistic outlook of Absurdist thought, conveying as it does the quiet 
desperation of our everyday lives:
II faut qu’un homme soit fou pour se dire heureux
6 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p. 119.
7 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.49.
8 L 'Existentialisme est un Humanisme, pp.67-68.
9 See later, Section 2, and Naville in L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, discussion, p .l 10: ‘Votre 
conception de la condition humaine, c ’est un substitut pour la nature humaine.’
10 La Nausee, p. 159.
11 Ibid., p.62.
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avant le dernier moment de son dernier jour . 12
Hecube’s pessimism is both moving and effective, especially in the intensely tragic 
context of the play, but it certainly does not stand alone in Sartrean theatre. Indeed the 
seeds o f despair are sown in Sartre’s first major play, in which Jupiter, assuming the 
role o f an omnipotent God, laments the very creation of the human being: ‘Le premier 
crime, c’est moi qui l’ai commis en creant les hommes mortels. ’ 13 But in a Godless 
world, the lamenting is left to Man, and in the absence of a God, devoid o f metaphysical 
meaning, it is Man who is challenged to justify his reasons for existence: ‘Osez-vous 
bien me demander mes raisons de mourir? C’est a moi, malheureux, c ’est a moi de vous 
demander vos raisons de vivre! ’14 Georges’s incisive inversion is taken up by Leni in 
Les Sequestres d ’Altona, who combines a similarly Absurdist outlook with a bourgeois 
sense o f stoicism: ‘Je vous l’ai dit: cette famille a perdu ses raisons de vivre, mais elle a 
garde ses bonnes habitudes. ’15 Her cynical pragmatism is not shared by her antagonists, 
however, who reveal a deeper insight into existential Absurdity in their strong, 
evocative diction:
Johanna: Les fous disent la verite, Werner.
Werner: Vraiment. Laquelle?
Johanna: II n ’y en a qu’une: l’horreur de vivre. 16
The Absurd nature of the human condition can be seen to underpin Sartre’s philosophy 
and encompass his broad range of plays. The senselessness, despair, and even horror of 
human existence are voiced by characters as diverse as Roquentin and Hecube, Jupiter 
and Johanna -  a diversity which reinforces the universality of M an’s shared condition 
and underlines the philosophical significance of the theme; and it is fitting that a 
discussion on the Humanist condition should conclude with a reference to the absent 
God: ‘C ’est drole, une vie qui eclate sous un ciel vide. Qa. ... 9 a ne veut rien dire . ’ 17 Le 
Pere’s final speech comprises a subtle union of senselessness and derision, and as such 
is an appropriate endnote to a general analysis of the Absurd. But it is now time to 
scrutinise the specifically Sartrean concepts of Absurdism, which are to distance Sartre 
from the more traditional exponents mentioned above.
Our facticity is of course determined by our birth into the world, where we 
receive our place in time and space. The notion of birth is essential for metaphysical 
Absurdists such as Ionesco, but as an ontologist, Sartre views this extraordinary catalyst 
somewhat differently. He is initially concerned to restrict the problem yet again to 
metaphysics, taking the starting point of ontology as the very first moment of 
consciousness:
II y a un probleme metaphysique de la naissance, dans la mesure ou je  peux 
m ’inquieter de savoir comment c’est d u n  tel embryon que je  suis ne; et ce 
probleme est peut-etre insoluble. Mais il n ’y a pas de probleme ontologique: 
nous n ’avons pas a nous demander pourquoi il peut y avoir une naissance 
des consciences, car la conscience ne peut s’apparaitre a soi-meme que 
comme neantisation d’en-soi, c’est-a-dire comme etant deja nee. [...] La
12 Les Troyennes, p. 119.
13 Les Mouches, p. 198.
14 Nekrassov, p.28.




naissance [...] est une loi d’etre du Pour-soi. Etre Pour-soi, c’est etre ne.n
Being insoluble, the notion is thus absurd, but it nevertheless seems to worry Sartre, 
who subsequently unites it with the problem of place , conveniently reuniting it with his 
phenomenological ontology: ‘Naitre c’est [...] prendre sa place ou plutot la recevoir.’]9 
The place in which we find ourselves determines to a large extent our class, race, and 
nationality, and it is thus of vital importance. But the purely random nature o f our birth 
into a particular situation is perhaps the most outrageous reminder o f our contingent 
facticity:
Je suis la: non pas ici mais la. Voila le fait absolu et incomprehensible qui 
est a l’origine de l’etendue et, par suite, de mes rapports originels avec les 
choses (avec celles-ci, plutot qu’avec celles-la). Fait de pure contingence -  
fait absurde.20
When we question our existence, it is primarily to the contingency o f our birth, and 
therefore place, that we must return, and once in the troublesome predicament o f a 
Heideggerian situation limite, Sartre’s characters often challenge the contingent origin 
o f their very being: ‘Et voila. (II rit) C’etait vraiment tout a fait inutile que je  naisse . ’21
Despite the gratuitous uniqueness of our individual places, there are naturally 
environmental features which we have in common. The problem of autrui will be dealt 
with later, but the existence of objects (les choses) is a significant and unifying element 
of place, and it is regarded by Sartre primarily as an area of conflict. Wherever we are 
bom, we all face resistance from the objects around us, whether in the form o f a 
mountain to climb, a river to cross, a wall to transcend, or a door to be opened, and this 
common resistance is referred to by Sartre as the Coefficient o f Adversity .22
If  birth is seen as the first moment o f consciousness, as the origin o f ontological 
facticity, then death must be regarded as its last. Like birth, death (or rather, mortality) 
is a major obsession of metaphysical Absurdism, yet Sartre is content to reduce it 
initially to the phenomenological immanence of his notion of facticity:
Elle ne saurait done appartenir a la structure ontologique du pour-soi [...]. La 
mort est un pur fait, comme la naissance; elle vient a nous du dehors et elle 
nous transforme en dehors. Au fond, elle ne se distingue aucunement de la 
naissance, et c ’est l’identite de la naissance et de la mort que nous nommons 
facticite.23
Sartre’s outlook is again essentially ontological: as birth was linked with place , so is 
death transposed into finitude, the progressive exclusion o f rejected possibilities, before 
it can merit the philosopher’s attention. But in this case, the two terms are explicitly 
disassociated, and unlike birth, death is thus high-handedly rejected in an apparent 
manipulation of metaphysics to cover any area of ontological uncertainty:
II convient de separer radicalement les deux idees ordinairement unies de 
mort et de finitude [...]. La mort est un fait contingent qui ressortit a la 
facticite; la finitude est une structure ontologique du pour-soi qui determine
18 L ’Etre et le Neant, p. 185.
19 Ibid., p.571.
20 Ibid., p.572.
21 Henri, Morts sans Sepulture, Theatre I, p.204.
22 The term is borrowed from Bachelard. See also later, in relation to free projects.
23 L ’Etre et le Neant, pp.629-30.
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la liberte et n ’existe que dans et par le libre projet de la fin qui m ’annonce 
mon etre. Autrement dit, la realite humaine demeurerait finie, meme si elle 
etait immortelle, parce qu’elle se fa it finie en se choisissant humaine .24
The aforementioned conflict between en-soi and pour-soi is extended into this 
domain as well: death is seen as the final victory of the former over the latter, 
‘passifying’ the subjectivity and re-seizing it as plenitude o f being, so conquering, at 
least in part, the temporality and nothingness introduced into the world by the birth of 
the individual Pour-soi. Because death entails the relinquishing o f consciousness, it is 
inherently Absurd, and this is apparently the sole characteristic with which it is 
accredited:
Ce qu’il faut noter tout d ’abord c’est le caractere absurde de la mort.25
Ainsi, la mort n ’est jamais ce qui donne son sens a la vie: c ’est au contraire 
ce qui lui ote par principe toute signification. Si nous devons mourir, notre 
vie n ’a pas de sens parce que ses problemes ne re9 oivent aucune solution et 
parce que la signification meme des problemes demeure indeterminee.26
Rather than face these essential problems o f birth and death, or follow them through to 
their logical conclusion of all-embracing Absurdity, Sartre chooses to override them, 
and the notion of death is ultimately expelled completely from the ontological make-up 
of pour-soi:
II n ’y a aucune place pour la mort dans l’etre-pour-soi; il ne peut ni
l’attendre, ni la realiser, ni se projeter vers elle; elle n ’est aucunement le
fondement de sa finitude [...] Qu’est-elle done? Rien d ’autre qu’un certain 
aspect de la facticite et de l’etre pour autrui, c’est-a-dire rien d ’autre que du 
donne. II est absurde que nous soyons nes, il est absurde que nous 
mourions.27
This half conclusion, reminiscent in technique of Husserlian epoche, is far from
satisfactory, and it soon becomes apparent that the only answer to, or even treatment of,
these highly significant questions will be found in a metaphysical exploration of 
Absurdity. There is not even an approach to an answer in Sartre’s theatre; the 
impression left by his fiction is Roquentin’s desperate aporia: ‘Ce qui m ’a retenu, c’est 
l’idee [...] que je serais encore plus seul dans la mort que dans la vie . ’28
The logical and correct explanation for Sartre’s considerable failures in this area 
is that he is primarily concerned with the existing consciousness, which lies solely 
within the immanent boundaries of the contingent metaphysical realities o f birth and 
death; and it is of course in this domain that his truly outstanding achievements have 
been made. The concept at the very heart of Sartrean ontology is that o f total, 
unadulterated freedom, and the connection between freedom and contingency is forced 
and expanded into philosophical assimilation: ‘Le fait de ne pas pouvoir ne pas etre 
libre est la facticite de la liberte, et le fait de ne pas pouvoir ne pas exister est sa 





28 La Nausee, p. 164.
29 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.567.
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interdependent forces which govern the inner structure of pour-soi, and this 
interdependence is at the root o f the Existentialist axiom contending that ‘Man is 
condemned to be free’. Freedom, then, is the most essential part o f our facticity, in both 
senses o f the term, and it is the concept of freedom that truly distinguishes Sartrean 
Humanism. The ontological implications of the concept will be dealt with in the 
following section, but for the moment it suffices to accept the notion as contingent, and 
regard it as the defining feature of our facticity, and thus of our humanity: ‘En fait, nous 
sommes une liberte qui choisit mais nous ne choissisons pas d ’etre libres: nous sommes 
condamnes a la liberte. ’30
As a feature of facticity, freedom is inherently Absurd, but it deserves this 
classification in its own right as the causal factor of our Anguish. For Sartre, Anguish is 
the human awareness (reflective apprehension) of its own freedom and its lack o f 
external justification: ‘C’est dans l’angoisse que l’homme prend conscience de la 
liberte. ’31 Sartre thus accepts Heidegger’s unification o f his own Angst at the ‘saisie du 
neant’ with Kierkegaard’s ‘angoisse devant la liberte’ ,32 thereby, like his predecessor, 
synonymising freedom and nothingness. But whereas Kierkegaard’s Anguish was 
essentially religious, based on the premise of Original Sin, Sartre’s is Humanistic in its 
ontological and anthropocentric origin. Projection towards the future is a major source 
o f anguish, since pour-soi is forced to be its future ‘sur le mode de n ’etre pas ’ ,33 which 
takes it into the realm of possibility:
L ’angoisse, en effet, est la reconnaissance d’une possibility comme ma 
possibility, c ’est-a-dire qu’elle se constitue lorsque la conscience se voit 
coupee de son essence par le neant ou separee du futur par sa liberte meme .34
By choosing its preferred possible, pour-soi projects itself continually from its past and 
through its present towards its future, but the realisation that nothing(ness) either 
justifies its choice or connects its three ekstases of temporality invokes a constant state 
o f Anguish. Sartre notes that while fear  is fear before the world, Anguish is anguish 
before oneself, and he later extends this definition to include an awareness of autrui: 
‘L ’angoisse est constante, en ce sens que mon choix originel est une chose constante. En 
fait, 1’angoisse est, selon moi, 1’absence totale de justification en meme temps que la 
responsabilite a l’egard de tous. ’35 The ethical implications o f this extension (invoking 
the moral responsibilities demanded by the gaze of the Other) will be discussed in the 
final chapter, but we can see from this analysis that Sartre’s conception o f angoisse, 
though not metaphysical, contributes to the Absurd in terms of both ethics and ontology, 
through the constant implication of the Self and the Other.
Since Anguish precedes (and ideally incites) action, the theme is relatively 
overlooked in Sartre’s theatre, and, yet again, it is left to Roquentin to convey the 
practical manifestations o f this potent human drive:
Une veritable panique s’empara de moi. Je ne savais plus ou j ’allais. Je 
courus le long des Docks, je  toumai dans les rues desertes du quartier 
Beauvoisis: les maisons me regardaient fuir, de leurs yeux momes. Je me 






35 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, discussion, p. 100.
36 La Nausee, pp. 113-14.
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The three central characteristics of panic, doubt and contingent possibility can be 
appreciated here, and the personification of en-soi, o f Being, provides a pleasing 
structural link between the affiliated notions of / ’angoisse and la nausee, so effectively 
communicated by Cranston:
Nausea is the natural feeling that comes to anyone who confronts the fluid, 
sticky, viscous mess which constitutes the world o f sensible appearance. 
Anguish is the natural feeling that comes from confronting the absolute 
openness of our own future, that nothingness in the centre of which we 
live .37
These ‘natural feelings’ comprise then the conflicting worlds of en-soi and pour-soi, but 
this does not divide them completely, for perception o f one can aggravate awareness of 
the other; and, like Roquentin, we often spend our time in a vertiginous flight from one 
to the other.
Originating in this viscous world of objects, Nausea is literally the taste o f our 
contingent facticity, and it reveals itself to us in our conflicts with en-soi and autrui. It 
is symbolised particularly by material and physical waste, such as refuse, compost, 
vomit, excrement, and blood, and is portrayed sporadically in Sartrean theatre, but 
perhaps nowhere so effectively as in the eponymous pests o f Les Mouches, who loom so 
ominously around the moral and physical decay evident in the plagued inhabitants of 
Argos. In our Anguish, Nausea is our natural response to our confrontational 
coexistence with en-soi; as with Roquentin, it is also the precondition to an enlightened 
appreciation of Being through a devoilement de Vexistence:
Alors la Nausee m ’a saisi, je  me suis laisse tomber sur la banquette, je  ne 
savais meme pas oil j ’etais; je voyais toumer lentement les couleurs autour 
de moi, j ’avais envie de vomir. Et voila: depuis, la Nausee ne m ’a pas quitte, 
elle me tient.38
To Roquentin, this excessive and introspective Absurdist, Being is de trop -  grotesque 
and gratuitous, anonymous and ubiquitous. It is encapsulated memorably in the image 
of the seeping root of the marronnier, that epitome o f intrusive viscosity which forces 
the character to a greater understanding of pour-soi through intense focalisation on en- 
soi: ‘Combien de temps dura cette fascination? J ’etais la racine du marronnier. Ou 
plutot j ’etais tout entier conscience de son existence. ’39 In actually becoming the root, 
Roquentin fuses himself with his own facticity, before realising the act of his reflection, 
and thus the potential of his dormant transcendence. But, continuing his impure 
(accessory) reflection, he begins to appreciate the Absurdity of Being, for which the root 
becomes a potent metaphor: ‘L ’absurdite, ce n ’etait pas une idee dans ma tete, ni un 
souffle de voix, mais ce long serpent mort a mes pieds, ce serpent de bois . ’40 The 
contemplation of Being awakens Roquentin to the Absurd duplicity o f en-soi: he is 
faced, simultaneously, with the repulsive grotesqueness o f its facticity, and the tempting 
fulfilment o f its plenitude, which leaves him with a combination o f Nausea and 
Anguish, both fleeing from and longing for the attributes o f Being.
This somewhat paradoxical state reflects the characteristic ambiguity o f pour- 
soi, and Roquentin’s ‘ecoeurement’41 invades the stage through characters like Mouton,
37 Sartre, p.49.
38 La Nausee, p.35.
39 Ibid., p. 185.
40 Ibid., p. 181.
41 Ibid., p .137.
40
who effectively convey this precarious oscillation between the hollow Anguish of 
M an’s existence and the Nausea o f his being: ‘Le cceur de rhom m e est creux et plein 
d ’ordures. ’42 The resonance may be Beckettian, but the philosophy is profoundly 
Sartrean. The feeling of ‘hollowness’ presents itself to Sartre’s characters as the 
permanent possibility of potential, which explains the conundrum of pour-soi ‘being 
what it is not’: ‘L ’homme est toujours separe de ce qu’il est par toute la largeur de l’etre 
qu’il n ’est pas . ’43 Presented with the complete ontological structure o f en-soi, pour-soi 
appreciates itself as ‘lacking’, a point well illustrated by Sartre in the example of the 
crescent moon: as en-soi, this phenomenon is neither ‘full’ nor ‘incomplete’, it simply 
is; but the Pour-soi, looking skywards, perceives the crescent as both incomplete and 
lacking, hence the vague misnomer of ‘full moon’ .44 We can thus appreciate Sartre’s 
contention that it is pour-soi that introduces absence, deficiency, and nothingness into 
the world. It is as if en-soi teases and chastises pour-soi, exhibiting its satisfaction in a 
diverse range of phenomena from the most profoundly beautiful to the most repulsively 
grotesque; and pour-soi is left unfulfilled, in deep dissatisfaction:
Que la realite humaine soit manque, 1’existence du desir comme fait humain 
suffirait a le prouver [...]. Un etre qui est ce qu’il est [...] n ’appelle rien a soi 
pour se complementer.45
Ce que le pour-soi manque, c’est le soi -  ou soi-meme comme en-soi.46
This unrealised and unrealisable potential is another defining feature o f pour-soi, 
revealing once again the Absurd nature of its structure, for Man is left in a state of 
constant yearning for something he is never to attain. This merely compounds his 
Anguish, filling him with a sense of incompleteness and condemning him, perhaps for 
good, to unhappiness and suffering:
La realite humaine est souffrante dans son etre, parce qu’elle surgit a l’etre 
comme perpetuellement hantee par une totalite qu’elle est sans pouvoir 
l ’etre, puisque justement elle ne pourrait atteindre Ten-soi sans se perdre 
comme pour-soi. Elle est done par nature conscience malheureuse, sans 
depassement possible de l’etat de malheur.47
It is worth noting two things about Sartre’s flirtation with pessimism here: firstly, by 
referring to the ‘nature’ of the ‘realite humaine’, he comes desperately close to 
acknowledging a human nature; and secondly, he seems to reject the possibility of a 
‘conscience heureuse’, o f action, hope, and salvation, as if  anticipating the conclusions 
o f the metaphysical Absurdists. As yet, there is little sign of optimism, for Sartre goes 
on to introduce the symbol of the ‘trou’:
Le trou est le symbole d’un mode d’etre que la psychanalyse existentielle se 
doit d ’eclaircir. [...] On voit tout de suite [...] qu’il se presente 
originellement comme un neant ‘a combler’ avec ma propre chair: 1’enfant 
ne peut se tenir de mettre son doigt ou son bras entier dans le trou. [...]
Ainsi, boucher le trou, c’est originellement faire le sacrifice de mon corps
42 Nekrassov, p. 160.
43 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.53.
44 Ibid., p. 129.
45 Ibid., p. 130.
46 Ibid., p. 132.
47 Ibid., p. 134.
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pour que la plenitude d’etre existe, c ’est-a-dire subir la passion du Pour-soi 
pour fa9 onner, parfaire et sauver la totalite de l’En-soi. Nous saisissons la, a 
son origine, une des tendances les plus fondamentales de la realite humaine: 
la tendance a remplir.48
Flouting Freud’s libidinous fascination with the ‘hole’, Sartre’s symbol is merely a 
continuation of the human desire to be ‘whole’; and although Sartrean Woman, viscous 
and trouee, may be the ideal symbol of le manque, the condition is a fundamental reality 
for humanity as a whole: ‘Le Pour-soi, en effet, n ’est pas autre chose que la pure 
neantisation de l ’En-soi; il est comme un trou d’etre au sein de l’Etre . ’49
As a central concept of Existentialist psychoanalysis, it would be interesting to 
examine the significance o f the ‘trou’ in works such as Baudelaire, L ’Idiot de la famille, 
and Saint Genet, but this time we do not need to turn to the novel to find examples of 
the theme in practice. Sartre’s theatre, though one o f action, is peopled with characters 
who acknowledge, or at least betray, a desire to be whole, either as a Sartrean precursor 
to the mode of doing, or an un-Sartrean regret at a failed existence:
Je vais, je  viens, je sais crier d ’une voix forte, je  promene partout ma grande 
apparence terrible [...]. Mais je  suis une coque vide: une bete m ’a mange le 
dedans sans que je m ’en ape^oive. [...] Ai-je dit que j ’etais triste? J ’ai 
menti. II n ’est ni triste ni gai, le desert, l’innombrable neant des sables sous 
le neant lucide du ciel: il est sinistre. Ah! je  donnerais mon royaume pour 
verser une larme!50
Johanna: Qu’est-ce qui vous possedait, vous?
Frantz: Est-ce que cela porte un nom? Le vide .51
Egisthe and Frantz’s comments reveal a somewhat desperate sense o f emptiness; they 
are tortured and possessed by nothingness and desire, and become inhuman and thus 
unsalvageable. They are contrasted, though, with more positive characters like Kean and 
Goetz, whose desire overcomes their nothingness and leads them to the greatest and 
most fundamental yearning, the desire to be God. Although in Goetz, this initially 
presents itself as a type of megalomania, it is in fact an existential rather than political 
goal, and it can be seen to shape and dominate every Fundamental Project of pour-soi. 
As pointed out by Champigny, the Sartrean desire to be God encapsulates and 
universalises the plagued condition of humanity, unifying the similar phenomena o f 
Ancient Greek hybris, Christian myth, and the mal du siecle o f Romanticism .52 This 
desire to be God is o f course the logical conclusion to the tensions and conflicts 
apparent in the coexistence of en-soi and pour-soi, for if  there were a God, this ideal 
(impossible) being would simultaneously enjoy the objective plenitude o f the former 
and the transcendent subjectivity o f the latter, would be defined as en-soi-pour-soi, 
Creator and created:
Le possible est pro-jete en general comme ce qui manque au pour-soi pour 
devenir en-soi-pour-soi; et la valeur fondamentale, qui preside a ce projet est 
justement 1’en-soi-pour-soi, c’est-a-dire l’ideal d ’une conscience qui serait 
fondement de son propre etre-en-soi par la pure conscience qu’elle prendrait
48 Ibid., p.705.
49 Ibid., p.711.
50 Les Mouches, p. 192.
51 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p .195.
52 Stages on Sartre’s Way, p.7.
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d’elle-meme. C’est cet ideal qu’on peut nommer Dieu. Ainsi peut-on dire 
que ce qui rend le mieux concevable le projet fondamental de la realite 
humaine, c’est que l’homme est l’etre qui projette d ’etre Dieu .53
We are now in the realm of pure Absurdism, for Man has been defined as the being 
which longs to be the being that cannot be. If the semantics are nonsensical, the 
philosophy is equally so, but we should not therefore presume that it is flawed -  if  Man 
is Absurd, why should he make sense? Aware o f its contingent birth and gratuitous 
death, pour-soi nevertheless projects itself towards an ens causa sui, disregarding its 
pre-reflexive consciousness of this inherent impossibility: ‘Le desir est manque d ’etre 
[...]. Cet etre, nous l’avons vu, c’est 1’en-soi-pour-soi, la conscience devenue substance, 
la substance devenue cause de soi, l’Homme-Dieu. ’54 The oxymoronic ‘Homme-Dieu’ 
is then an impossible synthesis of en-soi and pour-soi, a monistic, Spinoza-style 
consciousness, but one which by rejecting God is forced to found itself.
By exploring common human projects such as creating, possessing, destroying, 
and even eating, Sartre shows how pour-soi attempts to establish itself as its own 
foundation. The first o f these projects is perhaps an undisguised attempt at self- 
deception, but the others are not quite so obvious. The act o f possessing is effectively 
portrayed in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, for one of Goetz’s bids for divinity takes the 
form of the material possession of land. Sartre may link this politically with the projects 
o f the bourgeoisie, but both have as their origin the ruthless search for plenitude:
Tout projet possessif vise a constituer le Pour-soi comme fondement du 
monde ou totalite concrete de 1’en-soi en tant que cette totalite est, comme 
totalite, le pour-soi lui-meme existant sur le mode de 1’en-soi. Etre-dans-le- 
monde, c ’est projeter de posseder le monde, c ’est-a-dire saisir le monde total 
comme ce qui manque au pour-soi pour qu’il devienne en-soi-pour-soi.55
But when this project predictably fails, it is merely replaced by the negative project o f 
destruction, which shares the same end of becoming the Master of Creation:
C ’est precisement la reconnaissance de T impossibility qu’il y a a posseder 
un objet, qui entraine pour le pour-soi une violente envie de le detruire. 
Detruire, c’est resorber en moi, c’est entretenir avec l’etre-en-soi de l’objet 
detruit un rapport aussi pro fond que dans la creation. [...] La destruction 
realise [...] 1’appropriation, car 1’objet detruit n ’est plus la pour se montrer 
impenetrable.56
And eating is no more than a ‘sub-project’ o f destruction: ‘Consommer, c ’est aneantir et 
c ’est manger; c ’est detruire en s’incorporant. ’57 All these various acts o f being are 
essentially appropriative, and appropriation, as a mode of having, is the result o f the 
primary mode of being, namely the desire to be God, which Sartre recognises as the 
ideal or value of pour-soi:
On voit que 1’appropriation n ’est pas autre chose que le symbole de l’ideal 
du pour-soi ou valeur. [...] Je ne satisfais pas plus mon desir originel d ’etre a 
moi-meme mon propre fondement, par 1’appropriation, que le malade de






Freud ne satisfait son complexe d ’CEdipe lorsqu’il reve qu’un soldat tue le 
Tsar (c’est-a-dire son pere) . 58
Although we are left with an unsolved problem, with Man in a constant state of 
unfulfilled desire, we have at least gleaned a valuable insight into Sartrean 
psychoanalysis, and the exploration of the human yearning to be God has clarified the 
tense and highly complex interrelationship between the ontological structures of pour- 
soi and en-soi:
Tout se passe comme si le monde, l’homme et l’homme-dans-le-monde 
n ’arrivaient a realiser qu’un Dieu manque. Tout se passe done comme si 
1’en-soi et le pour-soi se presentaient en etat de disintegration par rapport a 
une synthese ideale. Non que l’integration ait jamais eu lieu, mais 
precisement au contraire parce qu’elle est toujours indiquee et toujours 
impossible. C’est le perpetuel echec qui explique a la fois l’indissolubilite 
de l’en-soi et du pour-soi et leur relative independance.59
We can now appreciate Sartre’s concept of the Absurd and the specific use he 
makes o f it as the starting point o f his ontology. Although this central theme does not 
feature greatly in Sartrean theatre, close analysis of the plays does reveal an Absurdist 
outlook among the various stage characters, and a reading of Sartre’s philosophy and 
novels, in particular L ’Etre et le Neant and La Nausee, gives a comprehensive 
impression o f Sartre’s ontological Absurdism. This impression is not as remote from the 
metaphysical Absurdists as one might imagine, despite Sartre’s disregard for certain 
significant themes, and if  we recall Camus’s portrayal o f Absurd Man in Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe, we cannot fail to acknowledge a definite resemblance:
Les dieux avaient condamne Sisyphe a rouler sans cesse un rocher jusqu’au 
sommet d ’une montagne d’ou la pierre retombait par son propre poids. Ils 
avaient pense avec quelque raison qu’il n ’est pas de punition plus terrible 
que le travail inutile et sans espoir.60
The useless, hopeless task imposed on Sisyphus is certainly not dissimilar to that 
endured by Sartrean Man, who is condemned to the facticity o f a contingent birth, 
anxious, finite freedom, and a gratuitous death, and who suffers en-soi in the form of 
Nausea, the Coefficient of Adversity, and the desire to be God.
If Sisyphus is a symbol for Sartrean Man, at least at this early stage, it is because 
Sartre accepts the Absurdity o f Man’s condition and facticity: his Humanism is based 
upon this premise, removing it definitively from the idealisation o f earlier forms, and 
the intellectual, Humanist agent must regard Absurdism as the pre-condition, the point 
de depart, for any valid choice of action. But where Camus simply tells us that we 
should ‘imaginer Sisyphe heureux’ ,61 Sartre indicates a possible salvation, affording us a 
means of escape from the impasse of Absurdism in the form of personal transcendence:




60 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p. 163.
61 Ibid., p. 168.
62 Jeanson, Francis, Sartre par lui-meme, p. 163.
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II nous faut crever ou inventer l’homme, choisir l’existence ou sombrer dans 
1’Absurde.63
For Sartre, then, to exist is to have the strength to transcend the Absurd and go beyond 
the Given. If, in a desagregation intime, pour-soi is divided into facticity and 
transcendence,64 it is the duty of the agent to transcend his facticity, converting his 
Anguish into action and rejoicing in his freedom. After all, in the famous words o f 
Oreste, ‘la vie humaine commence de l’autre cote du desespoir’,65 and without the 
catalyst o f Anguish, its action would be doomed to impotence:
II ne s’agit pas [...] d’une angoisse qui conduirait au quietisme, a l’inaction. II s’agit 
d ’une angoisse simple, que tous ceux qui ont eu des responsabilites connaissent [...]. 
C ’est la condition meme de leur action.66
63 Ibid., p. 178.
64 L ’Etre et le Neant, p. 111.
65 Les Mouches, p.238.
66 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, pp.32-33.
ii) A Celebration of Freedom: The Ontological Agent
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It has been discussed how pour-soi is condemned to be free as a primary condition o f its 
facticity. But through transcendence, it is able to overcome the Given and choose for 
itself its level of freedom. It is in this context that Sartre’s agent is ontological, for 
without a philosophical appreciation of its unavoidable freedom, pour-soi will have 
little chance to project towards action, ethical commitment, and ultimate salvation. 
Freedom, then, is viewed by Sartre as an ontological condition, and the aim o f this study 
is to consider its effects on the human reality and the problems posed by its relentless 
supposition.
In the same way that Absurdism formed a cohesive classification for the issues 
o f facticity, freedom can be seen to determine the various manifestations of 
transcendence, defining the very structure o f the consciousness and all o f its conduites: 
‘Liberte, choix, neantisation, temporalisation, ne font qu’une seule et meme chose . ’67 
The notion o f neantisation is of particular importance in that it is totally inseparable 
from the phenomenon of freedom; indeed the title of L ’Etre et le Neant is broadly 
analogous to the respective concepts of facticity and freedom, and serves to elucidate 
their connotations to some degree of precision. The connection between freedom and 
nothingness is that pour-soi ‘nihilates’ en-soi through its consciousness, drawing itself 
from the plenitude of Being towards a free existence as an abandoned Nothingness in 
the very heart o f Being:
La liberte, c’est precisement le neant qui est ete au cceur de 1’homme et 
contraint la realite-humaine a se fa ire , au lieu d ’etre. [...] L ’homme ne 
saurait etre tantot libre et tantot esclave: il est tout entier et toujours libre ou 
il n ’est pas .68
Sartre’s polemic extremism comes to the fore in his writings on freedom, and there is 
literally no room for compromise of any kind. But the freedom described by Sartre is 
ontologically specific and should not be confused with the more literal semantics o f the 
term. It is thus absurd and nonsensical to speak of freedom in terms of ‘success’ or o f it 
giving us the ability to obtain what we desire; freedom must respect the constraints o f 
facticity, whether presented as a prison door or the fact we have blond hair, and we can 
only transcend the Given within the framework o f reason. However, when en-soi reveals 
itself as a resistance to our free projects, as a Coefficient o f Adversity, it is ultimately 
our own freedom which willingly concedes this power:
Nous ne sommes separes des choses par rien, sinon par notre liberte; c’est 
elle qui fait qu’z'/ y  a des choses, avec tout leur indifference, leur 
imprevisibilite et leur adversite.69
Le coefficient d’adversite des choses [...] ne saurait etre un argument contre 
notre liberte, car c ’est par nous, c’est-a-dire par la position prealable d’une 
fin que surgit ce coefficient d’adversite. Tel rocher qui manifeste une 
resistance profonde si je veux le deplacer, sera, au contraire, une aide 
precieuse si je  veux l’escalader pour contempler le paysage. [...] II est 
neutre.70





Indeed it is thanks to this resistance that our freedom is revealed -  ‘sans obstacle, pas de 
liberte’71 -  for without the barrier of Being, our freedom would become superfluous. In 
terms o f ontology, then, there are apparently no restrictions to our freedom apart from 
those we willingly impose on ourselves, as Sartre implies when he asserts that ‘chacun 
se fait sa propre porte’ .72
The theme of freedom can be seen to dominate much of Sartre’s early work, and 
the early plays, in particular, show characters rejoicing in their freedom. It has often 
been commented that Les Mouches provides the closest reflection o f Sartre’s early 
philosophy, and it is this play whose hero most successfully incarnates his ontological 
agent: ‘Je ne suis ni le maitre ni l ’esclave, Jupiter. Je suis ma liberte! A peine m ’as-tu 
cree que j ’ai cesse de t ’appartenir. ’73 Oreste literally becomes his own freedom, and by 
assuming his autonomy, he proudly takes his place in the celebrated ranks of 
Humanism. As such, he poses a threat to the hierarchical system of determinist 
absolutism, and Egisthe’s fears remind us clearly of the transcendent power o f our 
freedom: ‘II sait qu’il est libre. Alors ce n ’est pas assez que de le jeter dans les fers. Un 
homme libre dans une ville, c’est comme une brebis galeuse dans un troupeau. II va 
contaminer tout mon royaume et ruiner mon oeuvre. ’74
Man’s assumption of his freedom, as typified by Oreste, opens the floodgates of 
Existentialist philosophy and carries us away from the desperate pessimism of 
Absurdism towards a new, enlightened optimism. Given the initial attacks on his 
philosophy for its apparent inducement towards Quietism, Sartre is particularly keen to 
emphasise this point: ‘L ’existentialisme est un optimisme, une doctrine d ’action, et c ’est 
seulement par mauvaise foi que, confondant leur propre desespoir avec le notre, les 
chretiens peuvent nous appeler desesperes. ’75 This optimism again emanates from our 
freedom, and the combination of these two qualities defines the nature o f our 
transcendence. Sartre refers to pour-so fs transcendence as a ‘negation interne et 
realisante’76 to describe its ability, within the internal unit o f the consciousness, to 
‘negate’ the facticity of Being {en-soi) and to ‘realise’ (to be aware o f its situation and to 
bring about free projects); and any philosophical doctrine which endows the individual 
with the power of free transcendence must, he feels, be acknowledged as optimistic. If 
we accept this doctrine, our lives are what we make them and belong to no-one else:
Georges: A qui est-elle, ma vie?
Le Clochard: Elle est a vous. Entierement a vous .77
The burden of responsibility which this autonomy implies will be discussed in due 
course, but it cannot be fully appreciated without a prior understanding of how the 
ontological structure of pour-soi condemns it to this level o f freedom. It is the 
consciousness, the transcending Pour-soi, that provides the key to this understanding by 
extending even further Sartre’s conception o f freedom.
Sartre’s theory of consciousness is based on adaptation and development of both 
Descartes’s Cogito and Heidegger’s existential response to Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology .78 Cartesian theory is extended in temporality to uncover a thinking
71 Ibid., p.564.
72 Ibid., p.635.
73 Les Mouches, p.235.
74 Ibid., p.203.
75 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.95.
76 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.228.
77 Nekrassov, p.24.
78 See La Transcendance de I ’Ego, pp.26-37, and Herbert Spiegelberg, The Context o f  the 
Phenomenological Movement, Chapter Three, pp.51-61.
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being who is, was, and will be, simultaneously and transphenomenally, 79 and 
subjectivity becomes the pre-reflective consciousness (of) consciousness; and the 
intentional consciousness attributed to Dasein receives an appended modification on its 
transfer to pour-soi: cLa conscience est un etre pour lequel il est dans son etre question 
de son etre en tant que cet etre implique un etre autre que lui.,i0 Sartre’s adaptation is 
vital, for it affects his subsequent theory on pour-sof s freedom, temporality, and on his 
goal of pure reflection. His consciousness is free because it is devoid o f substance and 
content, and can never fix itself in nature or time, unlike the conscience malheureuse 
which is plagued with the Absurd desire to be God; and unlike Freudian consciousness, 
which can conveniently escape into the Unconscious, it exists only, and permanently, on 
the conscious level:
Toute conscience [...] est conscience de quelque chose [...]. La conscience 
n ’a pas de ‘contenu’. [...] Une table n ’est pas dans la conscience, meme a 
titre de representation. Une table est dans l’espace, a cote de la fenetre, etc .81
The Sartrean theory is unoriginal in its phenomenological traditionalism and problems 
such as that of knowledge are marginalised into a fitting ‘complex’ .82 The impression we 
are left with is perhaps less convincing in its ontological validity than in its pleasing 
literary metaphor: ‘L’eau est le symbole de la conscience: son mouvement, sa fluidite, 
cette solidarity non solidaire de son etre, sa fuite perpetuelle, etc., tout en elle me 
rappelle le Pour-soi. ’83 However, we have now gleaned significant insight into the 
ontological structure of the consciousness -  its free structural void, its reflective and 
pre-reflective duality, and its function as a type of translucent interface between en-soi, 
itself, and its temporal ekstases -  and this foundation is essential if  we are to appreciate 
the central core of Existentialist theory, the vital attestation that existence precedes 
essence.
The profound and logical implication of this conclusion is that the free, 
transcendent agent of Sartrean Existentialism has no recourse to a fixed, universal 
essence or a ‘human nature’. Since the consciousness serves the Pour-soi as a temporal 
transcendence, there can be no linearly determinant relationship between its past (its 
essence), its present (its nothingness), and its future (its existence). Its past is its only 
essence, the en-soi, the substance that it longs for, since it can be regarded and assessed 
by itself and by autruv, its present is its consciousness, a nothingness that can never be 
fixed; and its future is the free existence ahead of it, determined solely by its choice of 
action:
II n ’y a pas de nature humaine, puisqu’il n ’y a pas de Dieu pour le 
concevoir. L ’homme est seulement, non seulement tel qu’il se c o n ^ it, mais 
tel qu’il se veut [...]. L’homme n ’est rien d ’autre que ce qu’il se fait.84
Sartre’s rejection of human nature is of course a central tenet of his Humanism, for he 
takes the supremacy of Man to its logical conclusion in making him the sole creator o f 
his essence. This point is emphasised by a critique of God’s Creation which establishes 
a role reversal in this first creative process:
79 It is also extended in implication to elucidate Sartre’s theory of the conscious choice o f emotions.
80 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.29, (my italics).
81 Ibid., p. 17.
82 In this case, into the Actaeon Complex, which regards knowledge as a means o f appropriative violation 
along with eating, destruction, and sexual sadism, again caused by the fundamental desire to remplir.
83 Ibid., p.702.
84 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.22.
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Adam ne se definit point par une essence, car 1’essence est, pour la realite 
humaine, posterieure a 1’existence. II se definit par le choix de ses fins, 
c ’est-a-dire par le surgissement d ’une temporalisation ek-statique qui n ’a 
rien de commun avec l’ordre logique.85
Thus Adam may choose to create God (to believe), but God has no power to create 
Adam (Man) nor to endow him with an essence. Sartre’s Humanism succeeds then in 
replacing God with Man, and, to this extent, is truly anthropocentric.
To deny this elevation by seeking refuge in a creating God or an aprioristic 
human nature is to act in Bad Faith, and the effect is to re-reverse the roles and reduce 
the agent to the puppet. This denial of the freedom offered to Man by Existentialist 
Humanism is particularly well explored in the opening tableau of Nekrassov, where 
Georges, offered a lifeline (‘une corde’) to prevent his suicide, defends his decision to 
accept it:
Georges: Je l’ai prise parce que j ’y etais force.
La Clocharde: Force par quoi?
Georges: Tiens: par la nature humaine. C’est contre nature, le
suicide!86
Georges is using the cushion of human nature to deny his free decision to save himself, 
and, in so doing, he provides us with a typical example o f the human abdication of 
freedom to an unknown entity. Another such entity is the consistent human personality 
or character,87 which amounts to little more than the microcosmic solipsism of a large- 
scale human nature:
Ainsi ne trouvons-nous aucune donnee dans la realite humaine, au sens ou le 
temperament, le caractere, les passions, les principes de la raison seraient 
des data acquis ou innes, existant a la maniere des choses. La seule 
consideration empirique de l’etre-humain le montre comme une unite 
organisee de conduites ou de ‘comportements’ .88
So in the same way that Man cannot be justified by a transcendent human nature, neither 
can he hide behind his conception o f himself. Sartre has reduced the personality to an 
organised unit o f active behaviour whose only cohesion lies in the choice of 
Fundamental Project; and if I am to judge myself, I can only rely on the actions of my 
past. Hence I may claim, with justification, that I have always acted courageously in the 
past, but this does not mean that I am courageous or that I will behave courageously in 
the future , for the future is my free existence, waiting to be chosen:
Ce monde n ’a de sens comme futur qu’en tant que j ’y suis present comme 
un autre que je serai, dans une autre position physique, affective, sociale, 
etc. [...] Le Futur [...] est quelque chose qui attend le Pour-soi que je  suis. Ce 
quelque chose c’est moi-meme.89
85 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.547.
86 Nekrasso v, p. 2 2.
87 For a more detailed study on personality, see Phyllis Sutton Morris, Sartre’s Concept o f  a Person: An 
Analytic Approach, and La Transcendance de I'Ego, which seeks to reverse the misconception o f the 
primacy of the ego over consciousness. See especially pp.54-72.
88 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.555.
89 Ibid., pp. 171-72.
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Our future is waiting for us to define it, and by the time we arrive at a given point in the 
future, we may find ourselves in a different situation and seem like a different person. 
This is consistent with Sartre’s extension of Heidegger’s definition o f consciousness to 
include the idea of introspection or impure reflection involving the Self reflecting on an 
Other within the unit of a single consciousness. Thus Sartre’s attack challenges the very 
idea o f Se lf  for the term implies a consistent psychological unit (personality) which 
could fix itself in pure reflection. This would require a synthesis o f consciousness and 
self, which is an impossibility if  the consciousness is free and void; so by implication, 
the Self is at best meaningless, and at worst defunct. Its only relevance is in the past, 
where it has some substance, but even then its consistency is debatable and o f no import 
whatsoever to the freedom of the present and the choices o f the future. Consequently, as 
pointed out by Frantz, our lives begin to resemble an empty platform, our 
consciousnesses the wait for a derailed train: ‘Qu’est-ce que c ’est vivre? Vous 
attendre? ’90 In the absence o f the Self, pour-soi is forced to choose its own future 
subjectively and without justification. It must act in a quasi-psychological vacuum 
based solely on the ontological reality of its freedom. If, in denial, it chooses to relate to 
the essence of its Self, it will be living in the past, ignoring its transcendence, and acting 
in the Bad Faith caused by envy of en-sot £Si la volonte doit etre autonome, il est 
impossible de la considerer comme un fait psychique donne, c ’est-a-dire en-soi. ’91 We 
are reminded here of Roquentin, gazing at the root of the marronnier and longing for its 
plenitude: one o f the roots of our Nausee is indeed this contrast between being and 
existence, between en-soi which is, and pour-soi which is not what it is and is what it is 
not. Devoid o f plenitude, Man is a series of conduites, condemned to spend his life in a 
desperate search for his own identity:
Le Pere: Je te donne la recette: si tu veux commander, prends-toi
pour un autre.
Werner: Je ne me prends pour personne.92
By accepting the oscillating nature of pour-soi, the blurred dichotomy between Self and 
autrui, both these characters are acting in Good Faith: Le Pere is acknowledging the 
function of role-play and the practicality o f impure reflection, and Werner is 
approaching the autonomous ideal in relinquishing the search for the Self.
The reverse attitude is of course that taken by the waiter in Sartre’s description 
of Bad Faith or by Goetz in his attempts to be Evil and then Good. Pour-soi can no 
more reduce itself to a social function than it can postulate its character to be 
consistently good or bad, and impose on it a subjective value judgement: ‘Pour-moi, je  
ne suis pas plus professeur ou gar9 on de cafe que beau ou laid, ju if ou aryen, spirituel, 
vulgaire ou distingue. Nous appellerons ces caracteristiques des irrea lisab lesf3 Sartre’s 
theatre is full o f characters searching for identity -  Oreste to be a saviour, Hugo, a 
political assassin, Wemer, a successful business man and a loved son -  and it is only 
those select few who transcend their identities by their actions and celebrate their 
freedom and the absence of the Self who are recognised by Sartre as heroic. A good 
example of an anti-hero is provided in the (dead) character o f Garcin, who seeks 
recognition for his courage, despite the cowardice of his past actions; but Estelle, seeing 
him for what he is, is aware that his essence is not transcendent, and, in her own Bad 
Faith, she reduces him to his pure facticity:
90 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.255.
91 L 'Etre et le Neant, p.518.
92 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.29.
93 L 'Etre et le Neant, p.610.
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J ’aime les hommes, Garcin, les vrais hommes, a la peau rude, aux mains 
fortes. Tu n ’as pas le menton d’un lache, tu n ’as pas la bouche d ’un lache, tu 
n ’as pas la voix d ’un lache, tes cheveux ne sont pas ceux d’un lache. Et c ’est 
pour ta bouche, pour ta voix, pour tes cheveux que je  t ’aime.94
The tragedy of Huis Clos lies in the fact that the characters are dead and have no more 
cards to play. Thus they can legitimately search for a defined personality in the 
substance of their completed actions, but, unlike their living counterparts, they are not 
free to redefine themselves in future action -  les jeux sont faits. Sartre goes on to link 
pour-soV s attempt to find itself a character with its primary desire to be God, for in this 
ideal synthesis o f modes, the consciousness could simultaneously be void and 
substance, transcendence and facticity, autonomous freedom and determined 
personality: ‘Le caractere est meme souvent ce que le Pour-soi tente de recuperer pour 
devenir l’En-soi-pour-soi qu’il projette d’etre. ’95 The stage characters who show 
themselves to be guilty o f such conduct have not progressed beyond the limitations of 
the Absurd, and it will take a revised Fundamental Project, a radical conversion like that 
o f Goetz, to re-route them on the path of the ontological agent.
In contrast to Goetz, the character o f Nasty is perhaps the leader on this track, for 
while Sartre’s heroes are ‘psychologically incredible’, Nasty has no ‘Self that interferes’ 
and his personality is ‘indistinguishable from his actions’ .96 He is the embodiment of the 
revolutionary impulse, of pure action, and although there is little evidence of the 
intellectual, ontological, or indeed ethical agent in him, he is in terms o f personality the 
perfect Sartrean ‘character’. However, he is a one-dimensional character who is never 
subject to the complexity of choice reserved for thinking beings like Hilda and Goetz, 
and without the compulsion o f choice, he can never display the freedom o f character 
ultimately realised by his protagonists. In this respect, he is a ‘magic’ character along 
the lines of Kean, who, as an actor, escapes the question of identity by never playing 
himself, who excels on the stage, where action is but gesture: ‘On joue pour ne pas se 
connaitre et parce qu’on se connait trop. [...] Est-ce que je sais, moi, quand je  joue? Est- 
ce qu’il y a un moment ou je cesse de jouer? ’97 Kean is defined as a social puppet: on 
the stage, he is modelled by playwright and director, and off it, high society pulls the 
strings; like Nasty, Kean’s freedom is limited by his inability to choose, and ultimately 
we must agree with Champigny that ‘the theatre, the actor, is the unhappy conscience of 
society’ .98
Choice is a major theme of Sartrean Existentialism and it is inseparable from the 
issues o f freedom, consciousness, identity, personality, Bad Faith, and ethics. It lies at 
the heart o f any discussion on Sartre’s agent, for it bridges the gap between identity and 
action:
La realite humaine ne saurait recevoir ses fins, nous l ’avons vu, ni du 
dehors, ni d’une pretendue ‘nature’ interieure. Elle les choisit et, par ce 
choix meme, leur confere une existence transcendante comme la limite 
exteme de ses projets.99
It is the ends we choose, then, and not our disparate, mercurial personalities, which are 
our true transcendent forces. If  Sartrean Man is the sum of his choices, it is because he
94 Huis Clos, p.83.
95 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.637.
96 McCall, Dorothy, The Theatre o f  Jean-Paul Sartre, pp.40-41.
97 Kean, p.81.
98 Stages on Sartre’s Way, p. 140.
99 L ’Etre et le Neant, p .519.
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is condemned to be free, to choose, and thus to choose freedom. Without this choice, 
there will be no being, no free or valid existence: ‘Quel que soit notre etre, il est choix. 
[...] Le concept technique et philosophique de liberte, le seul que nous considerons ici, 
signifie seulement: autonomie du choix . ’ 100 Oreste’s autonomy is proven when he 
triumphs over Jupiter and chooses to liberate the people of Argos; Goetz’s freedom 
blossoms in his final rejection of absolutes represented by the Devil and the Good Lord; 
and even Garcin sees the light through the mist of his ironic self-deception: ‘Je n ’ai pas 
reve cet heroisme. Je l’ai choisi. On est ce qu’on veut. ’ 101 But the harsh reality o f choice 
is that it is a constant imposition on the consciousness. Bereft of nature and personality, 
Pour-soi is forced to reinvent itself on a continuous scale, to transcend any hope of 
identity by creating itself en route: ‘ Ainsi, sommes-nous perpetuellement menaces de la 
neantisation de notre choix actuel, perpetuellement menaces de nous choisir -  et par 
consequent de devenir -  autres que nous sommes. ’102 The concluding phrase illustrates 
effectively the close interrelationship existing between consciousness, personality, and 
choice, all three of which indicate the temporal autonomy that constitutes the free 
ontological agent. Again we are reminded o f Sartre’s sketch o f Humanism, for in 
reinventing ourselves, we contribute to the reinvention o f Man; in choosing for 
ourselves, we replace a puppeteer God with an active human agent like Oreste: ‘Je ne 
reviendrai pas a ta nature: mille chemins y sont traces qui conduisent vers toi, mais je  ne 
peux suivre que mon chemin. Car je  suis un homme, Jupiter, et chaque homme doit 
inventer son chemin. ’ 103
Time and temporality form the catalyst for the necessity o f choice. I f  time were 
suddenly to come to a halt, pour-soi could finally fix itself in the elusive instant, in its 
present situation and conduite. It would then be free of choice, indeed o f freedom, and 
in pure reflection, it could seize its own persona and become the God it longs to be. For 
the ontological Absurdist, this is the true ideal o f eternity: ‘L ’etemite que l’homme 
recherche, ce n ’est pas l’infinite de la duree, de cette vaine course apres soi dont je  suis 
moi-meme responsable: c’est le repos en soi, l’atemporalite de la coincidence absolue 
avec soi. ’ 104 In the absence o f eternity, pour-soi becomes the being which introduces 
temporality into the world, and choice is therefore part o f its facticity; even the choice 
not to choose must constitute a choice. Sartre’s temporal extension o f the Cogito and the 
temporal aspects of consciousness and personality have already been uncovered, but the 
significance of the temporal domination o f choice remains to be elucidated.
Pour-soi is separated from itself and the world around it in the three temporal 
ekstases of past, present, and future: ‘Le temps me separe de moi-meme, de ce que j ’ai 
ete, de ce que je  veux etre, de ce que je veux faire, des choses et d ’autrui. ’ 105 The past 
has been shown to represent M an’s essence, the substance posterior to his existence, and 
while the present is a transcendent shell o f nothingness at the heart o f Being and the 
future exists as pour-soi, the past is in the mode of en-soi, along with History and the 
History book. But this does not mean that our past is dead and fixed in stone, for the use 
we make of the present and future determines the significance o f what has gone before: 
‘Moi-seul en effet peut decider a chaque moment de la portee du passe [...]. En me 
projetant vers mes buts, je  sauve le passe avec moi et je  decide par Taction de sa 
signification. ’ 106 The optimism continues, for Sartre is determined to reunite the past 
with the present and future. He regards time as a sliding scale, and there is literally
100 Ibid., p.551 and pp.563-64.
101 Huis Clos, p.90.
102 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.543.
103 Les Mouches, p.237.
104 L ’Etre et le Neant, p. 188.
105 Ibid., p. 176.
106 Ibid., p.579.
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nothing separating past from present from future: ‘Que le passe soit, comme le veulent 
Bergson et Husserl, ou ne soit plus, comme le veut Descartes, cela n ’a guere 
d ’importance si Ton a commence par couper les ponts entre lui et notre present. ’ 107 
Sartre, typically, is less interested in the respective ontological merits o f the temporal 
dimensions than in the effect they have on the individual Pour-soi. If  we compare this 
effect with a moving snail, the blurred edges of the three dimensions become more 
apparent: the present would be the moving snail; the past, the sporadic, viscous trail left 
behind; and the future, the free, open path stretching out in front. However closely we 
observe, we cannot see where the trail turns to snail, where the past becomes present, 
and at any given point, the snail is free to determine its future path, to turn left, right, or 
even backwards. But the analogy employed by Sartre is his cherished one o f water: 
‘Depuis longtemps la pierre qui a troue l’eau a rencontre le fond de la mare, que des 
ondes concentriques parcourent encore sa surface. ’ 108 The past and the present combine 
here in the fluidity of water, which, we recall, is the essential characteristic o f the 
consciousness. Our past may be ourselves, our unity with plenitude, but until the day we 
die it can never be curtailed, for it flows into the present and refuses to define us. 
Because of this fluidity, the present also defies fixation and presents itself as ‘pur 
glissement le long de l’etre, pur neant’ . 109 The nature o f the present calls into question 
the very existence o f the ‘instant’, or at least the homogeneous instant; if  human reality 
is governed by time, the basic unit of this reality (the temporal atom) must be the 
instant, but because of the successive nature of time, ‘le monde s’effondre en une 
poussiere infinie d ’instants’ , 110 and if  the instant existed, pour-soi, by definition, could 
be, and we know that this is impossible: ‘II n ’y a jamais d ’instant ou Ton puisse affirmer 
que le pour-soi est, parce que, precisement, le pour-soi n ’est jamais. Et la temporalite, 
au contraire, se temporalise tout entiere comme refus de Tinstant. ’ 111
Sartre’s study of temporality is also useful in defining the inner structure of 
pour-soi. If  we examine the present in the absence of the instant, and rather in its close 
interrelationship with its past and future, a clearer understanding of pour-soi cannot fail 
to emerge:
Le present n ’est pas, il se presentifie sous forme de fuite [...]. II est fuite hors 
de l ’etre co-present et de l’etre qu’il etait vers l ’etre qu’il sera. En tant que 
present il n ’est pas ce qu’il est (passe) et il est ce qu’il n ’est pas (futur) . 112
Thus temporality supports the theory that pour-soi can transcend its essence and 
determine its own future; the present is the consciousness. But as the dimension which 
governs choice and action, the future is the most important focus for Existentialist 
ontology. It is in relation to the future that the Pour-soi thrives as a human being and 
rejoices in its freedom, and this emphasis on the future is the main justification for 
Sartre’s claim of optimism. If we were not free, we would have to be, not choose, our 
future:
Le Futur ne fait que preesquisser le cadre dans lequel le Pour-soi se fera etre 
comme fuite presentifiante a l’etre vers un autre futur. II est ce que je  serai si 
je  n ’etais pas libre et ce que je  ne peux avoir a etre que parce que je  suis 
libre. [...] Je suis mon Futur dans la perspective constante de la possibility de
107 Ibid., p. 153.
108 Ibid., p. 157.
109 Ibid., p.260.
110 Ibid., p.176.
1.1 Ibid., p. 196.
1.2 Ibid., p.168.
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ne l’etre pas . 113
Choice is all about the future, and by projecting ourselves from our pasts, through our 
presents and into our futures, we are able to escape the Absurdity o f our facticity. The 
seeming trap o f temporality and the desire for the eternal instant can be avoided if  we 
choose our projects in the light of our freedom:
C ’est par le Passe que j ’appartiens a la temporalite universelle, c’est par le 
present et le futur que j ’y echappe. 114
Dire que le passe du pour-soi est en sursis, dire que son present est une 
attente, dire que son futur est un libre projet [...] c ’est une seule et meme 
chose . 115
Sartre’s term for our initial choice in life is the Fundamental Project or Original 
Choice. It is, to a certain extent, an adaptation of Aristotle’s Life Plan f 6 and is a 
concept o f extreme importance given the lack of a given God, nature, essence, or 
personality which could determine us in advance. Indeed our only hope of identity lies 
in our choice o f Fundamental Project, for through this, we choose our very being and 
attempt to define ourselves as we wish ourselves and others to regard us. However, this 
early and initial consciousness of freedom is also a causal factor o f our Anguish: 
‘J ’emerge seul et dans l’angoisse en face du projet unique et premier qui constitue mon 
etre, toutes les barrieres, tous les garde-fou s’ecroulent, neantises par la conscience de 
ma liberte. ’ 117 Because we are totally unjustified in our choice of project, we cannot fail 
to sense a certain Anguish, and the huge significance given to this choice by Sartre can 
only compound our Anguish. The central aim of Existentialist psychoanalysis is to 
determine the choice of Fundamental Project, for, according to Sartre, once this is 
established, the core of the individual lies bare, and all his further projects are mere 
accessories which can be slotted in like vertebrae to the spine. This naturally produces a 
polemical contrast with Freudian psychoanalysis, which looks essentially to sexual 
drives and parental/environmental influences to discover the underlying personality. The 
contrast can be appreciated in Sartre’s description of Adler’s inferiority complex:
Ainsi le complexe d ’inferiorite est projet libre et global de moi-meme, 
comme inferieur devant 1’autre, il est la maniere dont je choisis d ’assumer 
mon etre-pour-autrui, la solution libre que je donne a l’existence de l’autre, 
ce scandale insurmontable. Ainsi faut-il comprendre mes reactions 
d’inferiorite et mes conduites d ’echec a partir de la libre esquisse de mon 
inferiorite comme choix de moi-meme dans le monde . 118
Whereas Freud’s patient has been made to feel inferior by other people, Sartre’s victim 
has chosen the complex himself as a means of surviving his coexistence with autrui. But 
ultimately, whatever our choice of Fundamental Project, it amounts to a desire to be -  to 
be inferior, to be intelligent, to be generous, in the same way that a table is a table: 
‘L ’homme est fondamentalement desir d ’etre [...]. Le projet originel [...] est done le
113 Ibid., pp. 173-74.
1.4 Ibid., p.259.
1.5 Ibid., p.583.




projet d ’etre, ’ 119 Unless our Fundamental Project constitutes a choice o f freedom, we 
risk falling back into the Absurdist impasse o f the desire to be God. This is clearly 
portrayed by Sartre in the character of Goetz, who, after two unsuccessful (Absurd) 
choices o f project -  the choice to be Bad and then the choice to be Good -  finally 
rejects these absolutes in favour of freedom and ambiguity. On each occasion, he can 
start afresh and with no regrets, thus his ‘je ne reconnais pas les fautes de l’annee 
demiere’ at his first conversion, and his ‘je recommence tout’ at his second . 120
Like Goetz, our free projects exist within the broad limitations o f our 
Fundamental Project. Just as Goetz establishes the ‘Cite du SoleiT to be Good, so may 
we blush to be Inferior or buy a lavish present to be Generous. Our daily projects are the 
outward display of our freedom, and in choosing our own ends, we cannot fail to act, to 
transform ourselves from the modes of having and being to the valued modes o f doing:
Le pour-soi qui existe sur le mode volontaire veut se recuperer lui-meme en 
tant qu’il decide et agit. II ne veut pas seulement etre porte vers une fin, ni 
etre celui qui se choisit comme porte vers telle fin: il veut encore se 
recuperer lui-meme en tant que projet spontane vers telle ou telle fin . 121
In choosing our projects, we become the authors of our own actions, and thus o f our 
own destiny, and it is in this respect that the ontological agent becomes the active agent 
o f Humanism. Sartre’s stage characters are constant witnesses to this transformation in a 
broad scope o f projects ranging from Oreste’s brutal murders to Hilda’s choice of 
pacifism; and a fundamental change of project such as that undergone by Goetz marks 
the clearest and most spectacular aspect o f our freedom:
Ces instants extraordinaires et merveilleux, ou le projet anterieur s’effondre 
dans le passe a la lumiere d’un projet nouveau qui surgit sur ses mines et qui 
ne fait encore que s’esquisser [...] ont souvent paru foumir 1’image la plus 
claire et la plus emouvante de notre liberte. 122
Moving as this may be, the inherent contradiction can not be overlooked: Sartre seems 
to recognise the existence and validity of the instant, which had previously been clearly 
rejected. This is obviously a point of confusion for Sartre, who does not accept the 
instant as a temporal unit but is happy to postulate it as the moment of decisive choice:
Dans le moment ou le pour-soi pense se saisir et se faire annoncer par un 
neant pro-jete ce qu’il est, il s ’echappe car il pose par la meme qu’il peut 
etre autre qu’il est. II lui suffira d’expliciter son injustifiabilite pour faire 
surgir V instant, c ’est-a-dire 1’apparition d ’un nouveau projet sur 
l’effondrement de l’ancien. 123
The instant has become for Sartre a contradiction in terms, and it is to be one of the 
several problems raised by his relentless supposition o f absolute freedom.
Another negative aspect of Sartrean freedom presents itself in the form of 
responsibility, for if  we are free to choose, we can blame no-one but ourselves for the 
consequences of our actions. Not only does this add to our existential anguish, it also 
leads to the Bad Faith of the denial of freedom revealed so often in the abdication of
119 Ibid., p.652.
120 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p. 145 and p.239.
121 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.528.
122 Ibid., p.555.
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choice. The motive behind choice is important to Sartre, and even when we claim to be 
unaware of any motivation, there is always a reason directing what we choose:
Free to choose our conduct, we are also free to choose the causes which 
determine it -  even when we think this is not the case; even when, in the 
voluntary act, we have deliberated carefully and at length over our 
motives. 124
Sartre divides motivation into subjective ‘mobiles’ and objective ‘motifs’; we are pre- 
reflectively conscious of the former and reflectively conscious o f the latter. The example 
he gives is o f someone joining the Socialist movement, whose ‘motifs’ are to serve the 
interests of humanity and to be part o f the major force o f History in the years to come, 
and whose ‘mobiles’ are the shame of belonging to the privileged classes, an attempt to 
shock those close to me, etc. 125 Our ‘mobiles’ are our hidden motives, and because 
Sartre rejects the Unconscious, the Pour-soi must at least be pre-reflectively conscious 
of them. This is what makes his doctrine somewhat harsh, for we can never negate the 
burden o f responsibility:
Notre description de la liberte ne distinguant pas entre le choisir et le faire, 
nous oblige a renoncer du coup a la distinction entre 1’intention et l’acte. On 
ne saurait pas plus separer 1’intention de l’acte que la pensee du langage qui 
1’ exprime. 126
L ’homme, etant condamne a etre libre, porte le poids du monde tout entier 
sur ses epaules: il est responsable du monde et de lui-meme en tant que 
maniere d ’etre. Nous prenons le mot de ‘responsabilite’ en son sens banal de 
‘conscience (d’)etre l’auteur incontestable d ’un evenement ou d ’un objet’ . 127
In Sartre’s theatre, the heroes and anti-heroes can ultimately be separated by their 
attitudes towards responsibility and choice. If we consider heroes such as Oreste, Goetz, 
and Hoederer, all three acknowledge the motivation behind their choices and willingly 
accept responsibility for the result o f their actions. Even farcical heroes like Georges can 
bear the burden of their freedom: ‘C’est a moi seul que je  dois des comptes. Je suis fils 
de mes oeuvres! ’ 128 Goetz’s first conversion seems at first to be the work o f chance, for 
Sartre, making rare use of dramatic irony, perhaps to emphasise the point, shows Goetz 
throwing dice to decide his future; only later do we discover that he cheated, and 
actually made a willing choice to be Good. But other characters are not so strong and, 
fearful o f the burden of their own responsibility, choose not to choose, playing instead 
the role of Pontius Pilate:
Je ne suis responsable de rien! Je me lave les mains de toute 1’affaire I129
Je ne veux pas choisir: je  ne veux pas que tu te laisses tuer, je  ne veux pas 
que tu le tues. Pourquoi m ’a-t-on mis ce fardeau sur les epaules? Je ne 
connais rien a vos histoires et je m ’en lave les mains. [...] Je suis innocente
124 Lafarge, Rene, Jean-Paul Sartre: His Philosophy, p.60.
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de tout.130
Sibilot and Jessica are typical anti-heroes in their common reaction to responsibility: by 
foiling the strengths of their more autonomous counterparts, they betray their underlying 
weakness and passivity. Like many others, they are ultimately crushed under the bitter 
burden o f Sartre’s testing doctrine.
The problems of conscious knowledge and the instant have already been dealt 
with, but the repercussions of Sartrean freedom are as numerous as they are 
uncomfortable. At the top of the list is probably the objection to the high-handed 
rejection of Essentialism in favour o f an uncompromising Existentialism where 
existence precedes essence. At times, Sartre’s portrayal of a universal human condition 
comes dangerously close to an acceptance of a shared human nature to which all men 
can relate; and the fact that Sartre makes use o f Classical tragedy in his artistic creation 
is perhaps a testimony to the validity o f such a universal nature. Certainly, a reading or 
an audience of the plays of, say, Shakespeare, Moliere, Miller, and Ionesco points 
towards a shared existence which transcends the barriers of time, nationality, colour, 
religion, and class. Yet Sartre makes no allowances for such empathy: his world is 
individualistic to the point of solipsism and socio-historical to the point o f political 
totalitarianism.
His rejection of the personality, the psychologically consistent unit, is equally 
determined, despite the evidence of genetic and environmental influence: identical twins 
separated at birth and raised in different continents have tended to show remarkably 
similar characteristics, as have unrelated foster children raised by the same parents. 
Sartre’s ontology and theatre make no room for such coincidence, and although his 
proof seems tempting, and even somewhat noble, it is not entirely consistent with the 
world we see around us. There is, however, the occasional slip in his characterisation, 
the odd inconsistency between his cafes and his stage, where characters defy the 
Existentialism of their creator: ‘C’est une affaire de vocation [...]. On est tueur de 
naissance. Toi, tu reflechis trop: tu ne pourrais pas . ’ 131 Hoederer’s declaration is 
uncomfortably accurate, for it seems that Hugo, victim o f his class, his nature, his 
personality, whatever, would never be able to become a natural assassin, a cold-blooded 
killer. His suicide, his ‘unsalvageability’, proves his failure, and along with it, perhaps a 
failing of the doctrine that condemns him: if he is free to choose and to change, how can 
he be unsalvageable? Neither is there any place for psychological abnormality, for 
syndromes which have been proven to govern social behaviour: the closest we get is in 
the issue of madness, which is regarded as a somewhat eccentric, if  not even superior, 
conduite magique.132
The rejection of the Unconscious is equally astounding, if  over-explored, given 
the weight of evidence in its favour. Sartre has criticised Freud for substituting his 
favoured mauvaise fo i  with the notion of ‘a lie without a liar’ 133 which would absolve 
the agent from responsibility and thus question the viability o f a discernible code o f 
ethics; and he challenges the conveniently adjustable structure of the Freudian 
Unconscious: ‘Si vraiment le complexe est inconscient, c ’est-a-dire si le signe est separe 
du signifie par un barrage, comment le sujet pourrait-il le reconnaitre? ’ 134 Such 
objections are certainly not without validity, but the fact that Sartre steadfastly refuses 
to at least explore the unknown world of the Unconscious must count against him,
130 Les Mains Sales, p. 179.
131 Ibid., p.213.
132 See especially the characterisation of Pierre and Eve in La Chambre, where ‘madness’ is undoubtedly 
linked with heightened perception of the world of objects and en-soi.
133 See L ’Etre et le Neant, p.90ff, and p.552: ‘Le concept de mauvaise foi [...] nous parait devoir 
remplacer ceux de censure, de refoulement et d’inconscient.’
134 Ibid., p.661.
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particularly if we bear in mind the celebration of the dream evident in Absurdist theatre 
like Ionesco’s, and the admission of de Beauvoir that Sartre was inconsistent in his view 
o f the human unconscious. 135 The evidence of successful post-hypnotic suggestion is yet 
another factor working in Freud’s favour and diminishing the responsibility emanating 
from the consciously chosen motive.
The choice of Fundamental Project is another area of contestation. We are given 
little insight into when or how it is chosen, if  its subject is conscious o f his choice, if  it 
can be changed, etc. Sartre declares that it is ‘unique’ , 136 and then contradicts himself by 
showing Goetz undergo two changes in this initial choice o f project; and if  it is chosen 
in early life, how can its naive author be held responsible for its repercussions? De 
Beauvoir is again more helpful on this matter, but even she does not leave us satisfied:
Aucune question morale ne se pose a 1’enfant tant qu’il est encore incapable 
de se reconnaitre dans le passe, de se prevoir dans l’avenir; c ’est seulement 
quand les moments de sa vie commencent a s’organiser en conduite qu’il 
peut decider et choisir. 137
The moral is certainly ambiguous, and it seems that such a life plan amounts to little 
more than token substitution for Freudian complex and desire, 138 and human nature and 
personality, all o f which are totally unacceptable for the free, autonomous Existentialist. 
To criticise it Existentially, one need only refer to the seeming unanimity o f the 
Fundamental Project and the desire to be God: Sartre has ultimately left us with the 
futile desperation acknowledged by the intellectual agent in his perception o f the 
Absurd, a desperation he was so eager to avoid. 139
Sartre’s answer to these and many other questions lies in his safety net o f 
mauvaise fo i , a term which is, despite popular belief, o f the most highly-complex nature, 
and which has thus been drastically simplified and misconstrued by philosophers, 
audiences, and critics alike. Bad Faith is actually any attempt to flee the ambiguity of 
the desagregation intime, the dualistic composition of pour-soi comprising 
transcendence and facticity. If we oscillate from one o f these ‘ontological poles’ to the 
other, instead of accepting our imposed freedom to be simultaneously at the mercy of 
both, then we ‘deceive ourselves’ and act in Bad Faith. At its extremes, then, mauvaise 
fo i  presents itself as pour-soi declares either ‘je  ne suis pas ce que je  suis’ or ‘je  ne suis 
que ce que je suis’ (i.e. defines itself as pure transcendence or pure facticity) . 140 The 
duality is succinctly clarified by Champigny: ‘Hamlet’s question was: to be or not to be. 
Oreste’s answer is: to be and not to be . ’ 141 Of course, mauvaise fo i  presents itself 
throughout the wide range of thoughts and actions between these two extremities -  
indeed to such an extent that pour-soi spends most of its time in a state o f Bad Faith. 
But Sartre’s theatre, though dealing with the question in all its complexity, also 
succeeds in giving straightforward examples of his characters’ Bad Faith:
135 La Force de L ’Age, p .135: ‘Une de nos contradictions, c ’est que nous niions 1’inconscient; cependant 
Gide, les surrealistes et, malgre nos resistances, Freud lui-meme, nous avaient convaincus qu’il existe en 
tout etre un “infracassable noyau de nuit” [Andre Breton’s term] [...] qui parfois eclate, 
scandaleusement. ’
136 See L ’Etre et le Neant, p.77.
137 Pour une Morale de I ’Ambiguite, pp.38-39.
138 For a satirical contrast of the two, see especially L ’Enfance d ’un Chef, where the protagonist’s (Lucien 
Fleurier’s) childhood is subject to both Freudian and Existentialist psychoanalysis.
139 His concept of finitude and condemnation of the Gidean acte gratuit are equally gratuitous, and they 
must compound our dissatisfaction with central areas of Sartre’s ontology.
140 See L 'Etre et le Neant, p.96 ff.
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A la fin j ’ai pense: c’est ma mort qui decidera; si je  meurs proprement, 
j ’aurai prouve que je ne suis pas un lache.. . 142
Ils ne m ’ont pas touchee. Personne ne m ’a touchee. J ’etais de pierre et je  
n ’ai pas senti leurs mains.143
These two contrasting statements highlight the tendency of the Pour-soi to cling to one 
o f its ontological poles to mask itself from the Anguish o f its Freedom: in believing that 
his death, his final act (and, moreover, a magic act), will nullify the actions o f his life, 
his en-soi, Garcin is denying his facticity and striving after pure transcendence; and by 
attempting to ‘switch o ff  her consciousness, convincing herself that she is as hard, as 
complete, as stone, Lucie is doing just the opposite, disregarding her transcendence and 
clinging to her facticity. Both extremes are obvious attempts to escape from Anguish; 
both fail, because in attempting to flee from Anguish, pour-soi must first be conscious 
o f its existence.
More subtle forms of Bad Faith are found in the Pour-soi’s conduites o f 
reflection and distraction. Reflection is the attempt of the consciousness to become its 
own object through dissociation, and Sartre divides this extasis into ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ 
reflection. The former, in its Good Faith, realises the transcendence of pour-soi, 
maintains a distance (or nothingness) between its subject- and object-consciousness, and 
thus points the way towards salvation; 144 and the latter, as accessory reflection, tries to 
fix the reflechi as en-soi, unifying the two distinctive acts o f consciousness and 
remaining in the Bad Faith of psychic contemplation. L ’Etre et le Neant, while hinting 
at pure reflection in occasional footnotes, is essentially a study of impure reflection, of 
pour-soi’s attempt to deny its duality: ‘L’Ego sous la double forme grammaticale du Je 
et du Moi represente notre personne, en tant qu’unite psychique transcendante . ’ 145 In 
impure reflection, the Je and the Moi are synthesised to create a fully constituted 
personality or Self, and the implicit Bad Faith involved can only result in failure: ‘La 
reflection impure est un effort avorte du pour-soi pour etre autre en restant soi. ’ 146 
Reflection is Bad Faith in the present dimension of time, and it is compounded by 
distraction, which, in a similar assumption of Self, regards the past as a consistent, 
determinant Essence, thus denying the freedom of choice in the projects o f the future. 
Both reflection and distraction deny the freedom of transcendence, which means that 
Essentialism, Freudian Psychoanalysis, and even introspection can all be regarded by 
Sartre as products of Bad Faith. Emotions, too, can be viewed in this light: in La 
Transcendance de I ’Ego, Sartre claims that emotions are consciously chosen qualities 
rather than transcendent states, 147 and in Un Theatre de Situations, he is quick to 
condemn the theatre de caracteres for the same reasons. Thus, according to Sartre, 
pour-soi freely chooses to be happy at a celebration, sad at a funeral, etc: ‘Ses 
souffrances viennent d’elle, c ’est elle seule qui peut s’en delivrer: elle est libre . ’ 148 
Electre’s Bad Faith, so well observed by Oreste, is evident throughout the play, as she 
turns herself from vengeful and courageous to doubtful, guilty, and afraid. Emotions can
142 Huis Clos, p.80.
143 Morts sans Sepulture, Theatre I, p.237.
144 See Thomas C. Anderson, Sartre’s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity, esp. p.54.
145 L 'Etre et le Neant, p.209. See also La Transcendance de I ’Ego.
146 Ibid., p.208.
147 For example, he says of hatred: ‘Le rapport de la haine a l ’“Erlebnis” particulier de repulsion n ’est pas 
logique. C’est un lien magique, assurement. [...] C’est en termes exclusivement magiques qu’il faut 
parler des rapports du moi a la conscience.’ (p.51). This is discussed also by Sylvie Le Bon, who 
describes emotion for Sartre as a ‘conduite magique singuliere’, a ‘fuite irreflechie d’une conscience 
devant un monde qui l ’envahit violemment et qu’elle voudrait aneantir.’ (Ibid.)
148 Les Mouches, p.227.
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only be valid as means in conjunction with freely chosen ends; if  they are seen as 
unavoidable or unproductive ends in themselves, then pour-soi loses its transcendence 
and slips back into Bad Faith. To avoid this, pour-soi must incorporate its emotional 
activity into the rest o f its transcendent existence: ‘We are responsible [...] not only for 
our voluntary acts but for our emotions and our passions, for all our activity . ’ 149
As a means of fleeing Anguish, Bad Faith is equivalent to our etre-pour-fuir. 
Most, if  not all, of our conduites de mauvaise fo i  are direct attempts to escape our 
reality, but none are so apparent as our conduites magiques or d ’abandon. Presumably 
because the implications o f Sartre’s freedom are so extreme, many o f his stage 
characters try in vain to escape from their responsibilities; the result is a rich and 
eclectic range of the various means of temporary flight:
Goetz: Ote-moi la pensee! Ote-la! Fais que je  m ’oublie! Change
moi en insecte!150
Jules: Je bois pour oublier. 151
Bergerat: Nous sommes mines et deshonores.
Chari vet: Je veux me coucher! Je veux me coucher! 152
Frantz: Deja ma folie se delabre; Johanna, c ’etait mon refuge; que
deviendrai-je quand je verrai le jour? 153
Frantz: Savez-vous pourquoi je ne me suis pas tue? Je me disais:
ce qui est fait restera fait. (Un temps. Profondement sincere)
Cela n ’arrange rien de mourir.154
Even from this small selection, we can appreciate the common conduites magiques of 
metamorphosis, chemical intoxication, sleep, madness, suicide, and death, whose 
common aim is to escape consciousness, and therefore freedom, and therefore Anguish. 
Thus emotional Bad Faith, at its most extreme, may also present itself as magical 
behaviour:
L ’emotion n ’est pas un orage physiologique: c’est une reponse adaptee a la 
situation; c ’est une conduite dont le sens et la forme sont l’objet d ’une 
intention de la conscience qui vise a atteindre une fin particuliere par des 
moyens particuliers. L ’evanouissement, la cataplexie, dans la peur, visent a 
supprimer le danger en supprimant la conscience du danger. II y a intention 
de perdre conscience pour abolir le monde redoutable ou la conscience est 
engagee et qui vient a l ’etre par elle. II s ’agit done de conduites magiques 
provoquant des assouvissements symboliques de nos desirs et qui revelent, 
du meme coup, une couche magique du monde. En opposition a ces 
conduites, la conduite volontaire et rationnelle envisagera techniquement la 
situation, refusera le magique et s’appliquera a saisir les series determinees 
et les complexes instrumentaux qui permettent de resoudre les problemes. 155
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Sartre contrasts such behaviour with voluntary, rational conduct, through which the 
magical becomes technical and problems may be solved. In magical behaviour, 
problems are avoided in a conduct of flight as pour-soi flees from its transcendence to 
the safety o f its body. This can be appreciated particularly in the conduites o f fainting, 
sleep, and death, which represent progressive attempts to subjugate the consciousness to 
the material plenitude of en-soi, and therefore a vain attempt to solve the absolute 
problem of surpassing the desire to be God. The ultimate project o f flight must be that 
o f suicide, the choice to exterminate the consciousness and return to matter like a self­
burst balloon, but this choice too is doomed to failure:
Le suicide ne saurait etre considere comme une fin de vie dont je  serais le 
propre fondement. Etant acte de ma vie, en effet, il requiert lui-meme une 
signification que seul l’avenir peut lui donner; mais comme il est le dernier 
acte de ma vie, il se refuse cet avenir; ainsi demeure-t-il totalement 
indetermine. Si j ’echappe a la mort, en effet, ou si je  ‘me manque’, ne 
jugerai-je pas plus tard mon suicide comme une lachete? L ’evenement ne 
pourra-t-il pas me montrer que d ’autres solutions etaient possibles? Mais 
comme ces solutions ne peuvent etre que mes propres projets, elles ne 
peuvent apparaitre que si je  vis. Le suicide est une absurdite qui fait sombrer 
ma vie dans l’absurde. 156
For Sartre, then, pour-soi is not only condemned to be free, but also to a permanent 
consciousness of its Freedom, and any attempt to escape this facticity is restricted to the 
realm of magic. Even the self-imposed death o f the consciousness cannot transcend its 
facticity; the only achievement of suicide is the cowardly submission to the Absurd.
It can be seen that the concept of Bad Faith enables Sartre to rebuff almost any 
criticism of his ontology: the objections we might raise concerning Essentialism, 
genetics, the human personality, parental nurture, emotional behaviour, and the 
Unconscious can be countered through an invocation of the Sartrean concepts o f 
Freedom, consciousness, transcendence, dissociation, reflection, distraction, and 
conduites magiques, and through their unifying force of the Fundamental Project. Our 
essential objections, then, must be to the notion o f Bad Faith itself.
Bad Faith, in its complex, far-reaching, and esoteric suppositions, exists as its 
own network of self-defence, conveniently providing implicit criticism o f any attack on 
its merits. In its own bad faith, it is ironically reminiscent of Freudian analysis, since 
neither leave a place for dispute or progression:
The trouble [...] with this theory of bad faith, is simply that there is no room 
for a discussion of its merits. It is part of the teaching of Freudian 
psychology that its findings will be resisted, so that any resistance to it is 
taken as a confirmation of its truth. The same is even more true o f Sartre’s 
theory o f bad faith. If  a critic denies it, the denial will only be taken as 
evidence of the critic’s own bad faith.157
Such ‘evidence’ may be justified against critics like Boutang, who refuse to accept a 
Godless, loveless world, regarding Sartre as an agent o f the Devil, 158 but in general the 
assumption is unfair and even ridiculous. For example, Sartre’s conduites magiques 
such as fainting and sleep may well constitute a flight from the reality o f consciousness,
156 Ibid., p.624.
157 Cranston, Maurice, Sartre, pp.50-51.
158 See Pierre Boutang and Bernard Pingaud, ‘Sartre est-il un Possede?' suivi de ‘Un Univers F ige\
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but they are often unavoidable, physical needs which should not be regarded as 
intentional escapism; and suicide, though unquestionably a chosen flight, is perfectly 
compatible with the notion o f finitude, which, if  taken to its logical conclusion, cannot 
escape the threat of extinction -  hence the unsalvageable finitude o f Hugo and o f Franz, 
whose suicides provide fittingly dramatic denouements but contradict the tenets o f the 
philosophy behind them.
Another main objection must be that concerning Good Faith and Sartre’s 
‘dangling carrot’ o f Sincerity. As an ideological, rather than purely semantic, opposition 
to Bad Faith, Good Faith should constitute an attempt to accept the ambiguity o f pour- 
soV s ‘desagregation’, to accept the simultaneous reality o f its facticity and 
transcendence, and to engage in pure reflection by refusing the dissociation o f the 
consciousness and acknowledging instead the gap o f free, transcendent nothingness 
between its Je and its M oi: ‘Une liberte qui se veut liberte [...] choisit [...] d ’etre toujours 
a distance de soi. ’ 159 The ontological agent will avoid the Bad Faith o f Essentialism, 
distraction, and impure reflection by respecting its temporal autonomy and choosing its 
undetermined future self. But we are told by Sartre that in practice, Good Faith is but a 
project o f Bad Faith, as pour-soi flees its Anguish in the direction o f facticity: ‘La 
bonne foi cherche a fuir la desagregation intime de mon etre vers l’en-soi qu’elle devrait 
etre et n ’est point. ’ 160 Sincerity thus becomes another unrealisable, an unattainable goal 
like that to achieve the godlike synthesis of en-soi-pour-soi; for if  we determine to be 
‘sincere’, or ‘true to ourselves’, we must first determine what we are, which implicitly 
necessitates a rejection of the desagregation intime, an acceptance of the Self as defined 
personality, and a reduction o f pour-soi to mere object status. This acceptance reminds 
us o f Sartre’s ‘sincere man’, who reproaches the homosexual for not admitting that he is 
(only) what he is, denies his friend’s transcendence, and so falls himself into Bad Faith: 
‘Qu’est-ce done alors que la sincerite, sinon precisement un phenomene de mauvaise 
foi? ’ 161 Another example is given in the Bad Faith of Goetz, who, in one o f his 
Fundamental Projects, aspires towards a similar Sincerity: ‘Je ne peux pas etre un autre 
que moi. ’ 162 Thus Bad Faith, however undesirable, precarious, and ‘metastable’ , 163 
becomes a normal and even durable state of existence for the Pour-soi, and it is difficult 
to see how even the ontological agent can escape its clutches. If  we are condemned to 
mauvaise fo i , we may question the very validity o f Good Faith and Sincerity, and 
wonder why we should not choose to act in Bad Faith or escape from our Anguish in a 
conduite magique. Sartre’s answer is simple: the logical and rational conduct of the 
lucid consciousness must be to accept the reality o f its structure and condition, and 
pursue the goal o f sincere Good Faith, for Tattitude de stricte coherence est l’attitude 
de bonne foi’ . 164 The problem of the Bad Faith evident in Good Faith will be solved 
through Authenticity, claims Sartre; 165 and when the ontological agent acts freely and in 
situation, he will discover his moral self, and his floundering Good Faith will finally 
become his ethics.
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Sartre’s agent has now progressed from an intellectual appreciation o f his Absurd 
condition and through an ontological recognition o f his boundless freedom to a 
realisation of his moral self and of the ethical implications o f his freedom in situation. 
Just as transcendence offered an escape from the entrapment o f Absurdism, so can pure 
reflection and ethical Authenticity provide salvation from the ontological quandary of 
Bad Faith. The challenge of Authenticity will be dealt with in regard to the Sartrean 
hero; the challenge for the agent is to apply the freedom of his ontology to the blank 
canvas o f his moral conduct and to seek the ethical coherence hinted at in Sartre’s 
discussions on Good Faith. The philosophical progression from ontology to ethics has 
never been a smooth one, and for Sartre it has proved particularly testing; but for 
Sartre’s agents, it must begin with an ideological fusion between their freedom and 
morality:
L ’homme qui cherche a justifier sa vie doit vouloir avant tout et absolument 
la liberte elle-meme: en meme temps qu’elle exige la realisation de fins 
concretes, de projets singuliers, elle s’exige universellement. [...] Se vouloir 
moral et se vouloir libre, c ’est une seule et meme decision . 166
If logic decrees that we should try to avoid Bad Faith, then it must also encourage a 
strict adherence to Freedom as the catalyst for a human ethics; and Sartre’s Humanist 
ethics, founded on the basis of this Freedom, links its agent’s whole identity with the 
choice of his morality: ‘L’homme se fait; il n ’est pas tout fait d ’abord, il se fait en 
choisissant sa morale. ’ 167 The ethical agent is thus forced to create himself in his choice 
of morality, and the interdependence o f his ontological liberty and ethical situation 
serves to narrow down the scope of his choice: ‘II n ’y a de liberte qu’en situation et il 
n ’y a de situation que par la liberte. ’ 168 Freedom is meaningless, restricted to a condition 
o f facticity, unless it is applied with vigour to the concrete situation. We have seen the 
futile desperation of the desire to be in the Absurd desire to be God and in the 
ontological absurdity o f Bad Faith, but in the realm o f ethics, pour-soi can progress to 
the mode of doing, and find hope and identity in the meaningful world o f action. 
Moreover, this ethical choice of action will confirm us in our Humanism, for, according 
to Sartre, ‘en pratiquant la charite nous ne servons que les hommes, mais en etant 
charitable nous servons Dieu. [...] II faut que la moralite se depasse vers un but qui 
n ’est pas elle. Donner a boire a celui qui a soif non pour donner a boire ni pour etre bon 
mais pour supprimer la soif. La moralite [...] doit etre choix du monde, non de soi. ’ 169 
Ethics, then, cannot exist in a vacuum; it must be grounded in the context of Humanistic 
need and based on concrete action. Like ontology, ethics should discourage solipsism, 
and the two should work in conjunction to eradicate the primacy of Self. For indeed 
ethics is as inherent to the agent as ontology:
Le rapport entre la subjectivite agissante et le Bien est aussi etroit que le 
rapport intentionnel qui lie la conscience a son objet [...]. Le Bien ne peut 
etre con£u en dehors d’une subjectivite agissante, et pourtant il est l ’au-dela 
de cette subjectivite. [...] L’homme doit [...] etre considere comme l’etre 
par quoi le Bien vient au monde. 170
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If  ontologically pour-soi brings nothingness into the world, then on the ethical plane, it 
is the agent responsible for ‘goodness’. But before we can act, or locate the source or 
goal o f this goodness, we need to determine an ethical modus vivendi, a Fundamental 
Project based on our moral values, and this challenge, the justification behind our 
choices, lies at the heart of Sartre’s interest in ethics and forms the greatest inspiration 
for his theatre:
Ce que le theatre peut montrer de plus emouvant est un caractere en train de 
se faire, le moment du choix, de la libre decision qui engage une morale et 
toute une vie. La situation est un appel; elle nous ceme; elle nous propose 
des solutions, a nous de decider. 171
Sartre has moved on from ontology to ethics, and he is now concerned with the 
implications o f his ontology on the outside world, on society and politics, on the 
concrete situation au-milieu-du-monde. His theatre explores real life situations, from the 
everyday to the limit or boundary, and, though didactic, it leaves for the individual the 
choice o f his own ethics.
However, Sartre certainly does not refrain from establishing strict guidelines for 
the moral agent: the legacy of his Humanism, his Absurdism, and his ontology cannot 
fail to exert a profound influence on his detailed exploration o f ethics. The Existentialist 
Humanist is abandoned in a Godless world, free, responsible, and with no recourse to a 
higher moral being to justify his choice of values:
En effet, tout est permis si Dieu n ’existe pas, et par consequent l’homme est 
delaisse, parce qu’il ne trouve ni en lui, ni hors de lui une possibility de 
s’accrocher. II ne trouve d ’abord pas d ’excuses. [...] C’est ce que 
j ’exprimerai en disant que l’homme est condamne a etre libre. Condamne, 
parce qu’il ne s’est pas cree lui-meme, et par ailleurs cependant libre, parce 
qu’une fois jete dans le monde, il est responsable de tout ce qu’il fait.172
The implications o f Sartre’s Humanism for the ethical agent are particularly severe, for 
deprived of a Moral Father, o f guidance and obedience, pour-soi emerges ethically 
bastardised. The Biblical myth of Abraham evoked by Sartre has a double significance 
here : 173 Abraham’s religious faith becomes Sartre’s ethical Bad Faith, based as it is upon 
obedience and relinquished responsibility; and if  the myth became reality, it would 
merely prove the existence of a jealous, violent God with an ethic o f its own. Sartre’s 
rejection of God fortunately annihilates this problem, but it leaves Man in an ethical 
void, compounding the awareness of his ontological Absurdism:
Frantz: II n ’y a pas de Dieu, non?
Le Pere: Je crains qu’il n ’y en ait pas: c’est meme parfois bien embetant. 174
Perhaps the one true benefit of an omniscient, omnipotent God would be the resulting 
possibility of a tangible code of ethics. But Sartre, ever defiant about the autonomy of 
Man, turns the problem round, focusing instead on the challenging optimism proffered 
by Humanistic freedom. This defiance features strongly in Sartrean theatre, where 
characters rejoice in their freedom and accept the morality within them:
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Egisthe: Ce qui est juste, c’est ce que veut Jupiter. [...]
Oreste: Que m ’importe Jupiter? La justice est une affaire d ’hommes, et je  
n ’ai pas besoin d’un Dieu pour me l’enseigner.175
Oreste’s Humanism is truly inspiring, and it opens the way for the ethical autonomy 
later to be realised by heroes such as Hoederer and Goetz.
The first step on this moral crusade comes with the outright rejection of 
absolutism, which marks another central feature of Sartrean Humanism. It is explored 
most notably in Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, where the protagonist battles with the 
conflicting forces o f Good and Evil until he sees the light and rejects both in favour o f 
human, ethical, and political pragmatism. The play has been called an atheist allegory, 176 
but it is actually closer to the Humanist school of thought in its attempt to project 
mankind rather than cynically dismiss the very notion o f God: ‘It is not the 
metaphysical problem of the existence of a divinity that concerns Sartre; it is the 
psychological and ethical implications o f a hieratic way o f thinking . ’ 177 Again, the 
extension of freedom from the ontological plane to the ethical sphere cannot be 
overlooked. Sartre is advocating free, autonomous ethics, removed from the constraints 
of any organised system or doctrine. Although Goetz ultimately succeeds in freeing 
himself from his ethical restraints, others such as Heinrich are plagued with a 
conscience malheureuse, revealing the cowardly inner conflict o f their ethical Bad 
Faith: ‘Un elu, c ’est un homme que le doigt de Dieu coince contre un mur . ’ 178 Heinrich, 
and indeed Nasty, may well function as Goetz’s alter-egos, but their main role is to 
effect an underlying symbiosis which elucidates the conflicts within the protagonist and 
urges him towards the anagnorisis o f ethical liberty; and it is the final realisation that 
Evil and Good, the Devil and the Good Lord, are two sides o f the same coin which 
clears the way for the change in Goetz’s Fundamental Project, the genuine ethical 
conversion: ‘II faut avoir bonne vue pour distinguer le Bon Dieu du Diable . ’ 179 The 
rejection of absolutes is regarded as a vital precondition for valid moral conduct, for 
absolutism necessitates the abdication o f choice, responsibility, and freedom. If 
Heinrich, as a priest, incarnates the notion of Bad Faith, then we should perhaps look to 
Goetz, the freedom fighter, to clarify authentic moral action.
The first goal of descriptive ethics must be to determine a discernible set of 
values, for without a set of moral guidelines, any form of normative ethics must seem an 
impossibility. However, Sartre links the moral value with the ethics of absolutism, and 
attempts to decipher Existentialist values are thus likely to be in vain. As Man is free, 
his values must be founded in his Freedom, and there is thus nothing (since pour-soi is 
both Freedom and nothingness) to justify his choice of values. This ethical 
unjustifiability, and hence paramount responsibility, is o f course the main source of 
M an’s moral anguish:
Je n ’ai ni puis avoir recours a aucune valeur contre le fait que c ’est moi qui 
maintiens a l ’etre les valeurs; rien ne peut m ’assurer contre moi-meme, 
coupe du monde et de mon essence par ce neant que je  suis, j ’ai a realiser le 
sens du monde et de mon essence: j ’en decide, seul, injustifiable et sans 
excuse. 180
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As with ontological Anguish, Man is often tempted to escape from this moral 
responsibility, and he usually finds his refuge in the Spirit o f Seriousness, which 
subordinates him to the world, granting values a concrete, transcendent force o f their 
own. Just as the Biblical Moses received the Ten Commandments on tablets of stone, so 
does the Serious man regard his values as concrete, as written in stone, pre-existing both 
himself and the choice o f his actions. In a sensitive comparison, Sartre links ethics with 
language, moral actions with the choice of words:
II ne saurait, en effet, y avoir de lois de la parole avant qu’on parle. Et toute 
parole est libre projet de designation ressortissant au choix d’un pour-soi 
personnel et devant s’interpreter a partir de la situation globale de ce pour- 
soi. 181
The analogy is appropriate for a writer of such renown, and Sartrean Man is consistently 
shown to be an able agent of his (logical) language, particularly on the stage. Another 
comparison is made with hierarchical organisations, where the feudal system is used to 
show that power, like the value, is both upheld and surpassed by the countless 
individual projects undertaken by every human being .182 So whether in the realm o f 
ethics, language, or power, we must remember that these abstracts come into the world 
only through pour-soi, without which they are meaningless, empty, and redundant; and 
it is thus illogical, if  not unethical, for pour-soi to subordinate itself to an entity it
invents and therefore should control. Or, in Sartre’s words, ‘peu importe que le Bien
soit. II faut qu’il soit par nous'™2.
However, as the ethical equivalent of Bad Faith, the Spirit o f Seriousness is the 
default morality of pour-soi, the refuge from the moral ambiguity it cannot bear to face. 
In the world of objects, it functions as the denial of the Fundamental Project: we may 
claim to like eating jam for its bright colour or its sweet taste, whereas really it merely 
recreates, in its viscous, compressible form, our original desire to possess. But in the 
domain of meta-ethics, its effect is much more serious, for by reversing the natural roles 
o f Man and his values, it threatens the very core of any form of Humanism; and as an 
illogical, unethical, and harmful force, the agent must strive to defeat it:
Le resultat principal de la psychanalyse existentielle doit etre de nous faire 
renoncer a Vesprit de serieux. [...] Le resultat de l ’esprit de serieux qui [...] 
regne sur le monde, est de faire boire comme par un buvard les valeurs 
symboliques des choses par leur idiosyncrasie empirique [...]. L ’ontologie et 
la psychanalyse existentielle [...] doivent decouvrir a l ’agent moral qu’il est
I 'etre par qui les valeurs existent. C ’est alors que sa liberte prendra
conscience d ’elle-meme et se decouvrira dans l ’angoisse comme 1’unique 
source de la valeur, et le neant par qui le monde existe. 184
Sartre’s theatre clearly illuminates how this moral freedom is denied and traces the dire 
consequences o f its characters’ flight from ethical anguish. By definition, agents must 
be the subjects of their object-values, and must therefore renounce any claim to 
Seriousness; characters who deny their freedom place values on an ethical pedestal and 
flee responsibility to become their puppets:
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M oi,y ’ai des idees, j ’en produis a chaque minute par douzaines [...]. Vous, 
vous n ’en avez pas, ce sont elles qui vous ont; elles vous tiennent dans leurs 
griffes, elles vous labourent le crane et vous bouchent les yeux; c’est 
precisement pour cela qu’elles convainquent les autres; ce sont des reves de 
pierre, elles fascinent tous ceux qui ont la nostalgie de la petrification . 185
Sur toutes les routes il y a des crimes. Des crimes prefabriques qui 
n ’attendent que leur criminel. Le vrai soldat passe et s ’en charge. L ’histoire 
vous deplait? Je n ’aime pas vos yeux!186
These two examples illuminate the trap set for the ethical puppet: in the first speech, 
Georges contrasts his own (ironic) authenticity with Sibilot’s restrictive Bad Faith; and 
in the second, Frantz, unable to support his historical guilt, reveals his own Seriousness 
to the perceptive vision of Johanna. The notion that ideas or crimes possess or pre-exist 
humanity is the most extreme form of Serious thought, and it establishes a vicious circle 
between the moral standpoints of anguish, gesture, and absolutism. It acts as a threat to 
Humanism because in the absence of an absolute God, Serious Man can usurp the moral 
infallibility o f a divine Godhead, and use God as a mouthpiece for the doctrine o f his 
choice: ‘Quand Dieu se tait, on peut lui faire dire ce que Ton veut. ’187 I f  we consider 
quasi-religious dictatorships or pseudo-religious cults, we can easily appreciate the 
dangerous force of this common technique of ethical control. It is a variation on this 
theme that forms the inspiration for Les Mains Sales, where transcendent, infallible 
principles are juxtaposed with the ambiguous politics o f moral pragmatism. This ethical 
polemic is somewhat crudely embodied in the characters o f Hoederer and Hugo, whose 
bitter exchanges reveal the inherent conflict between Humanism and Seriousness:
Hoederer: Tu n ’aimes pas les hommes, Hugo. Tu n ’aimes que les
principes.
Hugo: Les hommes? Pourquoi les aimerais-je? Est-ce qu’ils
m ’aiment? 188
Being free of any preordained set of values, Hoederer represents the true ethical agent as 
conceived by Sartre, and although audiences and critics in the past have sympathised 
with the idealism of Hugo, the playwright makes it clear with whom his own 
sympathies lie: ‘Hugo n ’a jamais ete pour moi un personnage sympathique, et je n ’ai 
jamais considere qu’il eut raison par rapport a Hoederer [...]. C’est l ’attitude de 
Hoederer qui seule me parait saine. ’ 189 But Hugo is, in a sense, the tragic hero of the 
play, and the purer contrasts are to be found in characters like Louis and Olga who do 
not even doubt the validity of the values for which they are prepared to die. As potential 
martyrs to their cause, they highlight the dangerous extremism of any such collective 
morality.
It is clear then that, like Hoederer, the ethical agent should reject the illogical 
temptation of the values and absolutes advocated by the Spirit o f Seriousness and base 
his moral conduct on the sole principle of Freedom in situation. This, o f course, is not 
the easy route: ethical liberty removes the chance of justification and collectivism, 
condemning the agent to full personal responsibility, gratuitous choice, and moral 
ambiguity: ‘For humanistic existentialism [...] man’s absurdity and insecurity stem from
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the fact that there is no ultimate standard of reference, that ‘sub specie astemitatis’ all 
actions are equal. ’190 Bereft of any point of reference, divine or otherwise, Sartrean Man 
is once more condemned to be free. Sartre’s ethics are o f course based on this 
philosophical premise, and he uses two effective analogies to underscore his perception 
o f morality: the game (or ‘play’), and the artist’s canvas. The more straightforward is 
the blank canvas, free, empty, and clear, which gradually comes to life as the artist 
asserts his individuality through his choice of colour, style, and technique:
II faut comparer le choix moral avec la construction d ’une oeuvre d ’art [...].
II est bien entendu qu’il n ’y a pas de tableau defini a faire, que l’artiste 
s’engage dans la construction de son tableau, et que le tableau a faire, c ’est 
precisement le tableau qu’il aura fait. 191
There is no room here for preconception: we create as we go along and any guidelines 
must come from within. If  we do not like the end result, the portrait we have painted, we 
should start again, like Goetz, tabula rasa, until we finally begin to see our moral selves 
reflected in the portrait. Sartre speaks o f ‘un avenir vierge’ 192 with reference to morality, 
again linking the ontological truths of choice and temporality with the freedom of his 
ethics, and the analogy of the painter is wholly consistent with these truths . 193 Although 
one might object that the choice of painting, and thus moral code, is utterly gratuitous, 
removing from morality any possibility of righteousness or judgement, it remains, as 
pointed out by Pilkington , 194 that values can be determined by the ‘coherence’ of the 
work or action -  a contention which fits in neatly with Sartre’s own comments on the 
‘strict coherence’ of Good Faith . 195 As before, this points the way towards the possibility 
o f moral objectivity. But that is all it does; and, once again, Sartre’s insistence on 
absolute freedom has left us asking the right questions with little hope o f finding fitting 
or satisfactory answers.
Let us turn, then, to the more complex analogy o f the game. It seems appropriate 
that the alternative attitude to Seriousness should be one o f play, in which the rules are 
invented as we go along, by ourselves and fo r  ourselves, in the knowledge that nothing 
justifies their existence apart from their logic and coherence: if  the game works well, we 
do not need to change it. This unjustified, self-imposed regulation is perhaps Sartre’s 
answer to the Kierkegaardian ethics of irony, and it works effectively in the world of 
ethics, posing positive opposition to the enveloping mass o f Seriousness. It is clarified 
most eloquently by de Beauvoir, who evokes a perceptive conception o f childhood to 
emphasise her point:
Le malheur de l’homme, a dit Descartes, vient de ce qu’il a d ’abord ete un 
enfant. [...] Ce qui caracterise la situation de l ’enfant, c ’est qu’il se trouve 
jete dans un uni vers qu’il n ’a pas contribue a constituer, qui a ete fagonne 
sans lui et qui lui apparait comme un absolu auquel il ne peut que se 
soumettre; a ses yeux, les inventions humaines: les mots, les moeurs, les 
valeurs, sont des faits donnes, ineluctables comme le ciel et les arbres; c ’est 
dire que le monde ou il vit est le monde du serieux.196
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Perhaps as a means of revolt, the child’s natural reaction is one o f play, o f self-invention 
and regulation, and it is probably no accident that the notorious freedom o f childhood 
becomes the very shackles of adulthood: ‘Le malheur qui vient a l’homme du fait qu’il a 
ete un enfant, c’est done que sa liberte lui a ete d’abord masquee et qu’il gardera toute 
sa vie la nostalgie du temps ou il en ignorait les exigences. ’197 The agent, however, has 
to overcome this nostalgia and make a conscious decision to re-enter the world o f play; 
like the artist and the child, he must invent his own morality and set him self free from 
the prison of Seriousness:
Catherine: Et pourquoi faire le Mai?
Goetz: Parce que le Bien est deja fait.
Catherine: Qui l’a fait?
Goetz: Dieu le Pere. Moi, j ’invente. 198
In order to uphold his Humanist ethic, it is left for Sartre’s agent to cast aside the 
doctrines and dogma of Serious morality in the ultimate realisation that he is the author 
o f his own destiny, that he and no other chooses the values which determine his course 
o f action: ‘Toujours pas de miracle: je  commence a croire que Dieu me laisse carte 
blanche. ’ 199 Goetz’s realisation is the vital precondition for any ethical conduct, and it 
must establish the foundation for any form of Sartrean ethics. To deny this ethical ‘carte 
blanche’ is to act in Bad Faith in an attempt to escape from moral responsibility, and 
Sartrean theatre abounds in characters too weak to accept their ethical autonomy and 
authorship. Like ontological Bad Faith, this denial can take many forms, but it always 
involves a flight from the essential ambiguity at the heart o f the realite humaine:
Je ne peux ni veux comprendre! II faut croire! Croire! Croire!200
Je suis le plus jeune: je n ’ai fait qu’obeir. Je suis innocent! Innocent! 
Innocent!201
Le hasard a tire trois coups de feu [...]. C’est un assassinat sans assassin.202
Pardonne-moi.
Je n ’ai rien fait.
Si. Je sais, mon cheri, je t ’ai fait mal.
Mais ce sont les Dieux, tu le sais bien .203
Heinrich’s blind faith, F ra n c is ’ claimed naivete, Hugo’s ironic invocation o f Chance, 
and Helene’s manipulation of the gods are all strong examples o f flawed morality. The 
semantic repetition used by Heinrich and F ran c is  betrays a somewhat pathetic attempt 
at self deception, and all the characters are united in their struggle to ignore the freedom 
o f their facticity and the constant challenge of ethical transcendence.
However, even characters who accept their moral ambiguity and strive after 
ethical Good Faith are plagued with traps such as idealism and Sincerity. Hugo, for 
example, has the potential to attain hero status (and, indeed, has done so in the eyes o f 
some critics), but by placing his principles before others and even before himself, he
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demonstrates his naive political idealism, subjugating progress to purity and betraying 
an inherent lack of Authenticity. The temptation of Sincerity is equally strong and far 
more ambiguous, for even Sartre seems to set it down as a challenge with one hand 
while removing it cynically with the other. Having denounced the ‘sincere m an’ in 
discussions on Bad Faith ,204 he goes on to reveal his belief in at least the potential o f the 
very same concept of Sincerity: ‘Pourtant, le pour-soi est [...] a titre d ’etre qui n ’est pas 
ce qu’il est et qui est ce qu’il n ’est pas. II est puisque [...] le projet de la sincerite est au 
moins concevable. ’205 In relation to the analogy of the canvas, the idea o f Sincerity is 
that the moral artist would paint a mirror image of himself to which he would endeavour 
to remain resolutely true. If Shakespeare’s Polonius cries ‘to thine own self be true’, 
Sartre’s ontology replies ‘there is no S elf; but his ethics seems to hesitate in self- 
contradiction, and the issue is simply avoided by the promise o f a subsequent study on 
the theme o f Authenticity.
In other areas, Sartre’s ethics is explicitly, if  not devastatingly, clear. The logical 
conclusion to the rejection o f absolutes, values, idealism, and Seriousness is the 
acceptance of autonomous freedom and sole moral responsibility: Sartre’s agents can 
blame no system, ideology, Other, or even Self for the consequences of their actions. As 
Humanists, their moral choices have a profound resonance throughout the human world; 
in reinventing themselves, they choose their model for humanity:
Ainsi, notre responsabilite est beaucoup plus grande que nous ne pourrions 
le supposer, car elle engage l’humanite entiere. [...] Ainsi je  suis responsable 
pour moi-meme et pour tous, et je cree une certaine image de l’homme que 
je choisis; en me choisissant, je  choisis l’homme .206
This paramount responsibility creates an ethical schism between Sartre’s ideology and 
that of his opponents, and it establishes a direct convergence between his ontology and 
his ethics, allowing no room for ‘external’ factors such as childhood, conditioning, and 
terror:
Sibilot: Un criminel est un criminel.
Georges: [..] Ah! ce n ’est pas vous que je  risquerais d’attendrir en
evoquant mon enfance malheureuse.207
The satire is, o f course, at Freud’s expense, reasserting Sartre’s contention that a man 
cannot be separated from his actions: pour-soi is what pour-soi does. The Existentialist 
hero, then, is the one who claims his actions for himself, whether taking the credit or 
accepting the blame, and an ethical comparison o f Hugo and Oreste clearly 
distinguishes the flawed idealistic puppet from the heroic moral agent:
Voila un crime embarrassant: personne n ’en veut. Je ne sais pas pourquoi je 
l’ai fait et vous ne savez qu’en faire.208
Un crime que son auteur ne peut supporter, ce n ’est plus le crime de 
personne, n ’est-ce pas? C’est presque un accident. [...] Vous me regardez, 
gens d ’Argos, vous avez compris que mon crime est bien a moi; je  le 
revendique a la face du soleil, il est ma raison de vivre et mon orgueil [...].
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Je prends tout sur moi.209
The ethical pragmatism demonstrated by Oreste forms a stark contrast with the doubt 
and hesitation evident in Hugo. The hero of the early play perhaps anticipates the more 
rounded dedication of Hugo’s hero, Hoederer, who, like Oreste and Goetz, sees the 
ambiguity of ethics and accepts to be bad in order to be good. But even Hugo’s idealism 
is better than the shameful evil which poisons the past of Frantz and many o f his 
compatriots. Frantz’s shame is obvious, but the notion o f collective responsibility is 
much more complex, depersonalising action and thus diluting guilt:
Le Pere: Alors, choisis: laisse condamner les responsables ou fais 
retomber leurs fautes sur l’Allemagne entiere.
Frantz: Ha! £ a  revient au meme.210
The problems and contradictions evident in Sartre’s ethics are both numerous 
and far-reaching, and it is this vital area of Sartrean philosophy which currently 
preoccupies the vast majority of his critics. Firstly, the over-harsh burden o f 
responsibility must be challenged, for Sartre’s expectations o f his agents are certainly 
extreme: it is surely not logical to suppose that we are always totally responsible for the 
outcome of our actions. The usual objections apply, concerning age, mental state and 
capacity, disability, chance etc., and it seems that a compromise must be found between 
Sartre’s insistence on the deed and the Kantian focus on the motive, which 
acknowledges the unforeseen gulf between the intention and the outcome. There are 
echoes o f this in Sartrean theatre, especially in the later plays, where it seems that 
Sartre, somewhat uncomfortable with the rigidity o f his intransigent ethics, leaves it for 
his characters to locate the middle ground:
Leni: Les innocents avaient vingt ans, c’etaient les soldats; les
coupables en avaient cinquante, c ’etaient leurs peres.211
Le Pere: Petit prince! Petit prince! Tu veux porter le monde sur tes
epaules? Le monde est lourd et tu ne le connais pas. Laisse .212
It is no coincidence that Les Sequestres d ’Altona provides the best examples o f the 
problems of ethical responsibility, for the play is a dedicated study o f judgement and 
guilt. It has been said that the stage acts as a tribunal,213 at the centre o f which lies 
Frantz, the ‘Butcher of Smolensk’, who is racked with guilt and in desperate need o f a 
judge. Throughout the play, his profound sense o f guilt and wrongdoing, disguised in 
the ahistorical charade of his room and through the conduite magique o f his madness, 
bears down as a weight upon his conscience, establishing a paradox between Sartre’s 
ethical characterisation and his ontological insistence on the fluidity o f consciousness. 
Another objection therefore must be to this uncomfortable marriage o f ontology and 
ethics, exposed here in the ethical recourse to a form of ontological substantialism 
previously rejected as inherently flawed. This acceptance o f the ‘conscience’, confused 
o f course by the homographic ambiguity of the French (where la conscience is variably 
‘consciousness’ and ‘the conscience’), is supported by the recurrent, Kafkaesque 
symbolism of the crabs, who in this instance plague the troubled hallucinations of
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Frantz, reminiscent in their brutal, osseous form of his butchered ghosts from the past, 
and invoked therefore as the appropriate judicial arbitrators to determine his level of 
guilt. It seems that they choose to condemn him, for in an apocalyptic resolution not 
dissimilar to the dramatic fate of Hugo, Frantz is deemed unsalvageable, accepting 
finitude in the final conduite o f suicide. As with Hugo, we must object to the blatant 
pessimism, to the repeated contradiction of ontology and ethics: Why should Frantz’s 
past leave him without a future? Why is there no chance o f a change in Fundamental 
Project? The pessimism is compounded by the suicide o f Le Pere, who, though a 
stronger, more functional character, is condemned along with his son, despite rejecting 
the guilt o f his conscience:
Johanna: Vous aviez une conscience?
Le Pere: Oui. Je l ’ai perdu: par modestie. C’est un luxe de prince.
Frantz pouvait se le permettre: quand on ne fait rien, on 
croit qu’on est responsable de tout.214
If  the conscience is an ethical luxury, it is one enjoyed by many of Sartre’s anti-heroes, 
and especially by Hugo and Frantz, whom it appears to unequivocally condemn. It may 
well be that the later Sartre, in his increasing dramatic interest in political symbolism, 
was tempted by the power of character annihilation, but such theatre sits uncomfortably 
with his philosophy and serves to threaten any possible synthesis between his ontology 
and his ethics.
In the search for a judge, it is often the conscience, this mystical, intangible 
arbitrator, which acquires the role, and although regret is said to have no place in the 
thoughts of the true Existentialist, it often becomes the yard stick on the ethical scale o f 
action:
Mon honnetete venait du fond de mon cceur,
Et je ne voulais d’autre guide que ma conscience.215
Tu peux bien vivre, toi, tu as la conscience tranquille [...]. Moi, [...] il n ’y a 
pas un pouce de ma peau qui ne me fasse horreur.216
The conscious morality of Andromaque and Lucie reveals the high regard for personal 
ethics evident in Sartrean theatre, and it seems that Sartre ultimately wavers on the 
question of the conscience, never quite succeeding in either convincing defence or 
thorough obliteration. His characters’ actions are inseparable from their humanity, 
which in turn is shown to be dependent on the dictates o f their conscience:
Ils ont beau jeu: la-bas, quand ils decident qu’un homme va mourir, c ’est 
comme s’ils rayaient un nom sur un annuaire: c’est propre, c’est elegant. Ici, 
la mort est une besogne. Les abbatoirs, c’est ici. II boit, il fume, il me parle 
du Parti, il fait des projets et moi je pense au cadavre qu’il sera, c ’est 
obscene.217
We cannot fail to sympathise here with Hugo’s Hamletesque disposition: caught as he is 
between Hoederer’s gifted pragmatism and the Party’s dogged idealism, he is an 
intensely human character, and in him is embodied Sartre’s unresolved conflict between
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the freedom of ontology and the conscious substance o f morality.
Despite any evidence in Sartre’s philosophy and theatre for or against the 
acceptance of the conscience, it remains the case that as an implicitly subjective arbiter 
o f ethics, the conscience is ill-equipped to point towards a viable code o f ethics. Like 
Frantz, then, we must look elsewhere for moral judgement; and if  we recall Sartre’s 
ethical analogies and the problem of Bad Faith, it seems advisable to return to the goals 
o f logic and coherence -  a decision proposed by Sartre in L'Existentialisme est un 
Humanisme:
On peut juger [...] que certains choix sont fondes sur l’erreur, et d ’autres sur 
la verite. On peut juger un homme en disant qu’il est de mauvaise foi. Si 
nous avons defini la situation de l’homme comme un choix libre, sans 
excuses et sans secours, tout homme qui se refugie derriere 1’excuse de ses 
passions, tout homme qui invente un determinisme est un homme de 
mauvaise foi.218
The ‘truth’, like the logic and coherence o f the portrait and Good Faith, lies in the sole 
responsibility for a choice that is freely made. In this we have at least the basis for an 
objective system of moral judgement: for any given choice, we could ask its agent if  the 
decision was ethically autonomous and if full responsibility was then assumed. A 
negative answer to either of these essential conditions would simplistically remove the 
agent from the morals of Sartrean ethics.
But such a methodology cannot form more than a basis: firstly, because only the 
agent, and not the choice, can ever be condemned (I may choose, because I  am a 
Christian, to share my loaf of bread); and secondly, because the system lacks an 
adjudicator to make it accountably objective (who is to say that I did not choose 
freely?). The solutions to these problems lie in a normative code o f ethics, but the search 
for a moral judge is an obstacle which must be addressed immediately, for it permeates 
the very heart of Sartre’s theatrical exploration o f ethics.
The theme of moral judgement can be seen to divide Sartre’s characters into two 
distinct groups, namely ethical subjects and ethical objects (or, to be consistent, agents 
and puppets). The latter group comprises characters such as Hugo, Kean, and the 
unconverted Goetz, who all rely on others to create their images o f themselves. Indeed 
Huis Clos is dominated by a triangular tension o f judgement, in which each character’s 
persona is created and sustained through the gaze and perception of the others, who, on 
the set o f Les Sequestres d ’Altona, would be transformed into Frantz’s crabs. In Les 
Mouches, it is fittingly the divine character of Jupiter who is perceived as the judge, and 
it is in him that Electre seeks moral justification, before her brother reminds her o f her 
genuine guilt: ‘C’est a present que tu es coupable. Ce que tu as voulu, qui peut le savoir 
si ce n ’est toi? Laisseras-tu un autre en decider? ’219 The stronger characters, the true 
Sartrean agents, choose to judge themselves, remaining steadfastly true to their 
convictions:
Je ne suis pas un coupable, et tu ne saurais me faire expier ce que je  ne 
reconnais pas pour un crime. [...] Tourmente-moi tant que tu voudras: je  ne 
regrette rien .220
Au diable, le confesseur. C’est a moi seul que je dois des comptes.221
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Je n ’ai qu’un seul juge: moi, et je m ’acquitte.222
In the absence of God, the Existentialist Humanist has recourse to nothing and no-one 
but himself, at least in the domain of ethics. He is abandoned in an ethical vacuum, 
accountable to all and yet to none:
Je suis condamne a n ’avoir d’autre loi que la mienne.223
Des juges? Ils n ’ont jamais pille, massacre, viole? [..] S’ils font notre proces, 
qui fera le leur? 224
Moral judgement, this central tenet of Sartrean ethics, has invited a wealth o f criticism, 
not only from traditional Christian critics, but more importantly from those who 
recognise the element of solipsistic subjectivism which seems to open the way for as 
many moral codes as there are living human beings. In this respect, Sartre has failed to 
refine his ethics: he has discredited the judgement o f God and autrni, and placed 
nothing satisfactory in their place. All that we are left with is the Self, which has already 
been dissected under the scalpel of ontology. How then am I to judge myself, if  there is 
a constant gap between my Je and my M oil I could use a mirror to fix the gaze of 
judgement on myself (recalling Estelle’s craving for such in Huis Clos), or a tape 
recorder to capture my words and their persona (like Frantz, or even Beckett’s Krapp), 
but these are no more than conduites magiques, disregarding the laws o f temporality and 
thus the fundamental truths of my ontology; I am once again in Bad Faith. Aware, if  not 
plagued, by the vicious circle of his ethics, Sartre changes his direction from the ideals 
o f moral judgement to the pragmatic comparison o f ends, and it is surely in this 
direction that any tenable solution must lie: ‘J’aurais pu faire autrement, soit; mais a 
quel p r ixT 225
The ethical consideration of means and ends brings us back to the necessity for a 
normative form of ethics which could ultimately provide us with a discernible and 
viable code of moral conduct. In the absence of an acceptable arbiter o f ethics, the focus 
must shift from the chooser to the choice, from the ethical agent to the moral act: 
ontological logistics may dissuade us from Bad Faith, but morality should guide us in 
our choice o f action, pointing out the consequences of our possible Bad Faith. If  Sartre’s 
Humanism is to be effective, it must succeed in bridging this gap between ontology and 
ethics by combining Man’s freedom with a sense of human justice. In order to judge the 
achievements of Sartrean ethics, we must therefore consider the precise legacy left by 
his Humanism, for if  his Existentialism is a Humanism, the two must be inseparable. In 
terms of ethics, we need to determine whether Sartre’s Humanism functions as an 
aprioristic moral code, an advocate of situation ethics, a combination o f both models, or 
as a failure on both counts.
On the basis of L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, it would seem that Sartre is 
keen to establish a code of ethics based upon a somewhat crude reworking o f Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative:
Quand nous disons que l’homme se choisit, nous entendons que chacun 
d’entre nous se choisit, mais par la nous voulons dire aussi qu’en se
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choisissant il choisit tous les hommes. En effet, il n ’est pas un de nos actes 
qui, en creant l’homme que nous voulons etre, ne cree en meme temps une 
image de l’homme tel que nous estimons qu’il doit etre.226
On doit toujours se demander: qu’arriverait-il si tout le monde en faisait 
autant? et on n ’echappe a cette pensee inquietante que par une sorte de 
mauvaise foi.227
The objections to this are numerous and often cited: in addition to the usual problems 
concerning hyper-responsibility and Bad Faith are contentions about the crass 
universality involved in the imperative -  if  I choose to marry, am I advocating marriage, 
monogamy, and heterosexuality over the many other valid ways o f life? According to 
Bames and Bell, Sartre’s imperative is hypothetical rather than categorical, and given 
his numerous qualifications and seeming contradictions, it is difficult to fault their 
interpretation .228 McCall, too, finds fault with the imperative, quoting the examples of 
F ra n c is ’s murder in Morts sans Sepulture and Hilda’s decision of non-violence in Le 
Diable et le Bon Dieu to contest the Kantian model, exposing it as a mere abstraction 
which cannot function in the concrete world of extreme situations where the only valid 
choice is often the lesser of two evils.229 But the main objection must be to Sartre’s self- 
contradiction a few lines after his previous comments, which seems to condemn his own 
ethical code: ‘L ’existentialisme est tres oppose a un certain type de morale laique qui 
voudrait supprimer Dieu avec le moins de frais possible . ’230 This objection is supported 
also in the Cahiers, which offer a consistent resistance to the Imperative.
His second attempt at defining a moral code comes in the form o f an «H-Kantian 
kingdom of ends, where instead of pour-soi becoming an end in itself, the end itself 
(whether moral, historical or socio-political) attains supremacy, and the means are 
subordinated to the ethics of the ends. In the words of Bell, ‘The end, being absolute, is 
the essential; the human is the non essential. ’231 This ethic is consistent with Sartrean 
Humanism, which, as discussed, places no value on the human subject per se. The 
ethical leap towards a resolute rejection of the Kantian kingdom of ends is thus not a 
quantum one, and it is justified by Sartre once again in the Cahiers:
La cite des fins, en realisant la totalite humaine, parce que chaque homme 
devient fin pour tous les autres et tous les autres pour lui, realise en fait le 
totalitarisme. [...] Cette totalite ne peut pas se realiser. Quelqu’un restera 
toujours en dehors (le Chef, le Fiihrer) puisque par principe la totalite 
humaine est detotalisee. (p. 178)
The objection here is ontological as well as ethical, with Sartre resisting both a ‘human 
totality’ and a totalitarianist morality. This is of course also a blatant contravention of 
the Categorical Imperative, serving merely to confuse an area o f gross uncertainty, but 
nevertheless, the ethics of ends justifying means is by far the strongest moral influence 
behind Sartre’s dramatic art. It can be seen to dominate whole plays, notably Les Mains 
Sales, in which Hoederer embodies the ethical moral of ‘tout est bien qui finit bien ’ .232 
His conflict with Hugo has already been explored, but it reinforces here Sartre’s inner
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conflict o f morality:
Hugo: Tous les moyens ne sont pas bons.
Hoederer: Tous les moyens sont bons quand ils sont efficaces. [...]
Comme tu tiens a ta purete, mon petit gars! Comme tu as 
peur de te salir les mains. Eh bien, reste pur! [...] Moi j ’ai 
les mains sales. Jusqu’aux coudes. Je les ai plongees dans la 
merde et dans le sang.233
In practice, Sartre comes down on the side of efficacite, in defiance o f pure morality, 
and his preference is made clear in his other political plays:
Jean: C ’est ton frere.
Lucie: Apres? II devait mourir demain.
Jean: Est-ce bien toi? Tu me fais peur.
Lucie: II faut qu’il se taise. Les moyens ne comptent pas .234
Goetz: Sur cette terre et dans ce temps, le Bien et le Mauvais sont
inseparables: j ’accepte done d’etre mauvais pour devenir bon .235
Goetz’s words are of vast significance, for they give perhaps the greatest insight into the 
quagmire of Sartrean ethics: although in theory, Sartre propagates a universal, 
categorically imperative code of ethics, in practice, he is aware that the present social 
climate calls for pragmatism at the expense o f ethical idealism. Unless we change the 
world, moral purity will remain but a cherished ideal, and Sartre is engaged in a process 
of change, justifying means that will bring about the goal o f freedom. However, even he 
accepts the dangers of the means and ends ethic, as he reveals in his discussion on 
violence: ‘La maxime de la violence est “la fin justifie les moyens”. II faut pourtant 
prendre garde a cette formule. Elle est profondement ambigue. ’236
Freedom becomes the impetus for the third attempt at establishing a moral code. 
This time, Sartre returns to his ontology and assumes that because we are condemned to 
be free, we should logically choose Freedom as our guiding moral Value. His logic is 
echoed by de Beauvoir, who claims that ‘chacun a besoin que tous les hommes soient 
fibres’ .237 If  freedom is our ontological facticity, our condition o f being, it makes sense 
to fight oppression and transpose our freedom to our ethics. By choosing Freedom as 
our Fundamental Project, we could simultaneously comply with our ontology and effect 
a utilitarian morality, which is accepted by many as the true goal o f Sartrean ethics: ‘We 
consider the ideal of “the greatest freedom for the greatest number” as the highest 
normative principle of a Sartrean ethics. ’238 The main advantage of this concept is that it 
attempts to unite ontology and ethics, and its basic sentiment could be synthesised either 
with the Categorical Imperative or with the Sartrean kingdom of ends. But its 
drawbacks are too fundamental to be overlooked. The apparent unity o f this ethic with 
ontology is merely superficial, firstly because if  Man is condemned to be free, he cannot 
choose not to be free, and secondly because the choice of Freedom as a Value amounts 
to little more than Seriousness. By adopting Freedom as an ethical, and not just 
ontological, value, Sartre falls into his own trap and denies pour-soi the autonomy he is
233 Ibid., pp. 193-94.
234 Morts sans Sepulture, Theatre I, p.240.
235 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.245.
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237 Pour une Morale de I ’Ambiguite, p. 119.
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so desperate to achieve: ‘Sartre is arguing that liberty is both intrinsically valuable, an 
end in itself, and at the same time that it is to be aimed at in so far as it founds values; 
clearly this is a genuine contradiction. ’239 It is, indeed, yet another contradiction.
Sartrean ethics has now been shown to be incapable of establishing an aprioristic 
code of morality. This would seem to indicate the possibility o f situation ethics, based 
not upon a universal or collective ethical approach, but rather on the free individual in 
the concrete situation so often extolled in Sartrean theory:
Tout choix est choix d ’un changement concret a apporter a un donne 
concret. Toute situation est concrete.240
Si les valeurs sont vagues [...] il ne nous reste qu’a nous fier a nos 
instincts.241
We have returned no doubt to solipsistic methodology, but at last there is no startling 
discrepancy between theory and practice, philosophy and theatre. Each situation must be 
judged on its merits according to ethics o f the individual Pour-soi. As Sartre reminds us, 
‘II n ’y a pas de morale abstraite. II n ’y a qu’une morale en situation done concrete. Car 
la morale abstraite est celle de la bonne conscience. Elle suppose qu’on peut etre moral 
dans une situation foncierement immorale. ’242 Situation ethics at least maintains the 
ambiguity.
However, the problems, doubts, and contradictions of Sartrean ethics have still 
not been resolved. Situation ethics may well be a valid form of moral conduct, but it 
provides the ethical agent with no system or source of values and is therefore o f limited 
significance. Sartre provides a catalogue of ‘unacceptable’ or ‘inauthentic’ behaviour, 
but very little guidance on moral rectitude. His ethics is unquestionably plagued with 
inconsistency and failure. The promise of an ethics of deliverance and salvation, based 
on Authenticity and pure reflection, has never quite been fulfilled: the promise of a 
work dedicated to Existentialist ethics at the end of L ’Etre et le Neant, which was 
perhaps to be the fourth volume of the Chemins de la Liberte, lies abandoned; the 
Cahiers are ultimately fragmentary, unsynthesised, and inconclusive; the ethical work 
on Genet confuses readers with the elevation o f a thief to martyrdom and Sainthood; 
Sartrean heroes are either winning losers or succeed with dirty hands; and questions of 
great ethical substance are relegated to the reference of footnotes. This does not bode 
well for Sartre’s Humanism.
Sartre’s inner conflict between existential freedom and moral or political 
engagement, evident in characters such as Goetz and Hugo (and in his own oscillations 
to and from the Communist Party) cannot be resolved by a critical comparison of his 
philosophy and theatre; it is merely compounded. The Sartrean agent is presented as a 
living contradiction who is ontologically autonomous but ethically in desperate need of 
solidarity. Ultimately, even Sartre cannot deny the contradiction, and he is forced to 
conclude that a viable code of Sartrean ethics remains a disquieting impossibility:
La morale a lieu dans une atmosphere d’echec. Elle doit echouer parce qu’il 
est toujours trop tard ou trop tot pour elle.243
Le ‘probleme’ moral nait de ce que la Morale est pour nous tout en meme
239 Pilkington, A. E., ‘Sartre’s Existentialist Ethic’, French Studies, 23 (1969), p.42.
240 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.590.
241 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.43.
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temps inevitable et impossible. L’action doit se donner ses normes ethiques 
dans ce climat d’indepassable impossibility.244
There is no existentialist ethics; there are only valid choices.245
This ethical pessimism finds its grounding in the closing lines of L ’Etre et le Neant, 
where Sartre seems to renounce the possibility of moral salvation, introducing apathy 
and failure even to the heartland of Man’s action:
Toutes les activites humaines sont equivalentes -  car elles tendent toutes a 
sacrifier l’homme pour faire surgir la cause de soi -  et [...] toutes sont 
vouees par principe a l’echec. Ainsi revient-il au meme de s’enivrer 
solitairement ou de conduire les peuples. Si Tune de ces activites l’emporte 
sur l’autre, ce ne sera pas a cause de son but reel, mais a cause du degre de 
conscience qu’elle possede de son but ideal.246
Even at this early stage of Sartrean ethics, the element o f idealism is very much in 
evidence, and the acceptance of failure can be seen to dominate both Sartre’s early and 
later ethical ideology. The inherent contradictions create obstacles which prove far too 
complex to overcome, and the clash of ethics and ontology is too profound for any valid 
form of synthesis. We are left then once again with a dangling carrot, tempted by the 
chase but hindered by confusion, ambiguity, and finally acceptance of futility:
The very notion o f deliverance or salvation implies acceptance o f an 
Absolute, whether it be God, literature or existentialist ethics.247
Sans doute se donne-t-il [Sartre] beaucoup de peine pour montrer que les 
valeurs instaurees par moi sont reellement ‘valables’ et que la morale 
existentialiste n ’est pas le culte gidien de l’acte gratuit. Mais il n ’y parvient 
pas et les raisons qu’il invoque sont entachees d’equivoque.248
Sartre fails to deliver on his promise of an ethics, and this can only be a result o f 
his refusal to separate ontology from ethics: the paradoxical nature o f any attempt at 
synthesis is readily apparent, and instead of embarking on a futile chase, Sartre should 
have rather acknowledged the contradictions and reserved the ethical for the socio­
political; it is in the separation of the spheres that the true contribution to a Humanism 
must lie. By attempting to combine his ontology and ethics, his Humanism is 
diminished, for the confusion of ontological description with ethical prescription, of 
what is with what ought to be, gives rise to a morality o f descriptive prescription, which 
aims at being logical and falters into paradox. Though accepted by Sartre, this 
conclusion does not appear to have enlightened his subsequent work on ethics: 
‘L ’ontologie ne saurait formuler elle-meme des prescriptions morales. Elle s’occupe 
uniquement de ce qui est, et il n ’est pas possible de tirer des imperatifs de ses 
indicatifs. ’249 Unfortunately, Sartre’s ethical blindness is more than matched by many o f 
his critics who also refuse to accept defeat in their search for a philosophy or Humanism
244 Saint Genet, comedien et martyr, p. 177, footnote.
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which achieves a successful fusion of ontology and ethics. The vision o f realists like 
Pellauer is sadly the exception:
While Sartre does offer a number of interesting discussions o f topics 
relevant to an ethics developed on the basis o f his ontology -  discussions 
that may be read for themselves as a stimulus to further thought -  any 
overall synthesis is lacking and in the last analysis is unattainable.250
The description of the relationship between ontology and ethics as stimulus to further 
thought is a convincing one, wholly compatible with the overview o f Sartrean ethics 
provided in the present study. Any attempt to post-construct a Sartrean ethics must be 
regarded as futile and flawed: the idea that a Sartrean ethics is ultimately unresolved 
rather than impossible (a particularly topical one in the current critical trend) is one 
which regards ethics as descriptive and objective, and which is thus guilty of 
Seriousness. We must agree with the non-cognitive school of logical empiricism that 
ethics, at least as Sartre should conceive it, is neither descriptive nor based on 
knowledge, a contention which places us in the camp o f critics such as Wamock and 
Bell who contend that Sartre is incapable of postulating a discernible code of ethics 
because he is a subjectivist for whom the objectivising o f values is tantamount to ethical 
Seriousness.251 The paradox has been discussed, and it must lead us to question the very 
validity o f Sartre’s Existentialist Humanism as an autonomous philosophy: in his later 
works, Sartre himself proposes his Existentialism as an ideology, a way o f thinking, to 
structure, refine, and complement the philosophy, the basic thought, o f Marxism, and it 
seems appropriate in this instance to view his Humanism as an ideology which could 
stimulate his ontology into a productive Existentialist ethics.
Though flawed and contradictory as a Humanist philosophy, Sartrean ethics has 
certainly achieved a certain level of success. Sartre’s theatre champions the cause for 
situation ethics which, while failing to transcend the problem of subjectivism, can 
provide a viable form of moral conduct and work together with his ontology. His later 
ethical thought, based upon discussions with Benny Levy, transcends the tomes of 
L ’Etre et le Neant and Critique de la Raison Dialectique to transform the respective 
impasses o f solipsism and political absolutism into the potential fraternity of 
interpenetrating consciousnesses, of successful Being-for-Others, and a modalite 
morale. But even his early work succeeds in laying the most solid o f foundations, in 
showing what is ‘wrong’, and in leading by example:
While Sartre’s moral judgement has nothing to say about what values to 
choose apart from freedom (which serves as a means to every other 
valuation), it does enable him to condemn as inauthentic a surprising range 
of human choices from the relatively innocuous examples of the woman, 
waiter, and homosexual to the less innocuous “champion o f sincerity” to the 
more vicious Nazis and other racists and oppressive Capitalists.252
The examples set attempt to show the way towards the salvation of Authenticity 
heralded in L ’Etre et le Neant and explored with vigour in Sartrean theatre. The theories
250 Introduction to Jean-Paul Sartre: Notebooks for an Ethics, p.viii. See also Juliette Simont’s ‘Sartrean 
ethics’, in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, p. 195: ‘What is revealed through love is the indicative 
mode o f ontology. The imperative mode o f ethics aim[s] at a different totality; extensive rather than 
comprehensive, “all men” rather than “the whole of man”. These two totalities do not overlap.’
251 See Mary Wamock The Philosophy o f  Sartre, pp. 129-34 and Linda A. Bell, Sartre’s Ethics o f  
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of an impossible normative ethics exhausted in philosophy are eventually subjugated to 
the pragmatism of action and Engagement so vital to the stage. The ultimate Humanist 
goal becomes that o f Authenticity, and the agent is resurrected as the hero. As the 
Absurdist symbol of Sisyphus is replaced by the Humanist hero of Prometheus, it is to 
be hoped that the ill-fitting partners of ontology and ethics will finally be reunited, and 
that Sartre’s Existentialist Humanism will rise up triumphantly out o f the ashes, from 
the far side o f despair.
iv) From Agent to Hero: The Challenge of Authenticity
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The frustrations and contradictions plaguing both the ontological and ethical agents are 
direct repercussions of Sartre’s theoretical idealism caused by his philosophical 
insistence on the catalyst of Freedom. His intransigence on Freedom gives rise to the 
complex problems of Bad Faith and Seriousness which lead the agent twice into an 
impasse, marring his ontology and rendering his ethics a paradox of flawed 
impossibility. But in the practical world of theatre, the agent comes to life, and in the 
absence of the promised tome on ethics, it is to the shining examples o f Sartre’s 
theatrical heroes that we must turn for Authenticity, deliverance, and salvation; the fate 
of Sartre’s Humanism lies in their dirty hands.
With Les Mouches comes the first main insight into Sartre’s conception of the 
dramatic hero, the Sartrean Man of Action who transcends the conflicting and limiting 
worlds o f ontology and ethics in pursuit o f the ultimate challenge of Authenticity. The 
hero is Oreste, and although this unsuspecting saviour has been much compared with 
Christ, the religious allegory is again misleading: as a pagan, Humanist hero, Oreste 
provides a pleasing ideological transformation from the Absurd condemnation of 
Sisyphus to the fire-stealing Humanism of Prometheus; the symbolic inspiration is 
classical, not Christian. As a Promethean agent, Oreste sets down a new agenda, based 
on the Humanistic confidence of his anthropocentric liberty, through which the gods and 
all religion are removed from the equation. In him, Sartre sees the basis for a modem 
reworking of Existentialist autonomy, a simultaneous embodiment o f Everyman and 
Hero: ‘Oreste poursuivra son chemin, injustifiable, sans excuses, sans recours, seul. 
Comme un heros. Comme n ’importe qui. ’253 In Les Mouches, Oreste is a powerful 
symbol of freedom, and the fact that he assumes full responsibility for his ethical 
autonomy and action enables him to usurp the controlling power o f the gods, granted 
them only by the weaknesses of Man. By elevating himself to the highest point of the 
spiritual and ethical domain, Oreste is choosing for mankind, and he succeeds in 
reinventing the people of Argos, placing them back in the centre o f their world. By 
deposing the gods, he shows the great potential force of the free human spirit:
Tout homme s’est senti l’egal d’un dieu a certains moments. [...] Mais cela 
vient de ce que, dans un eclair, il a senti l’etonnante grandeur de 1’esprit 
humain. Les conquerants sont seulement ceux d’entre les hommes qui 
sentent assez leur force pour etre surs de vivre constamment a ces hauteurs 
et dans la pleine conscience de cette grandeur.254
His human force, his Humanism, seeks then to elevate the human to the divine, as 
opposed to the religious attempt to bring the divine back down to Earth. In a Camus 
play, Oreste would be a Conquerant; in Sartrean theatre, he is a constant Humanist, a 
dedicated Man of Action.
The concept o f heroism becomes increasingly complex as Sartre develops as a 
dramatist, and juxtaposed with troubled protagonists such as Hoederer and Goetz, 
Oreste becomes little more than a symbolic yard stick of comparison. There are several 
categories of hero in Sartrean theatre, and it is useful and appropriate to distinguish 
carefully between them. Oreste, though perhaps in his own group of ideal heroes, should 
probably be grouped along with types such as Hoederer, Canoris, and Goetz as a 
genuine Sartrean hero. These worthy men are elevated by comparison with the other 
groups, including anti-heroes (Garcin, Hugo, and Frantz), comic heroes (Kean and
253 Un Theatre de Situations, p.223.
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Georges), and the almost exclusively female failed heroes (or heroines) such as Ines, 
Electre, Lucie, Lizzie, Jessica, Hilda, and Johanna. The principal aim o f this study is 
therefore to determine the qualities which separate the true heroes from their foils, and 
thus to glean an insight into the mystery of Authenticity.
A concept at the heart of Sartre’s exploration of the theme o f heroism, and one 
which has undoubtedly inspired much of his greatest work, is that o f bastardy. This 
element o f Sartrean characterisation is highly autobiographical, and it presents itself in 
Sartre’s theatrical heroes in various forms, ranging from literal illegitimacy to symbolic 
social exclusion on grounds of class, race, colour, gender, sexuality, etc. In terms of 
atheistic Humanism, its roots are firmly embedded in the rejection o f religion, for 
deprived o f a moral or universal Father, Sartre’s heroes are condemned to a life of 
ethical bastardy. Like Camus’s conquerants, like the etranger or the homme revolte, it is 
thus their duty to rebel; and indeed this fight against their perceived contradictions 
forms the powerful impetus for their heroism:
Nous avons vu que le Personnage par excellence de ce theatre est le Batard: 
celui qui, mis porte-a-faux dans le monde humain, se trouve par la en 
situation de lucidite a l’egard des contradictions de la conscience et des 
comedies qu’elle se donne. Et nous avons vu que l’lntellectuel est un 
batard .255
Sartre’s existential bastardy is the equivalent of Original Sin, but unlike the religious 
dogma, based upon guilt and an inherent sense of shame, this Humanistic equivalent is 
converted into a positive incitement to action. It is evident to some extent in all Sartre’s 
heroes -  in the gender o f the heroines, the failed heroes; in the social or even genuine 
illegitimacy of the comic heroes, who are left with a crisis o f identity; and in the class, 
race, historicity, and very ontology of the anti-heroes and heroes, who respond to it, 
respectively, with woeful misguidance or in genuine revolt -  but it is embodied most 
effectively in the character of Goetz, who encompasses all the aspects o f the term and 
effects a scornful parody on its underlying sources of religion:
Schulheim: Tu es un assassin.
Goetz: Oui, mon frere, comme tout le monde.
Schulheim: Un batard!
Goetz: Oui: comme Jesus-Christ.
Schulheim: Sac a merde! Excrement de la terre!256
Schulheim’s insult is later echoed by Goetz himself when he treats Hilda to his 
misogynistic tirade comparing her with a ‘sac d’excrements’ ,257 and it is interesting, if  
somewhat ironic, that one outsider should so chastise another; but it is also perhaps the 
source of solidarity which leads to their dependence and companionship.
The negative side of bastardy comes in the form of the salaud, o f characters like 
Jupiter and Le Pere who through their esprit de serieux establish an ethical and/or socio­
political tyranny in an attempt to impose their own bastardy on others. A close 
examination of this process is to be found in La Putain Respectueuse, where the satirical 
dramatisation of the White American Male serves to suppress and subordinate both the 
Prostitute and the Negro, abusing their rights and denying them their Freedom. The 
characterisation may be crude (and the play unsuccessful), but its message is a clear 
condemnation of all forms of tyranny, ontological and ethical alike. This brings us back
255 Jeanson, Francis, Sartre par lui-meme, p. 101.
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to Sartre’s first main theatrical hero, Oreste, who stands in direct opposition to the 
salauds. His much criticised departure at the end of Les Mouches may well leave the 
city in a vide, but as an ontological symbol o f Freedom, and perhaps a historical symbol 
of the French Resistance, his action is entirely appropriate. Though not yet fully 
engaged, the Sartrean hero has at least pointed the way towards freedom and liberation, 
and indeed secured it, and he has already managed to conquer the tyrannical bastardy of 
Seriousness.
Another opposition connected with the hero is that o f cowardice and courage, 
the stereotypical contrast between the worthy and the weak. In stark contrast to 
Absurdist heroes such as Berenger and Krapp, Sartre’s typical heroes are decisive, 
resilient, and brave; their heroism lies not in the despair o f their existential anguish but 
rather in the assured optimism of their action. Characters who fail to meet the harsh 
expectations of the Existentialist hero are often doomed to the realm o f the laches, 
demeaned and discredited by the courage of those around them. One such figure is of 
course Garcin who, though constantly aspiring to heroism, is condemned to his stasis by 
the constant cowardice of his actions:
Garcin: Tu sais ce que c’est qu’un lache, toi.
Ines: Oui, je  le sais.
Garcin: Tu sais ce que c’est que le mal, la honte, la peur. II y a des jours
ou tu t ’es vue jusqu’au cceur -  et 9 a te cassait bras et jambes. [...]
Je voulais etre un homme. Un dur. J ’ai tout mise sur le meme 
cheval. Est-ce que c’est possible qu’on soit un lache quand on a 
choisi les chemins les plus dangereux? Peut-on juger une vie sur un 
seul acte?
Ines: Pourquoi pas? Tu as reve trente ans que tu avais du cceur; et tu te
passais mille petites faiblesses parce que tout est permis aux 
heros. Comme c’etait commode! Et puis, a l’heure du danger, on 
t ’as mis au pied du mur e t ... tu as pris le train pour Mexico .258
Garcin links his cowardice with evil, shame, and fear in a rare admission o f self-fault, 
and the source of his anguish, the ‘I /eye am I’, is ironically Beckettian in style due to 
the fact that he can judge him-Self sincerely in his death. His next admission reveals 
more about his, and certainly Sartre’s, perception of the hero -  the hard, masculine 
entity who gambles with his life. Ines’s perceptiveness (she is Garcin’s true eye) cuts 
through the conceit of his dream, exposing him as the coward he really is and showing 
him that heroes are neither comfortable nor unaccountable. Another character forced to 
recognise this fact is the young Fran9 ois, who is exposed too soon to the daunting call of 
heroism, accepting with some pathos the weaknesses of his youth which will ultimately 
culminate in his untimely death:
Est-ce que vous m ’avez prevenu quand je  suis venu vous trouver? Vous
m ’avez dit: la Resistance a besoin d’hommes, vous ne m ’avez pas dit qu’elle
avait besoin de heros. Je ne suis pas un heros, moi, je  ne suis pas un heros!
[...] J ’ai fait ce qu’on m ’a dit.259
In one of the most dramatic and moving acts of Sartrean theatre, his potential cowardice 
is punished with the ultimate severity in a practical demonstration of the lesser of two 
evils.
The struggle to cross the line from mere humanity to heroism finds its
258 Huis Clos, pp.88-90.
259 Morts sans Sepulture, Theatre I, p. 196.
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incarnation in the character of Hugo, whose ideals and impulses are constantly in 
conflict. Hugo can be seen to represent Sartre’s bastardised intellect, tom  between the 
niceties o f thought and the harsh realities of action, and his resulting sense o f guilt 
leaves him longing for the challenges of heroism, for the life o f the Adventurer. But his 
dreams and introspection are soon shattered by the political zealousness o f Olga, whose 
dedication to the cause, though idealistically clean-handed, authenticates her simplistic 
choice o f action:
Olga: Le Parti n ’a pas ete cree pour te foumir des occasions
d ’heroi'sme. II y a un travail a faire et il faut qu’il soit fait; peu 
importe par qui. [...]
Hugo: Si on me remplace, je quitterai le Parti.
Olga: [...] Le Parti, 9 a se quitte les pieds devant.260
At one time, perhaps in the days o f Les Mouches, Olga would have been a strong 
example o f heroic Authenticity, but in these later days o f discussion, coercion, and 
compromise, she is demoted to the sidelines of political ideology, heroic and yet no 
hero, authentic and yet not quite authentic enough. The reason for her failure is 
intimated by Le Pere, who explains the preserve of the tmly heroic:
Le Pere: Wemer est faible, Frantz est fort: personne n ’y peut rien.
Johanna: Qu’est-ce qu’ils font sur terre, les forts?
Le Pere: En general, ils ne font rien.
Johanna: Je vois.
Le Pere: Ce sont des gens qui vivent par nature dans l’intimite de
la mort. Ils tiennent le destin des autres dans leurs 
mains.261
Opposing Tes laches’ with Tes forts’, Sartre uses Le Pere to give another vital insight 
into his goal of heroic Authenticity. In a Heideggerian invocation o f death, of the 
memorable Sein zum Tode, he reveals his further requirements o f mortal awareness and 
control to the already established values o f Humanism, action, bastardy, and courage. 
Living in the intimacy of death is one of Sartre’s more perplexing concepts, but he 
fortunately defines it more clearly in an evocative description o f life under the 
Occupation:
Jamais nous n ’avons ete plus libres que sous l’occupation allemande. [...] 
Puisque le venin nazi se glissait jusque dans notre pensee, chaque pensee 
juste etait une conquete [...]. Puisque nous etions traques, chacun de nos 
gestes avait le poids d’un engagement.262
Verstraeten elaborates on the theme, linking the hero’s mortality with his greater sense 
o f Humanism: ‘C’est toujours face a un risque de mort que le heros sartrien definit sa 
qualite humaine. ’263 Situations of mortal danger serve to magnify each small expression 
of Freedom, and agents who engage themselves in the situations o f their Time, taking a 
stance and influencing others, will be rewarded with the accolade o f liberty.
The broadening of the philosophical situation to the socio-political situation is 
termed by Sartre ‘Historicity’, a term which implies the involvement o f pour-soi as a
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261 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.54.
262 ‘La Republique du Silence’, in Situations III, p .l 1.
263 Violence et Ethique,p.95.
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concrete agent in the actual world around it. In terms o f theatre, the claustrophobic cells 
o f Morts sans Sepulture's attic and the hell o f Huis Clos are opened out into the vast 
plains o f Le Diable et le Bon Dieu and Les Troyennes, as the protagonists learn to be- 
for-others. The somewhat enclosed world of L ’Etre et le Neant is defiantly extended 
into the reciprocal action of Critique de la Raison Dialectique, and yet the foundation 
for Historicity lies firmly embedded in the former work, connected as it is with the basic 
ontology of freedom and temporality: ‘Le temps universel vient au monde par le Pour- 
soi. ’264 Indeed pour-soi is condemned to its own epoch, governing and governed by its 
Time. Sartre reminds us that this is a basic given o f ontology: ‘En definitive, mon 
epoque c ’est moi [...]. Je dois l’assumer comme je  m ’assume. ’265 Without pour-soi, 
time would not exist, for in en-soi is only found plenitude, and it is thus illogical to 
separate men and women from their dates: ‘Chaque personne est un absolu jouissant 
d ’une date absolue et parfaitement impensable a une autre date . ’266 With the acceptance 
o f ontological logistics comes the responsibility to choose our historical period in the 
same way that we chose our birth to render it less Absurd. It is for the hero, then, to 
historicise the world around him and make his mark by his action: ‘C ’est en se 
choisissant et en s’historialisant dans le monde que le Pour-soi historialise le monde lui- 
meme et fait qu’il soit date par ses techniques. ’267 This, says Sartre, is M an’s only 
authentic means of escaping the Absurd, living out his Freedom and usurping the 
creative role of the impossible Homme-Dieu\ and, by extension, it is left for the living to 
determine the History of the passed:
C ’est moi, ce sont les hommes de ma generation qui decident du sens des 
efforts et des entreprises de la generation anterieure, soit qu’ils reprennent et 
continuent leurs tentatives sociales et politiques, soit qu’ils realisent 
decidement une cassure et rejettent les morts dans l’inefficience.268
History is no Absolute: it is as open to interpretation and alteration as M an’s past, and it 
is M an’s relationship with the Past and his past which truly determines him rather than 
any universal human nature: ‘Chaque epoque se developpe suivant des lois dialectiques, 
et les hommes dependent de l’epoque et non pas d ’une nature humaine. ’269
Sartre’s theatre of situations reflects the concerns of Contemporary Man, 
remaining true to its aim to take its part in History. His theatre, engaged and politically 
inspired, rejects classical, modernist, and epic genres alike for their psychological bias, 
apathetic derision, or didactic alienation; it focuses instead on the needs o f the masses, 
or rather so is its intention:
Maintenant, ce qui importe, c’est de situer des conflits humains dans des 
situations historiques et de montrer qu’ils en dependent. Nos themes doivent 
etre des themes sociaux: les themes majeurs du monde dans lequel nous 
vivons -  ceux dont nous avons pris conscience.270
Though certainly not innovative in form, Sartrean theatre is inspirational for its 
presentation of contemporary conflict, whether social, political, or ethical. But it is not 
always as optimistic as one might expect: the triumphalism of Les Mouches and Le
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Diable et le Bon Dieu turns sour in the later, darker pieces such as Les Sequestres 
d ’Altona and Les Troyennes, with their emphasis on irredeemability and futile brutality; 
and even the farces cast an ominous cloud on their epoch:
En plein vingtieme siecle, avec les progres etourdissants de la technique, ils 
croient qu’ils mourront dans leurs lits, comme au moyen age!271
Sais-tu ce qui est en train de mourir? L’Homme .272
The apocalyptic insight of Mouton and Sibilot anticipates and is compounded by the 
recorded omen of Frantz, which can leave us in no doubt as to Sartre’s perception of his 
century: ‘De qui, de quoi, ce gout ranee et fade dans ma gorge? De l’homme? De la 
bete? De moi-meme? C’est ce gout du siecle. ’273 The harsh, perceptive nudity o f the 
crabs completes the image, but it is neither they, nor Man, nor even Frantz himself 
which leave the bitter taste; it is the remnants o f the century, the extension o f Nausea to 
a taste of one’s own Time, and in order to defeat it, Frantz, as an archetypal anti-hero, 
attempts the conduite magique o f escaping his own temporality in the madness and 
seclusion of his sequestration:
Pour chasser le temps de cette chambre, il m ’a fallu cinq annees; pour l ’y 
ramener, vous n ’avez eu besoin que d’un instant. (II montre le bracelet)
Cette bete caline qui ronronne autour de mon poignet et que je  fourre dans 
ma poche quand j ’entends frapper Leni, c ’est le Temps Universel, le Temps 
de l’horloge parlante, des indicateurs et des observatoires.274
His inevitable failure leaves the burden of his guilt unbearable, and the final note is one 
o f despair. However, the burdens of the times, like that o f the Occupation, should be 
viewed as an inducement to positive action, and amidst the violence and repression of 
our century, the politics of liberation become ever more important, giving the Sartrean 
hero the opportunity to shine.
It is in the Marxist Historicity of need that lies the next requirement of Sartre’s 
authentic hero:
Quand la ‘condition humaine’ se concretise sous forme de ‘condition 
historique’, la Chair elle-meme va devoir s’incamer dans des besoins reels, 
et le Regard d ’Autrui ceder la place a la complexity reelle des rapports 
sociaux qui constituent le trame de l’histoire. La mauvaise foi, les conditions 
inauthentiques, le choix de l’echec, toutes les attitudes, enfin, selon 
lesquelles la liberte nous est montree, dans L ’etre et le neant, se retoumant 
contre soi, se niant elle-meme, -  c’est aux contradictions reelles des societes 
humaines qu’on les rapportera desormais en les nommant ‘alienations’ .275
Jeanson looks for an answer in I ’etre-pour-autrui, in a typical critique o f the subjectivist 
solipsism of L ’Etre et le Neant. He is right to search in that direction, but he overlooks 
the fact that Sartre’s Being-for-Others is not limited to the Marxism of Critique de la 
Raison Dialectique and that it begins with an ontological exploration o f the existential 
modes o f avoir, faire, and etre.
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Sartre dedicates nearly two hundred pages (almost a third) of L ’Etre et le Neant 
to a comprehensive study of having, doing, and being. His aim is to compare the 
interrelationship between the three modes of human existence and thereby to trace an 
escape route from the original desire to be God. Such, he maintains, is a primary 
necessity of ontology:
La valeur supreme de l ’activite humaine est-elle un faire  ou un etre! Et, 
quelle que soit la solution adoptee, que devient Vavoir! L ’ontologie doit 
pouvoir nous renseigner sur ce probleme; c ’est d ’ailleurs une de ses taches 
essentielles, si le pour-soi est l’etre qui se definit par I ’action.216
The escape route soon becomes apparent: action, the mode of doing, is the only logical 
option for pour-soi, since the other fundamental modes of human reality have been 
shown to fuse into the futile attempt to be God, and are thus doomed to failure. Sartre 
takes maximum advantage of the theatrical necessity for action to reinforce his 
philosophical conclusion, and his greatest heroes are without exception exemplary Men 
o f Action. The mode of having -  possession or appropriation -  is particularly scorned 
by Sartre, synonymous as it is with the evils of the bourgeoisie, and it is denounced to 
great effect in Hugo’s first conflict with Hoederer:
Hoederer: Ils cherchaient une arme. On peut cacher des armes dans
une valise mais on peut aussi y cacher des papiers.
Hugo: Ou des affaires strictement personelles.
Hoederer: A partir du moment ou tu es sous mes ordres, mets-toi
bien dans la tete que tu n ’as plus rien a toi.277
Sartre’s agents are people who do, and, to follow their ‘vocation’, his heroes must free 
themselves from the material trappings of their class, as they would follow a religious 
vow of poverty. Once rid of their burdensome origins o f Being, agents are finally free to 
act -  a precondition demonstrated superbly in Goetz, who gives up his lands in 
desperate pursuit of active justification, acknowledging the futility of his having and his 
being: ‘Nous ne sommes pas et nous n ’avons rien . ’278
Action, then, is proposed by Sartre as the salvation o f the human being and thus 
one o f the most vital preconditions to heroism. It can be regarded as a combination of 
Historicity and the mode of doing, for it involves by definition awareness of and active 
influence upon one’s Time. To act is to change the world:
Agir, c’est modifier la figure du monde, c’est disposer des moyens en vue 
d’une fin, c’est produire un complexe instrumental et organise tel que, par 
une serie d’enchainements et de liaisons, la modification apportee a l ’un des 
chainons amene des modifications dans toute la serie et, pour finir, produise 
un resultat prevu .279
Sartrean action is thus intentional, premeditated, and effective. It is a necessary 
condition o f human reality, for we can only attain our liberty through action, and if we 
cease to act, we cannot fail to cease to be:
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Je suis, en effet, un existant qui apprend sa liberte par ses actes.280
La realite humaine n ’est pas d’abord pour agir, mais etre pour elle, c’est agir 
et cesser d ’agir, c ’est cesser d’etre.281
Action lies at the heart o f Sartrean philosophy, and the insistence on the freedom to act 
is what gives it its note of optimism and its reasonable claim to Humanism. Removed 
from the despair of metaphysical Absurdism and from the restrictive pretence of 
organised religion, Sartre’s Existentialism provides a much needed lifeline to freedom, 
autonomy, and hope:
La doctrine que je vous presente est justement a l’oppose du quietisme, 
puisqu’elle declare: il n ’y a de realite que dans l’action; elle va plus loin 
d’ailleurs, puisqu’elle ajoute: l’homme n ’est rien d’autre que son projet, il 
n ’existe que dans la mesure ou il se realise, il n ’est done rien d ’autre que 
l’ensemble de ses actes, rien d’autre que sa vie .282
The doctrine is harsh: deprived of personality, possessions, and Being, Man is reduced 
to and defined by the acts which he chooses to commit.
The heroes of Sartrean theatre are thus inseparable from their noble acts, just as 
the failed or anti-heroes are condemned by the ignobility of theirs, for in action lies the 
only key to identity: ‘Agir (e’est-a-dire precisement l’objet du theatre), c ’est changer le 
monde et, en le changeant, c’est necessairement se changer. ’283 Thus Garcin’s heroism 
remains a dream of being, contradicted starkly by the history o f his actions:
Garcin: Je n ’ai pas reve cet heroi'sme. Je l ’ai choisi. On est ce qu’on veut.
Ines: Prouve-le. Prouve que ce n ’etait pas un reve. Seuls les actes
decident de ce qu’on a voulu.
Garcin: Je suis mort trop tot. On ne m ’a pas laisse le temps de faire mes 
actes.
Ines: On meurt toujours trop tot -  ou trop tard. Et cependant la vie est
la, terminee: le trait est tire, il faut faire la somme. Tu n ’es rien 
d’autre que ta vie.
Garcin: Vipere! Tu as reponse a tout.284
Ines, the viper of truth, reminds Garcin that his real intentions are revealed by his 
actions: to be the hero he longs to be, he would have to have acted courageously during 
his life; coward that he is, when put to the test, he fled from the scene. Les Mains Sales 
explores further this Sartrean propensity for action, emphasising the importance o f the 
act by linking the pragmatic agency of Hoederer, who knows that ‘on juge un type a son 
travail’ ,285 with the intellectual idealism of Hugo, who admits that his enemy’s actions 
speak louder than his words: ‘Ce qu’il veut, ce qu’il pense, je  m ’en moque. Ce qui 
compte c’est ce qu’il fait. ’286 Hugo’s tragedy lies in the fact that these noble words are 
no less idealistic than any of his other beliefs.
The distinction between action and gesture is also marked in Sartrean theatre in
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order to purify and extol the truly worthy deed. Gesture is relegated to the domain of the 
inauthentic and false, shown to be an ineffectual end in itself rather than an intentional 
and consequential means to a definite end. Theatre itself is often used as a metaphor for 
gesture, based as it is upon imagery and role-play, and it turns with a vengeance on itself 
to disown those characters who are nothing more than actors:
Leni: Sa femme a des projets.
Le Pere: Ce sont des menaces de theatre: le depit a ressuscite Tactrice et 
Tactrice a voulu sa sortie.287
Although Le Pere underestimates Johanna’s capacity for action, her ultimate weakness 
does indeed prove Leni’s judgement a little flattering. Compared with the exploits of 
Georges and Kean, however, Werner’s wife is certainly a capable agent. The two comic 
heroes live their lives through representation, playing themselves as they would like to 
be and so avoiding the pitfall o f identity: ‘On joue les heros parce qu’on est lache et les 
saints parce qu’on est mechant; on joue les assassins parce qu’on meurt d’envie de tuer 
son prochain, on joue parce qu’on est menteur de naissance. ’288 Kean is the epitome of 
futile gesture, condemned in the vein of Sisyphus to a life o f illusory distraction; and 
riled with anger at the fate of his profession, his outcry is one of particular despair: 
‘Voila vingt ans que je fais des gestes pour vous plaire; comprenez-vous que je  puisse 
vouloir faire des actes? ’289 The distinction here is made with some clarity, and it shows 
that Kean is finally in search of authentic action, transcending the boundary from comic 
to potential hero.
For the genuine hero, authentic action comes in the form o f engagement, Sartre’s 
term for action not just ‘dans le’ but ‘au milieu du monde’. Its translation into English 
proves testing, for the concept involves not only the idea o f being ‘engaged’ in the 
world, as all men and women are condemned to be ,290 but also, and more importantly, 
the necessity to be ‘committed’ to the world, to accept one’s Historicity, and take an 
active part in socio-political life. For the Sartrean hero, thrown into the world, the only 
way to make sense of human life is to accept the logical crusade for liberation through 
an assumption of social duty and ethical responsibility. The opposite attitude to 
committed Engagement is that of neutrality, an illogical conduite magique akin to the 
Quietism condemned in L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme and visible in many o f 
Sartre’s failed, comic, and anti-heroes.
The Sartrean hero is faced with the challenge of justifying his existence, and the 
recurrent problem of character identity, shattered by ontology and partly solved by 
action, is supposedly resolved by full, committed Engagement: ‘Celui qui ne fait pas 
tout ne fait rien: je  n ’ai rien fait. Celui qui n ’a rien fait n ’est personne. ’291 In a typically 
Sartrean ‘all or nothing’ mentality, Frantz declares that he has lost his identity through 
his non-committal Engagement; in fact, as an anti-hero, his identity has been fixed, and 
he will be remembered by his peers as ‘The Butcher o f Smolensk’. His tragedy stems 
from his misunderstanding of the nature o f action. Although he is right to connect it 
with identity, by linking it with destiny and regarding it as a means in itself, he acts in a 
Bad Faith which leads him to gratuitous evil:
Frantz: La guerre etait mon destin et je  l’ai voulue de toute mon ame.
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J ’agissais, enfin! Je reinventais les ordres; j ’etais d ’accord avec 
moi.
Johanna: Agir, c ’est tuer?
Frantz: C’est agir. Ecrire son nom .292
Action without commitment is even more dangerous than no action whatsoever: it is 
certainly commendable to ‘ecrire son nom’, but as a torturer (who has by definition no 
respect for the freedom of autrui), Frantz’s identity is that o f the Humanist anti-hero, 
brutal and oppressing instead of free and liberatory.
The Engagement o f Sartrean Existentialism manifests itself in three main forms: 
intellectual, artistic, and political. The role of the intellectual agent has already been 
discussed, but intellectual agents who do not progress through the ontology o f liberty 
and the ethics of action towards the committed Engagement o f heroism become the 
focus o f scorn in Sartre’s fiction and theatre. Characters such as Roquentin and Hugo 
who have climbed the first step of the Sartrean ladder seem to stagnate in their own 
ideology, conceiving and aware, but achieving very little; engaged but not committed: 
‘Rien a faire! Je suis un gosse de riches, un intellectuel, un type qui ne travaille pas de 
ses mains. ’293 Hugo’s despair shows a depth of self-awareness: he is a product of his 
class rather than bastardised by his birth into it, and his inability to transcend his ‘type’ 
leads directly to his finitude. Hoederer’s mistake is to incur his sexual jealousy, for in 
terms of ideology, his Engagement is restricted to words: ‘II faut le laisser dire. Chacun 
peut employer les mots qu’il veut. ’294 Hoederer’s realisation o f the vast gulf between 
words and action is of great significance, and this conflict is a theme which runs 
throughout Sartre’s work, separating hero from agent or even the agent from the puppet. 
The passive intellectualism of Roquentin and Hugo is mirrored by many other lesser 
characters, and it even enters the world o f farce and illusion in its incarnation in 
Georges:
Veronique: Je crois vos mains. Voyez comme elles ont Fair bete:
vous n ’avez jamais rien fait de vos dix doigts.
Georges: Je travaille avec la langue.295
The world of thoughts and words is that of the poet or, it seems, the prerogative o f the 
dead:
Estelle: Ah! tu penses trop!
Garcin: Que faire d ’autre? Autrefois, j ’agissais.296
By contrast, action is credited as a life-giving force, for, as pointed out by Canoris, 
without the agency of concrete Engagement, pour-soi loses its utility and thus its reason 
to exist: ‘Moi, je crois qu’il y a beau temps que nous sommes morts: au moment precis 
ou nous avons cesse d’etre utiles. ’297 Unless it is successful and efficient, action is 
reduced to the passivity and reverie o f intellectual Engagement, which functions for 
Sartre merely as a precondition and catalyst for socio-political involvement; it must not 
become a substitute:
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S’il suffit de concevoir pour realiser, me voila plonge dans un monde 
semblable a celui du reve, ou le possible ne se distingue plus aucunement du 
reel [...]. La distinction entre le simple souhait, la representation que je  
pourrais choisir et le choix etant abolie, la liberte disparait avec elle .298
The fusion of the modes of human reality, o f conceiving an act and carrying it out, is 
shown to counteract the concrete progressiveness of action. It is linked by Sartre with 
the surrealism of the oneiric, whose illusory abstraction threatens even the facticity of 
Freedom. Sartre’s greatest heroes are therefore those who defend and represent the 
supremacy of Freedom, planted firmly on the route from the abstract to the real: ‘Le 
chemin que suit Goetz est un chemin de la liberte: il mene [...] d ’une morale abstraite, 
sans lieu ni date, a un engagement concret. ’299 Abstract morality implies an ethics of 
non-Engagement, an intellectual ideology of acceptance and Absurdity, and characters 
who fail to transcend this ethic o f passivity will be confined to the Nausea o f Being 
explored so well in Roquentin.
The second manifestation of Sartrean Engagement is that o f the artistic, the form 
which can be credited with Roquentin’s salvation:
Je sens quelque chose qui me frole timidement et je  n ’ose pas bouger parce 
que j ’ai peur que 9 a ne s’en aille. Quelque chose que je  ne connaissais plus: 
une espece de joie.
La Negresse chante. Alors on peut justifier son existence? Un tout 
petit peu? [...] Un livre. Naturellement, 9 a ne serait d ’abord qu’un travail 
ennuyeux et fatigant, 9 a ne m ’empecherait pas d ’exister ni de sentir que 
j ’existe. Mais il viendrait bien un moment ou le livre serait ecrit, serait 
derriere moi et je  pense qu’un peu de clarte tomberait sur mon passe. Alors 
peut-etre que je pourrais, a travers lui, me rappeler ma vie sans 
repugnance.300
The prospect o f artistic Engagement is an ultimate source o f hope in a generally 
desperate novel, and for the central, autobiographical character it represents a positive 
chance of personal salvation. However, with the progression of Sartre’s work and 
ideology comes a modification of both Engagement and salvation, and the ephemeral 
celebration of aesthetic creativity is vanquished by resolute insistence on la litterature 
engagee, which resounds so clearly in Qu ’est-ce que la Litterature?. The seeds had been 
sown five years earlier when L ’Etre et le Neant brought into question the very validity 
of creation: ‘Ce que je cree -  si j ’entends par creer: faire venir matiere et forme a 
l’existence -  c ’est moi. [...] La totalite de mes possessions reflechit la totalite de mon 
etre. Je suis ce que j ’ai.,30] The argument returns to avoir, faire, and etre, for human 
creativity is consigned to the passive modes of having and being, and thence to the 
original desire to be God; art for art’s sake euphemises art for the sake o f the subjective 
Self, and its downfall lies in its solipsism and futility.
Sartre’s third and final form of Engagement, that o f political commitment, is a 
triumphant combination of action, Historicity, and ethics, and it has come to represent 
the hallmark of the authentic Sartrean hero. Oreste, Canoris, Hoederer, and Goetz are all 
engaged in political action, struggling as Humanists to improve the lot o f those around 
them, and it is no coincidence that these worthy characters all champion the cause for 
liberation, engaged in a history ranging from the tyranny of Ancient Greece to the self­
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interested politics of the recent Cold War. It is in this favoured form of Engagement that 
Sartre seeks an answer to the problem of solipsism, a problem which will lead him to his 
Being-for-Others. At this stage, however, the conflict of interests between the subjective 
individualist (the solitaire) and the committed political Humanist (the solidaire) is 
explored through the radically contrasting motivations of the intellectual idealist and the 
compromising realist:
Slick: T ’es pas fou? T ’as pas le droit de te respecter si t ’es pas au moins
secretaire.
Hugo: Pauvres idiots! Si je suis entre au Parti, c’est pour que tous les
hommes, secretaires ou non, en aient un jour le droit.
Georges: [...] Nous, mon petit pote, si on y est entre c’est qu’on en avait 
marre de crever de faim .302
Slick and Georges, like Nasty, are impulsively engaged, but despite the somewhat crass 
polarity o f class, the working men of Hoederer succeed in ridiculing the bourgeois 
respectability o f the introspective Hugo. Both motivations may well be autonomously 
valid, but taken on their own, they are of little common worth. Combined however in 
the political shell o f Hoederer, a balanced composition o f intellect and action, they work 
together to provide a worthy cause. With his balanced nature and his dirty hands, 
Hoederer is without doubt Sartre’s most successful political agent; while retaining a 
much envied sense o f Self, he succeeds in becoming an instrument of power:
Hoederer: A quoi 9 a sert-il de fourbir un couteau tous les jours si
l’on n ’en use jamais pour trancher? Un parti, ce n ’est jamais 
qu’un moyen. II n ’y a qu’un seul but: le pouvoir.
Hugo: II n ’y a qu’un seul but: c’est de faire triompher nos idees,
toutes nos idees et rien qu’elles.
Hoederer: C’est vrai: tu as des idees, toi. £ a  te passera.303
The image of the knife is particularly apt in the world o f the Sartrean hero, for 
within the realm of political Engagement, and even in the midst o f Hoederer’s social 
realism, lies the explosive ethical issue of the justification of violence. For Sartre, 
violence and political progress are inevitable partners, and the ethics of passive 
resistance is treated with the disdain accorded to neutrality or non-Engagement. With 
the rejection o f absolutes comes the ambiguous ethics of goodness and evil, and Sartre’s 
greatest heroes provide effective demonstration of his ruthless decomposition of 
traditional morality:
Goetz: J’ai voulu que ma bonte soit plus devastatrice que mes
vices.
Heinrich: Et tu y as reussi: vingt-cinq mille cadavres! En un jour de
vertu tu as fait plus de morts qu’en trente-cinq annees de 
malice.304
Goetz provides a satire on the virtue of non-violence in a play which seems to reconfirm 
the necessity o f war. Having completed his ethical progression, he is finally prepared to 
assume the role of the political hero, and to dirty his own hands in compromise and in
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blood: ‘Je suis resigne a tuer [...]. II y a cette guerre a faire et je la ferai. ’305 The attitude 
o f Sartre’s soldiers is characterised by resignation and dedication to the cause. His 
heroes act in the knowledge of their own and others’ mortality with their political end in 
constant sight, and they are not ones to shy away from the spilling o f blood. Sartrean 
Humanism is marked then by ethical compromise and justified violence, but it also runs 
the risk o f serious misnomer, as the human loses its humanity to the expectations of the 
cause:
Johanna: Un soldat c’est un homme.
Frantz: C’est d ’abord un soldat.306
Frantz lies on the outskirts of Humanistic ideology, but he portrays the efficacity 
implored by his creator, appearing at times, like many other memorable Sartrean 
creations, like a chess piece in a game. But this is no Beckettian Endgame, ruled by 
stasis and futility, but a tactical game o f action for the stake o f liberation. In his 
imaginary conflict with Klages, Frantz condemns once more the ethics o f non-violence, 
linking Hoederer’s pragmatic power with the ethical reality of Goetz: ‘La guerre passe 
par toi. En la refusant, tu te condamnes a l’impuissance: tu as vendu ton ame pour rien, 
moraliste. La mienne, je  la ferai payer. D ’abord gagner! ’307 The pejorative use o f 
‘moraliste’ confirms the break from the certainty of ethics, the transformation from 
agent to hero and the vital importance of political commitment. At this stage, 
commitment seems inextricably linked with an acceptance o f the necessity o f violence, 
and Sartre uses the situation of slavery to justify his Hegelian association o f violence 
and Freedom: ‘Puisque l’esclavage est l’ordre, la liberte sera desordre, anarchie, 
terrorisme. [...] Puisque le positif s’obtient par l’oppression, la liberte sera negativite 
pure. [...] La violence est negation de la negation . ’308 The essential qualities o f the 
Sartrean hero have now been traced, and in their final analysis, it remains to be seen if 
the ultimate goal o f the Humanist hero, the exceptional challenge o f Authenticity, is 
greater than or even equal to the sum of its own parts.
In many ways, Authenticity represents the golden standard of the Existentialist 
Humanist, and the truly authentic heroes of Sartrean theatre are few and far between. 
However, given the seeming importance o f the term, Sartre has given it relatively little 
credence in his theoretical discussions, and the task o f constructing a workable 
definition is tantamount to philosophical archaeology. The history o f the term begins 
amidst the burning ashes o f Good Faith in the notorious footnote o f L ’Etre et le Neant:
S’il est indifferent d ’etre de bonne ou de mauvaise foi, parce que la 
mauvaise foi ressaisit la bonne foi et se glisse a l ’origine meme de son 
projet, cela ne veut pas dire qu’on ne puisse echapper radicalement a la 
mauvaise foi. Mais cela suppose une reprise de l’etre pourri par lui-meme 
que nous nommerons authenticity et dont la description n ’a pas place ici.309
Authenticity is then a possible means of ontological escape from the apparent dead end 
o f the desagregation intime and the ultimate equilibrium o f Good and Bad Faith, and it 
functions as a purification of self-putrefied being, presumably on the level of pour-soV s 
reflection. The only other mention of the term in the work comes with reference to 
Heidegger’s authentic and inauthentic projects, which involve a combination of
305 Ibid., p.246 and p.252.
306 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.297.
307 Ibid., p.303.
308 Cahiers pour une Morale, pp.418-19.
309 L ’Etre et le Neant, p. 111, footnote.
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ontology and ethics and which are (thus?) rejected by Sartre as non-fundamental, based 
as they are upon a subjective awareness of death rather than an original choice o f life .310 
The Cahiers elaborate on this ‘reprise de l’etre’, continuing the work o f L'Etre et le
Neant: ‘Puisque sincerite et mauvaise foi etaient renvoyees dos a dos pour jouer sur
l’etre et le n ’etre pas, il allait de soi que l’authenticite consistait a devoiler l’etre sur le 
mode de ne pas etre. ’311 This reference to ‘devoilement’ o f Being, highly reminiscent of 
the Heideggerian description of Man as the ‘shepherd of Being’ and perhaps influenced 
by Heidegger’s objections to Sartre’s misinterpretations o f his philosophy addressed in 
the Lettre sur L ’Humanisme, may add to the definition o f Authenticity, but the concept 
remains shrouded in obscurity: how should Man unveil Being, and how does this affect 
the ethical process? Sartre’s previous definition o f the concept is more precise, and it 
succeeds in combining committed action with a positive and Humanistic ethic for life:
L ’homme authentique ne perd jamais de vue les buts absolus de la condition 
humaine. II est pur choix de ses buts absolus. Ces buts sont: sauver le monde 
(en faisant qu’il y a de l’etre), faire de la liberte le fondement du monde,
reprendre a son compte la creation et faire que l’origine du monde soit
Tabsolu de la liberte se reprenant elle-meme.312
But, once again, the description is problematic. Firstly, it links the unveiling o f Being 
with ‘saving the world’ without describing this process o f creative revelation; and 
secondly, it again imposes Freedom as an ethical absolute, risking a contradictory return 
to Seriousness. This problem is merely compounded by Sartre’s subsequent discussion 
on ‘devoilement’, where we learn that Te Pour-soi n ’existe que comme devoilement 
d ’Etre [...]. Par lui l ’Etre est sauve du Neant, l’Etre se manifeste: le Pour-soi surgit pour 
que l’Etre devienne Verite [...]. Le Pour-soi se perd comme soi pour cooperer a ce que 
l ’Etre soit. ’313 We are now confronted not only with a plethora of ethical and ontological 
absolutes, whereby Being equals Truth, but with a reminder o f the inherent lack of 
status accorded to the human in Sartre’s conception of Humanism.
Further insight is given by Sartre in his Reflexions sur la Question Juive which 
marks a definite movement from ontology to ethics:
L ’authenticite [...] consiste a prendre une conscience lucide et veridique de 
la situation, a assumer les responsabilites et les risques que cette situation 
comporte, a la revendiquer dans la fierte ou dans l’humiliation, parfois dans 
l’horreur et la haine. II n ’est pas douteux que l ’authenticite demande 
beaucoup de courage et plus que du courage. Ainsi ne s’etonnera-t-on pas 
que l’inauthenticite soit la plus repandue. Qu’il s’agisse de bourgeois, de 
chretiens, la plupart sont inauthentiques, en ce sens qu’ils se refusent a vivre 
jusqu’au bout leur condition bourgeoise et chretienne et qu’ils s ’en 
masquent toujours certaines parties.314
It seems here that Inauthenticity has become the ethical equivalent of ontological Bad 
Faith, with the significant proviso that its opposite attitude, that o f Authenticity, is not 
rejected as fundamentally indifferent and flawed, but rather as a positive Sartrean value 
based on the familiar heroic virtues of lucidity, responsibility, and courage. But as with 
Bad Faith, Sartre claims that Inauthenticity is the default position, the most common
310 Ibid., p.651.
311 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.490.
312 Ibid., pp.463-64.
313 Ibid., pp.500-01.
314 Reflexions sur la Question Juive, pp. 109-10.
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ethical state, and it is the few and not the many who transcend this common ground of 
morality, accepting the totality and truth of their condition and displaying with great 
strength the courage of their convictions.
In the light of Sartre’s incoherent treatment of Authenticity in his philosophical 
theory, critics have been compelled to turn to the practical world o f his theatre for a 
more comprehensive insight into this, his most elusive concept. Perhaps the most 
authentic of Sartre’s creations is the heroic character o f Hoederer, who represents a 
natural embodiment of the qualities demanded of a man of his type:
Tout ce qu’il touche a l ’air vrai. II verse le cafe dans les tasses, je  bois, je  le 
regarde boire et je  sens que le vrai gout du cafe est dans sa bouche a lui.
C’est le vrai gout du cafe qui va disparaitre, la vraie chaleur, la vraie 
lumiere.315
The true, the genuine, and the authentic seem to be combined in the incarnation o f this 
noble character, and if this is a source of regret and admiration for the inauthentic Hugo, 
it is one of fear and sexual intrigue for his wife: ‘Vous etes vrai. Un vrai homme de 
chair et d’os, j ’ai vraiment peur de vous et je  crois que je  vous aime pour de vrai. ’316 For 
Jessica, Hoederer is the epitome of a real man, a man of potency, dominance and natural 
appeal who more than compensates for everything her husband lacks. The triangle of 
characters is reminiscent of Huis Clos, though this time the triangle is far from 
equilateral, as the magnetic appeal o f Hoederer comes strongly to the fore. The inter­
relationships are summarised effectively by McCall:
Hugo and Jessica are attracted to Hoederer for much the same reasons. Only 
Hoederer’s confidence can make a man of Hugo; only Hoederer’s sexuality 
can make of Jessica a woman. Both feel in Hoederer a solidity, a reality, that 
they fail to find in themselves; Hoederer seems at home in his body. From 
the stage set in which they live, Hugo and Jessica watch enviously as the 
world o f real objects and real people comes into existence around 
Hoederer’s presence.317
The analysis is sensitive, but it fails to mention Authenticity as the subject o f its study. 
It seems that Sartre, having singled Hoederer out as a candidate for Authenticity, then 
endows him with the qualities he perceives as being fitting. It is no coincidence, then, 
that McCall works retrospectively, for devoid o f a theoretical definition, the critic is 
working in the dark. It is not clear whether Sartre’s characterisation is consciously 
affected by Authenticity, but it is unlikely that the links between the theory and the 
practice are purely coincidental: ‘Un type comme Hoederer ne meurt pas par hasard. II 
meurt pour ses idees, pour sa politique; il est responsable de sa mort. ’318 The reference 
back to Heideggerian Authenticity reinforces Hoederer’s privileged status amongst the 
best of Sartre’s heroes, and it strengthens the case for a textual analysis o f the plays to 
supplement the lacking theory.
The reality, sincerity, and truth of Sartrean Authenticity are explored further in 
Les Sequestres d ’Altona, where the central love interest is punctuated with an apparent 
search for an absolute:
Vous, vous etes vraie. Quand je vous regarde, je connais que la verite existe
315 Les Mains Sales, p. 123.
316 Ibid., p.224.
317 The Theatre o f Jean-Paul Sartre, p.71.
318 Les Mains Sales, p.244.
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et qu’elle n ’est pas de mon bord .319
II faut que nous nous aidions a vouloir la Verite.320
Frantz’s declarations lead him tumbling into Seriousness, into the ontological and 
ethical absolutism already rejected by Sartre in Sincerity and in the Value. However, 
Sartre seems to accept a certain absolutism in his personification of Authenticity, and it 
is certainly the case that his lesser characters are attracted, whether spiritually, sexually, 
or both, by the verite o f their greater fellows.
The farces again provide an illuminating foil for the theatrical exploration o f 
Authenticity. The role-playing creations o f Georges and Kean, who strive to evade the 
problem of identity, are perhaps not inauthentic, as the likes of Hugo and Frantz, but 
rather anti-authentic in their resolute rejection of truth and reality:
Elena: Une illusion? Kean n ’est done pas un homme?
Le Prince: Et non, madame: c’est un acteur.
Elena: Et qu’est-ce done qu’un acteur?
Le Prince: C’est un mirage.321
By living his life on the set of a stage, Kean can totally circumvent the world o f 
Authenticity with its eclectic concoction o f heroic postulations; but his life is a constant 
conduite magique, and as he is reminded by the Prince, the hole at the heart of his being 
will therefore never be filled: ‘C’est nous, c ’est nous que tu poursuis en Elena, nous les 
vrais hommes. C ’est nous que tu veux posseder! ’322
The Authenticity o f Sartrean theatre can be seen to represent a broadening out of 
the term first encountered in L ’Etre et le Neant to encompass a vast range o f adjectival 
qualities of character. A close definition is naturally impeded by such a general sketch, 
and thus the only practical guide to the precise semantics of the term must come in the 
form of a list. The authentic Sartrean hero has been shown to be: true, genuine, natural, 
and real; powerful, appealing, confident, and dominant; and solid, comfortable, at home 
inside his body, and physically prepossessing. The demands are certainly demanding, 
and Sartre’s Humanism appears to be crossing the line towards a mythically inspired 
and fictional doctrine, suitable rather for the super-human.
Sartre’s critics seem to have left an open verdict on the question o f Authenticity. 
Most can be seen to accept Sartre’s terminology, however ill-defined, and to apply it to 
his theatre without question. Thus, for example, Bradby can claim that ‘Hugo and Goetz 
represent respectively failure and success in the quest for authentic action’ without 
elaborating on the concept of ‘authentic action’ .323 Greene’s contribution that 
‘Authenticity requires of man not a code o f conduct but a way o f life’ achieves some 
success in implying the impossibility of a normative ethics, but his attempt at a 
combination of the ethical and ontological leads to assumption and confusion: ‘If 
anguish recalls the authentic man to his freedom and responsibility, the despair of 
nausea awaits the unauthentic. ’324 The sentiments are noble, but they are Greene’s, not 
Sartre’s. Even Jeanson, the so-called privileged critic, cannot manage a definition, and 
in the place of a valid critique comes merely simplistic truism: ‘L ’attitude authentique 
ne saurait etre qu’une attitude d ’autonomie. ’325 Recent criticism fares little better, and
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despite the recent flurry of interest in Sartrean ethics, the concept of Authenticity, which 
is proposed as the desirable mode of ethical conduct, remains relatively uncontested:
Sartre’s authentic individuals must create their own values through their 
actions; moreover, they must recognise that their choice of these values is 
not a necessary one and is not supported or justified by anything 
whatsoever.326
Bell is covering familiar ethical ground, but by linking Authenticity with the ethics of 
‘play’ and by converting the mode of being into the novel terminology of ‘striving’ ,327 
she demonstrates the ability to ‘imagine Sisyphus happy’ and achieves considerable 
progress in the Authenticity of Sartrean theatre: ‘Men like Hoederer [...] acknowledge 
and accept their freedom and the ultimate futility of their actions, yet enter the fray, 
resolved to control and change what they can . ’328 Her progress was perhaps anticipated 
by Champigny, who favoured the logic of ontology, rather than play, in his choice o f a 
framework for Authenticity:
Sartre’s conception of the relations between ethics and ontology is 
philosophically quite classical. To act ethically would be to act 
authentically; and acting authentically would be acting according to the 
nature which ontology defines.329
Both methods are acceptable, but they are both guilty of avoiding, rather than 
confronting, the fundamental problems of Authenticity. Similar tactics are at play in the 
work of Anderson and Fretz, who, inspired no doubt by the Cahiers, seek their solutions 
in the conversion to pure reflection.330
Sartre’s first invocation of pure reflection comes in La Transcendance de I ’Ego, 
where apparently it ‘s’en tient au donne sans elever de pretentions vers l ’avenir’. The 
example Sartre gives is that of hatred, where impure reflection would ‘affirm more than 
it knew’ in declaring “Je te deteste”, while pure reflection, which is ‘simply descriptive’, 
would disarm unreflective consciousness and concede: “Ce n ’est pas vrai, je  ne te 
deteste pas, je  dis 9 a dans la colere.” 331 In this instance, pure reflection recognises the 
transience o f the experience, acknowledging this ‘Erlebnis’ as an object outside 
consciousness, and treating it according to the transcendent ontology o f temporality. On 
the ethical plane, impure reflection is said to undermine the necessity o f action: ‘Dans la 
reflection morale complice, ce qui importe c’est l’etre moral du reflechi. II s’agit de 
vouloir le Bien [...] pour etre moral. ’332 The perfect example of such Bad Faith is o f 
course Garcin, who believes he is no coward purely through his longing to be brave. 
However, Sartre informs us that the failure o f complicit reflection, together with the 
very structure o f alienation and the failure o f the God-project, incites pour-soi towards 
pure reflection.333 This process, the acceptance o f ‘failure’, is what he calls ‘conversion’, 
and he links it with assumption of ‘la non-justification ou gratuite -  l ’ambiguite -  la 
tension -  l’echec. ’334 This insight takes us back to the acknowledgment of the Absurd,
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and it seems that if  Sartre had defined Good Faith as simply the assumption of the 
‘desagregation intime’, he might have reached this conclusion much sooner. Indeed he 
goes on to describe the three changes effected by conversion to pure reflection as:
Nouvelle maniere, ‘authentique’, d’etre a soi-meme et pour soi-meme, qui 
transcende la dialectique de la sincerite-mauvaise foi [...].
Saisie thematique de la liberte, de la gratuite, de l’injustifiabilite.
Nouvelle relation de l’homme a son projet: il est dedans et dehors a la 
fois.335
There is nothing particularly original here apart from the new relationship between 
pour-soi and the project, which is subsequently elaborated upon:
Dans la reflection pure [...] le Pour-soi veut toujours la fin pour elle-meme 
mais il est conscient de soi comme voulant cette fin. [...] C’est ce double 
aspect simultane du projet humain, gratuit en son cceur et consacre par la 
reprise reflexive, qui en fait Vexistence authentique,336
In this context, pure reflection resembles a simultaneous reflection achieved, as it were, 
by ‘splitting’ consciousness in two, so that pour-soi reflects on itself reflecting. Such a 
technique is reminiscent both of a conduite magique and o f dissociation 
(idedoublement), and thus cannot be far removed from idealism and Bad Faith. Hazel 
Barnes equates the effect with ‘fatigue, slight insobriety, or a sudden return to focusing 
on immediate surroundings after intense involvement in sustained nonreflective activity 
focused elsewhere’, thus emphasising its magical and transient nature. She adds:
What pure reflection reveals -  glimpsed over the shoulder, as it were, and 
only as a pseudo-object -  is our perpetually active, impersonal intentional 
consciousness. [...] It manifests itself in a feeling that what is happening 
now is no more real than what was happening yesterday or will be tomorrow 
and that at the core of the experience there is no stable and enduring ‘I ’. To 
interpret pure reflection as the evidence of the presence in us o f an 
impersonal, though individual, consciousness, is for Sartre both correct 
phenomenological procedure and the revelation o f our existential freedom. It 
is this that makes it possible for human reality to effect even a drastic 
modification of the fundamental project.337
This definition is particularly interesting if used in conjunction with Catalano’s 
understanding of Authenticity, according to which ‘the authentic person does not 
consistently distract herself from these moments o f pure reflection’ .338
It seems, then, that Authenticity requires a conversion to a pure reflection which 
assumes gratuity, ambiguity, tension, and failure through a simultaneous acceptance of 
facticity and transcendence, and through a magical conduite o f consciousness which 
leads it to reflect on itself reflecting, to accept the fluidity o f temporality, and thus to 
deny any ownership of ‘Self. Despite the complexity, the only new aspect o f this 
somewhat incoherent theory is a magical one, which in the final analysis cannot but 
prove contradictory. Thus far, therefore, Authenticity has managed to defeat and even
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outlive its critics, and ultimately we are left without the promised ethics o f deliverance 
and salvation, and devoid of the radical conversion so apparent in Saint Genet.
What then can be salvaged from the Sartrean delineation of Heroic Man? The 
hero of Sartrean theatre has been scrutinised with reference to Humanism, bastardy, 
courage, mortality, Historicity, action, Engagement, ethical realism, violence, and 
Authenticity, and a clear picture has emerged of the Sartrean concept o f heroism. 
Characters like Oreste, Hoederer, and Goetz undoubtedly represent the embodiment of 
this complex and demanding concept, and it is in their hands that lies the fate o f the 
practical reality of Sartre’s theatre, ontology, and ethics. Unfortunately, these characters 
have been mystified and almost canonised by half a century o f generally favourable 
commentary and audience, and a critical eye is required if  their qualities are to be 
challenged.
Firstly, the characterisation of the hero as a bastard must be contested, 
especially in relation to the successful portrayals of the contemporary hero evident in 
many modernist plays. The Sartrean propensity for bastardy is symbolic, rather than 
ontological or ethical, in origin, and in discarding philosophical logic for personal 
theatrical taste, Sartre alienates the ordinary being by excluding the potential heroism of 
Everyman, thus contradicting his declared intention to stage a theatre for the masses and 
denying an ethical tradition stemming back to at least medieval times. Secondly, the 
demand for heroic action and Engagement must be questioned: the modes o f having and 
being may have been rejected for the cherished mode of doing, but the failure of 
Sartrean ethics to justify human action leaves the very choice o f action both subjective 
and gratuitous. In this light, we may well ask why we should engage ourselves at all, 
why Sartre has cut the puppet’s strings to create his Man of Action. The answer must be 
that Sartre is avoiding the reality of Absurdism in an elaborate conduite magique o f his 
own creation, a view reflected also in the ideology o f Camus: ‘Pour m ’en tenir aux 
philosophies existentielles, je vois que toutes sans exception me proposent l’evasion . ’339 
Sartre is guilty of escapism and flight, leaving behind the apparent despair o f Absurdism 
for a transcendence based on an ontology of solipsistic liberty and on an ethics as 
inevitable as it is impossible. He is guilty o f Seriousness on two counts: his Values of 
Freedom and action are taken as written in stone, and his coercion into political 
involvement, even when not explicitly Marxist, has the dictatorial force o f the salaud 
which can easily lead the innocent to their death. The point is laboured by Camus:
Je vois beaucoup de gens meurent parce qu’ils estiment que la vie ne vaut 
pas la peine d’etre vecue. J ’en vois d ’autres qui se font paradoxalement tuer 
pour les idees ou les illusions qui leur donnent une raison de vivre (ce qu’on 
appelle une raison de vivre est en meme temps une excellente raison de 
mourir) . 340
But whether they die from their exploits (like Hoederer) or live to fight another day (like 
Oreste and Goetz), Sartre’s heroes are required to enter a political struggle which is 
always ostensibly one of Sartre’s own, and which thus conflicts with their freedom as 
autonomous, if  fictitious, beings. Hugo’s misguided ‘je  ne respire que depuis mon 
entree au Parti’ effects a powerful paradox between his existential freedom and his 
Existentialist duty ;341 if  Sartre’s characters cannot breathe outside the realm o f politics, 
it is surely because they are suffocated by the doctrine o f their own creator. Sartre’s case 
for political commitment amounts to little more than a crass attempt at combatting the 
ethical solipsism for which he was criticised in L ’Etre et le Neant, and the later theatre
339 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.50.
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sits uncomfortably on the throne o f the earlier success.
The third objection must be levelled at Sartre’s appeal for ethical realism, which 
is used as a euphemism for the justification of violence. Critics have rarely argued the 
Existentialist case for pacifism, even in the guise of devilish advocation, and yet the 
Sartrean insistence on the necessity of violence cannot fail to be seen as another 
paradoxical threat to the autonomy of choice, and thus to the very ontology of the 
freedom o fpour-soi\
Try to understand this at any rate: if  violence began this very evening and if  
exploitation and oppression had never existed on the earth, perhaps the 
slogans of non-violence might end the quarrel. But if  the whole regime, 
even your non-violent ideas, are conditioned by a thousand-year-old 
oppression, your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks o f the 
oppressors.342
By linking pacifism with passivity, Sartre is not only guilty o f semantic mis­
representation, but more seriously of undermining an ontologically valid choice of 
action, and in his defence of his characterisation of Goetz, he betrays a deep-set political 
preference for the ethics o f means and ends: ‘J’ai voulu montrer que mon heros, Goetz, 
qui est un genre de franc-tireur et d ’anarchiste du Mai, ne detruit rien quand il croit 
beaucoup detruire. II detruit des vies humaines, mais ni la societe, ni les assises 
sociales. ’343 If Sartre considers human lives as nothing, and humanity as just a means to 
an end, there can be little hope o f a future for his Existentialism as a valid form of 
Humanism. Indeed any Humanistic claim concerning the even non-religious sanctity o f 
human life, or even the contention that humanity is an end in itself, is treated with a 
level o f disdain usually reserved for the Seriousness of the salauds:
Vous etes un neutraliste qui s’ignore, un pacifiste honteux, un marchand 
d ’illusions!344
Le Prince: La violence n ’arrangera rien: il faut prendre une vue
realiste de la situation.
Karsky: Vous etes un lache: vous m ’avez attire dans un guet-
apens pour sauver votre tete .345
The venomous reproaches of Mouton and Karsky reveal the white-feathered connection 
between the pacifist and the coward, and the image they portray is reminiscent of the 
despicable character of Garcin, condemned to the shame o f hell for his cowardly flight 
into pacifism. The most comprehensive treatment of pacifism comes in Le Diable et le 
Bon Dieu , and even there, Sartre cannot refrain from parody:
Si, pendant mon absence, on voulait vous enroler dans Tun ou l’autre parti, 
refusez de vous battre. Et si Ton vous menace, repondez aux menaces par 
T amour. Rappellez-vous, mes freres, rappelez-vous: 1’amour fera reculer la
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In this satirical reworking of the teachings of Christ, Sartre reaffirms his scornful 
disrespect for the pacifist, appearing almost to relish the resulting destruction o f the 
masses. His stance on the issue does not only conflict with the freedom o f choice, but 
also with his portrayal of the possible relations with autrui, in which both sadism and 
murder are shown to result in failure.
The repercussions of Sartre’s obvious inner-conflict on his character portrayal 
are devastating, particularly in relation to his female characters. Through some inherent 
misogyny, Sartre links pacifism not only with passivity and cowardice, but also with his 
perception of women -  perhaps an ethical misogyny to match the ontological 
consignment of women to the viscous and the troue. As a result, Sartrean Hero is always 
a Sartrean Man o f Action, and Sartrean Woman is consistently demoted to secondary 
characterisation. Apart from in Les Mouches, where Sartre deliberately distorts the 
classical myth to demean the role of Electre, the most poignant example is that of Hilda, 
whose potential heroism is denied her because o f her gender, and thus her pacifistic 
ideology (the two go hand in hand). However, she is a character of great stature and
presence, and she stands as a strong and courageous model of free thought in a world
oppressed by tyranny and blood:
L ’lnstructeur: Tu ne dis rien, mais tu nous regardes et nous savons que
tu ne nous approuves pas.
Hilda: Ne puis-je penser ce que je veux? 347
She is also a committed Humanist, and while Goetz is undergoing his somewhat 
adolescent changes in life plan, Hilda is a constant source o f virtue, a paragon o f human 
care:
Goetz: Dieu est mort.
Hilda: Mort ou vivant, que m ’importe! II y a longtemps que je
ne me souciais plus de lui.348
She is at least one step ahead of Goetz for the majority o f the play, until the typical 
moment o f truth, the situation limite, when she is forced to lay her values on the line:
Hilda: Pourquoi veux-tu me rendre complice de tes crimes?
Pourquoi m ’obliges-tu a decider a ta place? Pourquoi me 
donnes-tu puissance de vie et de mort sur mes freres?
Goetz: Parce que je t ’aime.
Hilda: Tais-toi. Ah! tu as gagne: tu m ’as fait passer de l ’autre
cote de la barriere; j ’etais avec ceux qui soufffent, a present 
je  suis avec ceux qui decident des soufffances. O Goetz, 
jamais plus je ne pourrai dormir! Je te defends de verser le 
sang. Refuse.349
Hilda makes the choice which Goetz is too weak to make, and her choice of pacifism is 
neither easy nor invalid. But the resolution of the play is one o f committed, violent 
action, and by thus condemning her decision, Sartre strikes a blow at his own defence of 
ethical freedom and willingly misrepresents the respective merits o f his creations:
Goetz may be the last act ‘hero’ of Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, but Heinrich,
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Nasty and Hilda, mystified as they appear, are right at his expense, for by far 
the greater part of the action; and even his ‘conversion’ is marked by an 
inglorious murder and a readiness to be both ‘bourreau et boucher’ in a 
revolution that is bound to fail.350
Hilda is of course not the only victim o f this ethical prejudice and gender 
discrimination: Electre, Ines, Lucie, Lizzie, Veronique, and Johanna are all potential 
heroes who fa il through an ultimate weakness, passivity, or capitulation, occasionally to 
a foreign set o f values, but more usually to the irresistible dominance o f heroic 
machismo. Even those with the underlying strength to be truly heroic seem to crumble 
back to the viscous once their potential is put to the test, serving as a clear reminder of 
the misogynistic characterisation evident in Sartre’s theatre and fiction:
He is [...] revolted by women. There is something sickening about all the 
female characters in Sartre’s plays and stories. Woman is seen as corrupt 
and corrupting; and in the very viscosity o f the physical world, half-fluid, 
half-solid, Sartre discerns what is passive, yielding, and ‘feminine’ .351
There is no room here for a thorough discussion o f Sartre’s perception and presentation 
o f women, but it is interesting to note that his disdain for the passive is connected with 
both pacifism and femininity; neither ‘disability’ is deemed minor enough to produce a 
deserving hero.
Despite the lack of a pacifist hero, Sartre is obviously tempted by the less 
compromising ethics o f pacifism, and there are times in his philosophy and even in his 
theatre when he seems, almost in spite of himself, to actively condone the non-violent:
Si le but est concret et fini, s’il est dans un avenir a mesure d ’homme il doit 
exclure la violence [...] et si Ton est oblige d ’y recourir pour l’atteindre au 
moins apparaitra-t-elle comme injustifiable et limitee. Ce sera l’echec au 
sein de la reussite .352
The Cahiers reflect clearly Sartre’s ambivalence towards the question of violence, 
revealing at times, such as in his discussion on slavery, the premise for the ethics of 
violent struggle central to the Critique, and at other times the commitment to pacifism 
reminiscent of Les Carnets de la drole de guerre:
La violence implique le nihilisme [...]. Nous voyons que la violence n ’est 
pas un moyen parmi d’autres d’atteindre la fin, mais le choix delibere 
d’atteindre la fin par n ’importe quel moyen. [...] Dans l’univers de la 
violence il y a renversement du rapport fin-moyen. La fin est justifiee par la 
violence.353
This apparent separation of violence and ethics is clearly echoed on the stage: ‘Connais- 
tu plus singuliere bouffonnerie: moi, qui hais le mensonge, je  mens a mes freres pour 
leur donner le courage de se faire tuer dans une guerre que je  hais. ’354 The philosophical 
words of Sartre, echoed theatrically here by Nasty, establish a definite ethical 
contradiction, and point towards the Humanistic ideal of a heroism which could finally
350 Howells, Christina, Sartre: The Necessity o f  Freedom, p.74.
351 Cranston, Maurice, Sartre, p.l 11.
352 Cahiers pour une Morale, pp.215-16.
353 Ibid., pp. 179-82.
354 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.249.
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combine a clear conscience with clean hands. But this need not exist in a mythical 
character, for the unassuming Hoederer can fulfil both requirements: his conscience is 
clear despite his ethical compromise, and in tenns o f the spilling o f blood, his hands are 
more than clean: ‘In its political theme, Dirty hands is not ambiguous; it is confused. 
Hoederer’s hands are not dirty and Hugo’s hands are not clean . ’355 Hoederer’s actions 
succeed in saving a hundred thousand lives; he kills no one within the action o f the play; 
and his final act is one of pacifistic love, lying to save the life o f the man who has just 
shot him. In a play about political engagement and compromise, Hoederer ironically 
stands out as a hero of pacifism; though admittedly no pacifist, he achieves his success 
through the pragmatics of non-violence, and he even goes so far as to challenge the 
methods o f Hugo: ‘C’est le sang que tu regrettes? ’ .356 In many respects, Hoederer is the 
greatest of Sartre’s heroes, and if Sartre feels the closest affinity towards him, it is 
probably because he strikes a perfect balance between a ruthless political agent and a 
humanitarian man of the people:
Je m ’incame en Hoederer. Idealement, bien sur; ne croyez pas que je 
pretende etre Hoederer, mais dans un sens je me sens beaucoup plus realise 
quand je pense a lui. Hoederer est celui que je voudrais etre si j ’etais un 
revolutionnaire, done je suis Hoederer, ne serait-ce que sur un plan 
symbolique.357
It could well be that Sartre is changing with the times, adapting his ethics in the light of 
his Historicity. He conceded early in his life that ‘les types d’engagement sont differents 
suivant les epoques’ ,358 and it seems that in the later plays especially, his view of 
violence in the modem era has darkened almost to despair. The bitter taste o f the 
violence o f the century is the lasting memory of Les Sequestres d ’Altona, and Les 
Troyennes ends with a warning on the fatal Absurdity of war:
Faites la guerre, mortels imbeciles, 
ravagez les champs et les villes, 
violez les temples, les tombes, 
et torturez les vaincus.
Vous en creverez.
Tous.359
Poseidon’s warning should perhaps be heeded as the call for a new ethic for a new 
Time; the ethics of violence have finally gone too far.
The fourth and final point o f contention concerns the ultimate challenge of 
Authenticity itself. Although progress has been made by linking the term with logic or 
the mode o f play, or even by the references to pure reflection, such achievements are 
limited through their evasion of the concept, and are largely to the credit o f Sartre’s 
critics. By failing or declining to elucidate the term himself, Sartre is surely guilty o f his 
dreaded mysticism: Authenticity has become an elusive term which is unclear in 
meaning and shrouded in mystery. In the theatre, it relates to areas o f tmth, sincerity, 
sexuality, and power, standing as an umbrella term for the qualities demanded at the 
lofty heights of Sartrean heroism; and philosophically, it remains as a broken promise, 
an unelaborated answer to the quandary of Bad Faith, and a dangling carrot as doomed
355 McCall, Dorothy, The Theatre o f Jean-Paul Sartre, p.64
356 Les Mains Sales, p. 187.
357 Un Theatre de Situations, p.259.
358 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, discussion, p. 105.
359 Les Troyennes, p. 130.
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as Good Faith.
It must then be assumed that Authenticity is devoid o f meaning and thus can 
never be achieved. Even if it were a tangible goal, an attainable value, the problem of 
judgement would plague its success, for if  it stood as a value judgement o/M an by Man, 
it would have to be rejected by the Sartrean Humanist.360 The most severe objections, 
however, are on the ontological plane. How can pour-soi be authentic when it is what it 
is not and is not what it is? To what could it remain authentic in the absence of the Self, 
where ‘“bien se connaitre”, c ’est fatalement prendre sur soi le point de vue d ’autrui, 
c’est-a-dire un point de vue forcement faux . ’? 361 How can the realite humaine attain the 
fixed state of Authenticity when its consciousness is fluid, when it is condemned to be 
free and to constantly reinvent itself? Does the principle o f Authenticity not contradict 
the temporality, ambiguity, and distance o f the desagregation intime? These questions 
have all been raised by Sartre himself in objection to Sincerity, and it would seem that 
Authenticity is little more than a failed attempt at a reinvention o f this already 
discredited term, dressed in borrowed robes and shrouded in a cloak of mystery. The 
failure of Sincerity prefigured and determined the inevitable doom of Authenticity, and 
the absence of both values leaves an impenetrable vacuum at the heart of Sartrean 
philosophy.
Sartre tries to circumvent the implicit contradictions surrounding his interpretation 
o f consciousness by linking Authenticity with conversion and pure reflection. Pure 
reflection has been shown to be at best idealistic and at worst an impossible dissociation 
o f consciousness, replacing any Bad Faith form of distractive self-awareness with a 
magical phenomenon of ‘fleeting glimpses’. As for conversion, even Sartre concedes 
that individual conversion is ultimately as impossible as ethics: ‘On ne peut pas faire la 
conversion seul. Autrement dit la morale n ’est possible que si tout le monde est 
moral. ’362 Unsalvaged, then, by conversion and pure reflection, Authenticity 
presupposes Bad Faith, dissociation, distraction, and Seriousness, and thus must surely 
be rejected as the goal of Sartre’s agent. A similar conclusion is reached by Greene, who 
states that Sartre ‘cannot [...] hold that authenticity is an absolute value o f universal 
validity. [...] Since [he] denies the validity o f so-called a priori moral principles it must 
be assumed that he does not intend to assert one. ’363 Greene is right to exclude 
Authenticity from the realm of the categorically imperative, but his resulting assumption 
is somewhat over-lenient: Sartre’s ethics is ultimately one o f paradox and self­
refutation, as he attempts to both deny and assert the possibility o f an absolute value of 
universal morality. If Authenticity has any validity whatsoever, it can only be in death, 
in the completed en-soi o f the past where pour-soi has finally extinguished together with 
its Freedom, its transcendence, its fluidity and temporality:
La mort nous rejoint a nous meme [...]. Au moment de la mort nous sommes, 
c’est-a-dire nous sommes sans defense devant les jugements d ’autrui; on 
peut decider en verite de ce que nous sommes, nous n ’avons plus aucune 
chance d’echapper au total.364
Tirez sur moi, je  vous dis. C’est votre metier. Ecoutez done: un pere de 
famille, c’est jamais un vrai pere de famille. Un assassin c ’est jamais tout a 
fait un assassin. Ils jouent, vous comprenez. Tandis qu’un mort, c’est un 
mort pour de vrai. Etre ou ne pas etre, hein? Vous voyez ce que je veux dire.
360 See L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, pp.90-94.
361 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.69.
362 Ibid., p. 16.
363 Greene, Norman N., The Existentialist Ethic, p.58.
364 L Etre et le Neant, p. 159.
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II n ’y a rien que je  puisse etre sinon un mort avec six pieds de terre par- 
dessus la tete. Tout 9 a, je vous le dis, c’est de la comedie.365
Sartre reminds us that we cannot be anything until we are dead, for truth and totality, 
and thus Sincerity and Authenticity, are the preserve of en-soi, o f objects, o f things-in- 
themselves; and Hugo’s triumph, appropriate for an intellectual, comes in the realisation 
that death is the final victory o f Being, the last comic trick o f the Absurd.
In the demise of Authenticity, it remains to be established what remains of 
Sartrean Humanism. It seems that we have come full circle: Sartre has led us from the 
precondition of Absurdity through the ontology of transcendence, which terminated in 
Bad Faith, towards the possibility of an Existentialist ethic, which came unstuck with 
Seriousness, and thence to the ultimate promise of Authenticity, which has been shown 
to culminate in the solipsism of death, the primary metaphysical condition o f the 
Absurd. The zenith of Sartre’s Humanism does not lie then in the mystical goal of 
Authenticity; if  Sartrean Existentialism is to succeed as a valid form of Humanism, it 
cannot be in the form of a linear progression, from the despair of the Absurd to the 
heroic ethics of Authenticity, but rather through a divisive separation of ontology and 
ethics. Sartrean Humanism should thus be regarded as an ambivalent ideology, a two- 
sided coin: to be human is to be fluid, autonomous, and free; but it is also to choose 
values, and thus to define for oneself an active role amongst one’s fellow beings in a 
world which is superficially socio-political, but fundamentally Absurd.
365 Les Mains Sales, p. 155.
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CONCLUSION
The choice o f a combined and balanced focus on Sartre’s philosophy and theatre has 
succeeded in providing a fresh insight into the Humanistic existence o f the Sartrean 
agent, who has been explored in relation to the intellectual perception o f the Absurd, the 
ontological logistics of freedom, the conflicting necessities o f ethics, and the challenge 
o f authentic heroism. The established criticism on central areas o f Sartrean philosophy, 
particularly in the realms of heroism and ethics, has either been challenged or extended, 
and significant objections have been raised. The attempt was to trace a process, and the 
result has been to uncover a complex vicious circle.
In his philosophical foundation, Sartre builds on the Cartesian Cogito to assert 
that Man exists on a temporal plane, bringing nothingness into the world as a gap 
between its three extases of time; pour-soi exists as and at a constantly transcendent 
distance from itself. The intellectual agent perceives the resulting Absurdity of the 
human condition through its reflective consciousness. In order to progress, pour-soi 
must demonstrate a recognition of its facticity, o f the metaphysical contingency o f birth 
and death, and o f the given conditions of Freedom, along with the constant necessity o f 
choice and reinvention, and coexistence with en-soi. Such awareness leads to Nausea 
and Anguish, which can be conquered only through the ontological potential o f 
transcendence.
The ontological agent must accept the ambiguity o f its desagregation intime, its 
conflicting facticity and transcendence, and strive to avoid the temptation o f Bad Faith, 
the willing denial of this existential ambiguity. In the absence of the Self, the consistent 
psychological unit, pour-soi is forced to seek its identity in its choice o f free projects, 
which leads it inevitably into action.
The ontological impossibility of Good Faith and Sincerity pushes pour-soi into 
the domain o f ethics in its desperate search for salvation, but the inherent contradictions 
between its ethics and its ontology, evident in the basic conflict between autonomous, 
subjective freedom and the choice of common values, remove the prospect o f salvation 
and indicate instead the necessity for a permanent separation o f ontology and ethics.
The final chance of deliverance lies in the heroic goal of Authenticity, but 
Authentic Man proves to be as mythical as Prometheus and Sisyphus, and with the 
ultimate collapse of Authenticity comes M an’s fall back down to earth, to the mortal 
reality of Absurdism and to a perpetual state of contingency and Anguish.
Despite the broken links and the ultimately circular nature o f the process, 
Sartre’s great achievements within its boundaries cannot be overlooked. He has 
succeeded in sketching a viable Humanistic ideology, if  not admittedly a fully 
autonomous philosophy, which replaces an absent God with an impressive reinvention 
of Man, who is returned to his rightful place in the centre o f his world as the creator o f 
his own essence. Sartrean Man becomes free and autonomous, active and responsible, 
delineated on the page and on the stage as both a human and a social being, a concrete 
and historical existent in an increasingly political world. Regarded in isolation, Sartre’s 
contributions to the areas and techniques of Absurdism, phenomenology, theatre, 
ontology, and ethics are truly considerable, and the lack of an overall synthesis must not 
detract from the genuine quality apparent in each domain.
However, his failures are of equal significance and have often been overlooked. 
His ontology is undoubtedly marred by his resolute insistence on the totality o f 
Freedom, which leads him to the dubious and complete rejection o f Essentialism, the 
unconscious, and the consistent personality, and into the crass substitution o f the 
Fundamental Project and the harsh nobility o f full responsibility. Self contradiction is 
evident in discussions of the instant, and the broad applicability o f Bad Faith is surely
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far too convenient as an in-built self-defence.
Although some progress has been made in the form of situation ethics, Sartre has 
unquestionably failed to deliver a viable and discernible code of normative ethics, 
despite repeated promises to this effect. This failure has been a constant source o f 
frustration for Sartre, and it inevitably detracts from his cherished Existentialist 
philosophy: ‘Pourquoi l’existentialisme ne devrait-il pas donner de directives? Au nom 
de la liberte? Mais, si c’est une philosophic orientee dans le sens indique par Sartre, elle 
doit donner des directives. ’366 Sartre’s ethical theory must be viewed as disappointing, 
for it leaves his agents in a complex moral vacuum. His attempts to overcome this 
problem have invariably ended in Seriousness, and no more so than in the assertion of 
the ontological reality of Freedom as a universal Value of ethics. The repercussions of 
such attempts on his theatrical characterisation are significant, particularly in regard to 
the delineation of the hero, and they include an underlying sense of misogyny and an 
unjustifiable prejudice against the ethics of non-violence. The final ethical failure lies in 
the mythical goal of Authenticity, which is ultimately reducible to the passive mode o f 
being and therefore no better than the implied and impossible synthesis o f en-soi-pour- 
soi or of the fated Homme-Dieu.
What then is the legacy of Sartrean philosophy? Sartre has failed to achieve the 
desired synthesis between the dictates of his mind (his Existentialism) and the demands 
o f his moral self (his Humanism). This is mainly due to the incompatibility o f his 
ontology and ethics, and the only means of progression in this area must lie in a 
reworking of this failed relationship, whereby the ontological is regarded as a stimulus 
or indication to the ethical, rather than an inflexible and logical determinant. The ethical 
could even be salvaged by a conscious overriding of ontology: ‘[II s’agit de] chercher le 
salut en refusant de cooperer avec un processus ontologique et a-historique qui semble 
se servir de nous. ’367
In his defiant refusal to accept the limitations of human freedom, Sartre has 
engaged himself in an elaborate conduite magique, in a complex process of flight, to 
escape from the apparent despair of Absurdism and the contingency of M an’s facticity. 
Man is ultimately condemned, even by Sartre, to a futile chase after his own Self:
Notre vie n ’est qu’une longue attente [...]. Etre soi, c ’est venir a soi.368
Ainsi courons-nous apres un possible que notre course meme fait apparaitre, 
qui n ’est rien que notre course et qui se definit par la meme comme hors 
d’atteinte. Nous courrons vers nous-memes et nous sommes, de ce fait, l’etre 
qui ne peut pas se rejoindre.369
Le pour-soi est effectivement perpetuel projet de se fonder soi-meme en tant 
qu’etre et perpetuel echec de ce projet.370
Tout pour-soi est libre choix; chacun de ses actes, le plus insignifiant 
comme le plus considerable, traduit ce choix et en emane; c’est ce que nous 
avons nomme notre liberte. Nous avons maintenant saisi le sens de ce choix: 
il est choix d’etre, soit directement, soit par appropriation du monde, ou 
plutot les deux a la fois. Ainsi ma liberte est-elle choix d ’etre Dieu et tous 
mes actes, tous mes projets, traduisent ce choix et le refletent de mille et
366 Naville in L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, discussion, pp. 130-31.
367 Royle, Peter, Sartre: L ’Enfer et la Liberte, p. 131.





Sartre’s own conclusions to L'Etre et le Neant ironically emphasise the failure o f the 
transcendent project to escape from the Absurd, and they culminate in the vitally 
important realisation of the ultimate limitation of Freedom. Sartre has realised that there 
is no salvation and no deliverance, and if his initial drive was ‘la passion de comprendre 
les hommes’ ,372 his final despair comes with the understanding of the fundamental 
passion o f Man:
La passion de l’homme est [...] inverse de celle du Christ, car l ’homme se 
perd en tant qu’homme pour que Dieu naisse. Mais l ’idee de Dieu est
contradictoire et nous nous perdons en vain; l’homme est une passion
inutile.373
In the absence of salvation through Sartrean Humanism, we are reduced back to the 
futility of Sisyphus and the image of the donkey, carrot, and cart. With the demise o f the 
agent, we are forced to seek some answers in the resurrection o f the puppet, which will
fall within the scope of Ionescan theatre and thought. It is to be hoped that an
exploration of Ionesco’s metaphysical Absurdism, combined with a comparative study 
of Being-for-Others, will succeed where the Sartrean trail has gone cold; Camus’s 
words of advice may well be applicable to Sartre:
Le demier effort pour les esprits parents, createur ou conquerant, est de 
savoir se liberer aussi de leurs entreprises: arriver a admettre que l’ceuvre 
meme, qu’elle soit conquete, amour ou creation, peut ne pas etre; 
consommer ainsi l’inutilite profonde de toute vie individuelle. Cela meme 
leur donne plus d ’aisance dans la realisation de cette oeuvre, comme 
d’apercevoir l’absurdite de la vie les autorisait a s’y plonger avec tous les
'  374exces.
371 Ibid., p.689.
372 See Francis Jeanson, Sartre par lui-meme, preface.
373 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.708.
374 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p. 158.
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CHAPTER THREE -  THE IONESCAN PUPPET
INTRODUCTION
As the focus of the thesis shifts from Sartre’s agent to the puppet o f Ionesco, the aim is 
not to provide simplistic contrast, but rather to continue the scrutiny o f the Humanist 
subject. As discussed, the shift in focus is actually a necessity, since the study o f the 
Sartrean agent came full circle and plunged us back into the realm of the Absurd. If, 
then, Sartre’s Existentialist theatre can provide us with ‘no exit’ from the Absurd, it is 
natural to turn towards the metaphysical theatre of Ionesco for answers to remaining 
questions and for a possible escape route or salvation from the seemingly constant 
human state of Anguish.
Chapter One outlined the nature of Ionesco’s Absurdist Humanism and 
introduced its victim as the metaphysical puppet. Ionesco’s concept of Humanism was 
shown to be far less defined than that o f Sartre; to a large extent, Ionesco’s plays must 
speak for themselves, for they are not backed up by rational philosophical treatises of 
the thinker turned dramatist. The Humanism of Ionesco is instinctive and unsupported, 
emanating from the ‘humanness’ of creations such as Berenger, who define it as they go 
along, often erring, always unsure. The focus is on the human plight, the universal 
imprisonment of Everyman. The absence o f God is certainly the common factor, but 
although this serves to place Ionesco’s characters, like their Sartrean cousins, back in 
the centre of their ontological and ethical universe, these agnostics are constantly in 
search o f a lost Father or Mother, constantly subject to la so if et la faim .
The fundamental problems encountered in the study of the Sartrean agent proved 
to be caused by Sartre’s resolute insistence on Freedom, by his outright rejection o f the 
unconscious and Essentialism, by the self-contradictory notion o f Authenticity, and 
ultimately by the obvious incompatibility of his ontology and ethics. The Ionescan 
puppet is everything but free: he is shown to be caught in a trap, a victim o f cruel 
circumstance, plagued by his subconscious and restricted in his choice. Ionesco 
successfully avoids the danger of such incompatibility, for his ontology and ethics 
merge into a broadened metaphysics, even ’Pataphysics. 1 Sartrean action, too, was 
shown to be ultimately fruitless, a failed attempt at escaping the given modes o f being, 
and it thus remains to be seen how Humanism can be redefined in the light o f Ionesco’s 
preference for introspection, sequestration, and passivity.
The aim of the Sartre chapter was to trace the ethical process o f the agent; with 
Ionesco, it is rather to delve the murky depths of his puppets’ shared labyrinth. This is a 
natural result of the dramatists’ widely variant styles, methodologies, and intentions. 
However, philosophical concepts will continue to take precedence over individual 
characters and separate plays, for Ionesco can be seen to stand proudly on his own as a 
great contemporary thinker, taking his place in the long tradition o f classic philosophical 
theatre: ‘Ionesco, ce maitre de theatralite, cet Aristophane modeme matine de Beckett, 
est malgre toute apparence philosophe sous les masques du theatre drole . ’2 Ionesco’s 
puppet will thus be explored in a philosophical light, which has the further advantage of 
providing fresh outlook. If Sartre’s quest for Humanism failed on the route to 
Authenticity, it is to be hoped that Ionescan theatre will provide some insights into 
authentic human existence; in this respect, the scrutiny o f Ionesco’s puppet represents
1 See Richard N. Coe, Ionesco: A Study o f his Plays, pp.32-36.
2 Vuamet, Jean-Noel, ‘Un Vieil Enfant Philosophe’, Magazine litteraire, no.335 (1995), p.36.
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the search for a progression from Sartre’s agent, for an escape route from the 
Existentialist impasse.
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Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more; it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full o f sound and fury,
Signifying nothing .3
Au debut, le monde m ’avait plonge dans la stupefaction. Je regardais moi 
aussi: ‘qu’est-ce que tout cela?’, puis, je  me reveillais de ma stupeur: ‘Qui 
etais-je?’ et ce fut une stupeur nouvelle de me regarder moi-meme. J’etais 
trop plein de ce monde. Trop plein de ce moi: je  ne pouvais pas ne pas le 
dire, ne pas le crier. A qui? A moi-meme, pour moi-meme, ensuite aux 
autres. Cette question est d’abord solitaire. C’est a soi-meme qu’on se le 
demande. Une solitude absolue qui interroge l’univers, sans figures. Enfin, 
apres ‘qu’est-ce que c ’est que tout cela?’, apres ‘qu’est-ce que je  suis?’, ‘qui 
suis-je?’, s’ajouta le ‘pourquoi suis-je la entoure de tout cela?’ Cette 
troisieme question est deja plus impure. Elle etait moins metaphysique, plus 
pratique, plus historique, mais, deja, dans la stupefaction premiere, il y avait 
le sentiment de la menace, ce monde et moi-meme m ’inquietaient jusqu’a la 
terreur. C ’est avec cela que commence notre vie. Elle est passionnante tant 
que 1’interrogation existe. Puis, on n ’interroge plus, on s’en fatigue. La 
menace seule subsiste, cette inquietude qui ronge. Le monde devient 
habituel et tout naturel. II n ’y a plus que la fatigue, l’ennui et la peur qui est 
toujours la, qui seule est restee depuis le commencement. La vie n ’est plus 
miracle, elle est cauchemar. Je ne sais comment tu as pu garder intact le 
miracle. Pour moi chaque instant est a la fois trop lourd et vide. Tout est 
affreux. Je m ’ennuie dans l’angoisse.4
i) A Puppet Come to Life: The Metaphysical Absurdist
Shakespeare’s famous lines, often quoted by and in relation to Ionesco, form an 
appropriate preface in several ways: firstly, the metaphor connecting theatre and life 
introduces the genre o f philosophical theatre which is about to be explored; secondly, 
the notion o f protest is aired, a notion which is to characterise the oeuvre o f Ionesco; and 
thirdly, the whole context o f the Absurd is underlined, complete with the folly of Man, 
the senselessness of life, and the bitter silence of death, showing that Ionesco’s theatre 
follows in a long tradition of ‘universal’ human theatre, stretching back to Shakespeare 
and far beyond. The second part of the preface comes from one o f Ionesco’s latest plays 
and provides a useful and vitally important insight into the playwright’s world-view and 
dramatic preoccupations, introducing themes such as wonder and surprise, innocence 
and naivete, contingency and superfluousness, uncertainty and solitude, gravity and 
evanescence, monotony and anguish. The scene has thus been set for a detailed 
exploration of Ionesco’s theatrical puppet, o f his roots, his anxieties, and his ultimate 
destination.
The image of the puppet is particularly apt to the Absurdist conception o f Man, 
and from the very beginning, the notion of the puppet come to life (Pinocchio) or the 
woken doll (Coppelia) fits in comfortably with Ionesco’s creative bent. The stylistic 
influence of guignol on Ionesco has been much explored, but in terms of his philosophy, 
it can be seen to affect not just his theatrical form, but, more importantly, his very
3 Shakespeare, Macbeth, V.5.
4 Ionesco, Le Vieux in Jeux de Massacre, Theatre V, pp.89-90.
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conception o f humanity. In Ionesco’s theatre, Man becomes a short-lived trick of a 
vanished artisan, restricted in his freedom and controlled from far beyond. The trick 
remains a miracle as long as the sense of wonder and novelty prevails; when it fades, the 
trick becomes cruel conjury. As Man becomes aware that he is separate from his 
universe, that he has been, in the Sartrean sense, ‘thrown into’ an alien world, his 
surprise and amazement turn to anguish and a deep sense of loss.
It is with this consciousness that the world becomes Absurd. For Sartre, 
awareness o f the Absurd was an intellectual perception; for Ionesco, it is predominantly 
sensual, and it is thus awoken far earlier in life. In Ionesco’s case, this could well have 
taken place at the age of three, for this is the discrepancy he created between his real 
birth in 1909 and his claimed birth in 1912. If  this is so, then it was soon followed by 
further revelations:
A l’age de quatre ans quand j ’ai appris la mort et que le monde pouvait etre 
sans moi, ce fut le debut du malheur. J ’ai appris que moi et le monde nous 
n ’etions pas un. Mais la conscience malheureuse la plus aigue, je l ’ai eue a 
l’age de huit ans ou de sept ans je  crois, quand je me suis regarde dans la 
glace et que je  me suis decouvert a moi-meme. A ce moment-la, en sentant 
pour la premiere fois ma difference, en prenant conscience que j  ’etais moi, 
j ’ai senti pour la premiere fois comme une sorte de tragique, de terrible 
separation.5
The initial unhappiness, stemming from awareness o f mortality, is compounded by the 
knowledge o f the Self as self-contained and distinct from the world around it, and it 
leads the subject to a tragic neurosis reminiscent o f Jungian separation. With this 
‘knowledge’, the puppet is reborn; it is as if  life begins again.
The theme is reflected in Camusian Absurdity: ‘Commencer a penser, c ’est 
commencer d ’etre mine’ ,6 and it is strongly represented in Ionesco’s theatre. For the 
departed (or non-existent?) son in Les Chaises, realisation seems to have come at the 
age of seven -  ‘il avait sept ans, l’age de raison’7 -  yet for Jacques, conscious life was 
blissfully absent until puberty, and with realisation came revolt:
Lorsque je suis ne, je n ’avais pas loin de quatorze ans. Voila pourquoi j ’ai 
pu me rendre compte plus facilement que la plupart de quoi il s’agissait.
Oui, j ’ai vite compris. Je n ’ai pas voulu accepter la situation. Je l ’ai dit 
carrement. Je n ’admettais pas cela.8
So for Ionesco and his puppets, life comprises various states o f being, ranging in 
extremity from wonder to despair. Knowledge of death is the certain catalyst for revolt 
and despair, and it perceivably invokes a new state o f being, an almost Heideggerian (or 
Sartrean) Sein zum Tode.
However, the Ionescan perception of Absurdity is notably different from that of 
Sartre, and this is to be expected since the two thinkers display a different philosophical 
approach. Whereas L ’Etre et le Neant was an essay in phenomenological ontology, 
Ionesco’s concerns are consistently metaphysical and predominantly transphenomenal:
Peut-on trouver des solutions aux problemes fondamentaux? C’est-a-dire: 
Savoir ce que c’est que naitre, vieillir, mourir, etre la, etre entoure par tout
5 Decouvertes, p.81.
6 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p. 17.
7 Theatre I, p. 153.
8 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre /, p. 120.
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cela que je regarde avec un etonnement qui n e m ’a pas quitte, neuf comme 
au premier jour de la naissance de ma conscience.9
Although perception of the Absurd can diminish the spontaneous sense o f wonder, it 
should not quieten the nagging metaphysical questions that beg to be answered. 
Ionesco’s puppets are grounded in the metaphysical Absurd, and their fundamental 
questions are really only two: ‘Deux choses sont inacceptables: d ’etre ne [...] et ensuite 
de mourir. ’ 10 For Sartre, these questions are too ‘absurd’ even to consider, and they 
remain conveniently beyond the scope of his ontology. But for Ionesco, they are a 
permanent presence, the origins of his Anguish, and thus for him, Sartrean 
Existentialism ignores the very essence of being: ‘Etre existentialiste c ’est etre 
prisonnier de logomachines, enferme dans des mots tandis que l’etre nous echappe. ’ 11 
The Absurdism of Ionesco, though closely related to Sartre’s, is therefore far more 
compatible with that of Camus, who is also quick to point out the shortcomings o f 
phenomenology:
La phenomenologie se refuse a expliquer le monde, elle veut etre seulement 
une description du vecu. Elle rejoint la pensee absurde dans son affirmation 
initiale qu’il n ’est point de verite, mais seulement des verites. 12
Indeed Camus reminds us that the very origin of the Absurd is precisely this lack o f a 
Truth, a Truth which is constantly implied and consistently elusive: ‘L ’absurde nait de 
cette confrontation entre l’appel humain et le silence deraisonnable du monde . ’13 
Nevertheless, Ionesco’s living puppet, his metaphysical Absurdist, seeks answers to the 
fundamental questions o f being. Unlike Sartre’s agent, he transcends the phenomena o f 
the vecu; but like Sartre’s agent, he rejects a single Truth, consciously perceives the 
Absurd, and lives in the constant awareness of his death. The link with Heidegger here 
is appropriate, for Heidegger can be seen to make no distinction between consciousness 
and the Absurd, showing that Care (or ‘souci’) is the only reality of an ‘existence 
humiliee’ . 14
As with the Sartrean agent, perception of the Absurd leaves Ionescan Man in a 
constant state o f Anguish. The more sensual nature o f Ionescan Anguish is underlined 
by the dramatist’s own declaration that Anguish lies beyond the realm o f rational 
language: ‘Mon angoisse n ’a aucune explication possible, aucun logique puisqu’elle est 
au-dela de la parole. Des que j ’en parle, je  ne suis deja plus tout a fait dans l’angoisse 
mais dans la litterature de 1’angoisse. ’15 However, Ionesco’s literature o f Anguish 
provides a rare insight into the nature of M an’s existential Angst: on the stage, he seems 
like Beckett to throw a spotlight onto human anxieties and frustrations, longings and 
unfulfilled desires; and on the page, he is as capable as Sartre o f finding words to 
express the cruel nature of Man’s condition: ‘Je sentis mon coeur se serrer et l ’angoisse 
me reprendre. J ’avais peur. De rien. De tout. ’ 16 The description is highly reminiscent o f 
Roquentin, and it emphasises the fundamentally similar starting points o f Sartre and 
Ionesco. In this one short phrase, Ionesco manages to convey the stifling claustrophobia 
of Anguish, as well as the blind fear and the senseless gratuitousness caused by its (here
9 Journal en miettes, p.89.
10 Un homme en question, p.24. According to Heidegger, these two existential facts are revealed to Man 
through Angst. See L. A. C. Dobrez, The Existential and its Exits, p. 167.
11 Present passe, Passe present, p.215.
12 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.63.
13 Ibid., p.45.
14 See ibid., pp.40-41.
15 Un homme en question, p. 193.
16 Le Solitaire, p.58.
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personalised) presence. In his theatre, the description is even more moving, evoking a 
natural pathos through audience identification with the victim: ‘Toute ma vie, je  sentais 
que j ’etouffais. ’ 17 This identification and empathy is reinforced by stage directions, 
which demand an emphasis on the pathetic and inhuman aspect of Anguish: ‘ Vers la fin, 
les voix seront tres aigues [...] plaintives, inhumaines, irreelles, ressemblant a des cris 
d ’animaux souffrantsn The portrayal of the human puppet as a suffering animal is a 
recurrent theme in Ionesco’s theatre, and it reinforces the sensual nature o f M an’s 
Anguish. Ionesco constantly exploits the semiotic richness of theatre to recreate a 
‘whole experience’ of the Absurd, an experience which he feels should dominate the 
stage:
Ionesco criticizes someone like Sartre in part because Sartre, as playwright, 
talks about the absurd but doesn’t live it. Ionesco feels existential anguish 
felt by the author must possess his whole stage, not merely the words o f his 
characters. 19
The labelling of Ionesco as ‘Absurdist’ is of course controversial, since both 
Ionesco and many of his critics have rejected the term, particularly in the light o f his 
later plays. However, there is no need to retrace the Absurdist influences on Ionescan 
theatre elucidated so comprehensively by Esslin; and philosophically speaking, there 
can be little doubt that Ionesco has provided one of the greatest articulations of the 
Absurd this century:
J’ai l’impression qu’il n ’y a de raison a rien et que seule nous pousse une 
force incomprehensible.20
Cruels sont les Dieux, terribles et folles les passions, malheureux les 
hommes.21
Such sentiments are surely inspired by a mind supremely conscious o f the Absurd 
condition of Man. Indeed, they are more resolutely Absurd than those of either Sartre or 
Camus, who strive to imagine Man at least useful and at best happy. A theoretical 
analysis o f the Absurd is undertaken by Ionesco himself, and there seems little point in 
trying to paraphrase a quotation which is in itself a concise summation:
II y a plusieurs sortes de choses ou de faits ‘absurdes’. Parfois, j ’appelle 
absurde ce que je ne comprends pas, parce que c ’est moi qui ne peux 
comprendre ou parce que c’est la chose qui est essentiellement 
incomprehensible, impenetrable, fermee, ainsi ce bloque monolithique du 
donne, epais, ce mur qui m ’apparait comme une sorte de vide massif, 
solidifie, ce bloc du mystere; j ’appelle aussi absurde ma situation face au 
mystere; mon etat qui est de me trouver en face d ’un mur qui monte 
jusqu’au ciel, qui s’etend jusqu’aux frontieres infinies, c ’est-a-dire aux non- 
frontieres de l’univers et que je ne puis pourtant pas ne pas m ’achamer a 
escalader ou a percer tout en sachant que cela c’est 1’impossibility meme; 
absurde done cette situation d’etre la que je ne puis reconnaitre comme etant
17 Le Vieux, Les Chaises, Theatre I, p. 140.
18 Amedee, Theatre I, p.285.
19 Grossvogel, David I., ‘Ionesco: Symptom and Victim’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco’s 
Theatrical Quest, ed. Mosche Lazar, p.82.
20 Notes et contre-notes, p.23.
2] Un homme en question, p. 108.
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mienne; qui est la mienne pourtant. J ’appelle aussi absurde l ’homme qui 
erre sans but, l’oubli du but, l ’homme coupe de ses racines essentielles, 
transcendentales [...] Tout cela, c ’est l’experience de l’absurde 
metaphysique, de l’enigme absolue.22
The Absurd is then multifaceted for Ionesco: it emanates from the senseless, the 
unknowable, the contingent Given, the mysterious, the religious, the infinite universal, 
the individual situation, the pointless striving, and the severed spiritual roots. This 
‘absolute enigma’ has much in common with Sartrean Absurdism (concerning le donne, 
la situation, la place etc.), but the difference is again the focus on the transphenomenal. 
Yet both depart from the primal Absurdity of being jete dans le monde without a choice. 
The history o f the Absurd tradition is a long and complex one, and this too has been 
traced by Esslin, but a brief summary of Ionesco’s philosophical influences is certainly 
not superfluous. Ionesco’s Absurdism finds its recent origins in a tradition stemming 
back to Nietzsche’s declaration of the death o f God in his Also sprach Zarathustra o f 
1883, which had a profound influence on both literature and philosophy, both of which 
were subsequently concerned with a search for a way to confront a universe deprived of 
its very core, its source of reason and values. In philosophical terms, this vacuum 
combined with Kierkegaard’s rejection o f an absolute Truth which could salvage an 
existence which is impossible in itself, and with Jaspers’s connection between failure 
and the very being of transcendence. In literary terms, it accompanied a somewhat 
paradoxical development from Naturalism to Expressionism, effected through a new 
desire to represent the whole o f reality and influenced by the unconscious world of 
dreams explored by Freud and Jung, and dramatised effectively by writers such as 
Strindberg. Jarry and the ’Pataphysicians (such as Prevert) reflected this trend and, as 
we know, had a direct philosophical and stylistic influence on Ionesco; and the 
Surrealist movement, though more effective in the fine arts, cinema, and poetry, 
nevertheless encouraged a new angle of perception on the stage. Such literary influence 
inevitably affected the form of Ionesco’s plays, but, as writers such as Dostoevsky, 
Kafka, and Joyce began to probe the universal through the subconscious, this influence 
became profoundly equally philosophical; and philosophers such as Wittgenstein, who 
also sought to deconstruct language, reflected the merging development o f philosophical 
and literary trends. It is in this context, then, that Ionesco began to write his plays -  a 
context which is perhaps best summarised as an uncomfortable and questioning 
exploration of a new-found sense of freedom. Ethical, psychological, artistic, and 
linguistic certainties had been permanently undermined, and the way had been cleared 
for the new theatre of the Absurd to illuminate this unease on the stage.
Ionesco’s particular response to the insolite world in which he finds himself is 
initially one of etonnement. This state is perhaps the most inspiring creative force for 
Ionesco, and its fleeting transience is a central cause o f Anguish: ‘Je crois que je  suis 
plus authentique lorsque j ’exprime dans mes oeuvres l’etonnement et le desarroi. C ’est 
dans cet etonnement que plongent les racines de la vie. ’23 The link between etonnement 
and authenticity is an interesting one which will be explored in due course. It seems at 
this stage though that in ‘wonder’ lies the key to re-establishing M an’s spiritual roots, 
the route perhaps to Ionescan Authenticity.
Another source of Anguish, caused again by severed roots, is the puppet’s sense 
of abandonment and orphanage. Reminiscent of the Sartrean theme o f bastardy, this 
theme of isolation functions on a theological level (the notion o f an absent God), a 
social level (the paradox of isolation with autrui), and on an intimate level (the search 
for the departed father or mother). It is certainly a cause of dark neurosis for Ionesco,
22 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, p. 148.
23 Notes et contre-notes, p.23.
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and it originates in the persona of his father:
Je cherche dans mon souvenir les premieres images de mon pere.
Je vois des couleurs sombres. [...] Je crie.24
The theme is widely reflected in Ionesco’s theatre, both in the general depiction of 
faceless, deracinated puppets, and in the particular portrayals o f the anxious psyche:
Le Vieux:
La Vieille:
Ah! ou es-tu , maman, maman, ou es-tu, maman?...hi, hi, hi, 
je suis orphelin. (Ilgem it. ) ... un orphelin, un orpheli...
[...]
Mon orphelin, mon chou, tu me creves le cceur, mon 
orphelin.25
Madeleine II: Je suis veuve, je suis orpheline, je  suis pauvre, malade,
vieille, la plus vieille orpheline de la terre !26
Josephine: Je suis minuscule dans ce monde enorme. Je suis une
fourmi egaree, affolee, qui cherche ses compagnes. Mon 
pere est mort, ma mere est morte, tous ceux de la famille 
sont morts. [...] Plus personne, il n ’y a plus personne .27
Again, the idea o f Man as a suffering animal is present, but the underlying feeling is one 
of abandonment and fear. Ionesco’s characters are consistently shown to be craving 
return to the womb ,28 or at least to early childhood, and their need for parenting seems 
never to subside. The concept is extended metaphorically in L ’Homme aux Valises, 
where the protagonist becomes a global and metaphysical refugee, in search o f a home, 
an identity, and probably a womb; he clearly embodies the metaphorical ant alluded to 
by Josephine above.
The desire for protection from or regression beyond the world has its origins in 
the contingent nature of Man’s birth. Though certainly not as outraged by the 
phenomenon of birth as Beckett, Ionesco consistently protests against the conditions 
into which we are bom, and the whole procreative process is satirised in plays such as 
Jacques and L ’Avenir est dans les ceufs. Like Sartre, he concentrates too on the gratuity 
of our arrival:
Tu aurais pu ne pas etre, tu aurais pu ne pas etre! J ’en ressentis une enorme 
panique retrospective; un regret dechirant, aussi, pour des milliards 
d’enfants qui auraient pu naitre, qui ne sont pas nes, pour les innombrables 
visages qui ne seront jamais caresses, les petites mains qui ne seront tenues 
dans les mains d’aucun pere, les levres qui ne babilleront jam ais .29
The contingency remains a mystery, but here, birth is viewed as something positive, life 
as a touching existence on which the unborn are missing out. However, the phenomenon 
of birth itself is still under attack, especially since those who are bom are bom deceived: 
‘Nous sommes la. Nous ne savons ce que cela veut dire. Nous ne savons pas ce que veut
24 Present passe, Passe present, p.9.
25 Les Chaises, Theatre I, pp. 135-36.
26 Amedee, Theatre I, p.289.
27 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 180.
28 Hence their love o f sequestration. N.b. also the importance of the circle in Ionesco’s plays, eg. the room 
in Les Chaises, the Nouveau Locataire’s circular tomb, etc.
29 Voix du Policier, Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.205.
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dire que cela ne veuille rien dire. Nous sommes nes trompes. ’30 The attack soon extends 
to one on the inherent lack o f logic,31 and i f  we are bom, it is into a world that simply 
does not make sense, a far cry from the rationality of Cartesian logic (the starting point 
o f Sartre’s ontology). Such is the message of Les Chaises: in their speed to point out the 
lack of message and the ontological void uncovered in the play, critics often ignore the 
most obvious significance of the Orator’s muteness. The fusion between philosophy and 
art is again apparent here, and it is appropriate that a philosophy of anti-logic should be 
expressed in a language which strives to undermine the powers of reason. The literary 
tradition o f nonsense is also contributive here, for, as Esslin maintains, ‘the literature of 
verbal nonsense expresses more than mere playfulness. In trying to burst the bounds of 
logic and language, it batters at the enclosing walls o f the human condition itself. ’32 The 
senselessness o f life is indeed the dominant underlying theme in Ionesco’s theatre, and 
it is voiced impressively by Berenger on his discovery o f death in the Cite Radieuse: ‘ Je 
me sens meurtri, fourbuL.Ma fatigue m ’a repris...Texistence est vaine! A quoi bon tout 
[...] si ce n ’est que pour en arriver la? ’33
Berenger’s enlightenment reminds us o f the Absurdist conception o f the futility 
of life, and this is interpreted by Ionesco, as by Camus, not just in terms o f the ultimate 
vanity of human existence, but also in relation to the drudgery o f everyday life. Like 
Sartrean Absurdism, this is also highly evocative of Camus’s interpretation o f the Myth 
of Sisyphus; like Camus, Ionesco and his puppets cannot return to the bliss o f their 
former ignorance: ‘A partir du moment ou elle est reconnue, l ’absurdite est une passion, 
la plus dechirante de toutes. ’34 However, far from being passionate, the lives o f Ionescan 
characters are usually as futile and monotonous as that o f Camus’s hero, and there can 
be little escape from Anguish in the harsh conditions of the quotidien:
Mon metier m ’obligeait d’errer sur toute la terre. Helas, je  me trouvais 
toujours, d ’octobre a mars dans l’hemisphere nord, d ’avril a septembre dans 
l’hemisphere sud, si bien qu’il n ’y avait, dans ma vie, que des hivers. J ’etais 
miserablement paye, mal vetu, ma sante etait mauvaise. Je vivais en etat de 
colere perpetuelle.35
La vie a ete pour moi un long combat. La vie, c’est une lutte sans merci. On 
marche sur les cadavres.36
The recurrent images of aimless wandering, coldness, anger, struggling, and death 
combine to paint a full and dark picture of human Anguish. If  the Absurd is indeed a 
passion, it is less one of Sartrean action than o f Beckettian monotony and emptiness; the 
literality in plays such as Les Chaises conveys with impact the cruelty and ‘empty 
space’ o f human life, explored of course by practitioners such as Artaud and Brook. 
Accordingly, when inquisitioned by the curious monks, Jean’s prevailing memory of 
Earth is the stagnant image of the labyrinth:
Frere Tarabas: Quelles images vous hantaient?
Jean: Pareil. Une plaine morose, une plaine grise, une plaine
boueuse, une plaine sans fin, ou des senders menant nulle
30 Present passe, passe present, p. 138.
31 This theme is particularly evident in the early ‘anti-plays’ and in the extended satire on logic through 
the Logicien in Rhinoceros.
32 The Theatre o f  the Absurd, p.341.
33 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p.89.
34 Camus, Albert, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.38.
35 Voix du Policier, Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.204.
36 Le Gros Monsieur, Le Tableau, Theatre III, p.232.
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part; et puis la brume s’est etendue. . .37
This sticky mass o f Being is again evocative o f Sartre, and confronts us with yet 
another origin o f Anguish. In this instance, it is connected to the Sartrean concept of 
nausee, which is regarded by Ionesco not only as the craving for plenitude (en-soi) but 
also as the victory o f ‘anti-spiritual forces. ’38 This transphenomenal relationship with 
Being is linked with Sartre’s material perception o f resistance referred to as the 
Coefficient o f Adversity; but whether interpreted spiritually or materially, Being is 
viewed by both as a potential threat to the freedom of Man:
Le plenitude que je ressentais etait peut-etre un peu ressemblante a la 
plenitude mystique. Cela debutait par le sentiment que l ’espace se vidait de 
la lourdeur materielle d’ou le soulagement euphorique que je ressentais. Les 
notions se liberaient de leur contenu. Les objets devenaient transparents, 
permeables, n ’etaient plus des obstacles, il semblait qu’on pouvait passer a 
travers. C’est comme si 1’esprit pouvait se mouvoir librement, comme si 
aucune resistance ne pouvait plus l’empecher.39
Spiritual plenitude is associated then with material absence, and material plenitude with 
spiritual absence. In Ionescan theatre, this manifests itself principally in the beloved 
technique of proliferation: over the years, his audiences have seen the mass reproduction 
of noses, chairs, cups, bread, mushrooms, telephone calls, suitcases, furniture, eggs, 
rhinoceroses, plates and dishes, guillotines, glasses, and dead bodies. This distinctive 
technique explores the problem of matter on many different levels, for the paroxysmal 
repetition of objects, coupled with that o f the characters’ language (which itself 
becomes reified), reproduces not only the repressive wall of materialism and the 
monotony of daily life, but also the vertiginous symptoms o f nausea:
{Les appels se succedent; I ’heure avance; elle [Madeleine] dit:) Je vous le 
passe... Je vous la passe... Je vous les passe... Alio, alio... alio... je  vous le 
passe, je vous la passe... je vous les passe... Alio... A lio ! . . .40
The image here is verbal, visual, and audible, and, accompanied by the steadily 
increasing imposition of the corpse, the intrusive nature o f Being is conveyed with 
profound effect. In Le Nouveau Locataire, the theme is explored in isolation, and in this 
potent allegory, it is not just the tenant’s room that is invaded, but the stairs, the 
courtyard, the streets, and the spiritual lifeline of Paris itself: ‘La Seine ne coule plus. 
Bloquee, aussi. Plus d ’eau . ’41
One of the closest points of convergence between Sartre and Ionesco is indeed 
on the question o f Being, where Ionesco’s hunger and thirst for the Absolute coincides 
with the Sartrean quest for the en-soi-pour-soi or the elusive Homme-Dieu. Sartrean 
psychoanalysis uncovers M an’s desire to appropriate and to remplir le trou through pre- 
reflective consciousness of the nothingness at the core o f human being, and Ionesco’s 
reflections sit comfortably with those of the Existentialist: ‘A peine ai-je aspire une 
bouffee ou deux que j ’ai envie d’en allumer une autre. C’est comme si je  voulais que la
37 La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p. 135.
38 See Notes et contre-notes, p. 188: ‘Le trop de presence des objets exprime l ’absence spirituelle.’
39 Present passe, Passe present, p.222. See also Richard N. Coe, ‘La Proliferation’, in Les Critiques de 
notre temps et Ionesco, ed. Raymond Laubreaux, p.81: ‘La matiere est l’ennemi le plus mortel de 
rhomme.’
40 Amedee, Theatre I, p.248.
41 Theatre II, p.200.
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fumee remplisse ce vide interieur. ’42 His thoughts are translated onto the stage on 
numerous occasions, perhaps most notably in Choubert’s forced mastication of bread, 
and the notable recurrence o f the theme betrays its importance to Ionescan philosophy:
Je suis plein, mais de trous. On me ronge. Les trous s’elargissent, ils n ’ont 
pas de fond. J ’ai le vertige quand je me penche sur mes propres trous, je 
finis.43
Je bois, je  mange, je bois, je  mange. J ’ai encore soif, j ’ai encore faim. 
Excusez-moi, j ’ai l’air d’un trou .44
Ionesco’s focus on the nothingness o f Man is again tied to Sartre’s portrayal o f Anguish, 
and both are fully aware that the search for plenitude will be in vain. Such is of course 
the message o f La So if et la Faim :
[Jean] gets nothing. He continues to be thirsty and hungry. His thirst cannot 
be slaked, his hunger cannot be sated. Why this emptiness? Because every 
man desires the absolute and the infinite but seeks them in what is relative 
and temporal. He is able to find nothing since all is wind and ashes .45
For Ionesco, this Absurd desire pushes Anguish to the extreme reaction o f neurosis and 
forces the puppet into a state of nostalgia; and it is seemingly in the state o f neurosis that 
any search for truth should begin: ‘La verite est dans une sorte de nevrose... Elle n ’est 
pas dans la sante, c ’est la nevrose qui est la verite, verite de demain contre la verite 
apparante d ’aujourd’hui. ’46 In Berenger’s musings on literature, ephemeral truth is 
contrasted with spiritual, metaphysical truth, and the comforting nest o f nostalgia 
provides the neurotic with a solace from the constant thirst for truth: ‘Tu vas voir, on se 
fait un nid de tout, on se couvre de ses nostalgies. On se nourrit de ses desirs, on boit la 
coupe d’esperance et on n ’a plus soif. ’47
The theme of nostalgia is never far away in Ionesco’s theatre and journals, and it 
can be seen to be divided into two types o f nostalgia -  universal and individual. 
Universal nostalgia encapsulates the sensation o f the Lost Paradise, the Biblical Fall 
from grace, and it is associated theatrically with a loss of light and evanescence:
Je suis a la recherche d’un monde redevenu vierge, de la lumiere 
paradisiaque de l’enfance, de la gloire du premier jour, gloire non temie, 
univers intact qui doit m ’apparaitre comme s’il venait de naitre. C ’est 
comme si je  voulais assister a l’evenement de la creation du monde avant la 
decheance.48
Many of Ionesco’s creations, including Choubert, Amedee, Berenger, and Jean, go in 
search o f a lost world, a wonderous and luminous Edenic garden, with varying levels of 
success. The world which is sought is airy and light -  the very antithesis o f the sinking, 
gloomy labyrinth:
42 Un homme en question, p. 131.
43 Le Roi in Le Roi se meurt, Theatre IV, p.54.
44 Jean in La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p. 125.
45 Benmussa, Simone, ‘Hunger and Thirst: A conversation with Simone Benmussa’, in The Two Faces o f  
Ionesco, ed. Rosette C Lamont and Melvin J. Friedman, p. 197.
46 Le Pieton de VAir, Theatre III, p. 127.
47 Marie-Madeleine, La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p.94.
48 Antidotes, p.316.
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Je savais qu’il existait dans notre ville sombre, au milieu de ces quartiers de 
deuil, de poussiere, de boue, ce beau quartier clair, cet arrondissement hors 
classe, avec des rues ensoleillees, des avenues ruisselantes de lumiere... cette 
cite radieuse.49
Though Berenger succeeds in finding his paradise, he is soon dispossessed of his 
utopian beliefs on discovering that the Radiant City too is subject to the metaphysical 
Given of death. This fall back down to Earth unites most o f Ionesco’s protagonists, and 
they are left, like Jean, with a diminishing memory of perfection, with naivete turned to 
nostalgia:
Tout suffisait, tout etait plein. Je n ’avais pas faim, je  n ’avais pas soif, ou, 
plutot, c’etait cette joie qui etait mon pain, qui etait mon eau... Pourquoi, 
tout a coup, y a-t-il eu ce changement? Pourquoi, tout a coup, cette 
absence? 50
The lesson Jean learns is that his paradise existed where he already was, had he only 
maintained the precious gift to see it: ‘En realite -  nous dit Ionesco -  Adam n ’a pas ete 
chasse du paradis; mais apres le peche originel, il a ete condamne a la perte de sa 
capacite d’emerveillement. ’51
Individual nostalgia works on a different time scale and is too personal to attain 
the realm of myth. Ionesco’s Romantic focus on transience, on the passing o f beauty, 
youth, and innocence, is one which moves him profoundly, and his protests ring out 
with the naive simplicity o f childhood: ‘Nous naissons, nous croissons en force et en 
beaute et petit a petit c ’est la degringolade et nous voila boiteux, laids, fragiles; 
comment cela est-il possible, comment cela est-il permis, et pourquoi? ’52 With the 
irreversible process of ageing, the Absurd condition continues and the puppet’s Anguish 
is embellished. The decrepitude of old age is arguably the greatest source o f pathos in 
Ionescan theatre -  one need only think of the old couples in Les Chaises and in Jeux de 
Massacre -  and the theme is all the more poignant since it provides a constant memento 
mori: ‘Le vieillissement se prolonge de plus en plus et se met a ressembler a la mort 
[...]. Le vieillissement est 1’avant-garde de la mort. ’53 The indubitable fact is 
characterised in Jacques-Grand-Pere, whose ‘centenarian’ protest songs on ageing54 are 
soon reduced to words spoken from the grave.55 In Victimes du devoir, personal 
nostalgia blends with the universal, as Choubert evokes the image o f light to represent 
the beauty of the past: ‘Comme tu as change! Mais quand cela est-il arrive? Comment 
n ’a-t-on pas empeche? Ce matin, il y avait des fleurs sur notre chemin. Le soleil 
remplissait le ciel. [...] L ’hiver est venu brusqement. ’56 Again, the protest and the sense 
of loss are clear. This negative aspect of the passage o f time is stressed also by 
Berenger: ‘Je suis triste quand je pense que les annees s’en vont comme des sacs que 
Ton retoume vides. ’57 It seems that with time, our sense o f emptiness is just increased.
Time and temporality thus become another focus of Anguish for Ionesco, who is 
keen to underline their relative unimportance: ‘D ’ailleurs le temporel ne va pas a
49 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p.65.
50 La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p. 166.
51 Tobi, Saint, Eugene Ionesco ou A la recherche du paradis perdu, p. 166.
52 ‘Tout finit dans l ’horreur’, interview with Gabriel Liiceanu, Magazine litteraire, no.335 (1995), p.23.
53 Malachy, Therese, La Mort en Situation dans le Theatre Contemporain, p.31.
54 See for example Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p.99.
55 See L ’Avenir est dans les oeufs, Theatre II.
56 Theatre I, p. 197.
57 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 160.
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l’encontre de l’intemporel et de l’universel: il s’y soumet au contraire. ’58 Clocks are a 
prominent feature in Ionesco’s plays and they reflect the dramatist’s uneasy 
preoccupation with time. Whether parodied, as in La Cantatrice chauve,59 crushing, as 
in Le Nouveau Locataire, or ticking away with relentless ominousness, as in Amedee 
and Le Roi se meurt, time is a constant enemy of the puppet, and the clock becomes a 
time bomb counting down the hours until death. Man is regarded as a puppet o f Time, 
scared by the future and haunted by the past: ‘Nous avons le passe derriere nous, 
l’avenir devant. On ne voit pas l’avenir, on voit le passe. C ’est curieux car nous n ’avons 
pas les yeux dans le dos. ’60 On this point, Sartre and Ionesco are naturally at odds: 
whereas Sartrean Anguish is caused by the freedom offered by the future, Ionescan 
Angst arises when the past creates an essence. Thus regret (a Sartrean mauvaise fo i) 
figures strongly amongst Ionesco’s puppets, and it is housed in the appropriate tense of 
the conditional perfect:
La Vieille: Tu aurais pu etre quelque chose dans la vie .61
Le Vieux: Helas! nous avons tout perdu. Nous aurions pu etre si
heureux, je  vous le dis; nous aurions pu, nous aurions pu .62
It is perhaps to eradicate regret that Ionesco attempts a deconstruction o f time in this 
play -  the contradictions of the couple demonstrate the unreasonable inaccuracy o f the 
past -  and it is certainly no coincidence that time is linked back once again to the 
atavistic myth o f Paradise Lost: ‘Indeed, the Fall in Christian mythology is precisely the 
Fall from timelessness into time, from immortality into mortality . ’63
Mortality soon becomes the hingepin of Ionesco’s Absurdism, for, as we are 
reminded by Plato, the mystery of death has eternally formed the central focus of 
philosophy: ‘Pour les hommes c’est un mystere: mais tous ceux qui se sont livres 
veritablement a la philosophic, n ’ont rien fait d’autre que de se preparer a la mort. ’64 
And if  we then bear in mind the title of Montaigne’s ‘essai’ Que philosopher c ’est
apprendre a mourir, Ionesco emerges as a great and universal philosopher. As the
ultimate focus o f mortal Anguish and neurosis, the theme of death is a privileged one in 
Ionesco’s theatre; it is indeed the ultimate trick of the Absurd:
La chose la plus absurde est d’avoir conscience que 1’existence humaine est 
inadmissible, que sa condition est inadmissible, insupportable et pourtant 
s’accrocher desesperement a elle, en sachant et en se plaignant que Ton va 
perdre ce que nous ne supportons pas [...] ecartele entre l’horreur de vivre et 
l’horreur de mourir.65
The language here is strong, and death, like life, is regarded as an outrage. But given 
that we are bom, death is perhaps the only other Given worth contesting: ‘II s ’agit de 
cette chose inadmissible, incroyable, que cela ait pu etre, que cela ne soit plus . ’66 This 
contestation o f the Given again emphasises the discrepancies between Sartre’s 
Existentialist Humanism and Ionesco’s Absurdist Humanism. Unlike Sartre, Ionesco is
58 Notes et contre-notes, p.64.
59 The ‘pendule’ has an ‘esprit de contradiction’, {Theatre I, p.47).
60 Journal en miettes, p. 126.
61 Les Chaises, Theatre I, p. 135.
62 Ibid., p. 151.
63 Lane, Nancy, Understanding Eugene Ionesco, p.82.
64 See Leon Chestov, Sur la balance de Job, p.27.
65 Present passe, Passe present, pp. 118-19.
66 Ibid, p.38.
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not content to accept the human condition as he finds it, and his Humanist stance 
provokes him to call into question the entire Creative act: ‘Dites-moi que ce n ’est pas 
vrai. C’est un cauchmar. [...] Pourquoi suis-je ne si ce n ’etait pas pour toujours? Maudits 
parents. Quelle drole d ’idee, quelle bonne blague! ’67 As King, Berenger is enabled by 
Ionesco to ridicule the Creative flaw of mortality, and it seems likely that the Ionescan 
desire to create derives from a simple wish to ‘start again’ .68
Like the black monk in Jeux de Massacre, death is almost omnipresent in 
Ionescan theatre, for when it is not the driving force of a whole play it is always at least 
waiting in the wings. As a result, this obsession of Ionesco is dealt with in all its 
aspects:
Commenter le theatre de Ionesco c’est aborder le probleme de la mort sous 
ses avatars multiples: dans la hantise et la fantaisie; dans la solennite et la 
derision; dans la douleur et le plaisir; dans la jeunesse et le vieillissement; 
dans le suicide et dans le meurtre, dans la mort de l’un et la mort de tous .69
Ionesco’s characters range in their attitudes towards death, but common to them all is an 
awareness of death as a metaphysical phenomenon, rather than as a political tool or a 
Sartrean ‘dirty hands’ necessity: ‘C’est 9 a la vie. On meurt. ’70 Such simplistic 
acceptance, almost oxymoronic truism, is however far from the norm, and the vast 
majority of Ionesco’s characters are all too conscious o f the gratuitous Absurdity of 
their mortal condition:
Le Fonctionnaire: Nous sommes accables par une mortalite sans
causes connues.71
Jeanne/Lucienne: Qu’avons-nous fait tous, pour qu’il en soit ainsi?
Jean/Pierre: Rien. On n ’a rien fait. II en est ainsi pour rien .72
It is in Le Roi se meurt that the theme o f death, Montaigne’s philosophical 
apprenticeship, receives its finest treatment. The misty darkness, the crumbling walls, 
and the vanishing set contrive to reinforce the emptiness o f death, the transition to 
nothingness, and the King’s molieresque reaction to the phenomenon (denial - anger - 
bargaining - depression - acceptance) is psychologically classic. He feels like an actor 
who has not learnt his lines, an ill-prepared student sitting an exam, and he begs the 
chance to redoubler.73 But, as Marguerite points out, there is no second chance, and 
even Marie, with her romantic imagery, cannot evade the cruel transience o f life: ‘Ce ne 
fut qu’une courte promenade dans une allee fleurie, une promesse non tenue, un sourire 
qui s’est referme. ’74 There is here a sense of being cheated, as in the Pompier’s absurd 
tale of the woman who died by confusing her gas and her comb,75 combined with a 
ruthless power reminiscent o f La Legon.
Although the social custom surrounding death is parodied in plays like L  ’Avenir 
est dans les oeufs, parody is usually restricted to the human outrage at death itself, to the 
puppet’s awareness that its strings will one day be cut. Le Pieton de I ’Air finds this
67 Le Roi se meurt, Theatre IV, pp.36-37.
68 Cf. Sartre’s analogy o f destruction and creation with the desire to be God.
69 Malachy, Therese, La Mort en Situation dans le Theatre Contemporain, p.81.
70 Le Patron, Ce formidable bordel, p. 162.
71 Jeux de Massacre, Theatre V, p.26.
72 Ibid., pp.57-58.
73 Theatre IV, pp.32-33.
74 Ibid., p.37.
75 La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.42.
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tragicomic balance, satirising mortal stoicism and using the shock tactic of infant 
mortality to undermine any resignation to death:
Ire Vieille Anglaise: II faut s’habituer a mourir. C’est plus decent. II
faut partir poliment. II faut avoir le temps de faire 
ses adieux. Sans trop pleurer.76
{John Bull vise, tire, les deux Enfants tombent) [...]
Employe des
Pompes Funebres: C’est comme une euthanasie. Pas tout a fait
l ’euthanasie, on peut dire que c ’est une euthanasie 
preventive.77
The antithesis of resignation is the desire for immortality, partly realised in Berenger the 
King, which would transform the modes of temporality into an eternal instant.78 
According to Camus, this is indeed the cherished desire of Absurdism: ‘Le present et la 
succession des presents devant une ame sans cesse consciente, c ’est 1’ideal de l ’homme 
absurde. ’79 As the archetypal homme absurde, it is left for Berenger to state the case for 
immortality, to claim it as a right of Man: ‘Nous pourrions tout supporter d’ailleurs si 
nous etions immortels. Je suis paralyse parce que je  sais que je  vais mourir. ’80 In the 
absence of immortality, death remains the main source o f Anguish, which itself is a 
symptom of a world without sense. In the face of death, a maid and a king are levelled; 
if  Humanism has elevated Man, his mortality reduces him back to dust: ‘La pensee 
humaniste a fait de l’homme un roi mais c ’est un roi dechu car il meurt, et meurt seul. 
La mort ote a 1’existence sa valeur. ’81 It seems that Sartre too would agree with this last 
statement, for ‘on rate toujours sa vie, du moment qu’on meurt’ ,82 and Camus, in turn, 
pointed out that ‘les hommes meurent et ils ne sont pas heureux’ ;83 as Ionesco’s puppet 
becomes aware that he is a victim controlled from beyond, all he can do is cry out, like 
Job, in despair at the Absurd: ‘Le Createur s’est goure. ’84
76 Theatre III, p. 143.
77 Ibid., p. 187.
78 Sartre, too, mentions the eternal instant (see p.51), pointing out that if it existed, pour-soi could ‘be’, 
could have a constant essence.
79 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.88.
80 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p .128.
81 Abastado, Claude, ‘L’Art reinvente’, in Les Critiques de notre temps et Ionesco, ed. Raymond 
Laubreaux, p. 169.
82 Les Jeux sont faits, p.56.
83 Caligula, p.27.
84 La Concierge, Ce formidable bordel, p. 175.
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iil Controlled from Beyond: The Victim
What he destroys, none can rebuild;
Whom he imprisons, none can release.85
If  Ionesco’s puppet is left to cry out in despair, it is essentially through awareness o f his 
own helplessness in the face o f a creating and determining power. The idea o f 
imprisonment is central to this perception, and it will be shown how Man, imprisoned in 
his own nature, seeks refuge from Nature and from the outside world by sequestering 
himself within a labyrinth of walls. The aim of this study, then, is to explore the human 
situation, to trace the repercussions of the Absurd human condition on aspects o f 
identity, language, and ethics.
Chapter One explored Ionesco’s self-professed agnosticism, revealing a 
strangely paradoxical Humanism, according to which Man is both subject and object, 
paramount and yet victim of the cruel laws of determinism, whether at the hands of 
God, Nature, or simply Fate:
Je suis determine. En meme temps, a mon tour je  determine: je  decide, je ne 
decide pas, je change ou ne change pas, le fait que je  ne change pas les 
choses fait qu’elles changent tout de meme. Ma fa9 on de determiner est 
determinee elle aussi.86
This strong sense of determinism naturally precludes any escape from the Given in the 
form of the Sartrean ontology o f Freedom and choice. The Ionescan puppet is controlled 
from beyond and thus remains, even ontologically, firmly grounded in the cruelty o f the 
Absurd. Considering the vast restrictions on his freedom, it is indeed questionable 
whether Ionescan Man exists at all:
Je n ’existe pas dans la mesure ou je ne suis pas libre; dans la mesure ou je  
suis conditionne, determine uniquement par des energies exterieures, des 
poussees, des dynamismes dont je ne serais que le carrefour, le champ de 
bataille, un lien quelconque de rencontre.87
For Ionesco, Man is before he exists, since he is captured both in his own and in a 
universal essence. The philosophical motif of the puppet can also be clearly appreciated 
here, for Man is described almost as the contents of a metaphysical crucible, a cyclone 
of conflicting forces, an image reminiscent o f Classical Man who was the plaything of 
the gods. Indeed the imagery has hardly changed since classical times even if  destiny 
has taken a back seat: ‘Ce n ’est pas la philosophic qui nous guerit ou qui nous rend 
malades. Nous sommes au gre des vents. ’88 This is a telling opposition, revealing 
simultaneously Ionesco’s scepticism about the merits of philosophy (whilst himself 
indulging), and his deep pessimism concerning possible escape routes from the 
restrictions of the human condition. The puppet is also viewed as the slave of his drives 
and emotions, a far cry from the Sartrean agent who, at least in Good Faith, 
acknowledges the choice of his own passions:
85 Job 12.14.
86 Present passe, Passe present, p.81.
87 Journal en miettes, p.251.
88 Ibid., p. 129.
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Je ne suis pas maitre de mes desirs ou de mes tristesses ou de mes angoisses.
[...] Je ne suis pas ces passions, semble-t-il, je  suis celui qui voit, regarde,
commente, considere. Je suis aussi celui qui, ardemment, desire un autre
moi.89
Again, the image is that o f Man being invaded from without, cursed with the ability to 
turn the focus on himself and willing but unable to flee from what he finds.
Part of Ionesco’s outrage is indeed caused by this gulf between desire and 
possibility -  nostalgia for the un-recapturable, the will to fly, the quest for immortality -  
and it is expressed in the light of a cruel God or master playing a joke on his 
incarcerated slave: ‘On ne peut rien faire. Mais qu’est-ce que c ’est que cette condition 
de marionnette tiree par des ficelles, de quel droit se moque-t-on de moi? ’90 This 
fundamental awareness o f bondage and restriction permeates the Ionescan stage to the 
point of neurosis. The characters in the early plays, particularly, demonstrate a high 
degree of self-recognition when it comes to their metaphysical condition:
Amedee: ...II n ’y a plus d ’esclaves...
Madeleine: Je suis une esclave modeme, c ’est simple!91
Although referring ostensibly to her time-consuming and monotonous employment, 
Madeleine’s exclamation betrays the dual bondage o f the human situation -  the social 
and the metaphysical, or, in Sartrean terminology, the pour-soi and the pour-autrui. 
Ionesco’s characters would be consistently condemned by Sartre for their mauvaise fo i , 
for they extend their perception o f restriction to the ontology o f responsibility and 
choice, thus conveniently removing themselves from the judging gaze o f autrui:
Jacques Pere: Que voulez-vous que j ’y fasse! C ’est le sort qui l ’a voulu
■ 92amsi.
Amedee: Je suis bien oblige! Pas le choix .93
This is certainly a world where God (whatever the nomenclature represents) pulls the 
strings, and it can be seen already that Ionesco’s Humanism, while concerning itself 
exclusively with the human condition and situation, refuses to elevate Man to the free, 
determining role previously occupied by God. Ionesco makes a mockery o f Sartrean 
optimism, o f free choice, the Fundamental project, and the open future, and his later 
plays progress to discuss the philosophy of Freedom itself:
Tripp: La liberte, c’est mon choix.
[...]
Frere Tarabas: Philosophe, malgre l’inanition! Vous allez mourir de
faim, pauvre monsieur Tripp. Je pensais justement vous 
rendre la liberte. [...] Je voulais [...] vous rendre cette 
chose precieuse pour vous mais que vous ne pouvez definir: 
la liberte.94
89 Ibid., p.53 and p.50.
90 Ibid., p.39.
91 Amedee, Theatre I, p.241.
92 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p .l 15.
93 Amedee, Theatre I, p.300.
94 La Soif et la Faim, Theatre JV, p. 151.
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Freedom remains ill-defined as a philosophical concept, and it is evident that Ionesco 
remains unconvinced by arguments such as Sartre’s that the Coefficient o f Adversity 
provides no obstacle to M an’s Freedom; for Ionesco, it so obviously does. However, 
there is some small concession to Freedom, as Ionesco’s characters are shown not only 
to deny their Freedom, but also to lack the courage to pursue it: ‘Je croyais etre ne pour 
etre libre et triomphant. Je n ’ai pas ose l’etre. Je n ’ai jamais ose aller jusqu’au bout. Je 
n ’ai pas su me decider. ’95
Ionesco’s philosophical analogy between humanity and puppetry is reflected 
ubiquitously on his stage, for the reciprocity o f human and non-human ‘actors’ serves to 
populate the stage with a strange type of cross-breed, characters devoid o f person. This 
was no experimental accident, as it was in fact the banal functionality of the individual 
which inspired the dramatist in the first place to create ‘personnages sans caractere. 
Fantoches. Etres sans visages’ .96 Again, the metaphysical bondage o f the puppet is 
coupled with his inevitable imprisonment in society, which alienates any sense o f self 
and disinherits him of his humanity:
Les caracteres ‘robots’ [...] me semblent etre precisement ceux qui 
appartiennent uniquement a ce milieu ou a cette realite ‘sociale’, qui en sont 
prisonniers et qui -  n ’etant que ‘sociaux’ -  se sont appauvris, alienes, 
vides.97
From the closing scene of La Cantatrice chauve to the ballet scenarios o f Le Jeune 
Homme a marier and Apprendre a marcher and beyond, characters’ movement is of 
paramount importance, and whether robotic or grotesque, their limited stage life has 
more in common with the properties around them than with the audience sitting behind 
the fourth wall. This is indeed a natural extension o f literality: if  Ionesco wishes to 
convey the mechanical drudgery o f the soulless modem Man, what better way than to 
diminish him into a choreographed automaton? The psychological repercussions o f this 
are fascinating, for as characters are depersonalised, causal psychology is obliterated:
‘En realite, cette guignolade doit etre jouee par des “Auguste ” de cirque, de la fagon la 
plus puerile, la plus exageree, la plus “idiote” possible. II ne fa u t pas donner aux 
personnages un “contenu psychologique 'V 98 In the absence of such psychology, the 
puppet is not just now a slave to his emotions, but completely bemused by them, 
fluctuating manically like a circus clown:
Jacques Mere: Helas! mon epoux! j ’ai cm bien faire! Je suis 
completement et a moitie desesperee."
Character portrayal is revolutionised by Ionesco, the non-human exploited to give a 
satirical and even alienated insight into the quintessential^ human. The innovation is 
ultimately so extreme that Ionesco’s creations are occasionally barely recognisable as 
characters at all:
It is only because we are prisoners o f a traditional terminology that we 
continue to speak about the “characters” in Beckett and Ionesco as if  they 
were of the same nature as Medea, Hamlet, Woyzeck, or Mother Courage.
On the other hand, even though they are projections o f the writer’s inner
95 Le Vieux, Jeux de massacre, Theatre V, p.94.
96 Notes et contre-notes, p.251.
97 Ibid., p. 141.
98 Stage direction to Le Tableau, Theatre III, p.229.
99 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p. 100.
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world, they are not similar to the medieval personifications in the morality 
plays. These figures on the stage (masks, changing faces, puppets, grotesque 
icons) are ‘metaphysical personae’ or ‘doubles’ . 100
Ionesco illuminates Man through dolls and marionnettes, disguises him on stilts and 
behind masks, turns him into animals, frames him in pictures, hides him under furniture, 
and even makes him invisible. Numerous stage directions suggest replacing human 
actors with puppets and encourage any remaining humans to act like automata or 
mechanical dolls. Characters are replaced by functions, with policemen marching in 
caricature, couples frenetically procreating, and Madame Smith and Jacques-Fils 
replacing social intercourse with the ‘Teuf! Teuf! Teuf!’ o f a steam engine . 101 Edges 
become blurred as these ‘metaphysical personae’ merge and reproduce; the human has 
been reified:
Choubert: Est-ce bien toi, Madeleine? [...] Pauvre petite vieille,
pauvre poupee defraichie, c’est toi pourtant. Comme tu as 
change!102
The reification of the human is an extreme repercussion o f Ionesco’s 
Essentialism, for it is only because the dramatist believes in a human essence, 
independent from existence and removed from the dictates of temporality, that the 
human can be captured and objectified. This direct projection from philosophy to theatre 
clearly indicates that Ionesco’s drama is far from formalistic, and it demands that he be 
regarded as a thinker in his own right. This is also the source o f the greatest 
philosophical dichotomy between Ionesco and Sartre, as from the polarity with 
Existentialism stems Ionesco’s rejection of Freedom, transcendence, and choice: ‘For 
Ionesco, categorically, Essence precedes Existence: not all his fear and hatred o f the late 
Jean-Paul Sartre was rooted in politics. ’ 103 The conflict with Sartre continues with the 
recognition of the personality and the Self. For Sartre, the future was both ethically and 
ontologically a blank canvas, and because the past was rejected both as a point of 
reference and as a source of justification, the Self became redundant, at least in the 
present and future, and Authenticity became a paradox. With Ionesco’s reinstatement of 
the Self, the prospects o f Authenticity thus look brighter:
On ne change pas; la situation change. On peut etre mis dans des conditions 
meilleures ou pires, c’est toujours moi qui suis au milieu, le meme dans mon 
essence intime. [...] Depuis toujours, on est; on ne devient pas; l ’essence 
precede 1’existence; les reactions different sans alterer cette essence. 
L ’histoire ne nous fait pas. 104
The choice of language is certainly Sartrean, but the nouns have been inverted and the 
semantics are therefore antithetical. For Sartre, the Pour-soi is the agent o f the situation 
and changes alongside it, with the ultimate goal of changing History; for Ionesco, Man 
is the passive victim of the situation, the core o f rock shifted by the earthquake but 
resilient enough to maintain its essence. In Sartrean terms, the puppet is ‘dans le monde’ 
but not ‘au-milieu\ for, as Ionesco explains in his discussion o f L ’Homme aux Valises,
100 Lazar, Mosche, ‘Ionesco and His Doubles’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco’s Theatrical Quest, 
ed. Mosche Lazar, p. 137.
101 See La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.55 and L ’Avenir est dans les ceufs, Theatre II, p.227.
102 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, pp. 196-97.
103 Coe, Richard N., ‘Ionesco and the Vision o f Childhood’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco's 
Theatrical Quest, ed. Mosche Lazar, pp. 13-14.
104 Journal en miettes, pp.177-78.
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his past actions betray a personality which will colour his future situations: ‘[Les 
valises] sont tous les obstacles auxquels nous nous heurtons. Elies sont le passe, la 
personnalite dont on ne peut se debarrasser. Plus l ’homme voyage, plus les valises sont 
lourdes. ’ 105 This rare admission of symbolism is again indicative o f Ionesco’s 
philosophical intentions and it is wholly consistent with his Essentialist outlook. The 
theme is present too in his earlier plays, and, evidently conscious o f his polarity with 







Je suis costumitudiste, j ’etudie l’essence du 
costume.
II n ’y a pas une essence du costume! La 
costumologie cree le costume...
C’est le contraire!
Ainsi, vous etes done essentialiste!
Ainsi, vous etes done phenomenaliste!106
Though apparently indulging here in self-parody as well, Ionesco is not always so 
philosophically reticent in his theatre, and the later plays particularly reveal a more 
confident engagement: ‘Oublie que tu existes. Souviens-toi que tu es. ’ 107
The theme of universality is another major preoccupation o f Ionesco, and it too 
stems from the Essentialist belief in a shared human nature, a core o f human essence. 
One of our objections to Sartre resulted from his tenuous dissociation o f a human 
condition and a human nature. With Ionesco, the problem disappears, for the two are 
inextricably linked -  human nature is part o f the Given, an object of the Absurdist’s 
derision, and it unites all men in a common bond which transcends the barriers of time:
Les personnages que peint l’ceuvre ne doivent pas etre trop etroitement lies a 
leur epoque sinon ils expriment une humanite insuffisante, limitee, c ’est 
pourquoi une oeuvre litteraire de valeur est a 1’intersection du temps et de 
l’etemite, au point ideal de Funiversality. [...] Depuis deux mille ans, les 
hommes ressentent a certains moments cette verite de l’absurde si l’on peut 
dire, et se posent les questions essentielles. 108
Ionesco’s demands of ideal literature are again the very antithesis o f Sartrean thought. 
The cornerstone o f Ionesco’s Humanism is indeed this universal bond; and, pessimist 
that he is, he focuses on the common human plight:
La souffrance d’un seul etre est la souffrance de tous les etres. 109
Tous les hommes meurent dans la solitude; toutes les valeurs se degradent 
dans le mepris: voila ce que me dit Shakespeare. ‘La cellule de Richard est 
bien celle de toutes les solitudes. ’110
Unlike Sartre’s attempts to transcend the Absurd, Ionesco views it rather as a unifying 
force which defines what it is to be human. This belief in a human essence or nature is
105 Antidotes, p.265.
106 Theatre II, p.54.
107 Duncan, Macbett, Theatre V, p. 178.5
108 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, pp. 141-42.
109 Le blanc et le noir, p. 17
110 Notes et contre-notes, p.67.
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particularly interesting in the light of Sartre’s rejection of the concept of a human 
nature: if we recall Sartre’s claim that there cannot be a human nature since there is no 
God to conceive it, 111 then it seems logical to assume that Ionesco’s Essentialist stance 
removes him from the agnostics towards belief in a creating God.
Another implication of Ionesco’s universality and another source o f conflict with 
Sartre is his ardent rejection of historicity and socio-political engagement:
II faut etre au-dessus de tout cela, survoler son temps, passer a travers pour 
ne pas disparaitre avec lui [...]. Je ne serai pas une autre vague, mais un roc, 
peut-etre, c ’est-a-dire une permanence humaine, une sorte de conscience 
universelle, quelquefois recouverte par les vagues, mais toujours la . 112
The imagery is effective and highly reminiscent both of Berenger’s last stand in 
Rhinoceros and of Sartre’s analogy of consciousness and water. But Ionesco’s 
‘conscience’ is permanent and universal; it is the rock, not the water undulating over the 
top. Again, there is an implicit rejection of temporality, tied in with the quest for 
immortality, and the notion of flight from the Given is introduced. But the main thrust is 
the call for Man to be extra-historical, a demand repeated throughout Ionesco’s work: 
‘On devrait vivre en dehors de l’Histoire et prier...La seule action possible en faveur de 
l’humanite est la priere. II faut done prier. Vivre en dehors de l’Histoire et prier Dieu . ’ 113 
Ionesco’s desperate need for God is again apparent -  it is perhaps most willingly that he 
believes in human essence -  and again the spiritual and the universal take precedence 
over the historico-temporal. Ionesco’s concerns are resolutely metaphysical, and, almost 
certainly inspired by Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious, 114 he believes that Man 
is the scene of a permanent battle between mythical time (which saves) and historical 
time (which destroys). In fact, he goes so far as to make the two mutually exclusive:
Lorsque l ’homme ne se preoccupe plus des problemes des fins demieres, 
lorsque seul l ’interesse le destin d’une nation politique, de Teconomie, 
lorsque les grands problemes metaphysiques ne font plus souffrir, laissent 
indifferent, l ’humanite est degradee, elle devient bestiale . 115
This is naturally the subtext of Rhinoceros, and it reinforces the dramatist’s 
preoccupation with the transphenomenal. Rhinoceros succeeds in staging the process of 
historical totalitarianism, demonstrating that when Man loses sight o f the metaphysical 
and immerses himself in temporal phenomena, he does indeed begin to lose his 
humanity:
Berenger: A-t-il donne une raison?
Daisy: II a dit textuellement: il faut suivre son temps! Ce furent
ses demieres paroles humaines!
[...]
Berenger: ...Suivre son temps! Quelle mentalite!116
However, given Ionesco’s insistence on the Self, le Moi affected by the situation, 
the early plays and the secondary characterisation o f the later plays reveal very little
111 See L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.22.
112 Present passe, Passe present, p.63.
113 ‘Tout flnit dans l ’horreur’, interview with Gabriel Liiceanu, Magazine litteraire, no.335 (1995), p.24.
1,4 See Duckworth, Colin, Angels o f Darkness, p.88.
115 Present passe, Passe present, p.64.
116 Theatre III, p.98.
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evidence of any sense o f self. If Ionesco portrays Man as a puppet imprisoned inside his 
personality, as he unquestionably does, the personality is more often than not shared and 
universal rather than distinct and individual. The puppet’s identity is thus somewhat 
mystified, and as the dignity inspired by the name and adhered to in traditional drama 
from Sophocles to Miller begins to disappear, the Self as an entity and as a 
philosophical concept becomes entirely meaningless; names and identities either merge 
or contradict: ‘Elisabeth et Donald sont, maintenant, trop heureux pour pouvoir 
m ’entendre. Je puis done vous reveler un secret. Elisabeth n ’est pas Elisabeth, Donald 
n ’est pas Donald . ’ 117 At this stage, the once fruitful hope o f Authenticity is again 
diminished, for the deliberate dissociation of names and faces destroys any chance o f a 
consistent personality. In fact nomenclature becomes totally redundant as language itself 
begins to be dethroned, with human characters and everything around them rendered by 
the single phoneme ‘chat’:
Jacques: Et Jacques et Roberte?
Roberte: Chat, chat. 118
The dehumanisation is appropriate, for when Man is portrayed as a puppet, his essence 
is identical to all other men and even to inanimate objects. In this particular play, he is 
reduced to the primal forces of the animal, as courtship, love, and communication 
undergo a definitive reductio ad absurdum. Again, movement has priority over 
character delineation, following Nicolas’s dreams of irrationalist theatre:
Nous abandonnerons le principe de l’identite et de l’unite de caracteres, au
profit du mouvement, d’une psychologie dynamique... Nous ne sommes pas
nous-memes... La personnalite n ’existe pas. II n ’y a en nous que des forces
contradictoires ou non contradictoires. . . 119
On this occasion, personality is definitively annihilated in favour of dynamic 
spontaneity, and although this statement of intent rings true for most o f Ionesco’s early 
theatre, its engrossment with the visual indicates not so much philosophical conviction 
as formalistic innovation. However, to a large extent, the idea is a continuation of the 
conception of Man as automaton, and in plays such as Le Maitre and La Jeune Fille a 
marier, characters’ identities are determined solely by their functions (L’Annonciateur, 
Le Jeune Amant, Le Monsieur-Fille, etc.). Indeed, as Le Policier points out in L ’Homme 
aux Valises, without a function, there is no identity: ‘Au nom de mon gouvemement, je 
vous annonce, monsieur, madame, que vous n ’avez plus de fonctions. Done, plus 
d ’identite’ (p.67). The result is that characters are turned themselves into actors, and 
dramatic form is turned on its head: whereas traditional theatre ran neatly from 
exposition to resolution, the closing line of Le Maitre, ‘Comment vous appelez-vous?’, 
reverses the order, undermining sincerity in recognition o f deliberate role-play. The link 
with Sartre cannot be overlooked, especially since Sartre’s comments in the Cahiers 
seem to underline the underlying message of Victimes du devoir. ‘La personne qui agit 
par devoir ne se reconnait plus dans son oeuvre.5120 But, as Jacquart points out, even 
though both show disdain for the Sincere Man, Ionesco’s anti-psychology is much more 
deeply rooted: ‘Si Sartre avait perdu la foi dans la psychologie, elle ne lui inspirait pas 
un degout profond, visceral, comme ce sera le cas pour les ‘nouveaux’ dramaturges. ’ 121
117 Mary, La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.31.
118 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p. 126.
119 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.226.
120 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.267.
121 Jacquart, Emmanuel C., Le Theatre de derision, pp.60-61.
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Ionesco’s stance against the consistent personality originates in the opposite end 
of the philosophical spectrum from Sartre’s. Just as his universality derived from his 
Essentialism, so does his destruction o f the individual Self reflect his belief in a 
common human nature from which the Self is doomed to crave unattainable liberation. 
The human being is thus the victim of a restrictive essence, condemned not to be free, to 
be an individual deprived of individuality. In the same way that Sartre takes 
Existentialism to its fullest extreme, insisting on total Freedom, Ionesco extends 
Essentialism to disregard identity and call into question the very concept of human 
existence. Thus, at one stage, everything human becomes Bobby Watson, the 
multiplicity o f this generic character providing not only a source o f great amusement, 
but also a valid insight into Ionesco’s early philosophy o f character. 122 This lack of 
individuality is compounded later in the play when in the famous scene o f marital 
recognition (the impetus perhaps for the ending of Le Maitre) M. and Mme Martin are 
shown to have regressed to anonymity. Such mockery and multiplicity o f identity 
continues in Jacques ou la Soumission, where familial unity is threatened by the absurd 
portrayal of traditional family roles:
Jacques Grand-mere: Le fils de mon fils c ’est mon fils... et mon fils
c’est ton fils. II n ’y a pas d’autre fils. 123
Robert Pere: Nous avions prevu cet incident. Nous avons a
votre disposition une seconde fille unique . 124
The attempted abolition o f the individual develops into the theme o f human 
interchangeability, evident in the reversed roles of the married couples at the end o f La 
Cantatrice chauve, in the circular procession o f the forty pupils of La Legon, and in the 
recurrent characterisation o f characters like Mary/Marie the maid, Marie-Madeleine the 
wife, and, of course, Berenger the Everyman. Women in particular are regarded as 
interchangeable, whether in the guise of the mother/wife duality in types like 
Semiramis, the niece-epouse, or the long-anticipated cantatrice who finally emerges in 
Le Pieton de LAir.125 In case we are left in any doubt, we are explicitly reminded by 
Mado: ‘Personne n ’est irrempla9 able! ’ 126
The exploration o f the repercussions o f the Absurd Essentialist human condition 
on human identity has revealed that Ionesco views Man as a puppet controlled from 
beyond and as a victim determined by his universal essence. These conclusions form a 
natural progression from the dramatist’s metaphysical Absurdism, but the philosophy 
regarding the personality emerges as blatantly self-contradictory. The problem is 
interestingly identical to that encountered with Sartre, who also both refutes and implies 
the existence of the coherent Self to suit the particular theory. Ionesco wants it both 
ways: on the one hand, Man is plagued by his past actions (les valises) which imprison 
him in his personality; on the other, he is devoid of personality, interchangeable, and 
controlled by a shared human essence. However, as declared by Nicolas following his 
rejection of the personality, Man is governed by ‘contradictory and non-contradictory 
forces’, and we can only assume that Ionesco is as outraged at the seemingly 
paradoxical duality o f humankind as the narrator of Le Solitaire: ‘C’est cela qui me 
parait etre une cruaute certaine de la divinite: chacun est a la fois unique et tout le 
monde, chacun est l’universel’ (pp. 107-08).
122 See La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.22ff.
123 Theatre I, p. 105.
124 Ibid., p .l 12.
125 See Theatre III, p. 135.
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If Man is a nucleus of conflict and contradiction, then so is the language that 
conspires to control him: if  all words can be replaced by chat, it is not just identity, but 
language too that is emptied of all significance. In fact, identity and language go hand in 
hand, for in the absence of identity, language is denied its honour and resonance, and it 
becomes as paradoxical as the puppet through whom it is voiced:
M. Smith: Elle a des traits reguliers et pourtant on ne peut pas dire
qu’elle est belle. Elle est trop grande et trop forte. Ses traits 
ne sont pas reguliers et pourtant on peut dire qu’elle est tres 
belle. Elle est un peu trop petite et trop maigre. 127
It was of course a language manual that first inspired Ionesco to write for the stage and 
the power of language never seems to dissipate in his theatre. Language even tends to 
overtake the stage, whether in long, anguished diatribes or in monosyllabic nonsense. 
But whatever its form, Man becomes its instrument, and it, in turn, becomes one of the 
many contradictory forces that control the human puppet. The power o f language is 
explored most effectively in La Legon, where it is both the main subject of dialogue and 
the sole agent o f change:
Le Professeur: Le mot front est racine dans frontispice. II Test aussi dans 
effronte. ‘Ispice’ est suffixe, et ‘e f  prefixe. On les 
appelle ainsi parce qu’ils ne changent pas. Ils ne veulent 
pas . 128
Once personified, language is given free rein, and it goes on to become the vengeful 
angel of death, as Man (or rather girl) is reduced to its helpless victim:
Le Professeur: Repetez, repetez: couteau... couteau... couteau...
L ’Eleve: J ’ai mal... ma gorge, cou... ah... mes epaules... mes seins...
couteau . . . 129
The language dictates both the pace and the action, and this sadistic dictatorship is both 
sexual and megalomaniac. Like Man, language then becomes reified: it is the voicing of 
the word ‘knife’ rather than the actual tool which actually kills the pupil. The violence 
and danger of language is commented upon by Jacques in a play written later the same 
year: ‘O paroles, que de crimes on commet en votre nom ! ’ 130 The ironic misquotation 
serves of course to underline the theme. The conception o f Man as the puppet of 
language is certainly not restricted to the early plays -  the recurrent profession of the 
typist is an appropriate analogy, representing the machinery o f dead, replicated language 
beyond the user’s control. 131 The obvious interest in mutism, explored most memorably 
in the Orateur o f Les Chaises and in the Personnage of Ce formidable bordel, is perhaps 
a counter-attack on the power of language, for these two characters communicate as 
much, if  not more, than their vocal counterparts.
Throughout his theatre, Ionesco demonstrates a profound mistrust o f language; 
aware of its destructive power, he constantly strives to transmute it:
Je suis perdu dans les milliers de mots et d ’actes manques que sont ‘ma vie’,
127 La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.23.
128 Theatre I, p.80.
129 Ibid., p.89.
130 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p. 103.
131 Notably Daisy in Rhinoceros and La Fille-Monsieur in La Jeune Fille a marier.
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qui desarticulent, qui detruisent mon ame. [...] Des milliers et des milliers de 
mots, des masques et des mensonges et des errements devront dire ce que le 
mot cache. II ne me reste qu’a dementir toute parole en la desarticulant, en la 
faisant eclater, en la transfigurant. 132
Again, the unity of theme and form, of philosophy and theatrics is apparent: the 
linguistic innovation of Ionesco is truly astounding, and the reasoning behind it is now 
clear. It is the dramatist’s expressed intention to ‘faire dire aux mots des choses qu’ils 
n ’ont jamais voulu dire’ , 133 and consequently language becomes both a theme and a 
property in itself; in no sense is it a means to an end. Word play is a salient feature of 
Ionescan theatre, and paronyms and polysemes proliferate along with other inanimate 
objects, aiding and abetting in the build up to paroxysm:
Dans cette parlerie ou chacun parle pour ne rien dire, les mots defigures, 
ecorches, estropies, contrefaits, vides de leur substance, les lieux communs 
ecules, les psittacismes, les quiproquos, les pataques, les alliterations, les 
flatulences verbales, menent un dissonant concert jusqu’a la cacophonie 
finale ou, dans une kyrielle de coq-a-l’ane et de contrepeteries, la parlote 
s’acheve en cacade. C ’est l ’inanite absolue, l ’absurdite totale, 1’eloquence de 
l’aphasie. 134
The reference is obviously to La Cantatrice chauve, but it is applicable to Ionesco’s 
dramatic language throughout. In the absence o f meaning, rhythm becomes paramount, 
and in the absence of meaningful conversation, dialogue becomes stichomythic. Words 
are repeated ad absurdum until any sense they might once have had completely 
disappears. 135 Conscious of his excessive deconstruction, Ionesco defends himself 
facetiously: T1 est entendu que les mots ne disent rien, si je  puis m ’exprimer ainsi. ’ 136 
His philosophy on language, unlike that on the personality, is both coherent and 
consistent. From his first to his last play, his characters and their language are disunited 
and antagonistic, his audiences bereft of the comfort o f their tongues:
It is interesting to note that in the final monologue of ‘Journey’ Ionesco 
returns to the device he used at the end o f ‘The Bald Soprano’, as though he 
wished to come full circle. In both instances Ionesco derealizes the signifier 
in order to sever language from any practical material intent. Assonance is 
privileged over logic and syntax. Our faith in what is behind the word, at the 
core of discourse, is shaken, as is that of Ionesco himself. 137
As with Sartre, there is a conflict between words and action, but in Ionescan theatre, 
words are not a tame, intellectual, bourgeois substitute for action, but rather a direct 
contradiction to the action they incite:
Le Pompier: Je veux bien enlever mon casque, mais je n ’ai pas le
132 Present passe, Passe present, p.242.
133 Notes et contre-notes, p.252.
134 Jean Delay, Discours de Reception d ’Eugene Ionesco a I ’Academie frangaise et reponse de Jean 
Delay, p.60.
135 A good example is ‘anglais’, which appears sixteen times in seven sentences in the opening stage 
direction to La Cantatrice chauve ( Theatre I, p.19).
136 Journal en miettes, p. 120.
137 Lamont, Rosette C., ‘Ionesco’s Gnostic Dream Play’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco’s Theatrical 
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temps de m ’asseoir. (II s ’assoit, sans enlever son casque.)u%
Le Vieux: Bois ton the, Semiramis.
II n ’y  a pas de the, evidemment}3,9
The circular plots add to the careful eradication of meaning, for, again in a fusion of 
theme and form, they convey the perception of life as a stuck record, a karaoke machine 
on an endless loop . 140
The effects of the Absurd Given on the puppet’s sense o f identity and 
relationship with language have now been seen, and the question still remaining is how 
Ionescan Man, a being full o f Anguish, a victim controlled from beyond, can function in 
the world of ethics. The connection between language and ethics is far from arbitrary, 
for in the absence of language, the prospect of any descriptive or normative ethics must 
seem particularly bleak: although Sartrean ethics could not be ‘written in stone’, at least 
they had the potential to be coherently voiced. The ethical language o f Ionesco is as 
parodic and paradoxical as the rest of his language, and from the very beginning, while 
mocking traditional forms of ethical discourse, he accepts the inherent ambiguity in any 
system of morality:
Bartholomeus II: II me parait etre de mauvaise foi, c’est-a dire
dialectiquement, de bonne foi. . . 141
The snipe at Sartre is obvious, but the attack is also on the treachery o f language, which 
can euphemise all kinds of evil, and in the character o f La Mere Pipe (this time at the 
expense of Brecht), the satire on ethical and political jargon continues:
Nous ne coloniserons pas les peuples, nous les occuperons pour les liberer.
Nous n ’exploiterons pas les hommes, nous les ferons produire. Le travail 
obligatoire s’appellera travail volontaire. La guerre s’appellera la paix et 
tout sera change, grace a moi et a mes oies. 142
With the proliferation of meaningless political euphemisms, the image o f chat again 
springs to mind.
It is not just the inevitable failure of language which strikes at the heart o f a 
possible ethics. Man is consistently portrayed by Ionesco as a victim and a puppet, and 
as such it is to be expected that he will be unable to effect change. Throughout Ionesco’s 
theatre, characters are shown to be victims of circumstance, imposed upon by objects, 
events, and other people, and no more so than in Macbett, where any ethical action is 
doomed to be in vain: ‘Regner, regner, ce sont les evenements qui regnent sur l’homme, 
non point l’homme sur les evenements. ’ 143 The contrast with the Sartrean agent could 
not be more distinct. Ionesco’s characters are passive in the face o f change and 
upheaval, and, like their creator, they regard action less with fear than with disdain: 
‘Vivre hors de la contemplation, dans Taction, dans l’espoir, c ’est la stupidite, 
l’aveuglement. [....] Agir? Trop lucide, pour le faire. ’ 144 For Ionesco, then, the lucid 
consciousness is aware of the futility of hope and action; in Sartrean terms, Ionesco
138 La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.40.
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140 This image is interestingly the basis o f Dennis Potter’s Karaoke, which explores the predetermined 
nature o f the human condition.
141 L ’Impromptu de VAlma, Theatre II, p.35.
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immerses himself in the mode o f being, somewhat disregards the mode o f having, and 
removes himself completely from the mode of doing. A cause, or perhaps a result, o f 
this is a general feeling o f exhaustion: ‘Une enorme fatigue m ’accable. D ’origine 
psychique vraisemblablement, qui pourrait sembler ne pas avoir de cause mais dont, 
moi, je  connais la cause: la certitude ou presque que tout est vain . ’ 145 Ionescan Man is 
overcome with inertia, and, although certainly less static than his Beckettian 
counterpart, he betrays a definite antipathy towards any remotely ethical action:
Amedee: Je suis tellement las!
Madeleine: Comme chaque fois que tu dois agir. 146
Like many of his fellows, Amedee is selectively and voluntarily inert, and the excuse he 
offers for his passivity is reminiscent of Sartre’s Hugo: ‘Je suis un sedentaire, moi, un 
intellectuel. ’147 But unlike Hugo, who strives to prove himself in action and who is, in 
any case, intellectually engaged, Amedee and others like him steer clear o f any 
commitment. This sense of lethargy is a recurrent theme in Ionescan theatre, 
occasionally invoked as a flight from Anguish, always an escape route from the 
possibility of action:
Dany: J’ai besoin de me reposer defmitivement. 148
Jean: Cette fatigue... cette fatigue qui m ’empeche, mes jambes sont
molles, ma tete lourde. La ffayeur me reprend . 149
Such inertia and passivity reflect the deep sense of apathy and the deeply 
pessimistic outlook evident in the Ionescan puppet. If  the Sartrean agent’s optimism 
stems from his free, open future and his ethical belief in his ability to reap change, 
Ionesco’s characters are left in a state of despair, for they are determined by their pasts 
and impotent in the present. For Ionesco himself, ethical pessimism makes a mockery of 
action and the overriding feeling is the ‘a quoi bon?’:
Le ‘comment’ devient du ‘faire’, et le ‘faire’ ne peut pas ne pas aboutir au 
‘pourquoi’, car le ‘faire’ n ’est pas circonscrit, ne peut etre isole d ’un 
contexte sans limites: cela ne s’arrete pas, cela ne s’arrete jamais. On veut 
faire une bonne societe, une societe meilleure, mais on ne peut pas ne pas se 
demander pourquoi on veut faire une meilleure societe, et qu’est-ce que 
c’est qu’une meilleure societe, et pourquoi une societe serait-elle meilleure 
ou pire qu’une autre? 150
Chestov has pointed out the link between Plotinus’s Tessence meme de Taction est une 
limitation’ and Dostoevsky’s Thom m e d ’action doit etre un esprit mediocre’ , 151 and it 
seems that the Ionescan aversion to action is a well-reasoned continuation of this 
Classical ethical philosophy. Ionesco acknowledges the problem of ethical subjectivity 
delicately circumnavigated by Sartre, and the conclusion he reaches is that if  action is 
the means to a subjective end, then it is not only questionable but invalid. The only valid
145 Journal en miettes, p.29.
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stance lies in apathy -  ‘C ’est 9 a la solution. Le “je-m ’en-fichisme” absolu. ’152 This is the 
stance adopted by most o f Ionesco’s characters, and it is merely compounded by their 
mortal Anguish:
Sixieme Docteur: II y a des gens qui disent que toute action est
inutile, toute revolution et toute evolution car, 
disent-ils, de toute fa9 on, il y a la mort au bout.
Premier Docteur: C ’est un argument a prendre en consideration . 153
The direct link between metaphysical Absurdism and ethics, the continuation and 
coherence of thought, can be appreciated here; but it is not only death, but political 
cynicism that stands in the way of ethical progression, a cynicism clearly expressed by 
La Mere Pipe: ‘Je vous promets de tout changer. Pour tout changer il ne faut rien 
changer. On change les noms, on ne change pas les choses. ’ 154 In her bold bombast, she 
recognises both the treachery of language and the manipulative nature o f politics, but 
even she is unlikely to succeed in the stage world o f Ionesco, for her words will 
undoubtedly fall on nihilistic ears:
Le Monsieur: Faites comme moi, Madame, ne vous fiez a personne, ne
croyez rien, ne vous laissez pas bourrer le crane! 155
Le Gros Monsieur: Au lieu d ’avoir des principes, vous feriez mieux
d’avoir des coups de pied au cul! C’est preferable! 156
Their advice turns out to be vindicated in the brutal portrayal o f violence and evil in 
Macbett, where those wielding political power are certainly not to be trusted and where 
the ominous chiasmus ‘video meliora, deteriora sequor’ 157 is borne out by the anti­
resolution delivered by Macol: ‘Ma pauvre patrie verra regner plus de vices 
qu’auparavant. Elle suffira plus et de plus de manieres que jamais sous mon 
administration. ’158
It has been mentioned that Ionesco, unlike Sartre, recognises the subjective 
gratuitousness o f ethics, and this is indeed one of the greatest strengths o f his 
philosophy. Though constantly reproached by critics for leaving Man in a moral 
vacuum, the ethical stance taken by Ionesco is truly consistent with his agnosticism and 
with the central aspects o f his metaphysical Absurdism: if  we are abandoned in a cruel 
world by a potentially non-existent God, what can possibly be the source o f our ethical 
values? Ionesco must thus be credited with remaining consistently in the Absurd, at 
least at this stage, for, as pointed out by Camus, with the absence of sense comes the 
inevitable absence o f incontestable values: ‘La croyance au sens de la vie suppose 
toujours une echelle de valeurs, un choix, nos preferences. La croyance a l ’absurde, 
selon nos definitions, enseigne le contraire. ’ 159 By this definition, and by Sartre’s too, 
Ionesco is innocent of Seriousness, of adherence to pre-existing values. Further insight 
into the impossibility of normative or descriptive ethics is given by the narrator of Le 
Solitaire, who points out that no moral code can be constructed from senselessness and 
nothingness:
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Mais alors, sur quelles bases pouvons-nous fonder un avoir ou une morale?
En aucun cas, cette base ne peut etre l’ignorance et nous ne sommes que 
dans l’ignorance, nous n ’avons comme base de depart, comme fondement, 
que le neant. Comment batir sur le rien? (p.69).
Ionesco’s acceptance o f ‘the blank canvas of morality’ has vital repercussions, for it 
undermines essential philosophical objectives such as justice, ethical judgement, and 
even truth itself:
Comment etre objectif? Comment etre juste? Comment etre exact? 
Comment dire la verite? Comment faire qu’il s’agisse la d’une verite ‘vraie’, 
non pas que je  veux, que j ’impose? Cela est-il absolument un non-sens 
philosophique?
Sachant cela (fa9 on d ’interpreter a mon tour non pas verite 
absolue), je  suis indecis, conscient de la subjectivite de tous et de la mienne, 
me rendant compte que tout jugement est relatif, vrai et faux, impossible, 
etc., je ne puis que refuser de juger. 160
In direct contrast to the Sartrean agent, the puppet is condemned to ethical, if  not 
ontological or transphenomenal, freedom; but this is no contradiction, for in the face of 
pessimism, apathy, and cynicism, ethical choice is as meaningless as ever:
Mme Martin: Quelle est la morale?
Le Pompier: C’est a vous de la trouver. 161
Voix de la Concierge: Ne m ’en parlez pas des philosophes [...]. II faut
trouver chacun sa solution. S’il y en avait, mais y 
en a pas. 162
One of the most sustained philosophical explorations o f ethics comes in La So if et 
la Faim, where any form of ideology is shown to be illogical and where ethical belief is 
presented as willing relinquishment of freedom, prejudiced self-incarceration:
Frere Tarabas: (A Brechtoll) Si personne ne nous voit et ne m ’oblige a
etre bon, qui peut m ’empecher de vous laisser mourir de 
faim?
[...]
(A Tripp) Nous avons ni dogmes [...]. Ni principes, ni 
criteres; nous sommes libres. [...] Si vous etes enferme, 
c’est parce que c’est vous qui avez une croyance, un critere, 
un dogme ou [...] une morale. Bref, des prejuges. Vous 
n ’etes pas notre prisonnier. C’est votre pensee qui vous 
enferme. 163
Tripp is a typical Ionesco character in the sense that he is his own jailer. Imprisoned in 
his language, his nature, and his condition, the puppet willingly chooses to imprison 
himself in a variety of ways, in a labyrinth of different walls. The image of the world as
160 Antidotes, p.272.
161 La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.43.
162 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p. 102.
163 Theatre IV, p. 147 and p. 150.
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a prison is strongly recurrent, and it is an appropriate one for the Absurdists, since, as 
pointed out by Dobrez, ‘To exist is to suffocate, to be enclosed in a room or stifled by 
objects or words or people . ’ 164 The imagery here evokes the metaphysical Anguish 
explored earlier; the enclosed sets and situations of Ionesco’s creations can be regarded 
as a physical extension o f existential anxiety, another victory for Ionescan literality. 
Characters are thus imprisoned both literally and metaphorically, and, trapped as they 
are in their strange little worlds, they begin to resemble the insane or dead creations of 
Sartre: ‘Les marionnettes raidies de La Cantatrice chauve ressemblent aux personnages 
objectives d’Huis Clos [...]. La leur est “une vie morte” dirait Sartre . ’ 165 Indeed the 
puppets o f Ionesco have much in common with the living dead o f Huis Clos, for whom 
the past is determining and action futile. But, like the Nouveau Locataire, Ionesco’s 
characters choose their own captivity; they lock their own doors and turn off their own 
lights. Claustration is positively sought, whether individually or in a couple, the most 
striking examples being the old couple o f Les Chaises, who maroon themselves on an 
island, and Amedee and his wife, whose agoraphobia is so entrenched they have to send 
a basket down for food. This microcosmic display o f insecurity reflects their 
philosophical perception o f the macrocosm, a world-view shared by many o f their 
fellows:
Le Deuxieme Malade: L ’univers est pour moi une prison ou un bagne.
Regarder le monde me fait mal. Je ne puis soufffir 
la lumiere, je  ne puis supporter les tenebres. 166
Le Monsieur: Nous vivons dans une sorte de prison qui est une
boite. Cette boite est emboitee dans une autre 
boite, qui est emboitee dans une autre boite, qui 
est emboitee dans une autre boite [...] et ainsi de 
suite, a l’infini. Et l’infini, je  vous le disais on ne 
peut pas le concevoir. 167
The analogy o f the Russian dolls effectively drives home the extent o f the puppet’s 
sequestration, both willing and imposed, and this is further reinforced by the stagecraft 
o f the writer. Ionesco wittingly creates a theatre within a theatre within a theatre, where 
space itself becomes structurally imprisoned:
En structurant non seulement l’espace scenique mais aussi l’espace hors- 
scene, Ionesco accentue la cloture de l’espace. Sans doute, les portes et les 
fenetres existent, qui donnent sur l’exterieur. Mais cet exterieur est sans 
referent: il s ’agit d ’un espace virtuel de meme nature que l ’espace actuel: 
c ’est-a-dire d ’un espace theatral. 168
Enclosed within their labyrinthine walls, Ionesco’s victims are as doomed as the 
Minotaur’s prey; aware o f the danger, they burrow deep to find their warren or climb 
skywards to find a nest. Their space becomes increasingly restricted, and they lie low to 
avoid intrusion, whether from a fireman, a rhinoceros, a corpse, or death itself. The 
ethical world created by Ionesco is thus beyond the terrain o f the puppet, who,
164 The Existential and its Exits, p.151.
165 Malachy, Therese, La Mort en Situation dans le Theatre Contemporain, p.83.
166 Macbett, Theatre V, p.177.
157 Ce formidable bordel, p. 140.
168 Pruner, M., ‘L’Espace dans la dramaturgie de Ionesco’, in Ionesco: Situation et Perspectives, ed. 
Claude Abastado, p.226.
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imprisoned by the Given, his language, and his own walls, lies inert and apathetic in the 
expectance of inevitable disaster. ‘C’est peut-etre une hibernation’, admits Ionesco: ‘Je 
la recommande’ . 169
169 Ruptures de Silence, p.80.
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iiO Rats on a Wheel: The Escapist
The image of the hibernating victim, though appropriate, is a profoundly static one, and 
as the puppet transmutes from victim to escapist, the hibernating animal awakens and 
endeavours to flee from the constraints o f its claustration. The notion of flight is central 
to Ionescan theatre, and the aim of this section is to isolate its presentation o f the various 
forms of flight from the human condition and situation, and to explore their 
philosophical origins.
The use of inhuman, animalistic imagery, terminology, and artistry to convey 
human Anguish and language has already been discussed, and the extension o f the 
analogy in this context serves to fuse the complementary concepts of Absurdism (‘Le 
monde n ’est peut-etre qu’une farce enorme que Dieu a jouee a l’homme’) and 
incarceration (‘La creation n ’est ni logique ni illogique, elle est gratuite et libre. C’est 
d ’etre determine qui est insense, d ’etre pris dans le jeu .’170) explored in the previous 
sections. The fusion of these two central concepts creates a whole which is unbearable 
for the puppet to sustain and which drives him into the realm o f flight. The image o f the 
rat on a wheel, though not o f Ionesco’s creation, is alluded to throughout his plays and 
journals, but the m otif of the rat trap, which inspires the blocking and intrigue of La 
Legon, is directly acknowledged in his most personal diary:
Pris dans ce piege. Comme un rat [...] pris dans ce piege entre la naissance et 
la mort.
Un piege? Ou un col etroit d’ou on ne doit (re)partir que par le haut. 171
Again, the anthropomorphic images abound, and one cannot fail to be reminded of 
Dostoevsky’s ‘mousehold’ in his Notes from Underground}12 On the stage, it is not 
only oblique analogy which conveys the base condition of Man, but also the characters’ 
self-perception as animals trapped in a prison-like zoo:
Un Autre Homme: Nous sommes pris au piege. Comme des rats . 173
Alexandre: J ’ai Timpression de vivre dans une cage. Je suis
meme convaincu que nous sommes dans une 
cage.174
As might be expected, such lucidity is reinforced by Adamovian literality, for in the 
play within La Soif et la Faim , cages descend from above, and Brechtoll and Tripp are 
caught in a trap, easy prey for the torturing monks.
The image is also sustainable in the portrayal of the Absurdity o f the social 
condition, and, more particularly, o f the modem worker; interpreted in this way, it is 
once again reminiscent o f the monotonous toiling of Sisyphus, or here Berenger: ‘ Je ne 
suis pas fait pour le travail que j ’ai... tous les jours, au bureau, pendant huit heures, trois 
semaines seulement de vacances en ete! ’ 175 Man is caught, then, in a dual trap: 
metaphysically, he is condemned to the Absurd imprisonment between the arbitrary 
boundaries of birth and death; and socially, he is left little choice but to strive,
170 Decouvertes, p. 117.
171 La Quete intermittente, p. 165.
172 See Rosette C. Lamont, Ionesco's Imperatives: The Politics o f  Culture, p. 195. Interestingly, and not 
coincidentally, Dostoevsky’s book is also the source of the term anti-hero.
173 Jeux de Massacre, Theatre V, p. 110.
174 Voyages chez les Morts, p. 112.
175 Rhinoceros, Theatre III, p. 12.
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seemingly pointlessly, amidst the machinations of the current system. These 
philosophical convictions are transposed onto the stage in almost every conceivable 
way, and they even inspire the very movement o f the characters: ‘Le Premier Homme, 
tenant les deux valises dans les mains. II va d ’un bout de la scene a Vautre, il la 
parcourt plusieurs fois. De temps a autre, il depose ses valises, s ’eponge le front, puis 
repart, il joue le meme j e u f 76 This aimless wandering, which accompanies the main 
theme o f the play, is choreographed to the point o f paroxysm, as characters enter and 
leave the stage chaotically until they can move no more and the Quatrieme Homme is 
forced to cry, ‘Quel embouteillage! ’ . 177 The man on the stage has become the rat on the 
wheel.
Anthropomorphism is prevalent in Ionescan theatre, and rats are by no means the 
only animals used to elucidate the plight of the puppet. At varying moments, the stage is 
overrun by rhinoceroses, geese, and eggs, as literality comes once more to the fore and 
characters metamorphose into the beasts most appropriate to their flawed ideologies, 
whether totalitarian (the rhinoceros), political (the goose), or socially conventional (the 
breeding bird). Jacques and Roberte are particularly good examples, for, in the course o f 
their two plays, they lose their human identities first to the cat, then to the grotesque 
beast, and finally to the factory breeder. At the end of Jacques, their families too join 
them in their animalistic ritual. 178 Such transmutation is wholly consistent with the 
philosophy expounded in Ionesco’s interviews and journals, where he betrays a definite 
urge to identify the human puppet with the ensnared beast:
Nous sommes pris dans une sorte de piege collectif et nous ne nous 
revoltons meme pas serieusement [...]. Nous sommes menes, nous sommes 
conditionnes, nous sommes traines en laisse comme des chiens. 179
Je toume en rond dans ma cage, derriere les barreaux, comme un fauve. 180
The bestial analogies proliferate like the eggs or the rhinoceroses, and there is a link also 
with the theme o f enlisement, the sinking down into the soft earth o f the moles and 
worms, the labyrinth of the classical bull, or the dank cellars inhabited by rats.
The form of the plays is also consistent with the portrayal o f Man as a rat on a 
wheel. Ionesco’s preoccupation with the circle has been mentioned in relation to the 
wish to be ‘unborn’, to the craving for the womb; but the same image can be appreciated 
in the light o f the analogy explored above, which regards life as a fruitless tread-wheel 
and existence as a circular cage:
Le retour cyclique n ’est pas un simple element architectural place hors du 
champ de la signification. Au contraire, sa raison d ’etre, c’est de signifier. 
l’existence n ’est qu’un etemel retour absurde et sans solution. La structure 
cyclique illustre done le theme majeur. La ‘forme’ epouse le ‘fond’ et 
constitue avec lui un tout indissociable. 181
This unity of theme and form, one of the greatest achievements of the genre, is evident 
not only in the circular plots of La Cantatrice chauve and La Legon, but also in the 
distinctive technique of paroxysm, by which Ionesco accelerates and slows down the
176 Stage direction to L ’Homme aux Valises, p.97.
177 Ibid., p.98.
178 Theatre I, p. 127.
179 Journal en miettes, p.50.
180 Ibid., p.97.
181 Jacquart, Emmanuel C., Le Theatre de derision, p. 178.
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action like a madman spinning a wheel: ‘Le jeu  ira tres lentement au depart; 
declamation; le mouvement s ’intensiflera progressivement, durant la scene qui va 
suivre; se ralentira a la f i n f * 2 This stage direction is typical, and could just as well 
relate to the balletic movement of furniture in Les Chaises or in Le Nouveau Locataire, 
to the mass production of eggs in L ’Avenir est dans les ceufs, or to the waitress serving 
tables in Ce formidable bordel!
Scenic space is also highly influenced by the shape of the circle, from the 
circular outer wall o f Les Chaises to the circle drawn by the Nouveau Locataire, and the 
cyclical oscillations of brutal power in Macbett prove that even internal dramatic 
intrigue is highly dominated by this same image. The influence is certainly a deep one, 
and its symbolism, while plainly philosophical, has its origins in the world o f dreams: 
‘L ’idee d ’encerclement, de vie prise au piege, constitue une des bases de l’onirisme de 
Ionesco. Ce cauchemar tres obsedant [...] va orienter une dramaturgic dominee par 
l’idee du cercle. ’ 183 The nightmare can be appreciated in Jacques, where the horse in 
Roberte II’s story can only gallop round in circles; 184 and the teratological vision we are 
left with is this same grotesque storyteller, crawling round the stage with her three 
noses, and the nine fingers of her left hand waggling like reptiles. The edges between 
puppet and animal are becoming increasingly blurred.
Ionesco’s response to this seeming dead end is to explore the different methods 
of flight from the rat race, from the interminable Given. The concept o f flight can 
actually be seen as a development of the theme o f sequestration explored earlier: the 
failure o f self-imposed isolation in terms o f metaphysical escapism (the sequestered 
Amedee and old couple o f Les Chaises continue to be plagued by existential Angst) has 
led to a renewed pursuit o f freedom, to a longing for absence:
Etre libre, etre hors de l’Histoire, ne pas etre dans l’ordre du monde, ne pas 
etre un instrument de Torchestre ou une note de la symphonie. Ne pas etre 
sur la scene. Tout voir et entendre de la salle. Comme hors de 1’uni vers. Si 
on est sur la scene, si on fait partie de Torchestre, nous n ’entendons que le 
tumulte, nous ne saisissons que les dissonances. 185
The musical, Platonic analogy points towards a desire for transphenomenal escapism, 
the only effective method of fleeing from the dissonant chaos o f human existence 
towards the possible beauty and plenitude o f human essence. However, this ardent 
desire for a new condition and situation will remain an oneiric wish-fulfilment until the 
existential rat-traps have been successfully overcome:
Jacques: Et comment sortir? Ils ont bouche les portes, les fenetres avec du 
rien, ils ont enleve les escaliers... On ne part plus par le grenier, 
par en haut plus moyen... pourtant, m ’a-t-on dit, ils ont laisse un 
peu partout des trappes... Si je  les decouvrais... Je veux 
absolument m ’en aller. Si on ne peut pas passer par le grenier, il 
reste la cave... oui, la cave... II vaut mieux passer par en bas que 
d ’etre la. Tout est preferable a ma situation actuelle. Meme une 
nouvelle . 186
The ontological contrast to Sartre here should not be overlooked: whereas for Sartre,
182 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre /, p. 122, stage direction.
183 Vemois, Paul, La Dynamique theatrale d ’Eugene Ionesco, p.76.
184 Theatre /, p. 124.
185 Present passe, Passe present, pp.74-75.
I8’ Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre /, p. 121.
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Man is a nothingness surrounded by plenitude, for Ionesco, the inverse is the case, the 
puppet a potential plenitude, imprisoned within walls of nothingness.
The most natural, and perhaps the most attainable, means o f escape is that of 
humour. Practically absent from Sartrean theatre, humour is central to the world of 
Ionesco, and it presents itself in a variety of ways, from the playful and nonsensical to 
the bitterly satirical. For Ionesco, humour and freedom are mutually dependent, and he 
attacks the paradox o f the bondage of Sartrean liberty: ‘L ’humour, c’est la liberte [...] et 
les sartrismes nous engluent, nous figent, dans les cachots et dans les fers de cet 
engagement qui devait etre liberte. ’ 187 As in the world o f Beckett, humour provides 
welcome distraction from the misery o f the human situation; the catharsis o f laughter 
which occasionally unites the stage characters and their audience seems to suspend the 
consciousness from perception of the Absurd in the same way that Sisyphus’s toiling 
removes him from the misery of his plight. Laughter, then, provides solace and 
consolation, and its evocation leaves Ionesco doubly guilty o f Sartrean distraction, for 
not only does he seek to avoid Anguish by uniting past and future actions, but he 
attempts to flee the present in the conduite magique o f mirth. According to Ionesco, it is 
in humour, in whatever guise it may arise, that Man will find his peace: ‘Nous sommes 
comiques. C’est sous cet aspect que nous devrions nous voir. Rien que l’humour, rose 
ou noir ou cruel, mais seul l’humour peut nous rendre la serenite. ’ 188 I f  we accept along 
with Ionesco that comedy and tragedy are two sides of the same coin, then we must 
concede that humour is a particularly appropriate means o f escape. Here again, Ionesco 
succeeds in uniting theme and form, for his existential philosophy and his theatrical 
theory both contend that paroxysm is the proof of the ultimate convergence o f the tragic 
and the comic: pushed to its extreme, ridiculed and speeded-up, tragedy cannot fail to 
become burlesque; and comedy, when blackened and decelerated, is transformed to the 
realm of the tragic. Derision, the metaphysical farce, the tragicomedy, all terms 
regularly used in description of Ionescan theatre, testify to this unity in their unanimous 
acknowledgement that humour is indeed not only a valid means o f escape but also the 
ultimate outlet o f despair. In their more lucid moments, the characters on Ionesco’s, as 
on Beckett’s, stage are fully aware of their impulses to laugh in the midst o f their own 
sorrow:
Nell: Rien n ’est plus drole que le malheur [...]. Si, si, c ’est la chose la
plus comique du monde. 189
Jean: La douleur de l’homme est ridicule pour l’homme . 190
In its successful rapprochement of laughter and despair, the Theatre o f the Absurd has 
achieved the perfect escapism. Its only flaw lies in its transience, as the laughter soon 
turns back to bitter tears.
A less philosophical means of flight comes with the chemical escapism of 
alcohol, a more poetic device probably indebted to the Romantics. As with humour, the 
intention is not to physically escape but rather to nullify the consciousness and thus to 
flee from Anguish. Alcohol is also used to remove the consciousness from the 
encumbrance of the body, and there is a contrast here with Sartre’s Authentic Man who 
was shown to be at home inside his skin: ‘J ’ai toujours eu une mauvaise cenesthesie: 
mal a l’aise dans ma peau. D ’ou la necessite des euphorisants ou de la boisson . ’ 191
187 Notes et contre-notes, p.200.
188 Journal en miettes, p. 168.
189 Beckett, Samuel, Fin de Partie, pp.33-34.
190 La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p. 115.
191 Journal en miettes, p.56.
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Alcohol is perhaps not only a means of evasion o f Anguish, but also a magical conduct, 
a fast-track route to Authenticity, reminiscent indeed of the Sartrean conversion to pure 
reflection . 192
The stage character who explores this route is o f course the autobiographical 
Berenger, who in his awkwardness and physical weakness seeks strength and 
consolation in the bottle. He is chastised for this by several o f his fellows, but no more 
so than by the totalitarian Jean, whose puritanism is soon exposed to be blatantly 
hypocritical. Berenger naturally does not succeed in removing himself from reality for 
long, as the secured inebriation is almost as temporary as the escapism into humour. 
There is obviously a link here too with the craving for plenitude o f Being, and the 
consumption of alcohol thus fulfils a dual metaphysical role.
It is in the form of the novel, though, that the theme is examined most 
effectively. Le Solitaire, who is subsequently dramatised in Ce formidable bordel!, 
imbibes alcohol not merely to quell his social inadequacy but also to find a shelter from 
the imponderable questions of the Absurd, to cure his Roquentinesque nausee:
De nouveau cet affreux vertige. Je me dirigeai vers le buffet. Ouvris le 
battant, pris la bouteille de cognac. Je bus Tun apres l’autre cinq verres.
Dieu que c’etait bon. Toutes les questions s’emoussent, je  me sentis chaud, 
heureux, ou plutot, non pas heureux, libere de toutes ces questions. Je 
n ’etais plus prisonnier du globe seulement, mais de cette couverture chaude 
de Talcool qui vous enveloppe. Mais la nausee avait disparu. Je ne pense 
plus a Timpensable. 193
In a philosophical moment, he goes on to explore the different manifestations o f flight, 
reaching the conclusion that his own preferred method of evasion is no less valid than 
the Sartrean escapism of action: ‘Les gens qui s ’agitent, qui agissent, qui determinent 
les autres a agir, trouvent la-dedans une evasion, un oubli que pour ma part je  trouvais 
dans l ’alcool. ’ 194 His conclusion is of course identical to the one reached by Sartre 
himself in the closing pages of L ‘Etre et le Neant. I95
Both philosophically and technically, the most important aspect of flight lies in 
the celebration o f the unconscious, a preoccupation which fits in with Ionesco’s 
Essentialism and which inspires his development of form. The influences o f the 
Surrealists, of Freud and Jung, and of Strindberg in this area o f Ionesco’s dramaturgy 
have all been appropriately acknowledged, and it is more fruitful here to focus on the 
interesting contrasts with Sartre. One of the main problems in the exploration o f the 
agent was Sartre’s complete rejection of the unconscious in favour o f the reflective and 
pre-reflective consciousnesses, a rejection which had dire consequences for choice, 
responsibility, and therefore for personal ethics. With Ionesco’s puppet, his dreams and 
his unconscious unite him with his fellows, for they point towards a primal essence, a 
psychic underworld of being: ‘Nos reves essentielles ne sont-ils pas les memes? Ne 
revelent-ils pas nos angoisses communes, nos desirs communs? ’ 196 Although, following 
Sartrean analysis, the puppet would be left in mauvaise fo i , conveniently abdicating 
from ethical responsibility, Ionesco’s rejection of the validity o f action seems to remove 
the problems o f choice and repercussion. The unconscious almost explodes onto 
Ionesco’s stage, affecting dialogue, structure, and theme, and the role o f the dream is 
central in exposing M an’s primal desires of flight: ‘Si les avions sillonnent aujourd’hui
192 See p.97 for Barnes’s interpretation of pure reflection.
193 Le Solitaire, p.53.
194 Ibid., p. 141.
195 See p.721: ‘Ainsi revient-il au meme de s ’enivrer solitairement ou de conduire les peuples.’
196 Notes et contre-notes, p. 165.
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le ciel, c ’est parce que nous avions reve 1’envoi avant de nous envoler. II a ete possible 
de voler parce que nous revions que nous volions. ’ 197 The desire to fly inspires many 
dream sequences in the course of the plays, even in the absence o f the plane, and the 
theme of levitation, of physical and metaphysical escapism, can be seen to transcend the 
restrictive limits of the dream play and, as in Le Pieton de I ’Air, demand its place also 
on the conscious stage. We can also glean further insight into Ionesco’s Humanism here, 
for if Sartre rejects the notion of judging M an’s greatness by individual inventions such 
as the plane, 198 Ionesco’s more collective Humanism accepts that personal inspiration is 
predated and outshone by essential, atavistic desires that lie deep within the psyche. 
Indeed Ionesco is convinced that these unconscious drives are more honest and reliable 
than conscious processes of thought, and that a conscience heureuse is one which 
accesses these drives through dream:
L ’imagination ne peut mentir. Elle est revelatrice de notre psychologie, de 
nos angoisses permanentes ou actuelles, des preoccupations de l’homme de 
toujours et d ’aujourd’hui, des profondeurs de Tame. Un homme qui ne reve 
pas est un homme malade.199
It is thus the positive characters, such as Berenger, who are the dreamers o f Ionescan 
drama, and the negative characters, such as Jean, who remain closed to this therapeutic 
mode of self-removal:
Jean: Je ne reve jamais...
Berenger: Le mal de tete a du vous prendre pendant votre sommeil,
vous avez oublie d’avoir reve, ou plutot vous vous en 
souvenez inconsciemment!
Jean: Moi, inconsciemment? Je suis maitre de mes pensees, je
ne me laisse pas aller a la derive. Je vais tout droit, je  vais 
toujours tout droit.200
Jean refuses to dream in the same way he refuses alcohol, for he is so firmly fixed in the 
world of actuality that he has even forgotten to be human. It is o f course significant that 
by this stage Jean’s horn has started to protrude, for as a rhinoceros, he will have no 
need to relocate his humanity, whether in the form of drink or dreams. Unaware o f the 
need to escape, Jean freely relinquishes his human form and becomes a soulless animal, 
a rat trapped on its wheel.
The authenticity of the dream, and thus of the unconscious imagination, is 
highlighted particularly in the later plays, where the dream state is regarded as the 
default position o f the puppet’s consciousness: ‘Pour etre lucide, il faudrait passer sa vie 
en reve . ’201 The direct contrast with Sartre is again striking, and it would appear that 
Ionescan Authenticity demands an openness to the unconscious, whereas for Sartre, 
such adherence would characterise Inauthentic Man. In Ionesco’s last play, too, which is 
in itself an extended dream play, the timelessness and purity of the unconscious mind 
are clearly conveyed by Jean: ‘Je suis toujours jeune, je  me vois toujours jeune dans mes 
reves. L ’inconscient ne vieillit pas.[...] Dans les reves, je  te rencontre bien plus souvent 
que dans cette fausse realite. ’202 The escapism of the dream can be seen to extend to a
197 Ibid., p.210.
198 See L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, p.91.
199 Antidotes, p. 176.
200 Rhinoceros, Theatre III, p.69.
201 Premier Homme, L ’Homme aux Valises, p.25.
202 Voyages chez les Morts, p.96 and p .l 17.
145
counterattack on Absurdity itself, for in his dreams, Jean can attain the eternal instant, 
successfully remove himself from transience, decrepitude, death, and temporality. Like 
humour and alcohol, the unconscious provides the puppet with a weapon to fight against 
the injustices of his situation and condition, and Sartre’s lucid consciousness, which is 
destined to face its own problematics, is shown by Ionesco to be both false and 
temporally constrained. In fact the dream state becomes so normalised that conscious 
life and historical existence begin to induce delirium:
La Vieille: C’est bien lui, il existe. En chair et en os.
Le Vieux: II existe. Et c’est bien lui. Ce n ’est pas un reve!
La Vieille: Ce n ’est pas un reve, je te l’avais bien dis.203
Like Choubert in Victimes du devoir, the old couple re-emerge from their subconscious 
thought with a new-found wonder at existence, and just as Choubert’s consolation lies 
in bread, the hosts place their faith in salvation through the orator, whose status is 
probably diminished because he actually does exist. Throughout Ionesco’s theatre, the 
dreamy world o f unconscious desires is shown to be more real than its conscious 
counterpart, and although the flight it enables is again relatively transient, it lies at the 
very core of the writer’s Humanism, uniting the temporal ages and testifying proudly to 
the essence o f Man.
Another powerful means of escape is presented in the theme o f metamorphosis 
and regression. The metamorphosis from human to animal, a form of symbolism no 
doubt inspired by Kafkaesque polymorphism, has been discussed and exposed as a 
negative aspect of flight, but metamorphosis from one human character to another, 
facilitated by characters’ universal and often interchangeable identity, is also a common 
phenomenon on Ionesco’s theatrical stage. Again there is a pleasing unity between 
theme and form, for the technique of literality allows Ionesco to reinforce his 
philosophy of character with powerful visual images: philosophical themes such as 
flight from the Self, whether the individual consciousness or the physical body, equated 
with Sartrean themes such as distraction, dissociation, reflection, and objectivation, are 
conveyed in the form of transmutation o f character. Thus, in Victimes du devoir, 
Madeleine and Le Policier are transformed into Choubert’s mother and father;204 thus La 
Jeune Fille a Marier is or has become a virile man with a large black moustache; in 
Macbett, La Premiere Sorciere turns into Lady Duncan; and at the end o f the fabulesque 
Tableau, Le Peintre is conjured into a mythical prince:
Le Gros Monsieur [...] tire un coup de pistolet sur le peintre; les vieux 
vetements de celui-ci tombent soudainement, il apparait en Prince 
Charmant. [...] L ’eclairage fa it que le decor aussi est metamorphose: du 
plafond tombent des fleurs, des serpentins; des petards, des feux d ’artifice 
illuminent la scene.205
The stage elements all work together and the positive semiotics underline the magical 
metamorphosis: the play has ended, and the myth will thus endure. For once, the 
escapism is permanent, for the successful evasion is theatre itself.
Simpler forms of metamorphosis involve flight within the same body. A 
common example of this is the regression to the child, a classical theme reminiscent of 
some of the greatest dramatic heroes such as Shakespeare’s King Lear. With Ionesco, 
the theme is particularly resonant, since it fits in with the ludic nature o f his theatre and
203 Les Chaises, Theatre /, p. 174.
204 See Theatre I, pp.202-03.
205 Theatre III, p.273, stage direction.
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places the escapee back into the authentic state o f wonder: the scales fall from aged 
eyes, literally and metaphorically. Examples abound on Ionesco’s stage, from La 
Legon's Professeur, who cowers from his mother-maid after killing the fortieth Eleve, to 
the Vieille Femme of L ’Homme aux Valises, who longs to show her re-found mother to 
her ‘petites camarades’ (p. 19). Like the world of the dream, childhood offers the puppet 
another chance to escape from false reality and from the pressing demands of Anguish. 
Thus the old couple of Les Chaises seek a remission from the torment o f their emptiness 
which they discover in the mode of play:
Le Vieux: Fais semblant toi-meme, c’est ton tour.
La Vieille: C’est ton tour.
Le Vieux: Ton tour.
La Vieille: Ton tour.206
The language, though infantile, is no less ridiculous than the nonsense spouted in their 
adult existence; if  anything, it is purer and more genuine than the anti-logical pretence 
o f their usual discourse. Choubert too seeks comfort in regression, for once disavowed 
o f the promise of the dream, he makes his wife into his mother to suckle him from his 
pain: ‘Choubert, la bouche pleine (il est au niveau mental d ’un bebe de deux ans; il 
sanglote): Ma-ma-ma-de-lei-lei-ne! ! ! ’207 But the most poignant example comes in Le 
Roi se meurt, where the King is under no illusion o f the motive behind his own 
regression:
Marie: II est comme un petit enfant. II est redevenu un petit
enfant.
Marguerite: Un petit enfant barbu, ride, moche. Que vous etes
indulgente!
[...]
Le Roi: Parlez-moi, au contraire, parlez. Entourez-moi, retenez
moi. Qu’on me soutienne. Non, je  veux fuir.208
As in Les Chaises and L ’Homme aux Valises, this attempt to recapture lost childhood is 
intensely moving, for, though indulgent, as pointed out by the brutally honest 
Marguerite, it is caused by a refusal to face the cruel metaphysical condition with which 
the human puppet is unwillingly presented. In this case, it is death, the ultimate cause of 
Anguish, which proves too harsh to endure, and the King responds with petulance in his 
desire to become immortal: ‘Un seul nom de bapteme, un seul nom de famille pour tout 
le monde. Que Ton apprenne a lire en epelant mon nom: B-e-Be, Berenger. ’209 The 
symbolism of the proper nouns (Be-be-renger and Ma-ma-deleine) reinforces the theme 
of regression and the recurrence of these symbolic characters shows its importance to 
Ionesco’s theatre as a whole.
Another flight within the body comes with the magical conduct of madness and 
senility, which is of course an escape route shared with Sartre’s sequestered agents. In 
Ionescan drama, though, madness presents itself as a stream or evasion of consciousness 
not dissimilar to that experienced in the dream. Given the nature o f Ionesco’s theatre, 
with its deconstruction of traditional character and its sustained attack on language, it is 
difficult to isolate the precise instances of madness, but there are certainly occasions 
where regret and nostalgia combine to effect a flight into self-induced insanity: ‘Alors,
206 Theatre /, p. 132.
207 Ibid., p.228.





on a ri. Ah!... ri... arri... arri... Ah!... Ah!... ri... va... arri... arri... le drole ventre nu... au 
riz arriva... au riz arriva. [...] Puis les deux Vieux petit a petit se calment.'>2]0 Despite the 
familiar nonsense, the pain and hyper-excitation of the Vieux are striking, and they 
reveal the attempt of the couple to find comfort in the inner world o f madness. 
However, as in Sartre’s work, madness is occasionally a privileged position of 
consciousness, a more genuine world perception than the false actuality o f reason. If  Le 
Roi is reminiscent of a Shakespearean king, then the seemingly mad must call to mind 
his Fool, whose insanity often disguises an acuity of universal understanding: ‘Pourtant 
nous savons depuis toujours que le clown n ’est pas necessairement gai, et que le fou du 
roi dans ses pretendus delires prononce souvent des verites que nous prefererions ne pas 
entendre. ’211
A n  additional form of heightened perception is revealed in the theme of 
temporality. Linked with the themes of dreaming and senility, the re-conception o f the 
temporal modes to merge the present with the past and future provides another means o f 
escape from the constraints of the actual present. Annoyed with the limitations of 
consciousness, Ionesco requests a relocation of the boundaries: ‘Limite par les 
categories de la conscience, espace-temps, je  ne sais qui a fait, comment se sont faites 
ces categories qui me limitent -  et je  voudrais etre hors-limites. ’212 Time on Ionesco’s 
stage is inaccurate and dreamlike, and his Eastern influences can be perceived in his 
preference for space over time:
La Femme: Si nous ne sommes plus dans le meme temps, nous
pouvons nous rencontrer ailleurs. Dans l’espace.213
This is indeed precisely what happens in Voyages chez les Morts, where the past is 
relived in the a-temporal world of the dream. Ionesco’s reconstruction o f temporal 
consciousness is once again in unity with his form, for his Artaudian preoccupation with 
Vespace scenique, revealed particularly in his use o f vertical space, sits comfortably 
with his philosophy which celebrates the realm of space. This also ties-in with the theme 
o f flight through regression to childhood, as one of the reasons for nostalgia is the 
yearning for the pre-awareness of time:
For if [Ionesco’s] childhood was both ‘magical’ and ‘abundant’ [...] it was 
because of his acute awareness that, in his previous existence as a child, he 
stood ‘outside time’. He had lived, as it were, a Beckettian ‘instantaneous- 
infinite’, a Self immobile at the centre o f all Being, observing itself, 
observing itself observing a moving panorama o f events circling that 
sentient point of immobility, not in time but in space,214
The various methods of flight all stem from the same idea, from the desperate need to 
relocate the vanished sense of wonder.
The Eastern influences persist in Ionesco’s exploration o f mysticism and
210 Les Chaises, Theatre I, p. 135.
2,1 Pouilloux, Jean-Yves, ‘Nostalgie de la Lumiere’, Magazine litteraire, no.335 (1995), p.39.
212 La Quete intermittente, p. 101.
213 L ’Homme aux Valises, p.53.
214 Coe, Richard, ‘Ionesco and the Vision of Childhood’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco’s 
Theatrical Quest, ed. Mosche Lazar, pp.4-5. Cf. also de Beauvoir’s comments on Descartes’s recognition 
of Man’s nostalgia for childhood, which she interprets as nostalgia for pre-awareness o f the demands of 
Freedom (see Pour une Morale de I ’Ambiguite, pp.67-68). This is linked, of course, with Sartre’s ethics 
of play, and nb. also the connection between Sartre’s pure reflection and the Ionescan/Beckettian 
‘instantaneous-infinite’ which ‘observes itself observing’. Perhaps Sartrean pure reflection would thus 
function ideally in childhood.
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transcendence, which creates a whole new realm of possibilities o f flight. In the 
Mystics, Ionesco finds an indication of certitude and plenitude, which he links, both 
philosophically and theatrically, with music, light, and levitation: ‘Les images 
lumineuses des mystiques sont revelatrices d ’un extra-conscient de plenitude et 
lumineux sur lequel les tenebres ou le neant n ’ont plus de prise . ’215 Again, the aim of 
flight is to extend the consciousness and return to a state of wonder, but now the escape 
becomes spiritual as images of light and darkness, o f gravity and evanescence, enter the 
fray. This is the nature of Ionescan transcendence: though based, like Sartrean 
transcendence, on the premise of freedom, Ionesco’s interpretation of freedom is one of 
contemplation rather than choice and action, and it transcends the Given not by 
engagement in the concrete situation but by removal o f the Self from the confines of 
reality. Thus Choubert, once freed from the weight and darkness o f his condition, can 
rise vertically in space and find both wonder and light: ‘Je baigne dans la lumiere. 
(Obscurite totale sur scene) La lumiere me penetre. Je suis etonne d ’etre, etonne 
d ’etre... etonne d ’etre. . . ’216 Though short-lived, Choubert’s transcendence is perfect at 
this stage, for he has found his spirituality, rejected temporality for space, and 
rediscovered his childhood sense of wonder.
An effective way to explore this spiritual aspect o f Ionesco’s theatre is to divide 
it into a number of revealing binary oppositions. These oppositions, related to flight and 
to the polar extremes of consciousness, are incited by the dramatist himself:
Deux aspects de conscience fondamentaux sont a l’origine de toutes mes 
pieces: tantot Tun, tantot l’autre predomine, tantot ils s ’entremelent. Ces 
deux prises de conscience originelles sont celles de T evanescence et de la 
lourdeur; du vide et du trop de presence; de la transparence irreelle du 
monde et de son opacite; de la lumiere et des tenebres epaisses.217
In philosophical terms, this polar opposition is not unlike Sartre’s desagregation intime, 
which divided the agent’s consciousness into the ambiguous dichotomy o f facticity and 
transcendence. With Ionesco, though, the emphasis is on transcendence (flight) rather 
than simultaneous acceptance of both, and the terminology thus transcends the 
ontological towards the mythical, religious, and metaphysical.
The hellish symbol of the labyrinth is used to expose dehumanisation and 
sequestration, and its Humanistic antithesis is found in the lost paradise o f the Garden of 
Eden. This religious symbolism pervades Ionesco’s drama and it synthesises the related 
oppositions of light and darkness, weight and weightlessness, and enlisement and 
levitation. The spiritual goal of the human puppet is therefore to reach this 
transphenomenal paradise; the theologically orphaned agnostic is presented with 
transcendence in the symbol of Jacob’s ladder, which offers a mythical Assumption, a 
mystical Himmelfahrt to salvation.
The three sets of oppositions mentioned above can be seen to work together in 
Ionesco’s theatre, and they culminate eventually, at the end o f the puppet’s journey, in a 
unity of wonder and awe. The first opposition, between darkness and light, is the most 
poetic and the most religious, for, based on an early childhood experience of the 
playwright, it re-expresses the theme of the thirst for the absolute in relation to the 
puppet’s abandonment and his floundering in the Absurd:
Mes personnages [sont...] a la recherche, consciemment ou non, de la 
lumiere absolue. C’est parce qu’ils n ’ont aucune indication sur la route a
215 Present passe, Passe present, p.222.
216 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.219.
217 Notes et contre-notes, p.226.
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suivre que mes personnages errent dans le noir, dans l’absurde, dans 
Fincomprehension, dans Fangoisse.218
The Absurd, the world of questions, is symbolised by aimless wandering in darkness, 
and light is thus equated with the answers o f certitude and salvation, with the absent 
God. The role of light in the plays themselves is vital, dominating the stage directions 
and working in tandem with the central themes. It is of paramount importance in plays 
like Tueur sans gages, where it distinguishes between the grey monotony o f Berenger’s 
world and the lofty promise of the ‘Cite Radieuse’, and Le Nouveau Locataire, where 
the final blackout is a direct response to the protagonist, who has finally been defeated 
by the anti-spiritual forces of material matter. Neither is it absent from the dialogue, for 
characters such as Jean possess the insight to acknowledge their need for luminosity: 
‘Alors pourquoi l’ombre revient-elle? Lumiere, reste! [...] Est-ce que je  ne reve plus? Ou 
bien est-ce un cauchemar? De nouveau Fobscurite hante mon cceur. ’219 Light is linked 
here with the flight of the dream, and the darkness o f its absence forms the living 
nightmare of daily existence.
The opposition between weight and weightlessness, gravity and evanescence, is 
a continuation of the exploration of Being, reflected most effectively in the remarkable 
proliferation of matter. Like darkness, the weight of the body and o f external objects is a 
negative aspect of our Absurd condition, and, as revealed in Le Nouveau Locataire, 
weight and darkness can combine to further alienate the human puppet. This alienation 
at the hands of matter poses a significant threat to freedom and to flight; the world turns 
back into a prison whose walls are closing in:
La legerete se mue en lourdeur; la transparence en epaisseur; le monde pese;
F uni vers m ’ecrase. Un rideau, un mur infranchissable s’interpose entre moi 
et le monde, entre moi et moi-meme, la matiere remplit tout, prend toute la 
place, aneantit toute liberte sous son poids.220
Since heaviness and weight provide resistance to the freedom to escape, they are a major 
source of Anguish, trapping the puppet in its temporal place, but as the weight is lifted 
and the light filters in, the Anguish disappears and the puppet becomes euphoric:
Je me sens [...] ou bien trop lourd ou bien trop leger. La legerete c ’est 
F evanescence euphorique qui peut devenir tragique ou douleureuse quand il 
y a angoisse. Quand il n ’y a pas angoisse, c ’est la facilite d’etre. [...] Ainsi le 
theme de la condition malheureuse se traduit peut-etre [...] par la lourdeur et 
par l’epaisseur.221
The dual poles of consciousness are again evoked to reinforce the dichotomy between 
materialism and spirituality, which are perceived by the puppet as depression and 
euphoria respectively. This insight into human mood comes across plainly in the plays, 
as the protagonists, who indeed become so weightless as to venture off the ground, 
express sensations of freedom, plenitude, and luminosity which fill them with abundant
joy-
Choubert: Je suis plus leger que Fair. Le soleil se dissout dans une
lumiere plus grande que le soleil. Je passe a travers tout.
218 Antidotes, p.316.
219 Voyages chez les Morts, p.99.
220 Notes et contre-notes, p.277.
221 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, pp.41-42.
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Les formes ont dispam. Je monte... Je monte . . .222
Amedee II: Univers aerien... Liberte... Puissance transparente...
Equilibre.... Legere plenitude... Le monde n ’a pas de 
poids. . .223
Berenger: Jamais je n ’ai ete si detendu; jamais je n ’ai ete si heureux.
Jamais je ne me suis senti si leger.224
This excess of weightlessness induces the third set o f oppositions, namely 
enlisement and levitation. Like proliferation, these techniques are distinctive to Ionesco, 
and they form a natural conclusion to the themes of Being and flight. The desire, or even 
necessity, to sink into the earth continues the theme of sequestration, for as he finds 
himself submerged in the slimy bowels o f the Earth, the puppet has become a prisoner 
o f matter, a soulless animal. Ionesco’s characters thus usually descend against their will, 
forced to the depths by matter, and even by their fellow men:
Choubert: Je marche dans la boue. Elle colie a mes semelles...
Comme mes pieds sont lourds! J ’ai peur de glisser.
Le Policier: N ’aie pas peur. Descends, debouche.225
It is no coincidence that it is the authority figure, the policeman-cum-father, who orders 
the protagonist to sink into the slime. On this occasion, the enlisement is not fatal, but in 
the short film La Vase, with Ionesco himself in the starring role, the final submergence 
is grotesque and complete, and in Le Roi se meurt, it is synonymous with death, with the 
process o f annihilation, o f being unborn:
Le Roi: J ’ai peur, je  m ’enfonce, je m ’engloutis, je  ne sais plus rien, je 
n ’ai pas ete. Je meurs.226
The theme is again an influence of Dostoevsky, who, as Chestov explains, uses it to 
explore the possibilities of existence in the absence o f God:
Dostoievsky parait suspendu entre ciel et terre. Le sol s’est derobe sous ses 
pieds et il ne sait pas au juste ce que c ’est: la mort ou une seconde naissance, 
miraculeuse. L ’homme, peut-il exister sans s’appuyer sur quelque chose de 
stable? Doit-il s’aneantir, si les pieds ne se posent plus sur le sol? [...] Les 
Anciens disaient que les dieux se distinguent des hommes en ce que leurs 
pieds ne touchent jamais la terre, car ils n ’ont besoin de point d’appui.227
The Humanist theme is again dominant, but for Ionesco, it is levitation rather than 
sinking that is expressly linked with triumph. Enlisement, on the other hand, is closely 
linked with all the other negative inverses o f flight, such as gravity and darkness, but it 
is especially connected with the nightmare, for if  the dream is liberatory, its darker side 
is primal and repressive:
222 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.217.
223 Amedee, ibid., p.288.
224 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 155.
225 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p. 196.
226 Theatre IV, p.43.
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Jean: C’est mon cauchemar. Mon cauchemar. Depuis toujours, depuis
que je suis tout petit, il m ’arrive souvent de me reveiller le matin, 
la gorge serree, apres avoir reve de ces habitations affreuses, 
englouties a moitie dans l’eau, a moitie dans la terre, pleines de 
boue. Tiens, regarde comme c’est plein de boue !228
This nightmare o f enlisement is inevitably a further source of Anguish, and in this case 
it is the image of collective submergence which torments the dreamer’s unconscious. 
The torment is caused by the dominance of the material over the spiritual, which 
represents the victory of the Absurd. It becomes more poignant with age, for if  death is 
the fina l victory of the Absurd, then the decrepitude which accompanies the ageing 
process is a slow enlisement into matter, during which flight towards the Absolute 
becomes increasingly impossible: ‘The adult, the ageing man is trapped in what Ionesco 
often refers to as ‘the warm slime’ of existence. By sinking into matter man is no longer 
able to free himself for the mystical flight of transcendence. ’229 This mystical flight is 
then by contrast the triumph of the soul over matter, and it is undoubtedly the apotheosis 
of escapism on Ionesco’s stage. Perhaps inspired by the classical myth of Icharus, 
Ionesco is fascinated by the repressed or forgotten desire to fly, and the wonderful 
moments of levitation are certainly the high points of his theatre. The euphoria o f the 
weightless has already been seen, and it is indeed their abundance o f joy which secures 
their victory over matter:
Une Femme: II s’envole! II s ’envole! II dit qu’il veut pas, mais pourtant
il a l’air bien content.230
Berenger: Excusez-moi, Mesdames, Messieurs, je  ne peux plus
contenir ma gaite. Elle deborde. [...] Elle m ’emporte, elle 
me transporte.231
Berenger goes on to equate flying directly with happiness, and linking the notions of 
nostalgia, childhood, light, and spirituality, he laments the sad loss o f M an’s primal 
desire to fly:
Tout le monde doit savoir voler. C’est une faculte innee. Tout le monde 
oublie. Comment en ai-je pu oublier le procede? C ’est simple, pourtant, 
lumineux, enfantin. Quand on ne vole pas, c’est pire que si nous etions 
prives de nourriture. C’est pour cela sans doute que nous nous sentons 
malheureux.232
As a child, Marthe is the only character to fully understand her father’s need to fly, for 
she has not yet lost the capacity for wonder, and her youth protects her from the 
desperate nostalgia that would turn her too into an escapist.
The most desperate examples of flight are seen in the occasional attempts to 
annihilate the consciousness through murder or through suicide. Much o f Ionesco’s 
political cynicism is due to the human massacres which inevitably stem from political 
commitment, and such destructive brutality is satirised in plays like Macbett and Jeux
228 La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p.78.
229 Lamont, Rosette C., ‘Ionesco’s Gnostic Dream Play’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco’s Theatrical 
Quest, ed. Mosche Lazar, p.96.
230 Amedee, Theatre I, p.315.
231 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 160.
232 Ibid., p. 166.
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de Massacre. But the dramatist is also concerned with murder on a personal level, as in 
La Legon, and it seems that the destruction of the Other, on whatever scale, is just a vain 
attempt to flee from death itself: ‘On se fait tuer. On se tue dans l’autre. Ou peut-etre on 
essaie de tuer la mort. ’233 Political Man, then, has ultimately the same aim as Universal 
or Metaphysical Man: to kill the phenomenon of death, and in so doing attain 
immortality and escape from the clutches of the Absurd. Thus murder is as futile in 
Ionesco’s drama as it is as the culmination of hatred explored in L ’Etre et le Neant.
At the opposite end of the spectrum of relations with autrui is sexual love, which 
again in L ’Etre et le Neant is shown to end in failure due in part to the fleeting 
possession which dissipates with the orgasm. Seemingly concordant with this view, 
Ionesco unites the flight into love with the flight into death (Freud’s eros and thanatos), 
and he explores the sexuality of death both in Macbett and in La Legon, where the 
structural and thematic paroxysm climaxes in orgasm and in murder. The attempt 
remains to escape from the consciousness, but flight through the Other is particularly 
short-lived.
The ultimate flight is of course that of suicide, the puppet’s annihilation o f its 
own consciousness. The most poignant dramatisation o f this comes in Les Chaises, 
where the old couple, tired o f their empty existence and basking in self-delusion, throw 
themselves out o f the window and drown. Their fate is similar to the negative effect of 
enlisement, for not only do they sink back into matter, they become its sacrificial lambs, 
permanent victims of the Absurd. They are presumably stimulated by two main strands 
o f Ionescan thought, namely to escape from temporality, and to put an end to their 
personal suffering:
Le temps n ’est qu’une categorie de la conscience subjective. Une fois la 
conscience abolie, il n ’y a plus de temps. La mort etemelle n ’est qu’un 
instant qui ne fmit pas .234
Le Monsieur: Pourquoi a-t-on mis en nous [...] ce desir de vivre? Parce
que le createur qui a fait ce foutu monde a voulu que son 
oeuvre survive. [...] Si on pouvait ne pas desirer vivre, 9 a 
se terminerait. [...] On devrait se suicider. C’est pas 
facile.235
The old couple overcome their desire to live and rise to Le Monsieur’s challenge, but 
the premise for their suicide is the successful delivery of a message which cannot be 
delivered. Their deaths then, like their lives, remain senseless, and once again, the
Absurd triumphs. Ionesco’s conclusions thus concur with those of Sartre, for whom
suicide was one of the greatest absurdities of all, and with those of Camus, who 
regarded suicide as both contradictory and ineffectual: ‘On peut croire que le suicide 
suit la revolte. Mais a tort [...]. Je sais que pour se maintenir, l’absurde ne peut se 
resoudre. II echappe au suicide, dans la mesure ou il est en meme temps conscience et 
refus de la mort. ’236 The point is driven home by Grossvogel in his discussion of 
Camus’s work: ‘Suicide and faith are attempts to destroy the consciousness which man 
has of the absurd and, therefore, acknowledgements of it . ’237 Ionesco concludes the 
discussion with an admission of the failure of suicide: ‘Le suicide, c’est un echec
233 Le Solitaire, p. 144.
234 Antidotes, p. 195.
235 Ce formidable bordell, pp. 138-39.
236 Le Mythe de Sisyphe, p.77.
237 Four Playwrights and a Postscript, p.59.
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inadmissible; or nous devons reussir. ’238
The various attempts at flight uncovered in a scrutiny o f Ionesco’s theatre -  
escapism through humour, alcohol, dream, the unconscious, metamorphosis, regression, 
timelessness, spiritual transcendence, murder, sex, and suicide -  can be seen to be 
strongly related to aspects of Sartre’s etre-pour-fuir. In Sartrean terms, Ionesco’s 
obsession with flight marks a willing acceptance o f mauvause fo i , for rather than 
acknowledging the ambiguous ontology of the human subject, the desagregation intime, 
Ionesco protests at the Given and seeks continuous escapism from facticity to 
transcendence. The “happy” medium of daily existence is firmly rejected, and no more 
powerfully than in Le Solitaire:
De la boue seulement, mais aussi un lac pur, mais aussi les neiges. Les gens 
normaux sont entre les deux. Ni la lumiere, ni les tenebres. Ils vaquent entre 
les deux a leurs affaires, a leurs soucis, leurs preoccupations quotidiennes, 
ils vivent de cela. C’est de cela qu’on vit. C ’est cela l’humain. Moi je  ne 
peux vivre qu’en etat de grace. Qui vit en etat de grace? Ne pas vivre en etat 
de grace pourtant est inadmissible. Pour moi, il n ’y a pas de milieu entre la 
grace et la merde. (p. 1 0 1 )
The puppet is left, then, like the agent, constantly seeking the unattainable, for freedom 
is illusory and the man who flies will soon fall back down to Earth. The plight o f Man, 
like that of Le Policier, is one of endless vacillation: ‘On en est exactement au meme 
point que tout a l’heure! De haut en bas, de bas en haut, de haut en bas, et ainsi de suite, 
et ainsi de suite, c’est le cercle vicieux! ’239 As realised by Jean in La So if et la Faim , ‘Le 
paradis trouve est vite reperdu. ’240 The rat is finally back on its wheel.
238 Journal en miettes, p. 138.
239 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.221.
240 Malachy, Therese, La Mort en Situation dans le Theatre Contemporain, p.84.
iv) From Puppet to Everyman: The Archetypal Anti-hero
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The ultimate failure of flight means that Ionesco’s characters are forced to find escape 
from within, and the result is a perceptible shift in characterisation, as the helpless 
puppet transforms before our eyes into the human Everyman. This final section o f the 
chapter is concerned then with, it could be said, the most memorable characters of 
Ionesco’s theatre, the archetypes and anti-heroes, who respond somewhat differently to 
the challenges of their condition and situation. As Ionesco’s Humanism finally comes to 
the fore, the sense of Self is restored and Authenticity is back on the agenda. Questions 
o f engagement and ethics thus resurface, as the thinking personality tries to make its 
way through the unsteady landscape of human existence, with its essence on its back 
and incertitude tied firmly around its neck.
Despite the fact that the puppet is in evidence in many o f the later plays, its role 
is increasingly restricted to secondary characterisation, and it would appear that 
Ionesco’s development as a dramatist is accompanied by the progressive humanisation 
o f his characters: ‘Read in order of composition the plays on the whole reveal a 
development of the Ionesco character from puppet to human being . ’241 This 
development is fascinating both on a dramatic and philosophical level. Dramatically, 
although these ‘human beings’ retain many of their predecessors’ characteristics, their 
language tends to be more rational, their movement more naturalistic, and their 
behaviour more self-conscious. Philosophically, they begin to exist on an ethical plane, 
looking inside as well as outside for answers and escape, and they finally reveal a new­
found sense o f self. The distinction between archetype and stereotype is delicate, but 
Ionesco is careful to avoid the latter, the Molieresque stock character, drawing together 
his Essentialist convictions in the universal, the unconscious, and the atavistic to create 
the archetypal Everyman:
Ionesco who is deeply indebted to Jungian analysis is aware that he is 
working with archetypes [...]. Jung defines the archetype as a pre-existent 
form that is part of an inherited structure o f the psyche [...]. The archetype is 
a facultas prceformandi, a form which can be filled only with content when 
the conscious mind brings the material of experience to bear upon the 
psyche.242
Ionesco’s archetypal characters are in some respects combinations of the agent and the 
puppet: although restricted by an essence, or inherited psychic structure, they are free to 
develop this essence through the Existentialist ensign of lived experience.
The Everyman who emerges from this fusion is ontologically complex, an 
ambiguous and intensely human character who is paradoxically simplistic due to 
Ionesco’s evocation of the lost child. These later inventions are undoubtedly more 
autobiographical; their often childlike vision inhabits and dominates their archetypal 
selves, whether disguised under the pseudonym of Amedee, Berenger, or Jean, making 
them intuitively identifiable as generic human beings. But the theme o f the Everyman 
mns throughout Ionesco’s theatre, from the mw/fr'plicitous Bobby Watson o f La 
Cantatrice Chauve to the familiar dreamer Jean of Voyages chez les Morts. Berenger is 
o f course the Everyman incarnate, for as the most recurrent character on Ionesco’s stage, 
he is seen to represent the broadest spectrum of humanity. But minor characters like 
Mary/Marie the maid walk the stage in several plays, and her fellows may change their
241 Dobrez, L. A. C., The Existential and its Exits, p. 188.
242 Lamont, Rosette C., ‘Z, 'Homme aux Valises: Ionesco’s Absolute Stranger’, in The Two Faces o f  
Ionesco, ed. Rosette C. Lamont and Melvin J. Friedman, p.247.
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names, but their identities often remain the same. Even Ionesco’s choice of proper 
nouns -  Smith, Martin, John Bull, etc. -  and his functional description o f characters -  
Le Personnage, Le Premier Anglais -  point towards a general or generic portrayal of 
Man, and if  such characters communicate in aphorisms and cliches, it is because they 
embody The Human, the universal victim of identity and language.
The portrayal of gender in Ionesco’s theatre is particularly interesting, ranging 
from the comic confusion or even merging of gender in La Jeune Fille a marier, which 
establishes a type of Everyperson, to the deliberate uniformity o f the female, which 
serves to create an Everywoman who plays foil to her male counterparts. This 
universality of the female is symbolised effectively in the three-faced mask o f Roberte 
II: ‘C’est la femme qui n ’a pas seulement trois visages, mais une infinite de visages 
puisqu’elle est toute femme. ’243 Such characterisation can be appreciated in a 
comparison of the protagonists’ wives, and even in the nomenclature of, say, Marie {Le 
Roi se meurt), Madeleine {Victimes du devoir and Amedee), and their hyphened 
synthesis Marie-Madeleine {La Soif et la Faim). The wife in Ionescan drama is a 
multifaceted figure, whether pragmatic and scolding, or tender and loving, whether wife 
or mother, companion or foe. Each individual woman is indeed Everywoman, or at least 
has the capacity to become so, for her task is to support her partner through illusion and 
reality, flight and sequestration, regression to childhood, and veteran awareness of 
mortality. In this respect, her plight is harsher than the male’s: she is steady and 
constant, and her feet remain firmly on the ground.
If Ionesco’s female and secondary characters support the notion of an Everyman, 
it is undoubtedly Berenger who is designed to explore the fullest repercussions of this 
traditionally stock characterisation, which has shaped ethical theatre since at least 
medieval times. It is thus appropriate that Berenger is introduced in Tueur sans gages 
with the qualifications ‘age moyen, citoyen moyen’,244 and that he subsequently declares 
himself to be at various stages of his own middle age: ‘J’ai trente-cinq ans, Monsieur 
l’Architecte, trente-cinq... en realite, pour tout vous dire, j ’en ai quarante, quarante- 
cinq... peut-etre meme davantage. ’245 His appeal is contrived to be as general as 
possible, and as the Berenger cycle progresses, it even extends beyond the boundaries of 
mortality, for in Le Roi se meurt, Berenger is said to have been at the forefront o f human 
progression from classical times to the present day, outwitting Icharus and building 
Rome, writing Shakespeare’s plays and splitting the atom .246 His seeming immortality 
(which expires in the course of the play) is consistent with Ionesco’s theme of 
universality and it succeeds in upholding the power of the soul in its interminable 
battling with matter:
To be truly present to oneself, and to others, one must be o f No Place and of 
Every Place, [...] No Man and Everyman. Only then can one found relations 
based on mutual reverence for the spirit, though it be assigned to this 
grotesque and vulnerable dwelling, mortal flesh.247
There is an implicit link here between the Everyman and Authenticity, for it seems that 
the way to reinstate the Self is to relocate one’s universal spirit, to be a-historical, Man 
and No Man. In this respect, Berenger is Ionesco’s most Authentic character: he is 
universal; he reveres the human spirit; and he yearns to escape from the constraints of
243 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, p. 159.
244 Theatre II, p.61.
245 Ibid., p.68.
246 See Theatre IV, pp.57-58.
247 Lamont, Rosette C., ‘L ’Homme aux Valises: Ionesco’s Absolute Stranger’, in The Two Faces o f  
Ionesco, ed. Rosette C. Lamont and Melvin J. Friedman, p.265.
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his flesh.
Though a metaphysical puppet in many ways, Berenger has cut his ties with his 
predecessors and become the distinctive Everyman o f Ionesco’s theatre. As he struggles 
to find and uphold his sense of Self, he brings fresh hope to ethical questions like that of 
Authenticity, and he redefines his creator’s understanding and exploration of 
Humanism. In vast contrast to the Humanism of Sartre, with its heroics and courageous 
men of action, Ionesco’s Humanism develops from the premise that the average human 
being is equal to the greatest. Thus the hero of Ionescan theatre is the Everyman rather 
than the exceptional man, and as the Everyman incarnate, Berenger is carefully defined 
as the apotheosis of humanness. In some ways, his weaknesses are his strengths, for 
they underline his humanity and fallibility, increasing his appeal as an Everyman: ‘Ce 
sont eux qui sont beaux. J ’ai eu tort! Oh, comme je voudrais etre comme eux. Je n ’ai pas 
de come, helas! Que c’est laid, un front plat. ’248 This significant moment o f doubt in the 
midst o f Berenger’s resistance provides a fascinating insight into Ionesco’s Humanism, 
for it is paradoxically in his momentary repulsion for humanity, in his inversion of 
human aesthetics, that his Humanist sensibilities are truly revealed. His weaker instinct, 
which makes him human, is to seek anonymity amongst the crowd (to be Inauthentic); 
but his stronger instinct, or rather intuition, which enables him to resist the bestial 
temptation, is the one which leads him to greatness:
Je ne suis pas cale en philosophie. Je n ’ai pas fait d ’etudes; vous, vous avez 
des diplomes. Voila pourquoi vous etes plus a l’aise dans la discussion, moi, 
je  ne sais quoi vous repondre, je  suis maladroit. Mais je sens, moi, que vous 
etes dans votre tort... je le sens instinctivement, ou plutot non, c ’est le 
rhinoceros qui a de 1’instinct, je le sens intuitivement, voila le mot, 
intuitivement.249
Ionesco has stated that he gives greater importance to emotional reactions than to 
ideological convictions, and the embodiment o f this ethic in Berenger is what makes 
him a credible Everyman.250 Indeed Berenger’s emotion o f anger at the Tueur -  
‘Pourquoi? Dites-moi pourquoi? ! ’251 -  is apparently indicative of his unconscious 
heroism: ‘La colere, c ’est le courage, cela peut meme etre l ’heroisme. C’est bien vrai 
que la colere est aveugle. L ’heroi'sme est inconscient. ’252
Heroism is a complex issue in Ionescan theatre and it is neither as definable, nor 
as appropriate a label, as it is in the plays of Sartre. It is self-consciously introduced in 
Tueur sans gages, where it receives its first definition:
L ’Homme: Je suis... je suis pour... la rehabilitation du heros.
[...]
Edouard: Qu’est-ce que vous entendez par heros?
[...]
L’Homme: Heros? C’est celui qui ose penser contre l’histoire et qui
s’eleve contre son temps.253
Although the drunken hiccups of this enthusiastic defender o f heroism detract somewhat 
from the sobriety of his convictions, his stance is certainly consistent with Ionesco’s
248 Rhinoceros, Theatre III, p .l 16.
249 Ibid., pp.94-95.
250 See Ruptures de Silence, p.38.
251 Theatre II, p. 162.
251 Journal en miettes, p.91.
253 Theatre II, pp. 139-41.
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universal Everyman and presciently valid for the last man’s stand o f Rhinoceros. The 
Humanist hero is even more vividly evoked in Le Roi se meurt, where we are informed 
by the guard that Berenger too stole fire from the gods.254 This Promethean reference is 
reminiscent of Sartre’s fire-stealing heroes such as Oreste, and it is a fitting 
acknowledgement o f the Humanist heroism undeniably evident in Berenger himself. 
There is a marked development from Berenger, the would-be hero at the end of Tueur 
sans gages, who talks himself out of heroic counter-action, to the Berenger of 
Rhinoceros, who has finally understood in what sense he really is an unwilling victim o f  
duty'.
Dudard: J’ai des scrupules! Mon devoir m ’impose de suivre mes
Chefs et mes camarades, pour le meilleur et pour le pire.
[...] Mon devoir est de ne pas les abandonner, j ’ecoute mon 
devoir.
Berenger: Au contraire, votre devoir est de [...] vous opposer a eux,
lucidement, fermement.255
Berenger has now risen to the challenges of heroism, and as he begins to realise his own 
inner strength, his intuition to resist becomes more confident. This confidence and 
intuition sets him apart from his peers, and his sense o f isolation evokes a bitter 
disappointment with his fellows: ‘Je pensais tout de meme que Monsieur Papillon aurait 
eu la force de mieux resister. Je croyais qu’il avait un peu plus de caractere! ’256 As he 
discovers his own character, Berenger moves away from the condition of the puppet 
controlled from far beyond, and even flight is temporarily forgotten in the face o f his 
problems on Earth. Towards the end of the play, he finally attains the status of the true 
Humanist hero, for he has combined his inherent resistance with a resolute acceptance 
of his own humanity:
Je ne vous suivrai pas, je  ne vous comprends pas! Je reste ce que je  suis. Je 
suis un etre humain. Un etre humain. [...] Contre tout le monde, je  me 
defendrai! Je suis le demier homme, je le resterai jusqu’au bout! Je ne 
capitule pas!257
However, Berenger’s heroism is not quite as clear cut as this. His human 
weaknesses -  his mental and physical clumsiness, his drinking, his doubts, and his raw 
fear -  are certainly endearing, but they call into question his role as a modem hero, and 
the lack of hubris, and often of catharsis, removes him also from the heights of the 
classical tragic hero. As an Everyman, Berenger can never hope to attain traditional 
heroism, for his recurrence and transformations detract from his identity, and his 
uncomfortable relationship with death opposes him directly to the hero. As Lamont 
points out, ‘All heroes are “half in love with easeful death”. On the contrary, antiheroes 
wish to destroy within themselves this nihilistic love and fear of death that drives men 
of action to impart annihilation. ’258 Unlike Sartre’s heroes, Berenger fights from the 
soul, not with the sword, and his craving for immortality is too solipsistic to be deemed 
heroic. He is thus indeed more of an anti-hero than a hero, for as he explains to the 
Architect, he lacks the virtue, assertion, and completeness which would be necessary to 
reverse his rank: ‘Je n ’ai pas mauvais caractere. [...] Je ne suis pas, comme vous, un
254 Theatre IV, p.57.
255 Theatre III, p. 103.
256 Ibid., p.91.
257 Ibid., pp. 115-17.
258 Lamont, Rosette C., Ionesco’s Imperatives: The Politics o f  Culture, p. 134.
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homme complet. ’259 His status as an anti-hero is confirmed by the intuitive, emotional 
responses imposed on him by his creator, for his ideological neutrality prevents him 
from converting others:
Joumaliste: Donnez-nous un message.
Berenger: Ils sont deja donnes.260
He is even less didactic than the Orator of Les Chaises.
We are confronted in Berenger with a new form of hero who is fitting to 
Ionesco’s Absurdist theatre -  the archetypal anti-hero who has rightfully claimed his 
place among the greatest characters of twentieth-century theatre. Though Berenger 
graces the stage in only four of Ionesco’s plays, his ghost haunts the characterisation of 
subsequent protagonists such as Jean, and the Premier Homme of L ’Homme awe 
Valises, and he can be seen to have been influenced by aspects o f Choubert and Amedee 
before him. This interesting lineage upholds the dedication to the Everyman and 
strengthens the development from the puppet to the archetype.
With the advent of this archetypal anti-hero comes a restoration of the 
personality, of the personal identity which was obscured by the strings o f the puppet. 
Thus Choubert can delve into the depths of his own unconscious, as Berenger can self- 
analyse his own personality: ‘Sincerement, je  vous le jure ce n ’est pas dans mon 
caractere de faire des compliments. ’261 The implications o f this humanisation of the 
character on questions such as Authenticity have been mentioned and will be concluded 
in the discussion on ethics; for the moment it suffices to confirm that there is indeed a 
Humanistic progression in the Ionescan character, a deliberate and acknowledged 
reinstatement o f the previously contested phenomenon of Self: ‘J’ai detruit le 
personnage dans mes premieres pieces. Je l’ai reintroduit ensuite en incamant, en 
dormant des visages a mes phantasmes. ’262 The final scene of Rhinoceros is where 
Berenger’s personality is at its most integral, and his conduct at the close o f the play 
thus enables the greatest comparison with the heroes o f Sartre. The dramatists’ 
conflicting interpretations of the scene illuminate their differences most clearly:
A ce moment-la, ce n ’etait pas sa pensee qui resistait, ce n ’etait pas des 
arguments qui lui venaient a 1’esprit, mais e’etait tout son etre, toute sa 
‘personnalite’ qui se rebiffait [...] Berenger ne sait done pas tres bien, sur le 
moment, pourquoi il resiste a la rhinocerite et c ’est la preuve que cette 
resistance est authentique et profonde.263
Pourquoi y en a-t-il un qui resiste? Au moins pourrions-nous le savoir, mais 
nous n ’en savons rien du tout. II resiste parce qu’il est la, il represente 
Ionesco, alors il dit: ‘Je resiste’ et il reste la au milieu des rhinoceros, seul a 
defendre l’homme, sans que nous sachions tres bien apres tout s’il ne 
vaudrait pas mieux etre rhinoceros.264
Once again, Ionesco places the human spirit over ideology and links the intuition of the 
personality with Authenticity; Sartre is unimpressed with Berenger’s resistance, 
condemning its tokenism and ideological uncertainty, and there is an interesting
259 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p.85 and p.92.
260 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 126.
261 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p.65.
262 Un homme en question, p. 178.
263 Notes et contre-notes, p.274.
264 Sartre, Un Theatre de Situations, p. 129.
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disregard for the human spirit which again undermines Sartre’s Humanism. The irony 
here is that Berenger is in many ways more Existentialist than Sartre’s own creations, 
for he demonstrates a personal liberty and a lack of Seriousness which has been shown 
to be absent in even the greatest Men of Action:
Berenger is not sure why he resists rhinoceritis, but he is a man free from 
ideologies and group slogans. His resistance arises from a deep natural 
element of man that seeks spiritual vitality and freedom of choice, and is 
unencumbered by preset notions.265
The question of Engagement too provides a revealing dichotomy between 
Sartre’s heroes and Ionesco’s anti-heroes. Although apathy and inertia prevailed in the 
puppet, as the Self begins to embellish the Everyman, the option of Engagement is no 
longer an impossibility. However, the heroic Engagement so evident on Sartre’s stage, 
with its politics, compromises, guns, and revolutions, has no place in Ionescan drama; in 
fact, Ionesco is so opposed to ideological Engagement that critics have even claimed 
that his theatre lacks any form of positive Engagement whatsoever.266 Though Ionesco’s 
Engagement is very different in form from Sartre’s, if  not diametrically opposed, to 
state that it is wholly negative or even non-existent is undeniably somewhat blinkered. 
In a return to the image of the rat on a wheel, Ionesco clarifies his position on spiritual 
Engagement:
Nous avons oublie ce que devait etre la contemplation. Nous ne savons plus 
voir, nous ne savons plus nous arreter dans l’agitation generale et regarder, 
immobiles un instant, cette agitation meme. Nous ne savons plus regarder 
nos barreaux, ni la terre, nous n ’en avons plus le loisir, et c ’est pourtant en 
regardant autour de nous, en nous, c ’est pourtant ainsi qu’on pourrait voir 
quelque chose apparaitre.267
This defence of contemplation confirms yet again the development from puppet to 
Everyman, for Ionesco is now advocating, in the place o f flight, reflection on our 
condition and reflection on our selves. This is certainly no contradiction to the passive 
ethics of the puppet, but rather an extension, as the anti-hero seeks an answer to his 
plight: ‘Answers? Yes, if we consider wonder and contemplation as possible answers, 
the only ones which our mind can grasp and the only ones able to annihilate pride, self- 
love, and vanity. ’268 Man’s lost sense of wonder, his fall from paradise, is linked in with 
the need for contemplation, which seems here also to provide some answers to the 
problems of Being-for-Others. The theme of contemplation is explored from both angles 
in Berenger, who sets an example in Le Pieton de I ’Air which he disregards himself in 
the Le Roi se meurt:
Ier Anglais: II s’arrete. On dirait qu’il s ’arrete.
Ire Anglaise: Oui, il s’arrete.
Ire V. Anglaise: II s’arrete pour contempler. 269
Marguerite: C’est ta faute si tu es pris au depourvu, tu aurais du t ’y
265 Lewis, Allan, Ionesco, p.72.
266 See J. Guichamaud, ‘Un theatre onirique et satirique’, in Les Critiques de notre temps et Ionesco, ed. 
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preparer. Tu n ’as jamais eu le temps. Tu etais condamne, 
il fallait y penser des le premier jour [...]
Le Roi: J ’y avais pense.
Marguerite: Jamais serieusement, jamais profondement, jamais de tout
ton etre."270
Contemplation is shown consistently to be a valid and indeed necessary means of 
Engagement to provide us with a solace from the cruel inexplicability of our condition. 
In Voyages chez les Morts, in a comparison reminiscent of Sartre’s avoir, faire, and etre, 
the protagonist is reminded by Le Gros Monsieur o f what to do about his being'. ‘Jeune 
homme, la contemplation est superieure a la possession.’ (p.57). As with Sartre, the 
mode of having is consciously rejected, but it is replaced by Ionesco with reflection and 
introspection.
Introspection is also upheld in the unconscious Engagement of the dream, and 
Ionesco defends his position on this with an attack on Sartrean Engagement:
‘L ’engagement’, tel qu’il est con9 u, est une catastrophe. Peut-etre est-il bon 
de militer pour quelque chose, de choisir dans la vie pratique. II est encore 
plus necessaire, sous peine de suffocation, de creer en liberte, d’ouvrir les 
portes et les fenetres a l’air pur de 1’imagination, il est indispensable de
271rever.
Choubert’s oneiric Engagement reinforces the point, but removed from the context of 
flight, the dream is revered as inspiration for creativity, which is perhaps the most 
important aspect of Ionescan Engagement, a comer stone o f his Humanistic philosophy: 
‘Ce qui caracterise l’homme, a-t-on dit, c ’est qu’il est l ’animal qui rit; il est surtout 
T animal createur. ’272 Ionesco makes a clear distinction between flight and Engagement, 
insisting that the creative force of the imagination is reinvention rather than escapism: 
‘Imagination n ’est pas evasion. Imaginer, c’est construire, c’est faire, creer un monde... 
A force de creer des mondes on peut “recreer” le monde a l’image des mondes inventes, 
imaginaires. ’273 Whereas for Sartre the desire to create is linked with Man’s yearning for 
plenitude, for L ’Homme-Dieu, and is thus doomed to be in vain, Ionesco establishes the 
artist as a Creator-God, and art becomes one of the few pursuits worthy of M an’s 
dedication.274 The reason for this is that art is another form of reflection and 
contemplation, another means of understanding our condition: ‘Ancien, modeme, 
prophetique, c’est l’art qui revele l’homme a lui-meme. ’275 In Le Tableau, art and 
aesthetics are again credited with defining the human spirit, and we are told that in their 
absence, the human is reduced to the bestial, the resistance of Berenger rendered vain:
Le Gros Monsieur: Que sommes-nous, mon cher, sans la beaute, la
musique, la peinture, la poesie, le theatre, la 
gravure, Part decoratif, le cinema, la couture, le 
dessin?
Le Peintre: Euh, nous serions, euh...
Le Gros Monsieur: Oui, que serions-nous, je  vous le demande?
Le Peintre: Euh... je... je ne sais pas, Monsieur.
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Le Gros Monsieur: Je vais vous le dire... des brutes, Monsieur!276
It is of course ironic that the artist here (like Sartre) cannot articulate on the art for art’s 
sake argument which is defended throughout Ionesco’s theatre and journals. Ionesco is 
supported in his stance on artistic Engagement by Camus, who acknowledges its rightful 
place in the world of the Absurd and who recognises that within the context o f this 
world, it is an appropriate substitute for Truth: ‘La joie absurde par excellence, c ’est la 
creation. “L’art et rien que l’art, dit Nietzsche, nous avons l’art pour ne point mourir de 
la verite.’” 277 Engaged in his art, Ionesco uses his medium to contemplate, reflect, and 
protest. The title of his early work Nu is particularly revealing: art is his revolt, his 
resistance, and his truth.
Nietzsche is invoked again by Camus to elaborate on the function o f 
Engagement, and as Ionesco’s Absurdist anti-hero is confronted with the problem of 
ethics, it seems that his first lesson is to engage himself consistently, whether 
philosophically, aesthetically, spiritually, or morally:
Quand Nietzsche ecrit: ‘II apparait clairement que la chose principale au ciel 
et sur la terre est d’obeir longtemps et dans une meme direction: a la longue, 
il en resulte quelque chose pour quoi il vaille la peine de vivre sur cette terre 
comme par exemple la vertu, l’art, la musique, la danse, la raison, 1’esprit, 
quelque chose qui transfigure, quelque chose de raffine, de fou ou de divin’, 
il illustre la regie d ’une morale de grande allure.278
Unlike the puppet, who opted out of the world of ethics, Ionesco’s Everyman or anti- 
hero is certainly engaged in the ethical world, even if his stance is again diametrically 
opposed to the Sartrean hero’s. Due to its self-perception as a victim, the failure and 
incoherence of its language, and its ultimate despair and sequestration, the puppet was 
shown to be amoral; although the Everyman is equally aware o f the inevitable 
subjectivity of ethics, his sense of Self prevents him from rejecting morality completely. 
But the ethics displayed by Ionesco’s more human characters merely confirm them in 
their function of anti-heroes, for they are doubting and unsure, sceptical o f everything 
but moral freedom. Ionesco interprets their aporia as a sign o f their Authenticity, as the 
Cogito re-fmds Descartes’s ‘je doute done je suis’:
Ce qui est difficile et a la fois ce qui est authentique, c ’est de ne jamais etre 
sur de rien. Je vous disais que la situation est inconfortable; en effet elle est 
a ce point inconfortable que je ne sais plus du tout a quoi m ’accrocher.279
In the ethical world of the Everyman, the comfort o f flight is abandoned, and the moral 
assertiveness of the Sartrean hero is seemingly condemned as both easy and Inauthentic. 
Ionesco again defends the moral vacuum he consciously establishes, and his ethics are 
thus uncomfortable, ambiguous, and contradictory:
Je ne crois pas qu’il faille surmonter, resoudre les contradictions. Ce serait 
s’appauvrir. II faut laisser les contradictions s’epanouir en toute liberte.280
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Ionesco: Je suis pour la contradiction, tout n ’est que contradiction .281
In Ionescan philosophy, then, Anguish stems from the gratuitous freedom o f ethics as 
well as from the constraints of the human ontological condition.282
Even in the early plays, there is evidence of ethical uncertainty, for the 
Professeur’s best lesson is an aphorism of doubt: ‘Nous ne pouvons etre surs de rien, 
Mademoiselle, en ce monde. ’283 As the anti-heroes begin to dominate the stage, the 
sense of uncertainty increases, for when they are faced with ethical choices, there is 
nothing to support them but intuition. Thus, at the end o f Tueur sans gages, when 
Berenger assumes the task of moralising to the Killer, we are told that his morality ‘se 
degonfle comme un ballon’ ,284 and he is ultimately overcome as much by his own self­
doubt as by the sneering nihilism o f his foe: ‘Ce que vous faites est peut-etre mal, ou 
peut-etre bien, ou peut-etre ni bien ni mal. Je ne sais comment juger. [...] Je ne sais plus 
du tout, moi, je  ne sais plus du tout. ’285 In Le Pieton de TAir, he is a little more self- 
assured, but his daughter, filled with the uncorrupted wisdom of youth, knows all too 
well that his euphoric sense of certainty is as precarious as ever:
Berenger: Je suis enivre de certitude.
Josephine: Quelle certitude?
Marthe: Ne lui pose pas de question, Maman, cela peut troubler sa
certitude.286
Ionesco and his Everymen are plagued with ethical uncertainty, and it is surely no 
coincidence that the final, resounding words of his theatre are Jean’s unequivocal ‘je  ne 
sais pas .
Ionesco’s metaphysical Engagement leads to a deep-rooted pessimism in the 
concrete world o f ethics, and his anti-heroes are loth to engage themselves socio- 
politically, for they know that no political action can ever defeat the metaphysical pain 
imposed by the human condition:
Aucune societe n ’a pu abolir la tristesse humaine, aucun systeme politique 
ne peut nous liberer de la douleur de vivre, de la peur de mourir, de notre 
soif de l’absolu. C ’est la condition humaine qui gouveme la condition 
sociale, non le contraire.288
By tipping the balance from politics to metaphysics, Ionesco seems to reduce the 
Everyman back to the ethical inertia of the puppet, for no matter what he does, his 
condition will remain unaltered. Unlike the Sartrean hero, there is no onus on the anti- 
hero to assume leadership in order to improve the social situation; indeed the temptation 
is to remain as apolitical as possible, for those who do progress to power are shown to 
be brutal, selfish, and corrupt:
Candor: Duncan est-il un tyran, le croyez-vous vraiment?
Glamiss:Un tyran, un usurpateur, un despote, un dictateur, un mecreant,
un ogre, un ane, une oie, pire que cela. La preuve, c’est qu’il
281 L ’Impromptu de I ’Alma, Theatre II, p. 19.
282 This is the inverse of Sartrean thought, whereby Man is free ontologically but ethically repressed.
283 La Legon, Theatre I, p.62.
284 Theatre II, p.62, stage direction.
285 Ibid., p. 170.
286 Theatre III, p. 156.
287 Voyages chez les Morts, p. 134.
288 Notes et contre-notes, pp. 140-41.
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As in Rhinoceros, the political is associated with the bestial, and it thus becomes the 
opposite pole to the Humanistic Engagement in art.
Bathos is used in several o f the plays to underline the futility of ethical 
Engagement and the ultimate lack of hope. The Orator o f Les Chaises, this embodiment 
o f emptiness, is the first powerful symbol o f M an’s helplessness in the face o f his 
condition, and his bathetic role is subsumed by the Killer of Tueur sans gages, whose 
ethical nihilism finally defeats the virtue o f the apprentice-protagonist. The comic anti­
climax of Le Maitre marks a continuation of the theme, for the image o f the headless 
politician conveys not only the misguided allegiance of the Inauthentic crowd, but, more 
importantly, the folly and unsuitability o f any political system. The final symbol of 
Macbett completes this cycle of bathos; the Chasseur de Papillons reminds us that in the 
totalitarian arena of political ethics, freedom and beauty are captured and repressed, and 
once again serves to polarise social commitment and aesthetics. All these plays at some 
point raise our hopes for a better world, and in all o f them our hopes are dashed as we 
become the witnesses of empty chairs, the kneeling capitulants o f death, the seduced 
political crowd, or butterflies caught in a net.
Ionesco’s protagonists are all too aware of the dangers of any ethical system, for 
they have learnt Mme Smith’s lesson that practice is more ambiguous than theory:
M. Smith: Moi, quand je vais chez quelqu’un, je sonne pour entrer.
Je pense que tout le monde fait pareil et que chaque fois 
qu’on sonne c’est qu’il y a quelqu’un.
Mme. Smith: Cela est vrai en theorie. Mais dans la realite les choses se
passent autrement.290
Ionesco’s deconstruction of logic removes the possibility of any normative ethics, for 
the inherent randomness of life means that any predetermined set o f values is bound to 
failure. The gratuitous subjectivity of ethical values and choices discussed earlier is a 
further source of moral antipathy for the Ionescan anti-hero. Conscious o f their own 
ethical uncertainty, Ionesco’s protagonists are reluctant to bring judgement on others; in 
contrast to their Sartrean counterparts, they refuse to condemn on the end result of 
action:
Berenger: On ne doit pas juger a la legere, je le confesse. On ne peut
connaitre le coeur des gens. . .291
Plus de jugement involontaire et permanent, car chaque fois il nous semble 
que cette machine universelle et que ces gens et que ces rues et que ces 
mouvements sont laids ou beaux, bons ou mauvais, favorables ou 
defavorables, dangereux ou rassurants. J ’arrivais a obtenir une sorte de 
neutrality morale.292
With the reinstatement of the personality, ethical judgement becomes both subjective 
and impossible, for we can never fully understand the fundamental motives o f the Other. 
In addition, the treachery of language and the fickle incertitude of subjectivity leave the 
anti-hero with little choice but to embrace a moral neutrality, which throws him into the
289 Macbett, Theatre V, pp. 122-23.
290 La Cantatrice chauve, Theatre I, p.36.
291 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p. 124.
292 Le Solitaire, p.59.
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lonely domain of the ethics of individualism.
In the true Absurdist tradition, ethics thus becomes a game: fixed beyond the 
realm of logic, coherence, and attainability, moral values are replaced with the ludic 
creativity of the child, which coincides appropriately with the aesthetic Engagement 
expected of Ionesco’s protagonist. This ludic approach is consistent also with the 
Absurdist, and indeed Mystic, conception of Creation: ‘La creation cosmique est un 
“jeu”, c’est-a-dire l ’activite libre, spontanee de la divinite. Ce jeu cosmique devient le 
modele de la spontaneite de l’imagination creatrice et de la liberte spirituelle . ’293 If  the 
‘cosmic game’ provides the model for ‘spiritual freedom’, then ethics and the mode of 
play become ultimately interdependent. This interdependence is ubiquitous on Beckett’s 
playful stage, with its clowns and their various Endgames, and the same idea is to be 
found in L ’Etre et le Neant, where Sartre links the ad hoc rules of the game with pour- 
soVs ethical choice. The game is central to Ionescan theatre, whether in the word play 
inherent to its texts, in the titles of plays such as Jeux de massacre, or in the intrigue 
itself.294 The old couple of Les Chaises are particularly indulgent, and it seems that for 
Ionesco and his anti-heroes, it is as difficult to determine a code o f ethics as it is for the 
Vieux to ‘imiter le mois de fevrier’ .295
The stance adopted by the Everyman is thus one of anti-ideology, for Ionesco is 
acutely aware of the problems and hypocrisy of replacing one ideology with another: ‘Si 
j ’opposais une ideologie toute faite a d ’autres ideologies toutes faites, qui encombrent 
les cervelles, je  ne ferais qu’opposer un systeme de slogans rhinoceriques a un autre 
systeme de slogans rhinoceriques. ’296 This is of course the central message of 
Rhinoceros, and Ionesco’s childlike conception of ideology ‘cluttering the brain’ is 
further advocation of the free ethics of play. His attack on Sartre’s oscillations 
strengthens his condemnation of ideological Engagement, for in Sartre, Ionesco sees 
personified the gratuitousness and interchangeability o f ideological systems which 
affected him so deeply as a young man in Romania:
[Sartre] a dit que ce qu’il appelait l’existentialisme etait aussi un 
humanisme, et il a de nouveau brouille les cartes. Apres, il a dit que le 
communisme pouvait etre un humanisme, et maintenant il se declare anti- 
marxiste. II est la preuve que tous les systemes que Ton propose sont fortuits 
et rempla9 ables les uns par les autres.297
This equivalence of ideologies is portrayed with great effect in La So if et la Faim, where 
the monks playing Brechtoll and Tripp alternate each night, each knowing the other’s 
role and ready to assume its ideology.298 Berenger too is conscious o f the underlying 
pretence of ideological conviction, but aware o f the weakness o f action, he refuses to 
play his part:
Les ames faibles se donnent des raisons apparentes de leurs activites. Ils font 
semblant d’y croire. II faut bien faire quelque chose, disent-ils. Je ne suis pas 
de ceux-la. II y avait autrefois en moi une force inexplicable qui me 
determinait a agir ou a ecrire malgre un nihilisme fondamental. Je ne peux
293 Eliade, Mircea, ‘Lumiere et Transcendance dans l ’CEuvre d’Eugene Ionesco’, in Ionesco: Situation et 
Perspectives, ed. Claude Abastado, p. 124.
294 Consider, for example, the game of hide and seek in La Soif et la Faim ( Theatre IV, pp.98-102) and 
the Sphinx’s quiz in L ’Homme aux Valises (pp.28-29).
295 See Theatre I, p. 133.
296 Notes et contre-notes, p.287.
297 Ruptures de Silence, p.50.
298 See Theatre IV, p. 163.
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plus continuer.299
Another attack on ideology is based on the violent action which it inevitably 
inspires. Plays like Macbett and Ce formidable bordel! clearly satirise the brutal futility 
of political revolution (which is the hallmark o f the Sartrean hero), and in the latter, Le 
Monsieur delivers a powerful condemnation o f ideological intention: ‘Les ideologies 
sont depassees par la violence. Elies ne sont qu’un pretexte de la violence, un mystere. 
Tout est mystere. Et tout est violence.’ (pp.138-39). In Jewc de Massacre, the sheer 
power of ideology is underlined, and it seems here that the only alternative to anti­
ideology or nihilism lies in the Humanism of solidarity:
Emile: C’est ridicule. On peut presque tout pardonner, mais on ne peut
pardonner a quelqu’un qui a d’autres idees que vous. Celui qui 
pense autrement est un ennemi.
Jacques: C ’est parce que vous n ’avez pas la vocation de l’amitie. L ’amitie 
est plus forte que les ideologies.300
The contrast with Sartrean Humanism is again apparent. Ionesco’s final thoughts on the 
matter are voiced through La Concierge in Ce formidable bordel! who laments the 
demise of metaphysics and suggests that ideological revolution is the poor man’s excuse 
for genuine Absurdist revolt: ‘Vous faites la revolution parce qu’il n ’y a plus de 
metaphysique. Vous ne vous rendez pas compte, c ’est la condition existentielle qui est 
mauvaise, la condition sociale et economique est a peu pres supportable.’ (p. 172).
However, the fact that Ionesco and his Everymen take a definite ideological 
stand by rejecting ideology cannot be denied, and the Humanistic, or even political, 
Engagement advocated in Rhinoceros must be regarded as self-contradictory. Recent 
criticism has outlined the more ideological and political aspects o f Ionesco’s work ,301 
aspects which the dramatist himself has even occasionally acknowledged: ‘II m ’est 
arrive de combattre pour des choses auxquelles j ’ai cru moyennement; des combats 
politiques. J ’ai meme ecrit des pieces plus ou moins politiques pour la liberte, contre le 
Mal. ’302 This positive belief if indeed half-hearted, shines through particularly in 
Berenger’s Engagement in Tueur sans gages and in Rhinoceros. His role as a Humanist 
anti-hero has already been discussed, but there are certainly moments when his action 
and belief transform him into the committed hero. In Tueur sans gages, he chastises 
Edouard for an indifference which would have been the norm for the puppet o f the 
earlier plays,303 and his desire to avenge Dany’s death leads to an ethical revolt against 
evil: ‘Je dois venger Dany. Je dois empecher le mal! Oui, oui, j ’ai confiance. ’304 The 
aporia and ambivalence have vanished, and Edouard’s timely reminder -  ‘Vous devenez 
un homme d ’action’305 -  reinforces this uncharacteristic and traditionally heroic 
Engagement. In Rhinoceros, Berenger abandons his remaining doubts and fears and is 
transformed into the indubitable Humanist hero, firstly championing the ethical 
supremacy of Man, and subsequently defending the resulting necessity for action:
Jean: Apres tout, les rhinoceros sont des creatures comme nous,
299 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 125.
300 Theatre V, p.36.
301 See, for example, Rosette C. Lamont, Ionesco’s Imperatives: The Politics o f  Culture, p.9: ‘The time 
has come to do a revisionist study of Ionesco’s ceuvre, to decode the presence, at almost every turn, o f the 
forces of history and politics.’
302 Un homme en question, p.7.
303 See Theatre II, p. 123: ‘Votre indifference me revolte!’
304 Ibid., p. 160.
305 Ibid., p. 133.
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qui ont droit a la vie au meme titre que nous!
Berenger: A condition qu’elles ne detruisent pas la notre. Vous
rendez vous compte de la difference de mentalite? 
Jean: Pensez-vous que la notre soit preferable?
Berenger: Tout de meme, nous avons notre morale a nous, que je
juge incompatible avec celle de ces animaux.306
Berenger: II faut couper le mal a la racine.
Dudard: Le mal, le mal! Parole creuse! Peut-on savoir ou est le
mal, ou est le bien? Nous avons des preferences, 
evidemment. Vous craignez surtout pour vous. C ’est 9 a la 
verite, mais vous ne deviendrez jamais rhinoceros, 
vraiment... vous n ’avez pas la vocation!
Berenger: Et voila, et voila! Si les dirigeants et nos concitoyens
pensent tous comme vous, ils ne decideront pas a agir.307
In his defence of the human, Berenger now differentiates between Man and animal in 
ethical rather than aesthetic terms, and his call for action is dangerously Sartrean.
This problem of positive Engagement is not even confineable to Berenger, for 
the general political message of plays like Rhinoceros is one o f anti-totalitarianism and 
anti-repression, and thus one of individual human freedom. There is also a consistent 
inclination towards pacifism in the plays, which is supported by the censure of the 
journals: ‘Les ideologies revolutionnaires [...] donnent une justification du meurtre, ou 
invente une morale du meurtre, ou invente une “necessite historique” pour l’appuyer. ’308 
Ionesco’s ideology inclines towards atavistic conservatism rather than social revolution, 
and if  his characters have blood on their hands, it is for the purpose o f satire, not 
example. It is thus appropriate that Berenger lowers his old, incongruous weapons at the 
end o f Tueur sans gages, for ultimately, this gentle protagonist is a victim, not an angel, 
of death. It is also significant that La Vieille’s rendition of her son’s departure includes 
the story of his sensitivity to violence, his sense o f betrayal at the slaughter o f the birds, 
and his desperate cry: ‘Le ciel est rouge de sang. ’309 The pacifism continues in Macbett, 
where the grotesqueness of genocide is scrutinised in duplicate by the respective 
soliloquies of Banco and Macbett,310 and parodied most effectively in the inappropriate 
juxtaposition of proliferated execution and the casual drinking o f tea .311 Revolutionary 
political action is further satirised in Jeux de Massacre and in Ce formidable bordel/, 
where it is shown to be synonymous with violence and with mirth:
Troisieme Personnage: Dites-nous ce qu’il faut faire.
L’Orateur: La revolte. L ’action. La violence.312
La Serveuse: La revolution pour le plaisir!
[...]
La F emme: Vi va la muerte!313
These instances of heroism and ethical Engagement mark a departure from both
306 Theatre III, p.75.
307 Ibid., p.89.
308 Journal en miettes, p.58.
309 Les Chaises, Theatre I, p. 153.
310 pp.28-29 and pp.30-32.
311 Ibid., p.51.
312 Jeux de Massacre, Theatre V, p.77.
313 Ce formidable bordel!, pp.158-60.
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the apathetic inertia of the puppet and the pessimistic doubt o f the Everyman. But 
interesting as they are as rare examples of positive commitment or even didacticism, and 
despite the fact that they give a vital insight into the Ionesco’s personal morality, they 
can only really be regarded as the exception that proves the rule:
These Pharisees o f theatre are quick to spot the contradiction, and Ionesco’s apologetic 
promise is soon to be broken; but Berenger is there to jump to his defence and to remind 
us that our judgement cannot disregard intent:
Joumaliste: Vous faites done un theatre a message? Un message qui
n ’est pas celui des autres mais qui en est tout de meme 
un... Votre message...
Berenger: Helas! C’est bien malgre moi.315
However, the problem is ultimately solved by Ionesco himself, who apparently accepts 
his hypocrisy, expressing regret for this departure from his deeper theatrical agenda:
Dans ma premiere piece, La Cantatrice chauve, j ’etais a l’encontre de Sartre 
qui disait: ‘Engagez-vous!’ et qui demandait aux hommes de prendre part a 
1’action. Moi je me mettais en dehors de 1’action, je regardais comment je 
voyais, je  disais comment les hommes se comportaient, leur comportement 
paraissait absurde... et absolument incomprehensible. Et si j ’avais ete plus 
profond et moins impressionnable, je  serais reste comme 9 a jusqu ’a la fin et 
j ’aurais toujours dit ce que je crois finalement au fond de moi-meme: que je 
n ’arrive pas a y comprendre quoi que ce soit.316
This late admission is certainly consistent with the ‘je ne sais pas’ that concludes 
Ionesco’s theatrical journey; but, when regarded as a whole, his oeuvre undeniably bears 
witness to some lasting seeds of hope: ‘That Ionesco subscribes to the nihilistic way of 
thinking [...] there can be no doubt. But his adherence to it is uneasy, for he has not 
entirely given up . ’317
The important ethical question remaining surrounds Ionesco’s philosophy on 
Authenticity, which was shown to be the flawed goal of Sartre’s ethical philosophy. 
Coupled with the ethical potential o f Essentialism, the reinstatement o f the Self in the 
embodiment of the Everyman brought fresh hope to the possibility o f Ionescan 
Authenticity. This hope is compounded by the journals’ emphasis on the vital 
significance of the personal Self:
314 L ’Impromptu de I’Alma, Theatre II, p.58.
3,5 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p .127.
316 Ruptures de Silence, p.51.
3,7 Wellwarth, George E., ‘Ionesco’s Theory of Drama’, in The Dream and the P lay: Ionesco’s Theatrical 







Vous detestez qu’on vous donne des le9 ons et 
vous-meme vous voulez nous en donner une... 
Vous etes tombe dans votre propre piege.
Ah... 9 a, c’est ennuyeux.
Une fois n ’est pas coutume.
Excusez-moi, je ne le ferai plus, car ceci est 
F exception...
Et non pas la regie!314
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Remettez tout en question. Soyez vous-meme. N ’ecoutez aucun conseil: 
sauf celui-ci.318
Etre soi-meme n ’empeche pas d ’etre universel.319
The underlying virtues of genuineness and truth are readily apparent here, and the 
accepted compatibility of the individual personality with a timeless human nature 
removes the former barrier of confusion and contradiction. Indeed the notion o f the 
genuine Self, the consistent personality, is extended into the philosophy of truth, and the 
problems of ethical judgement seem diminished by the attempted definition of 
objectivity: ‘L ’objectivite c’est etre en accord avec sa propre subjectivite, c ’est-a-dire ne 
pas mentir. ’320 The origins of an ethic are again beginning to appear.
Ionesco’s preoccupation with dreams, reflection, and the unconscious seems to 
indicate that his Authenticity comes from the essence within; unlike Sartrean 
Authenticity, it is totally removed from action. Again, Ionesco combines the Self with a 
universal Humanism in a desperate attempt to reinstate values such as wonder and even 
grace, and he declares his Absurdist sense of wonder to be the most Authentic 
perception of the world: ‘Je crois que je suis plus authentique lorsque j ’exprime dans 
mes oeuvres l’etonnement et le desarroi. C ’est dans cet etonnement que plongent les 
racines de la vie. ’321 Indeed reflection, which is shown to be a means o f re-finding 
Man’s lost sense of wonder, is even credited with providing a possible escape from the 
Absurd: ‘Une seule issue peut-etre. C’est encore la contemplation, l ’emerveillement 
devant le fait existentiel. ’322 Dreams, unconscious contemplation, have already been 
revealed to be both more lucid and profound than the false reality o f consciousness, and 
a positive means of the Everyman’s Engagement. The dreamer is consistently portrayed 
on Ionesco’s stage as the Authentic character, for in dreaming, he is united with the 
origins of his own personal essence (his childhood) and with the universal essence of 
Man (his archetype). This universal embodiment awakens in him a profound 
metaphysical perception which is lacking in the vast majority o f his peers, the non­
dreamers who are grounded in the false temporality of their social existence. Berenger 
is, as usual, the prime example, for in Rhinoceros, it is his metaphysical strength which 
sets him apart from the crowd and leads him finally to Authenticity:
Berenger’s strength is his naivete, his embryonic sense o f wonder, the sense 
of ‘angst.’ Precisely because of it he sees what no one else does, the 
strangeness of the metamorphosis from man to beast. From the start and 
more clearly than Amedee, he sees the world of the “they” as falling apart, 
as insane and dangerous. Indeed it is the void of this world, its nothingness 
which hems him in at the end. Although initially hardly qualified to play the 
hero, he is in Heidegger’s terms individualized or set apart by the experience 
of ‘angst’, no longer a Ionesco puppet, a rebel rather than a mere scapegoat; 
in short, he possesses a real identity as an authentic hero .323
His individual Angst leads him also to an awareness of death, the Sein zum Tode 
demanded also by Sartrean Authenticity, and in his Heideggerian analysis o f Ionescan 
theatre, Dobrez goes on to suggest that Authenticity, Angst, and ethics are all ultimately
318 Antidotes, p. 14.
319 Present passe, Passe present, p. 152.
320 Journal en miettes, p.238.
321 Notes et contre-notes, p.23.
322 Antidotes, p.323.
323 Dobrez, L. A. C., The Existential and its Exits, p. 161.
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inter-linked:
For Heidegger authenticity requires that death be ‘anticipated’, that it 
permeate one’s present. Man is a being-towards-death, finite not in the sense 
that he ‘will die’ some day but in the sense that he is ‘made for dying’, 
whether he likes it or not. Inauthentic man escapes the recognition of death 
as he escapes ‘angst’. Authenticity means, among other things, an inward 
acknowledgement that one is being ‘thrown’ into existence and 
consequently ‘falling’ into the arms of death. [...] Exit the King [...] suggests 
[...] not only the horror of dying but a search for a positive ethic, an 
authentic acceptance of ‘angst’ and a preparation for death.324
Berenger’s Authenticity, his search for a positive ethic, is also apparent in his 
individualism, which opposes him to the collective. An artistic dreamer in Le Pieton de 
I ’Air, a defender of human morality in Tueur sans gages and Rhinoceros, and an 
apprentice of death in Le Roi se meurt, he progressively raises himself above his 
fellows, displaying instinctive humanness, original thought, and, most importantly, a 
soul:
Ne pas penser comme les autres vous met dans une situation bien 
desagreable. Ne pas penser comme les autres, cela veut dire simplement que 
l’on pense.325
Celui qui a une ame ne ressemble pas a tous les autres.326
Ionesco distinguishes between his Authentic and Inauthentic characters by exploring the 
strength of their sense of Self, of their personal identities, and if  the puppet is defined by 
its interchangeability, its faceless presence in the crowd, the Authentic Everyman is the 
character who flees from the crowd, who learns to die, whose skin does not change 
colour:
The Bald Prima Donna depicts man as immersed in the world in the form of 
the collective, that is, as an inauthentic of ‘falling’ being-with, a creature 
whose identity is in legion, one of the innumerable Bobby Watsons. [...] The 
crowd in The Bald Prima Donna differentiates, in later plays, into victim 
and aggressors, so that the stage is set for one of Ionesco’s central concerns, 
the struggle of the authentic individual against the collective.327
The negative aspect o f this individualism is of course the seclusion and sequestration 
which was encountered in the flight of the puppet. Although there is undoubtedly a 
marked progression form the puppet to the anti-hero, characters like Berenger retain the 
weaknesses of their ancestors, yearning for the transcendence offered by flight, failing 
often to engage themselves in reflective contemplation, and regressing back to 
childhood to escape the inevitability of death. If Ionesco ‘affirms the value and dignity 
of Berenger’s solitude’ ,328 it is for contradictory reasons: one the one hand, he is 
championing the Authentic resistance of his Humanist hero; on the other, he is 
preserving the cherished isolation of his puppet, who opts out o f language, ethics, and
324 Ibid., pp. 167-68 and p. 173.
325 Antidotes, p.l 1.
326 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, p. 138.
327 Dobrez, L. A. C., The Existential and its Exits, pp. 155-56.
328 Ibid., p. 161.
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other people. The character who finally emerges is a synthesis o f the two, a human 
contradiction, an Authentic Inauthentic, the archetypal anti-hero who appeals to us all.
171
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this chapter was to continue the scrutiny of the Humanist subject by 
focusing on the Ionescan puppet and exploring Ionesco’s Absurdist Humanism, with the 
intention o f finding answers to the problems encountered with the Sartrean agent. In 
terms o f Humanism, Ionesco’s journals and stage characters reveal an obsessive 
preoccupation with the fundamentals o f metaphysics, asking why Man exists and then 
why, existing, he must cease to exist -  the two questions which form the parameters of 
Ionescan theatre: ‘Ionesco has completed the cycle from the absurdity o f life in The 
Bald Soprano to the absurdity of death in Exit the King , ’329 Whereas the Sartrean agent 
was defiantly atheistic, Ionesco’s puppets are uncomfortably agnostic, and in their 
common quest for plenitude and fulfilment, they betray a desperate sensation of 
orphanage, a constant nostalgia for the comfort o f a God-figure. The other main 
challenge in the chapter was to attempt a redefinition of Humanism in the light of the 
demise of action inherent to Absurdist ethics.
Ionesco’s characters have been shown to progress from the helpless puppet (the 
metaphysical Absurdist, the helpless victim, and the desperate escapist) to the 
Everyman, the archetypal anti-hero who is occasionally prone to action in spite of 
himself and his creator. Several images have been used to trace this visible 
development. The waking doll encapsulated the wonder and surprise o f the puppet at 
‘being-there’, this authentic state of being which is soon corrupted by the conscious 
perception of the Absurd, and turned into despair by the Anguish of metaphysical 
abandonment, the craving for the Absolute, nostalgia and regret, and the nagging 
awareness of mortality. The image of the puppet controlled from far beyond conveyed 
the characters’ perception of themselves as victims who are determined by their 
common natures, helpless tools of the language they abuse, and prisoners o f ethics, too 
inert and apathetic to ever effect any change. The symbol o f the rat on the wheel was 
used to visualise the bestial entrapment of the human condition and situation, and the 
resulting temptation to flee. Freedom and transcendence became the goals o f the 
puppets, as they sought to win the battle of their spirits over matter. However, the 
ultimate realisation of the transience of flight led to a revival of identity and a renewed 
sense of self. With the advent of the Everyman came positive Engagement, the 
occasional defence of ideology, and fresh hope in the promise of Authenticity.
These various, and sometimes contradictory, aspects of the puppet enable several 
conclusions to be drawn. With the exception of Berenger, and his tendency towards 
heroics in his capacity as defender o f Man, the Ionescan puppet remains consistently in 
the realm of the Absurd. He is a creature full o f Anguish, plagued by his fellows, his 
own consciousness, and by the proliferating matter around him. In contrast to his 
Sartrean cousins, he is willing to remain in the default position o f Bad Faith; his 
constant protest at the desagregation intime leads him to a resolute rejection o f facticity 
and to a spiritual yearning for transcendence. He acknowledges the inherent subjectivity 
o f judgement and ethics, and ponders the universal, sneering pessimistically at the 
violence and futility of the socio-political.
This universal conception of humanity is demonstrated effectively in Berenger, 
in whom the essentials of Ionesco’s Humanism are most tellingly embodied. It has been 
said that as an anti-hero, Berenger’s strengths lie in his weaknesses, and this truth 
reveals the polarity between Sartre’s and Ionesco’s understanding o f the merits of 
Humanism. Whereas Sartre is preoccupied with the Hsm\ revolution through the 
courage of ethical action, Ionesco is interested in the thum an\ the fear of living and
329 Lewis, Allan, Ionesco, p.77.
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dying, the incertitude, the contradictions. For Ionesco, then, Humanism and action are 
totally disunited; with Absurdism comes the recognition that although Man is indeed the 
centre of his universe, his freedom and potential are limited, his call to action just 
another futile means of escape.
What, though, o f the potential of Authenticity? Ionesco’s criteria are certainly 
less contradictory than Sartre’s, for the former consistently upholds the dreamer, the 
universal, and the vanished sense of wonder, which he then invokes to define an 
Authentic state o f being. With Ionesco, there is eventually a self to which one can 
remain true. The compatibility o f Ionesco’s exploration of Authenticity with 
Heidegger’s related terminology is even more encouraging: the necessity o f Angst, the 
state of Sein-zum-Tode, and the support for the individual in conflict with the faceless 
crowd are all familiar elements in Ionescan theatre and thought, and they point towards 
a positive ethic, a possible modus vivendi.
Progress has been made, then, in the scrutiny of the Humanist subject. Trapped 
in the vicious circle of Sartrean Existentialism, the stage character has found some 
outlets in Ionesco’s conception o f Absurdism. But the emerging anti-hero is as isolated 
as Berenger at the curtain fall o f Rhinoceros, and we are left to wonder if  coexistence is 
possible at all:
Ionesco’s people [...] are lonely where, according to any materialist 
philosophy, they have no right to be: in a social situation. In their families, 
their sitting-rooms, their offices, surrounded by their relatives, ‘concierges’, 
policemen and visitors, they discover willy-nilly an additional dimension to 
be lonely in .330
Both Sartre and Ionesco show evidence o f a belief in the potential of ethics and both are 
certainly concerned with the interaction of the Self and the Other. If  drama is indeed the 
progressive resolution of conflict, it is to be hoped that the world of Being-for-Others 
will provide some solutions to the problems of ethics and Authenticity. According to 
one critic, ‘Berenger lui-meme qui reste seul nous laisse esperer que de sa solitude 
naitra une nouvelle communaute du bien. Comment cela se produit-il? ’331 The answer to 
this question will hopefully emerge in a detailed exploration o f the two dramatists’ 
portrayals of relations with autrui. Such a study is vital both to search for the possibility 
of a viable collective ethic and to complete the review of this comparative analysis of 
Humanism.
330 Coe, Richard N., Ionesco: A Study o f his Plays, p. 164.
331 Liiceanu, Gabriel, ‘Tout finit dans rhorreur,’ Magazine litteraire, no.335 (1995), p.24.
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CHAPTER FOUR -  
BEING-FOR-OTHERS: TOGETHER ALONE
Allons-nous trouver cette justification de l ’etre dans les autres pour-soi qui 
nous entourent? Y-a-t-il en nous, dans le pour-soi, une autre region d ’etre 
qui puisse rendre compte du sens de l’etre de telle sorte que nous 
possederions en nous une structure ontologique qui viendrait combler ce 
manque? 1
INTRODUCTION
In the previous two chapters, the agent and the puppet were independently and 
systematically explored as individuals. The aim o f this chapter is to focus on these 
individuals in their relationships with others, to examine if  and how they communicate 
and interact with their fellows -  questions which are inevitably at the very core o f any 
form of Humanism. Sartre’s own stated aims on this new dimension of being serve well 
as an indication to the aspirations o f the present study -  namely to rescue the ethical by 
simultaneously avoiding the looming threat of solipsism and simplistic recourse to God: 
‘II semble [...] qu’une theorie positive de l’existence d ’autrui devrait pouvoir a la fois 
eviter le solipsisme et se passer du recours a Dieu .2 Indeed, the absence of God 
permeates much of the theory behind Sartre’s concept of Being-for-Others, establishing 
the relationship between individual human beings as an ‘internal negation’ rather than a 
homogenous communion of sculpted images. Thus the ramifications o f Humanist 
thought come once more to the fore, as Ionesco too works against or in spite o f God in 
his consideration of the human community.
The methodology will also be modified to allow for a direct comparison of 
Ionescan and Sartrean thought, and it is to be hoped that this contrapuntal analysis will 
underline the profound similarities that undeniably exist between the two schools of 
thought, particularly in this area of L ’Etre-pour-autrui. The terminology is Sartrean by 
necessity; the striking convergence of the two thinkers in this domain will hopefully 
justify its extension to Ionesco.
Although some progress was made in the quest to elucidate Authenticity in the 
analysis of Ionesco’s puppet, the concept remained a little unclear and was certainly 
subject to the charge of solipsism. The course o f ethics was even less smooth: whereas 
Sartre demanded of the agent political action which conflicted with his freedom of 
choice, Ionesco’s rejection of the ethical, though generally consistent, was almost 
absolute. It remains to be seen if the world of Being-for-Others will throw fresh light on 
such issues; either way, a final analysis o f the Humanist legacy left by the theatre and 
thought of Sartre and Ionesco cannot fail to emerge.
1 Presseault, Jacques, L 'Etre-pour-Autrui dans la Philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre, p.39.
2 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.288.
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i) The Presence of the Other
As might well be expected, it is Sartre, rather than Ionesco, who is predominantly 
concerned with the theory, and not just the reality, of the Other’s presence. Indeed it is 
in the ontology of Being-for-Others that Sartre is at his most innovative and inspired -  
an achievement for which he has not always been truly credited. In the presence o f the 
Other, Sartre recognises the need for a development o f his ontology of pour-soi, for 
once confronted with the problem of autrui, the inevitability o f a new mode of being 
cannot be overlooked:
Autrui ne m ’a pas seulement revele ce que j ’etais: il m ’a constitue sur un 
type d’etre nouveau qui doit supporter des qualifications nouvelles. Cet etre 
n ’etait pas en puissance en moi avant 1’apparition d’autrui car il n ’aurait su 
trouver de place dans le Pour-soi [...]. Mais cet etre nouveau qui apparait 
pour autrui ne reside pas en autrui; j ’en suis responsable.3
The implications of this new type of being are thus foreshadowed from the outset: 
Vetre-pour-autrui will pose no threat to the freedom of pour-soi and will therefore 
provide no cushion for the responsibility which I bear towards myself. This is to be 
expected, since Sartre considers it as the third ekstasis, the third separation from the 
Self, o f the Pour-soi,4 along with temporality and reflection, and its modality is thus 
almost magical.
Sartre’s approach to the existence of autrui constitutes no attempt to prove the 
Other’s existence; rather, he accepts the presence of autrui as a fact, as part o f the Pour- 
s o f s  facticity or Given: ‘L’existence d’autrui a la nature d ’un fait contingent et 
irreductible. On rencontre autrui, on ne le constitue pas . ’5 Following on from 
Heidegger, Sartre perceives the Other’s presence as a ‘meeting’, a contingent 
repercussion of being thrown into the world. L ’autre appears as Te moi qui n ’est pas 
m oi’ in an initial negation which sets us both apart.6 Proof is both superfluous and 
impossible, since the understanding of this negation is ‘pre-ontological’. By this, Sartre 
means that the gratuitous existence of the Other is a question for metaphysics, for, like 
birth and death, it is Absurd in nature and ‘unknowable’ to the already-existing Pour- 
soi:
Si Autrui est par principe et dans son ‘Pour-soi’ hors de mon experience, la 
possibility de son existence comme un Autre soi ne pourra jamais etre ni 
confirmee ni infirmee, elle ne peut ni croitre ni decroitre, ni meme se 
mesurer.7
Although our ontological structures are the same, I can never ascertain that the Other 
exists, for there is a separation between our consciousnesses which leaves him eternally 
beyond the scope of my experience. Our relationship is reciprocal, but it is inevitably 
one of mutual exclusion: ‘Ainsi le fait premier c ’est la pluralite des consciences et cette 
pluralite est realisee sous forme d’une double et reciproque relation d ’exclusion . ’8 








problem stated implicitly is how to overcome the exclusion in a successful coexistence.
Like his thought on subjectivity, Sartre’s theory on autrui is based on 
development of the Cartesian Cogito, and on the philosophy o f Hegel, Husserl, and 
Heidegger. The Cogito is used as the starting point of Sartre’s Being-for-Others, for it 
situates autrui simultaneously as a consciousness whose existence is certain, and as one 
which is not my own:
Ce n ’est pas dans le monde qu’il faut d ’abord chercher autrui, mais du cote 
de la conscience, comme une conscience en qui et par qui la conscience se 
fait etre ce qu’elle est. De meme que ma conscience saisie par le ‘cogito’ 
temoigne indubitablement d’elle-meme et de sa propre existence, certaines 
consciences particulieres, par exemple la ‘conscience-honte’, temoignent au 
‘cogito’ et d’elles-memes et de l’existence d ’autrui, indubitablement.9
The essential difference between Sartre and Descartes in this domain is that while the 
latter can rely on God for proof of the Other’s existence and for negation between the 
Other and the Self (God is me; God is the Other), the former, as an atheistic Humanist, 
has to work in the absence of God to avoid realism, idealism, and Seriousness -  charges 
he has levelled at the majority of his predecessors. The charge levelled at Hegel, though, 
is one of optimism , 10 for in ignoring the subjectivity of the consciousness o f the Self, 
Hegel considers solely the relationship between the consciousnesses o f others. His 
optimism, according to Sartre, is both ontological and epistemological: Hegel maintains 
that the truth of the consciousness of the Self can appear, that truth of ‘the All’ already 
exists, and that truth regarding the Other is thus possible to obtain . 11 Hegel fails because 
he provides no basis for intersubjective knowledge, and he is left with a plurality of 
consciousnesses which can never be properly connected. His optimism lies in the 
illusion that this connection has been successfully established. Sartre’s critique of 
Husserl is for leaving the Self in the clutches of solipsism: by defining the Other as an 
absence, Husserl destroys any chance for the Self to know the Other, leaving it 
enshrined within the boundaries of its own ontological core. Although largely 
influenced by Heidegger, Sartre charges him too with the inability to transcend 
solipsism. For Heidegger, indeed, the question o f the Other is only o f interest at all to 
those who have achieved ‘authentic existence’. Sartre condemns Heideggerian theory as 
ontic and psychologistic, rather than purely ontological, and concludes that its inability 
to transcend Mitsein into concrete being-in-the-world leaves it too trapped in solipsism, 
even in its rejection of the Cogito.
Sartre’s answer to these successive failures is to establish between the Self and 
the Other a relationship of internal negation. For realists and idealists, this relationship 
is essentially exterior, and I am separated from the Other as the table is separated from 
the chair. But again, Sartre’s atheistic Humanism allows for no external witness (God) 
to pour-soi equivalent to a Pour-soi witnessing two objects (en-soi), and in the absence 
o f this witness, the relationship between one Pour-soi and another can only possibly be 
internal. Interrelationships, then, are in the form of consciousness to consciousness 
rather than body to body, for as human beings, we are capable o f recognising the space 
that exists between us, and able to choose and alter this distance in the freedom of our 
projects. The presence of the body is thus a secondary phenomenon: ‘Autrui existe pour 
moi d ’abord et je le saisis dans son corps ensuite\ le corps d ’autrui est pour moi une
9 Ibid., p.322.
10 Ibid., p.300.
11 See Maurice Alexander Natanson, A Critique o f Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ontology, pp.31-34, for Sartre’s 
interpretations of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger.
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structure secondaire. ’ 12 It is for the Self to choose how to perceive the body of the Other 
(as flesh, as transcendence etc.) and how to live out the external relationship, in the 
same way that the Self is forced to choose how to exist its own body. Cartesian duality 
is rejected as the body becomes part o f pour-sof s facticity in the form o f pour-soi: 
although my body can be en-soi or objectified for another, it is too intimate to my 
consciousness to be en-soi for myself.13 As discussed, then, the relationship between the 
Self and the Other provides no threat to the freedom of pour-soi, for just as I am 
responsible for choices affecting myself, so am I entirely free to determine my 
coexistence with others.
However, the closest that this new mode o f being comes to threatening the 
freedom of pour-soi is in its initial affront -  namely le regard. With the regard, or the 
gaze, Sartre’s philosophy on Being-for-Others shifts from the theory of the Other’s 
presence and its internal negation with the Self to the reality of coexistence in the world 
and to the origins of conflict. It is through the gaze that I am perceived by the Other, 
who becomes a transcendent subject fixing me as a determined object -  ‘1’autre, comme 
regard, n ’est que cela: ma transcendance transcendee’ . 14 The phenomenological 
description of the gaze is consistent with the theory o f internal negation, for the 
penetration inflicted by the regard seems to emanate less from the eyes than directly 
from the consciousness itself: ‘Ce n ’est jamais quand des yeux vous regardent qu’on 
peut les trouver beaux ou laids, qu’on peut remarquer leur couleur. Le regard d ’autrui 
masque ses yeux, il semble aller devant eux.^5 The gaze is almost reified as it becomes 
part of the facticity of L ’Etre-pour-autrui; like the presence of the Other, it is a fact of 
coexistence: ‘La presence a moi d’autrui-regard n ’est done ni une connaissance, ni une 
projection de mon etre, ni une forme d ’unification ou categorie. Elle est et je  ne puis la 
delivrer de moi. ’ 16 The reason that I cannot judge the Other’s eyes when he is regarding 
me is that the regard makes me into an object which has lost its faculty to judge. It is as 
if  the Cogito is transformed in the mode of Being-for-Others into a subject-object 
duality of ‘I see therefore I judge’ and ‘I am seen therefore I am’. The notion of 
judgement is central in the role of the regard, and as I live out my situation of 
‘regarded’, my two original responses transpire as pride and its antithesis o f shame:
C’est la honte ou la fierte qui me revelent le regard d ’autrui et moi-meme au 
bout de ce regard, qui me font vivre, non connaitre la situation de regarde.
[...] Et ce moi que je  suis, je  le suis dans un monde qu’autrui m ’a aliene; car 
le regard d’autrui embrasse mon etre et correlativement les murs, la porte, le 
serrure; toutes ces choses-ustensiles, au milieu desquelles je  suis, toument 
vers 1’autre une face qui m ’echappe par principe. Ainsi je  suis mon ego pour 
l’autre au milieu d’un monde qui s’ecroule vers l ’autre. 17
At the receiving end of the regard I am forced to assume an attitude towards this 
imposed alienation from myself, this revelation of my third ekstasis. Whether I like it or 
not, whether I respond with pride or with shame, I have become objectified along with 
the en-soi which surrounds me, and in my Bad Faith, I can choose to use the gaze o f the 
Other as a God-figure to endow myself with an essence and flee from the desagregation 
intime. This desire to be judged is a conscious manipulation of autrui:
12 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.405.
13 Hence the Bad Faith o f the woman who leaves her hand engaged in flirtation with the male and tries to 






Nous avons besoin d ’etre juges. Nous demandons au jugement d’autrui de 
donner a notre projet cette solidite objective dont il est si totalement 
depourvu, de lui apposer un sceau de realite qu’il est seul a pouvoir 
produire. Positif ou negatif, le jugement d’autrui nous est indispensable pour 
transformer nos gestes en actes, nos mythes en entreprises. 18
Such are the projects of Garcin and Hugo, who in their terror o f being condemned for 
their lachete seek constant justification in the Other. The result is of course an illusion, 
for I can only ever be anything in the eyes o f another:
Ines: Tu es un lache, Garcin, un lache parce que je  le veux. [...] Je ne
suis rien que le regard qui te voit, que cette pensee incolore qui te
19pense.
The cruelty of Ines’s gaze fixes Garcin as the object he most detests, reinforcing the 
futility of his project. His Bad Faith is equivalent to the etre-corps in which, like the 
masochist, I seize myself as the en-soi o f flesh. The regard has thus been termed the 
Medusa Complex, for its project is to fix its object as stone:
En me conferant un caractere, autrui, comme le regard de meduse, me fige 
en objet, et du meme coup me justifie; mais en acceptant cette justification, 
je suis coupable de lachete: car ce que j ’accepte au fond, c ’est l’alienation 
permanente de mon etre.20
By accepting the judgement of autrui, I willingly relinquish my freedom in a self- 
deception which removes me from myself and therefore cossets me from full 
responsibility.
The regard is fundamental to Sartre’s philosophy of Being-for-Others, and when 
it comes to life on the stage, its impact is truly formidable. As the basis o f this new 
mode of coexistence, o f this imposed plurality o f consciousnesses, the theme is by no 
means limited to Sartre, and it is with this notion o f the gaze that Ionesco’s philosophy 
of the Other finally comes into play:
Joumaliste: II faut bien nous regarder, bien regarder nos visages et la
verite. Pour bien nous voir, il faut prendre une certaine 
distance, les uns vis-a-vis des autres... (II heurte 
legerement le 2e Anglais du coude en marchant) Oh, 
pardon! Je vous ai heurte. Excusez-moi.21
The initial convergence of the dramatists’ thought is already apparent here: Ionesco 
recognises the importance of the gaze and the distance or negation which it represents 
between the Self and the Other. Typically, he subverts the philosophy to point out the 
subtleties of its implications. Not only are the characters masked, so removing the sting 
from the regard, but the humorous contradiction between words and action, theory and 
practice, exposes it as both vulnerable and flawed -  the journalist may well be seeking 
knowledge of the Other (and even of Hegelian Truth), but his judgement proves to be as 
clumsy as his movement.
18 Boros, Marie-Denise, Un Sequestre: L ’Homme Sartrien, pp.83-84.
19 Huis Clos, p.91.
20 Royle, Peter, Sartre: L ’Enfer et la Liberte, p.98.
21 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 179.
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It is with regard to this theme of judgement that the gaze is at its most powerful 
on the Sartrean stage. Huis Clos dramatises brilliantly the infernal censure of autrui, 
where the characters’ torment is intensified by the unblinking gaze o f their fellows. 
Each is Medusa to the other, each one judge, jury, and torturer. The other plays too 
develop this important theme and reveal its ambiguity for the characters concerned. 
Thus Frantz and Goetz respond in opposite ways to the gaze o f their judges, while 
acknowledging the inevitability of their respective objectification:
Frantz: Vous ne serez pas mon juge.
Le Pere: Qui parle de cela?
Frantz: Votre regard.22
Goetz: Hilda, j ’ai besoin qu’on me juge. Tous les jours, a toutes les 
heures, je me condamne, mais je n ’arrive pas a me convaincre 
parce que je me connais trop pour me faire confiance. Je ne vois 
plus mon ame parce que j ’ai le nez dessus: il faut que quelqu’un 
me prete ses yeux.23
The effect of Sartre’s atheism on his description of relations with autrui has been 
mentioned, and Goetz goes on to develop the theme, revealing the repercussions on 
Humanistic coexistence. Once he has accepted the lack o f an external witness, Goetz 
begins to appreciate both the meaning of internal negation and the power o f the human 
regard:
Je te dis que Dieu est mort. Nous n ’avons plus de temoin, je  suis seul a voir 
tes cheveux et ton front. Comme tu es vraie depuis qu’il n ’est plus. Regarde- 
moi, ne cesse pas un instant de me regarder: le monde est devenu aveugle; si 
tu detoumais la tete, j ’aurais peur de m ’aneantir. Enfin seuls!24
Two things are particularly interesting here: firstly, Goetz can only begin to love Hilda 
properly once he has progressed from religious absolutism to valid Humanism; and 
secondly, it is only with the death of God that he recognises her Authenticity, or at least
her authentic existence. His need to be looked at, though, has become even more
intense, and without God to watch over him, he fears that his existence will crumble. 
His Bad Faith is replicated by Estelle, who is reminded by Ines that her beauty is only in 
the eye of the beholder, that her Original Project of vanity and pride is worthless in the 
absence of the gaze: ‘Si le miroir se mettait a mentir? Ou si je  fermais les yeux, si je  
refusais de te regarder, que ferais-tu de toute cette beaute? ’25 Any project based on the 
regard is doomed to failure, for it supposes the impure reflection of pour-autrui rather 
than the pure reflection of pour-soi.
Ionesco’s characters, on the other hand, seem eager to flee from the gaze:
Elle: J ’etais aveugle quand je  t ’ai vu; je  ne t ’avais pas regarde. Je
voudrais l’etre quand je te vois.
Lui: Moi aussi, je voudrais etre aveugle quand je  te vois .26
Inveterate escapists, Ionesco’s men and women seek evasion from the inevitable
22 Les Seqestres d ’Aliona, p.339.
23 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.230.
24 Ibid., p.241.
25 Huis Clos, p.48.
26 Delire a deux, Theatre III, p.224.
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fixation of the regard behind masks and closed doors, in the thick skin o f an animal, and 
often by literally vanishing from the scene. The perfect example is perhaps the invisible 
guests o f Les Chaises, who, if they indeed exist, can be judged solely on the noises they 
make at the end of the play. The question of the Other’s existence, though far from 
central to Ionescan thought, does find some expression in the journals and in the novel 
Le Solitaire. For Ionesco, it appears, the reality of the Other’s presence is essentially a 
question of faith: ‘Moi, je ne suis pas, je  ne me suis pas une illusion. Et je  crois aussi 
que l’Autre est [...]. C’est la une foi. ’27 This anti-logician cannot be concerned with 
Cartesian proof, for his philosophy is filled with aporia and contradiction. Thus at 
various times, it seems as if autrui does not really exist at all: ‘Les autres passsaient 
dans la rue, dans une sorte de rue, dans une sorte d’espace, pour la premiere et demiere 
fois. II n ’y avait plus que moi a exister reellement. Le reste etait indistinct, c ’etait “tout 
cela” . ’28 Ionesco’s agnosticism seems also to permeate his relations with autrui; but his 
awareness of the distance between the Self and the Other (the ‘espace’), and his 
admission of his lack of knowledge of the Other (who is ‘indistinct’) once again unite 
him with Sartre. Like Sartre, Ionesco defines the Other as a negation o f the Self and 
recognises the problems imposed by this original separation:
La presence des autres m ’a toujours gene. II y avait une sorte de cloison 
invisible entre eux et moi.29
En somme, tout est mystere: ainsi, la vie quotidienne, tout ce qui s’y passe. 
L ’existence des autres. Les autres: le fait que je  ne sois pas eux ou qu’ils ne 
soient pas moi.30
By referring to others as a mystery, Ionesco continues the idea that the Other’s existence 
is a faith rather than a fact, and he thus removes the problem from ontology, placing it 
firmly in the realm of metaphysics. But, like Sartre, he regards coexistence as Absurd, 
for the presence of others is as contingent and gratuitous as the presence of Being in 
general. Thus on the Ionescan stage, the Other is often portrayed as an object to flee 
from, like the Professeur of La Legon or the herds o f eponymous rhinoceroses. Like 
objects, people proliferate, expand, and multiply (one need only think o f the mass 
production of L ’Avenir est dans les ceufs or the living corpse o f Amedee), merely 
compounding the Coefficient of Adversity. Again, the similarities in thought between 
the two dramatists are striking; in this case, the theory of Sartre is dramatised effectively 
by Ionesco:
Si je  ne suis pas point par point les indications foumies par les autres, je  ne 
m ’y reconnaitrai plus, je me tromperai de rue, je  manquerai mon train, etc. 
D ’ailleurs ces indications sont le plus souvent imperatives: “Entrez par la”, 
“Sortez par la” [...]. Je m ’y soumets; elles viennent ajouter au coefficient 
d’adversite, que je fais naitre sur les choses, un coefficient proprement 
humain d’adversite.31
On Ionesco’s stage, this threat to freedom, like the gaze, is avoided at all costs through 
disobedience, anti-logic, parody, and contradiction. As language is exposed as hollow 
and purely aphoristic, the Self can remove the straitjacket imposed on it by autrui.
27 La Quete Intermittente, p.96.
28 Le Solitaire, p.60.
29 Ibid., p.66.
30 Un homme en question, p. 142.
31 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.593.
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The closest link between Sartre and Ionesco, however, connected with the 
emergence of the Other lies in the symbolism which both employ to explain the Other’s 
presence and to portray him on the stage. The Biblical symbolism of the Fall is used to 
explain the Selfs existence in the presence of the Other: ‘S’il y a un Autre [...] j ’ai un 
dehors, j ’ai une nature; ma chute originelle c ’est l’existence de l’autre. ’32 I become 
‘fallen’ or, in the language of Heidegger, Sartre, and Ionesco, ‘thrown’ and ‘inauthentic’ 
because I share my existence with others; and through some Absurd irony, the plenitude 
or nature for which I yearn can only be invented by autrui. I f  eating from the forbidden 
tree of knowledge marks the birth of epistemology, then ontology must have its origins 
in my awareness of the Other. For Ionesco, this Fall is connected with the theme o f 
Paradise Lost: Ionescan Man is constantly in search of angel’s wings or Jacob’s ladder 
to ascend from the Other to the Absolute, to turn back time and return to a state o f grace. 
The reaction to the Fall is the feeling of shame described by Sartre:
La honte est sentiment de ‘chute originelle’, non du fait que j ’aurais commis 
telle ou telle faute, mais simplement du fait que je  suis ‘tombe’ dans le 
monde, au milieu des choses, et que j ’ai besoin de la mediation d ’autrui pour 
etre ce que je suis. La pudeur et, en particulier, la crainte d ’etre surpris en 
etat de nudite ne sont qu’une specification symbolique de la honte 
originelle: le corps symbolise ici notre objectite sans defense. [...] La honte 
est apprehension unitaire de trois dimensions: ‘J ’ai honte de moi devant 
autrui, ’33
Again, it is the objectification of the regard which is the cause of the sentiment of 
shame. Ionesco continues this elucidation o f shame by linking it also with Original Sin:
A sept ans enfin, j ’ai revecu le peche originel. Je me suis regarde dans la 
glace et j ’ai vu que j ’etais nu, c ’ est-a-dire j ’ai vu que j ’etais different, que je  
n ’etais pas les autres, que je n ’etais pas comme les autres. Entre moi et les 
autres il y avait un abime infini, il me semblait qu’il etait honteux de ne pas 
etre comme les autres, qu’il etait inadmissible et inconcevable d ’etre 
tellement autre que les autres. [...] Je ne m ’aimais pas depuis que je m ’etais 
vu et depuis que j ’avais compris ma separation, depuis cette rupture, ce 
peche fondamental [...]. J ’etais anormal [...] j ’etais monstrueux .34
Ionesco’s touching self-perception as ‘monstrueux’ evokes not only his own Berenger at 
the end of Rhinoceros, but also the creation of another renowned Humanist -  Camus’s 
individualist martyr Meursault. Thus the Biblical Creation is reinterpreted by both 
Sartre and Ionesco in terms of the presence of the Other, and contingent reactions such 
as shame are reverted not to God but to autrui -  an interpretation wholly appropriate for 
these two Humanists. Sartre, too, links the presence of others with the mythology of 
Original Sin, removing the fundamental reaction of guilt from the realm of the religious 
to autrui: ‘Le peche originel, c ’est mon surgissement dans un monde ou il y a Tautre et, 
quelles que soient mes relations ulterieures avec 1’autre, elles ne seront que des 
variations sur le theme originel de ma culpabilite. ’35
The striking convergence between Sartre and Ionesco at this early stage of 
Being-for-Others is readily apparent, but before going on to explore its effect on their 




35 L 'Etre et le Neant, p.481.
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used by both in their portrayal of the Other on the stage. The infamous image used by 
Ionesco in Rhinoceros is echoed by Sartre in Les Sequestres d ’Altona, which appeared 
just one year later: ‘Quels crabes? Ah! oui. Eh bien, oui... Les crabes sont des 
hommes. ’36 The image of the crab appears also in Sartre’s fiction, and, like the 
rhinoceros, it symbolises the impenetrability of autrui, the protective (if invisible) shell 
that separates the Self from the Other:
De seul je deviens solitaire, mais c’est que j ’ai fait du neant qui me 
distinguait des autres une carapace irreductible dans laquelle je  me suis 
emmure et qui m ’empeche de rejoindre ce qui se passe a l’exterieur. D ’ou la 
frequence de la metaphore du crabe, qui a secrete sa propre prison et qui la 
transporte avec lui partout ou il va .37
The crab is thus a wonderful symbol of solipsism, but it is used in the play to represent 
the Other in general, and it is therefore particularly appropriate that the crabs serve the 
function of the judge. The symbolism employed by Ionesco in Le Pieton de I ’Air is also 
remarkably similar:
Marthe: II y a tous les gens autour.
Josephine: Quels gens?
Marthe: Les amis, nous avons beaucoup d’amis.
Josephine: Tu appelles 9 a des amis. Que suis-je pour eux? Que sont-
ils pour moi? Non, non, ce ne sont pas des amis. Des 
objets vides dans le desert. Monstrueusement 
im penetrates, indifferents, egoi’stes, cruels. Enfermes 
dans leur carapace.38
The added advantage of the crab and the rhinoceros is that they are both somewhat 
sinister and brutal, and both relatively indistinguishable to the human eye: as the 
temptation seems to be to hide from the regard, the prognosis for successful coexistence 
looks bleak.
36 Frantz, p.279.
37 Boros, Marie-Denise, Un Sequestre: L ’Homme Sartien, p.236.
38 Theatre III, p. 180.
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iO Attempts at Coexistence
The initial attitudes of shame and guilt which arise in the presence of the Other have 
been mentioned, but Sartre goes on to explore what he calls authentic responses to 
autrui, and he reduces them fundamentally to two:
II y a deux attitudes authentiques: celle par laquelle je reconnais Autrui 
comme le sujet par qui je  viens a l’objectite -  c’est la honte; celle par 
laquelle je me saisis comme le projet libre par qui Autrui vient a l ’etre-autrui 
- c’est l’orgueil ou affirmation de ma liberte en face d’Autrui-objet. Mais la 
fierte -  ou vanite -  est un sentiment sans equilibre et de mauvaise foi: je  
tente, dans la vanite, d ’agir sur Autrui en tant que je suis objet.39
The only attitude, then, which is both authentic and in Good Faith is that o f shame, the 
attitude in which the Self accepts its object status in the presence o f the Other. The 
problem, of course, is how to deal with this shame, and this question lies at the heart o f 
coexistence.
Even a quick perusal of Sartre and Ionesco’s theatre provides the answer to how 
most of their creations react to their fundamental sense of shame. Indeed both dramatists 
have dedicated whole plays to the game of coexistence: an audience o f Jacques ou la 
Soumission or of Kean will soon appreciate the importance o f role-play, which is shown 
to be the most common, even the most viable, method of dealing with this shame. Role- 
play is discussed in both dramatists’ philosophy, and it seems that both accept the 
inevitable ‘clothing of being’ which arises in the world of autrui’.
L’etre des existants est ordinairement voile par leur fonction. II en est de 
meme pour l’etre de 1’Autre. ’40
Ce que l’on connait de chacun c’est, tout d ’abord, sa politesse, sa retenue. II 
ne faut pas aller plus loin, nous tomberions dans l’abime. Qui as-tu tue, au 
moins en esprit, toi qui es vetu en habit du dimanche? 41
It is fascinating to compare Ionesco’s thoughts with one o f Garcin’s speeches, for the 
language and the imagery are almost identical: ‘De la politesse, pourquoi? Des 
ceremonies, pourquoi? Entre nous! Tout a l’heure nous serons nus comme des vers . ’42
Ionesco’s use of masks and costume (the Pompier, the Policier, etc.) is central to 
this theme, for in this use of metatheatre, he stages visually the temptation o f the Self to 
revert to function and role-play in the presence o f the Other. In Le Maitre, all the 
characters are functions, from the Jeune Arnant to the Maitre himself; in Macbett, the 
doubling of roles results in Lady Macbett being dressed as the Premiere Sorciere before 
our very eyes;43 and in Delire a deux, masking is used metaphorically to denote the 
subterfuge inherent to Being-for-Others, which here, as indeed elsewhere, inevitably 
culminates in violence:
Elle: Cretin! Seducteur!
39 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.351.
40 Ibid., p.464.
41 Journal en miettes, p. 125.
42 Huis Clos, p.52. The language is also reminiscent of Genet, who is preoccupied with the theme o f role- 
play.
43 Macbett, Theatre V, p. 187.
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Lui: Ne m ’insulte pas. Ne m ’appelle plus seducteur. Tu n ’as pas
honte.
Elle: Je ne t ’insulte pas. Je te demasque.
Lui: Moi aussi je te demasque. Tiens, j ’enleve tes fards. (77 lui donne
une forte gifle)44
Sartre’s most famous example is of course the gargon de cafe, whose movements are 
just a little too rushed and contrived because, as we are told, ‘il joue avec sa condition 
pour la realiser’ .45 It seems, then, that role-play, like Inauthenticity, is our default 
position in the world of Being-for-Others, and thus many relationships on Sartre and 
Ionesco’s stage are based on the premise of the jeu. The most self-conscious o f these is 
probably that o f Jessica and Hugo, whose inter-play seems to disintegrate into a sort of 
Beckettian stalemate:
Hugo: Toi, tu joues a etre serieuse. Tu me l’as dit.
[...]
Jessica: Non. Tu joues a me croire.
Hugo: Nous n ’en sortirons pas .46
Both are in Good Faith in this respect, for they recognise exactly what they are doing, 
but when Jessica warns Hugo with the words ‘tu joues mal ton role’ ,47 it seems that the 
end of their love-game is imminent -  a fact confirmed by Hugo’s ultimate riposte: ‘Est- 
ce que tu ne sais pas que notre amour etait une comedie? ’48 The self-consciousness 
continues with Ionesco’s self-incarnation as Nicolas d ’Eu, the opinionated theatrician 
whose whole theory of character is determined by his recognition o f the 
interchangeability o f roles: ‘Les caracteres perdent leur forme dans l ’informe du 
devenir. Chaque personnage est moins lui-meme que l’autre. ’49 It is appropriate that this 
observation comes in Victimes du devoir, where characters are indeed the victims of 
their social duty, and once again there is convergence with Sartre who, following 
Rimbaud, declared in the early La Transcendance de VEgo that ''Je est un autre’. The 
implications of this interchangeability are emphasised throughout Ionesco’s work, but 
they receive a bitterly ironic interpretation under the cynical observation of Goetz: ‘Je 
suis militaire, done je tue. Je les tuerai conformement a mon office et l’Archeveque leur 
pardonnera, conformement au sien. ’50 The phenomenon of role-playing appears to be as 
inevitable as it is gratuitous. But it can hardly come as a surprise, particularly in 
hindsight of the ontology of pour-soi, which ‘is not what it is and is what it is not’, and 
which is seemingly condemned not only to Freedom, but also to the vanity o f any 
authentic identity. The solution to the conundrum seems to lie in the free assumption of 
this condemnation, to accept the role of actor and to play it to the full:
Celui, surtout, qui voudra utiliser sa liberte a changer sa situation dans le 
monde sera oblige d ’assumer son etre-pour-autrui, de jouer un role, pour que 
les decisions de sa liberte soient efficaces. Seulement, ce role il doit le jouer 
avec une lucidite et une bonne foi qui ne lui permettent aucune evasion dans 
des mondes imaginaires.51
44 Theatre III, p.206.
45 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.98.
46 Les Mains Sales, p.73.
47 Ibid., p . l l l .
48 Ibid., p. 180.
49 Victimes du devoir, Theatre I, p.227.
50 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.74.
51 Royle, Peter, Sartre: L ’Enfer et la Liberte, p.99.
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Si tel est le propre des relations humaines d’etre un immense theatre ou les 
hommes doivent vivre comme acteurs, la solution definitive sera d ’accepter 
d ’etre un acteur, d ’assumer ce divorce qu’autrui insere en moi-meme .52
Such is the assumption of Genet, which in Sartre’s eyes elevates him to sainthood; and 
if  theatre is indeed the perfect arena for human relations, the next step must be to 
scrutinise the genre for answers to remaining questions o f human coexistence.
The philosophical thinking behind the theatre o f Sartre and Ionesco in the realm 
of Being-for-Others is built around the analysis of several original relationships between 
the Self and the Other. Both dramatists are strongly influenced by Heideggerian thought 
on Mitsein, which is one of their strongest points of contact, but whereas Sartre rejects 
much of Heidegger’s terminology, its links with Ionesco are tangible. Thus the early 
‘anti-plays’ of Ionesco (particularly) dramatise effectively the Inauthenticity o f Idle 
Talk, where characters talk to each other ‘pour ne rien dire’ ,53 o f Curiosity, where they 
‘float away from what is ready-to-hand and towards the exotic, the alien and the 
distant’ ,54 and of Ambiguity, where the individual, thrown into a world of crowds, 
confuses authentic and superficial understanding. Confusion seems to permeate the very 
core of Ionescan Man, hence perhaps his desire in the later plays to free himself from his 
peers.
But on the whole, the dramatists are united in their portrayal o f the various 
human relationships from the presumable nirvana of love to the ultimate conflict of 
hatred. Language and communication naturally form the premise for any potential 
relationship, and as dramatists, Sartre and Ionesco are inevitably fascinated with the 
complexities of verbal interaction. It is Ionesco, though, who has made of language his 
true craft. Although he admits that ‘il y a un degre de communication entre les gens’55 
and insists that the message of La Cantatrice chauve was not to discredit human 
communication,56 he later betrays his true feelings on language and the effect it has on 
autrui'. ‘J ’ai voulu dire [...] que, tout en parlant, les hommes ne savaient pas ce qu’ils 
voulaient dire et [...] que le langage, au lieu de les rapprocher les uns des autres, ne 
faisait que les separer davantage. ’57 Language is consistently shown to fail as a means of 
communion or solidarity, and the apparent misinterpretation of La Cantatrice is 
vindicated by any reading of the text:
M. Smith: Hm.
Silence.
Mme Smith: Hm, hm.
Silence.
Mme Martin: Hm, hm, hm.
Silence.
M. Martin: Hm, hm, hm, hm.
Silence.
Mme Martin: Oh, decidement.
Silence.
M. Martin: Nous sommes tous enrhumes.
Silence.
52 Presseault, Jacques, L Etre-pour-Autrui dans la Philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre, pp. 182-83.
53 See Antidotes, p.94.
54 See Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Heidegger and ‘Being and Time ’, p. 106.




M. Smith: Pourtant il ne fait pas froid.
Silence.
Mme Smith: 11 n ’y a pas de courant d ’air.
Silence.
M. Martin: Oh non, heureusement.
Silence.
M. Smith: Ah, la la la la.
Silence.
M. Martin: Vous avez du chagrin?
Silence.
Mme Smith: Non. 11 s’emmerde.
Silence.
When language breaks down in Ionescan theatre, it disintegrates from meaningless 
cliche to verbal nonsense, and thence from mime and physical expression to violence 
and then emptiness. Characters rarely communicate on Ionesco’s stage; they merely take 
turns in expressing their anguish.
For Sartre, who speaks of a ‘diversite incommunicable des consciences 
humaines’ as a logical repercussion of the lack of a human nature ,59 this inability to 
communicate is perhaps less of a surprise. Although generally Sartre is concerned with 
preserving the dignity of rational language,60 in the realm o f Being-for-Others he too is 
ready to accept the failures of language as a means o f communication: ‘Le langage n ’est 
pas un phenomene surajoute a 1’etre-pour-autrui: il est originellement l’etre-pour-autrui, 
c ’est-a-dire le fait qu’une subjectivite s’eprouve comme objet pour l’autre . ’61 Like the 
regard of autrui, my own language serves to objectify me in the eyes and ears o f the 
Other. Sartre adapts Heidegger’s ‘je suis ce que je dis’ into ‘je  suis langage’,62 for once 
my language is out of my mouth, it belongs to the essence o f my past as an object at the 
mercy o f autrui:
Le mot est sacre quand c’est moi qui l’utilise, et magique quand l’autre 
l’entend. Ainsi, je ne connais pas plus mon langage que mon corps pour 
l’autre. Je ne puis m ’entendre parler ni me voir sourire.63
Les mots vivent de la mort des hommes, ils s’unissent a travers eux: chaque 
phrase que je forme, son sens m ’echappe, il m ’est vole; chaque jour et 
chaque parleur altere pour tous les significations, et les autres viennent les 
changer jusque dans ma bouche.64
My language, like my body, can even be at the mercy of myself, hence the anguish of 
Frantz (and Beckett’s Krapp) when he hears his own words on tape. Ultimately, then, 
even Sartre’s noble language provides no connection between two individual 
consciousnesses, and, like Ionesco’s language, it can be seen to fail as a means of 
rapprochement: ‘Le role du langage dans les relations humaines ne fait done que
58 Theatre I, p.33.
59 See L ’Etre et le Neant, p.282.
60 See Un Theatre de Situations, p.64: ‘L’un de nos problemes a ete de trouver un style de dialogue qui, 
tout en etant entierement simple et en n’utilisant que les mots de tous les jours, puisse preserver 
cependant quelque chose de la dignite ancienne de notre langue.’
61 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.440.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p.442.
64 Critique de la Raison Dialectique, I, p.211.
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redoubler cette alienation de mon etre que m ’inflige la presence de l’autre . ’65
Love is perhaps the most interesting relationship explored by the two dramatists, 
and if coexistence is to be redeemed after the brutal objectification o f the regard, the 
fundamental sense of shame, and the impossibility o f successful communication, it is 
surely in the guise of love that it will be so. But for Sartre, love is about possession: 
‘Ainsi l’amant ne desire-t-il pas posseder 1’aime comme on possede une chose; il 
reclame un type special d’appropriation. II veut posseder une liberte comme liberte. ’66 
The paradox is already apparent: freedom which is possessed is no longer freedom, and 
the conduct of love is thus in vain. The Self cannot possess the Other as a subject, and 
this is a semantic and ontological impossibility which characters like Werner learn the 
hard way: ‘Je voulais une femme, je n ’ai possede que son cadavre. ’67 Sartre goes on to 
elucidate clearly the reasons for the failure of love:
L ’amour est un effort contradictoire pour surmonter la negation de fait tout 
en conservant la negation interne. J ’exige que l ’autre m ’aime et je  mets tout 
en oeuvre pour realiser mon projet: mais si 1’autre m ’aime, il me de9 oit 
radicalement par son amour meme; j ’exigeais de lui qu’il fonde mon etre 
comme objet privilegie en se maintenant comme pur subjectivite en face de 
moi; et, des qu’il m ’aime, il m ’eprouve comme sujet et s ’abime dans son 
objectivite en face de mon subjectivite. Le probleme de mon etre-pour- 
autrui demeure done sans solution, les amants demeurent chacun pour soi 
dans une subjectivite totale; rien ne vient les relever de leur devoir de se 
faire exister chacun pour soi; rien ne vient lever leur contingence ni les 
sauver de la facticite. [...] II suffit que les amants soient regardes par un tiers 
pour que chacun eprouve l’objectivation, non seulement de soi-meme, mais 
de 1’autre.68
The outlook for love is bleak, for there appears to be no solution to the subject-object 
duality uncovered by the fix of the regard.
Ionesco, too, fails to find a solution, and while he appreciates M an’s need and 
even craving for love, he acknowledges the futility of its design: ‘L ’amour est notre 
atmosphere vitale, notre pain quotidien. Helas! l ’atmosphere est viciee, le pain 
empoisonne. ’69 The analogy with bread works well, and in Ce formidable bordel!, Le 
Monsieur continues the religious motif, inverting the words of Christ to expose the 
human experience of love: ‘On a dit “aimez-vous les uns les autres”, en realite on aurait 
du dire “mangez-vous les uns les autres”. C’est bien ce que 9 a veut dire d ’ailleurs [...]. 
On mange ce qu’on aime.’ (p. 138). Like Sartre, Ionesco recognises the possessiveness 
and objectification inherent to the project of love; and in their Good Faith, characters of 
both dramatists are well aware of the futile escapism of love and o f the magical 
ambiguity of its adoption:
Ines: C’est bon l’amour, hein Garcin? C’est tiede et profond
comme le sommeil, mais je t’empecherai de dormir.70
Jacqueline: Malgre tout l’immense amour que j ’ai pour toi, qui gonfle
mon cceur a l’en faire crever, je  te deteste, je  t ’exerte.71
65 Boros, Marie-Denise, Un Sequestre: L ’Homme Sartrien, p.67.
66 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.434.
67 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.246.
681'Etre et le Neant, pp.444-45.
69 Journal en miettes, p. 137.
70 Huis Clos, p.92.
71 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p.99.
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The project of desire is similar to love, except that its intention is to possess the 
Other as pure transcendence and as pure facticity. In Ionescan drama, desire is parodied 
and shown to be as gratuitous and arbitrary as love and any other emotional flight. As in 
Jacques ou la Soumission or its sequel L ’Avenir est dans les ceufs, beauty and physical 
attraction are turned on their head and the ‘act of love’ is revealed as just relentless 
material production. Even Berenger’s dalliances in Tueur sans gages and Rhinoceros 
end in disastrous isolation, as Dany’s death is followed by the ultimate betrayal of 
Daisy. For Sartre, the failure of desire is inevitable since its ideal is an ontological 
impossibility: ‘Tel est l’ideal impossible du desir: posseder la transcendance de l ’autre 
comme pure transcendance et pourtant comme corps', reduire Tautre a sa simple 
facticite . ’72 This vain ideal is clearly perceived by Johanna, who is aware o f men’s 
attempts to reduce her to the flesh on her body: ‘Qu’est-ce que je  suis, moi? Rien: un 
instrument de supplice. Chacun cherche sur moi les caresses de Tautre. ’73 The 
culmination of desire is of course the sexual act itself, and with the post-paroxysmal 
fmitude which accompanies the orgasm comes the ultimate realisation of the vanity of 
desire:
La ‘possession’ chamelle en effet nous offre l ’image irritante et seduisante 
d ’un corps perpetuellement possede et perpetuellement neuf, sur lequel la 
possession ne laisse aucune trace.74
Le plaisir, en effet -  comme une douleur trop vive -  motive 1’apparition 
d ’une conscience reflexive qui est ‘attention au plaisir’. Seulement le plaisir 
est la mort et l ’echec du desir. II est la mort du desir parce qu’il n ’est pas 
seulement son achevement mais son terme et sa fin .75
The violent pseudo-orgasm of Ionesco’s Professeur testifies to this failure most 
effectively.
The opposite relationships of sadism and masochism are barely evident in the 
vast range of plays created by Sartre and Ionesco, but they are explored by Sartre in 
L ’Etre et le Neant. Sadism differs from desire in that the sadist refuses his own flesh in 
the presence o f the Other, seeks obscene incarnation, and demands immediate 
appropriation.76 In Sartre’s plays, its rare occurrence is in the form of torture (Morts 
sans Sepulture, Les Sequestres d ’Altona) or general pleasure at the suffering o f others:
Ines: Moi, je suis mechante: 9 a veut dire que j ’ai besoin de la
souffrance des autres pour exister.77
The attempt of the sadist is to flee facticity towards pure transcendence by becoming the 
master of the Other’s facticity (flesh) and so enslaving his freedom. But again, the 
project is doomed to failure because the Other’s freedom is permanently out o f reach:
Le sadisme recele un nouveau motif d’echec. C’est en effet la liberte 
transcendante de la victime qu’il cherche a s’approprier. Mais precisement 
cette liberte demeure par principe hors d ’atteinte [...]. Le sadique decouvre
72 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.463.
73 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.265.
74 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.668.
75 Ibid., p.467.
76 Ibid., pp.469-70.
77 Huis Clos, p.57.
188
son erreur lorsque sa victime le regarde™
The masochist’s attempt is thus to flee transcendence towards pure facticity by 
becoming the victim of the Other’s transcendence and so denying his facticity. The 
masochist seeks his own obscene incarnation in his desire to become the Other’s object 
and to reassume the original experience of shame. In Sartrean theatre, it is generally 
women, as the penetrated, who, like Catherine in her relationship with Goetz, are shown 
to adopt the role of the masochist: ‘Je veux etre ton bordel! ’79 Her project is of course 
bound to fail, for it is always the Other who perceives the masochist as an object, and 
the masochist’s own transcendence can never be buried for long:
Le masochiste a beau se trainer a genoux, se montrer dans des postures 
ridicules, se faire utiliser comme un simple instrument inanime, c’est pour 
I ’autre qu’il sera obscene ou simplement passif, pour l ’autre qu’il subira ces 
postures; pour lui, il est a jamais condamne a se les donner [...] et plus il 
tentera de gouter son objectivite, plus il sera submerge par la conscience de 
sa subjectivite, jusqu’a l’angoisse [...]. Ainsi [...] l ’objectivite du masochiste 
lui echappe et il peut meme arriver, il arrive le plus souvent qu’en cherchant 
a saisir son objectivite il trouve T objectivite de l’autre, ce qui libere, malgre 
lui, sa subjectivite. Le masochisme est done par principe un echec.80
With the failure of language, the ‘positive’ relationships o f love and desire, and 
the opposing sexual relations of sadism and masochism, it seems logical to look to 
hatred for the final escape from the world of autrui. According to Ionesco, hatred o f the 
Other is the result o f human Anguish and a reaction to temporality: ‘La haine est 
l’expression de notre angoisse, de notre manque de temps. ’81 Like love and desire, 
hatred is parodied in Ionesco’s plays, usually at the expense o f political commitment 
and to underline the playwright’s ethics of passivity and inertia. But the overwhelming 
message is that hatred never succeeds: Le Professeur can go on killing forty pupils a 
day, but there will always be another waiting in the wings to ring the bell. This is also 
the message o f Sartrean philosophy, according to which hatred o f the Other is hatred of 
autrui in general and an attempt to rid the Self of the very existence o f others. The 
attempt is inevitably futile, for it contravenes the whole ontology o f Being:
La haine, a son tour, est un echec. Son projet initial, en effet, est de 
supprimer les autres consciences. Mais si meme elle y parvenait, e ’est-a-dire 
si elle pouvait abolir Tautre dans le moment present, elle ne pourrait faire 
que T autre n ’ait pas ete.82
The only option remaining is the attitude of indifference. In Sartrean terms, 
indifference involves a blindness towards autrui where the Self decides to ‘regarder le 
regard’ instead of perceiving the Other as a subject or an object. It is an attempt to 
simultaneously deny both the facticity and transcendence of autrui, even though its 
treatment of others ressembles that of objects, thus again compounding the Coefficient 
o f Adversity:
Je pratique [...] une sorte de solipsisme de fait; les autres, ce sont ces formes
78 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.476.
79 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.85.
80 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.447.
81 Journal en miettes, p .137.
82 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.483.
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qui passent dans la rue, ces objets magiques qui sont susceptibles d ’agir a 
distance et sur lesquels je peux agir par des conduites determinees. J ’y 
prends a peine garde, j ’agis comme si j ’etais seul au monde; je  frole ‘les 
gens’ comme je frole les murs, je les evite comme j ’evite des obstacles, leur 
liberte-objet n’est pour moi que leur ‘coefficient d’adversite’; je  n ’imagine 
meme pas qu’ils puissent me regarder.83
The language and outlook are reminiscent of Le Solitaire and equally they culminate in 
solipsism. But even this last-ditch attempt at coexistence (by denying it) is doomed to 
ultimate failure, for it is nothing but a deliberate act of Bad Faith, an attempt of the Self 
to delude its own consciousness: ‘Pourtant, l’Autre comme liberte et mon objectivite 
comme moi-aliene sont la, inaper9 us, non thematises, mais donnes dans ma 
comprehension meme du monde et de mon etre dans le monde . ’84 Ionesco is totally 
concordant, and with his resolute rejection o f indifference comes recognition o f the 
failure of all relationships with autrui: ‘Quelle est la bonne voie? Peut-etre 
1’indifference. Ce n’est pas possible; puisqu’on est la, on ne peut pas ne pas participer; 
on ne peut pas s’ecarter de la manifestation puisque nous sommes plonges dedans. ’85
Sartre believes that all other possible relationships with autrui are mere 
variations of the original relationships described above, and it would thus appear that 
any attempt at coexistence, whether positive or negative, is ultimately doomed to 
failure. Ionesco, it seems, acknowledges the problem with equal insight: ‘II ne faut pas 
aimer, il ne faut pas hair, il ne faut pas ni ne pas aimer ni ne pas hai'r. Cela non plus il ne 
le faut pas. ’86 The problem seems to be one of incompatibility between the Self and the 
Other, or in the language of Sartre, that Te pour-soi est inconnaissable par autrui comme 
pour-soi’ .87 In the same way that en-soi-pour-soi is constantly indicated and constantly 
out of reach, the ontological fusion of pour-soi-pour-autrui emerges as the oxymoron of 
a necessary impossibility. In Ionescan language, Man (or here Le Monsieur) is just a
slave to his futile desires: ‘Nous sommes des esclaves, des esclaves de nos desirs, nous
dependons les uns des autres, nous demandons toujours a l’autre de combler nos desirs. 
Chacun exige tout de chacun. ’88 With this desperate and mutual conclusion comes the 
greatest rupture with Heidegger, as the Mitsein is undermined and reversed to the 
disharmony of Hegelian conflict: ‘C’est done en vain que la realite humaine chercherait 
a sortir de ce dilemme: transcender l’autre ou se laisser transcender par lui. L ’essence 
des rapports entre consciences n ’est pas le Mitsein, c’est le conflit. ’89
This theme of conflict predominates in the plays o f Sartre and Ionesco. Huis 
Clos is in many ways an extended analysis o f conflict with autrui, but in no means is the 
piece an exception:
Leni: Qui de nous deux, pere, a besoin de l’autre?
Le Pere: Qui de nous deux, Leni, fait peur a 1’autre? 90
Le Pere’s question is the more pertinent, and it reflects the prevailing tone of conflict 
which exists in Sartre’s theatre not only in the domain of revolutionary engagement, but 
more disturbingly in the domestic arena of the family. Ionescan drama is equally one of 
overwhelming conflict, from the hostility which breaks out at the end o f La Cantatrice
83 Ibid. p.449.
84 Ibid., p.450.
85 Journal en miettes, p. 137.
86 Present passe, Passe present, p.84.
87 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.298.
88 Ce formidable bordell, p. 139.
89 L ‘Etre et le Neant, p.502.
90 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p. 105.
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to the pernicious Professeur, from the Tueur {sans gages) to the bloodbath of Jeux de 
Massacre. This universal aspect of conflict is summarised effectively by Jacques: ‘Des 
siecles et des siecles ont passe! les gens... ils avaient tous le mot bonte a la bouche, le 
couteau sanglant entre les dents. . . ’91 In his last play, Ionesco develops his theme of 
individual imprisonment into a nightmarish image o f collective incarceration, and it is 
clear that the cynicism of Jacques has not diminished on its journey to the lips of 
Alexandre: ‘Nous sommes pousses par les autres. Ils arrivent en masse, ils remplissent 
la cage. Ah, avoir une autre cage, moins encombree! ’92 The analogy is hellish, and 
indeed Hell is the lasting image of our forced coexistence with autrui. From Garcin’s 
now infamous Tenfer, c’est les Autres’93 has sprung a whole new philosophy on Being- 
for-Others; his words have proved highly controversial, and even Sartre has reneged on 
them a little,94 but this new aphorism, which one can imagine a future Ionesco parodying 
most mischievously, still stands as a neat summation of the theme of coexistence on the 
stage of both Ionesco and Sartre. The former’s journals serve to reinforce the image: 
‘Comment se fait-il que la Societe qui devait etre la plus favorable a l ’homme soit 
devenue la plus alienante, la plus mauvaise, le tribunal, la prison, Tenfer? ’95 Whatever 
Sartre’s subsequent disclaimers on the issue, the combination of the ontology of L ’Etre 
et le Neant and the dramatisation of coexistence in the plays reveals the meeting o f the 
Self and the Other as a conflictual confrontation of freedoms. The misery o f Georges at 
being rescued from the river clearly conveys the fact that the initial response to autrui is 
perhaps less one of shame than one of brutal fear: ‘Neron arrachait des esclaves a leurs 
epouses pour les jeter aux poissons; et toi, plus cruel que lui, tu m ’arraches aux poissons 
pour me jeter aux hommes. ’96 The closing words on the living Hell that is the Other 
should be left to two of the dramatists’ most perceptive social analysts:
Ines: Le bourreau, c’est chacun de nous pour les deux autres.97
Le Monsieur: Ne croyez-vous pas que nous vivons en enfer? Que
Tenfer est ici? Nous sommes tous des assoiffes, des 
affames, des desireux.98
The repercussions of both Sartre and Ionesco’s philosophical stance on 
relationships with others are vast, but they have particular implications for politico- 
ethical issues and for the portrayal o f women in the plays. In the world of politics, 
Sartre’s ontological conviction that the Other must appear as a subject or as an object 
leads him to the ethical position of treating the Other as a means to an end: ‘Si je  pars 
[...] du corps d’autrui, je le saisis comme un instrument et [...] je  puis en effet Vutiliser 
pour parvenir a des fins que je ne saurais atteindre seul. ’99 This ethic is one of Good 
Faith, for although I may be denying the transcendence of the Other, this provides no 
contradiction to my perception of him in my regard. The ethic is expanded upon in 
Critique de la Raison Dialectique, where the scarcity of the pratico-inerte is shown to 
culminate in the increasing necessity of social conflict. The ethic is also compatible with
91 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p. 121.
92 Voyages chez les Morts, p.l 12.
93 Huis Clos, p.93.
94 See Sartre, cited in Peter Royle, Sartre: L ’Enfer et la Liberte, pp.42-43: ‘Quelque soit le cercle d’enfer 
dans lequel nous vivons, je pense que nous sommes libres de le briser, et si les gens ne le brisent pas, 
c ’est encore librement qu’ils y restent, de sorte qu’ils se mettent librement en enfer.’ (p.43).
95 Antidotes, p.278.
96 Nekrassov, p.25.
97 Huis Clos, p.42.
98 Ce formidable bordell, p. 139.
99 L ’Etre et le Neant, pp.384-85.
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the ethical choice of pour-soi, for whom the end was shown to justify the means. 
Ionesco’s politics are very different, and his reaction to the inevitability of conflict is 
generally one of pacifism. Thus the authentic Ionescan character endeavours to avoid 
violent conflict (which is ubiquitously parodied) by removing himself from the crowd 
and even from the social situation. This escapism has been well documented, but in the 
context of Being-for-Others, it assumes the Heideggerian slant of flight from the Menge, 
which is consistently portrayed as both dangerous and inauthentic. Such is the context 
o f Rhinoceros, where even the less authentic characters like Botard are aware of the 
peril of the crowd: ‘Psychose collective, monsieur Dudard, psychose collective! C’est 
comme la religion qui est l’opium des peuples! ’ 100
There is sadly no place here for a thorough analysis of the dramatists’ portrayal 
o f women, but the implications of their philosophy of ‘Otherness’ for their similar 
characterisations of women cannot go unmentioned. Women seem to add to the existing 
problems of conflict between the Self and the Other in a variety o f ways. Firstly, they 
are the main victims of the process of objectification, for, as pointed out by de Beauvoir, 
Ta femme est un existant a qui on demande de se faire objet’ . 101 This generic ‘on’ 
certainly applies to Ionesco and Sartre, for the women in their plays are rarely the agents 
o f the regard', their characterisation is usually secondary, their role-play defined as a 
function of the male’s. Ionesco’s perception of the Everywoman became apparent in the 
discussion on the puppet, but it is clear that both Sartre and Ionesco conceive of women 
as highly duplicitous, and their creations, accordingly, inevitably confuse their roles:
Le Vieux: Hi, hi, hi! Ma maman! Ou est ma maman? J ’ai plus de
maman.
La Vieille: Je suis ta femme, c ’est moi ta maman maintenant. 102
Wemer: Un lache, hein, un lache: c ’est comme cela que tu
m’aimes, tu pourras me consoler. Matemellement.[...]
Johanna: Comme tu me detestes!103
As for Frantz, he concentrates on the other aspect of female duplicity, explaining to 
Johanna that: ‘Une femme est un traitre, Madame. ’104
The dramatists’ misogyny is evident throughout their theatre, and although few 
critics have dedicated much time to a sincere analysis o f its prevalence, the odd 
exception has pointed out the nature of this misogyny -  in this case with reference to 
Ionesco:
Women tend to be strongly associated with guilt, either through marital 
infidelity (as in Amedee) or filial neglect (in The Chairs or Man with Bags), 
and their relationship to the protagonist is usually conflictual. If the male 
protagonists are visionary, artistic idealists who long to escape the confines 
of earth and time, women are often practical figures who condemn the male 
characters’ search for an Edenic state of grace as impractical and tie them to 
the Earth (as in Victims o f Duty, Amedee, A Stroll in the Air and Hunger and 
Thirst)m
100 Theatre III, p.52.
101 See Le Deuxieme Sexe, II, p. 172.
102 Les Chaises, p. 136.
103 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, pp.246-47.
104 Ibid., p.269.
105 Lane, Nancy, Understanding Eugene Ionesco, p. 19.
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In terms of the female body, Ionesco often associates women with the grotesque, such as 
the virile and hirsute jeune fille  a marier, and Roberte with her superfluous fingers and 
faces, which again underlines her duplicity. For Sartre, women and the grotesque appear 
to be inseparable, and femininity enters his philosophy in relation to nausea and 
viscosity:
Le visqueux apparait comme un liquide vu dans un cauchemar et dont toutes 
les proprietes s’animeraient d ’une sorte de vie et se retoumeraient contre 
moi. Le visqueux, c’est la revanche de l’En-soi. Revanche douceatre et 
feminine. 106
Sartre goes on to denigrate Woman as trouee, again defining her as an object which both 
craves and tempts penetration:
L ’obscenite du sexe feminin est celle de toute chose beante: c’est un appel 
d ’etre, comme d’ailleurs tous les trous; en soi la femme appelle une chair 
etrangere qui doive la transformer en plenitude d ’etre par penetration et 
dilution.107
This ontology of womanhood as somehow lacking in Being leaves women subject to 
possession by the men that exist around them. Women, in particular, are shown to long 
for plenitude and even for assimilation in the project o f the Jonah Complex. The 
conflictive relationships continue as Sartre’s male characters persist in viewing women 
as monstrous temptresses who, like the viscous jam jar which traps the wasp, contrive to 
lure all men towards their deaths:
Georges: Une porte qui se referme, un nceud qui se resserre, un
couperet qui tombe: c’est la femme. 108
This violent imagery is in its turn linked back to nausea, as the women on the stage of 
both dramatists are perceived by the male, and even by themselves, as dirty, yielding, 
and obscene:
Garcin: Je ne veux pas m ’enliser dans tes yeux. Tu es moite! tu es
molle!109
Roberte II: Dans mon ventre il y a des etangs, des marecages. . . 110
Goetz: Moi qui repugne a toucher du doigt le filmier, comment
puis-je desirer tenir dans mes bras le sac d ’excrements lui 
meme? 111
This misogyny is of course connected to the Ionescan flight of enlisement, and it seems 
that women provide just yet another means of escape for the anguished male 
protagonist. But the final impression of womanhood is best conveyed by Ionesco’s 
Solitaire, whose perverted consciousness of women expresses the overwhelming fear
106 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.701.
107 Ibid., p.706.
108 Nekrassov, p.93.
109 Huis Clos, p.85.
110 Jacques ou la Soumission, Theatre I, p .125.
111 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p.225.
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and distrust which permeates the philosophy of Ionesco and of Sartre:
Le sexe feminin m’a toujours paru etre une sorte de blessure au has du 
ventre entre les cuisses. Quelque chose comme un gouffre, mais surtout 
comme une blessure ouverte, enorme, inguerissable, profonde. Cela m ’a 
toujours fait un effet de pitie et de peur: un gouffre, oui, c’etait cela. 112
The repercussions of both dramatists’ philosophy of failed relationships on politico- 
ethical and women’s issues are severe, and they serve merely to underline the all- 
embracing and seemingly irreparable conflict between the Self and the Other.
The lasting images of coexistence are undoubtedly Sartre’s infernal triangle and 
Ionesco’s sequestered couple. The motif of the torturous triangle o f characters is not just 
the preserve of Huis Clos. Threesomes form the basis of conflict in Sartrean theatre, 
from Hugo, Jessica, and Hoederer to Hilda, Goetz, and Catherine, for like Werner, 
Johanna, and Frantz, they suffer their Hell in the company o f their two ideal hangmen:
Johanna: Nous allons soufffir l’Enfer.
Frantz: Qui?
Johanna: Werner, vous et moi. II reste ici par jalousie . 113
Ionesco opts in favour of the couple to portray Man’s mutual isolation:
Le dramaturge fait au couple une place a part. Les Smith et les Martin, 
Jacques et Roberte, Choubert et Madeleine, les vieux, Amedee et Madeleine, 
Berenger et Daisy ou Josephine, le roi et les deux reines, Jean et Marie- 
Madeleine, Duncan et Lady Duncan posent avec acuite le probleme des 
rapports entre deux etres. Ils expriment l’usure des sentiments, 
l’impossibilite de se connaitre, la solitude a deux, le piege de la sensualite, 
le piege de l’ordre, le piege de l’enfant.114
His couples hide from the rest of society, so sequestered that, like the Martins, they do 
not even recognise each other out of the safety o f their lair. Their isolation and 
frustration comes across in their bickering and violence, and their dead yet desperate 
love is symbolised effectively by empty chairs or by a living corpse. Life for them 
becomes a game of hide and seek -  they find themselves alone, but cannot play without 
the other:
Marie-Madeleine: Je ne peux pas jouer ce jeu toute seule, il faut etre
deux; il me cherchait lui aussi, je suis seule 
maintenant. C’est bien pour cela que je ne le 
trouve pas . 115
Their lives together are trapped and paradoxical, and they make the ethics of Humanism 
appear particularly remote.
112 Le Solitaire, p. 122.
113 Les Sequestres d ’Altona, p.260.
114 Kamyabi Mask, Ahmed, Ionesco et son theatre, pp. 105-06.
115 La Soif et la Faim, Theatre IV, p. 102.
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iii) The Search for a Collective Ethic
With the collapse of all viable human relationships, the main problems remaining are 
how to salvage Humanism from the vicious circle of solipsism and how to define 
Authenticity in the context of the collective. These challenges mark an extension o f the 
analysis o f ethics from personal or individual ethics to the realm of Being-for-Others, 
and are thus a final attempt to determine a viable code o f Humanist morality.
Despite the clear evidence of Ionesco and Sartre’s belief in the impossibility of 
successful coexistence, both dramatists refute the charges o f individualism and 
solipsism. Sartre’s ‘defence’ of Huis Clos and Ionesco’s of La Cantatrice chauve have 
both been discussed in this respect, and in an attempt to circumnavigate the ethical 
problems caused by the breakdown of human relationships, both turn their attention to 
the ontology of the nous, both as the subject and object o f action: ‘Pour etre 
authentiquement moral, je  dois vouloir, a proprement parler, non le bien d’autrui mais 
notre bien . ’116 For Sartre, the nous-subject reinstates the plurality of consciousnesses 
which first appeared with the initial presence o f the Other, and it gives rise to the etre- 
avec, or Heideggerian Mitsein:
Dans le ‘nous’ sujet, personne n ’est objet. Le nous enveloppe une pluralite 
de subjectivites qui se reconnaissent les unes les autres comme subjectivites.
[...] Le nous est une certaine experience particuliere qui se produit dans des 
cas speciaux, sur le fondement de l’etre-pour-1’autre en general. Uetre- 
pour-l’autre precede et fonde Y etre-avec-Y autre.nl
This tfcws-subject is re-formed in each new situation and appears to found a communion 
o f human subjects. But again, the contradiction with previous comments on 
relationships and the apparent reinstatement o f Mitsein, which had been rejected in 
favour of conflict, cannot be overlooked. However, the Sartrean wows-subject is a logical 
inversion of the ^ows-object, which is wholly consistent with the ontology of the regard. 
In this context, Sartre’s comments on love cohere, for it was the arrival o f the tiers 
which objectified the lovers in the eyes of each other, and thus any group of people 
perceived by an outsider is inevitably objectified together.
Ainsi ce que j ’eprouve c’est un etre-dehors ou je suis organise avec 1’Autre 
en un tout indissoluble et objectif, un tout ou je ne me distingue plus 
originellement de l’Autre mais que je  concours, solidairement avec l’Autre, 
a constituer. 118
With this first mention of solidarity comes fresh hope for a collective ethic, or at least 
for a successful coexistence along the lines o f Heideggerian Stimmung. In his more 
euphoric moments, Ionesco is also willing to conceive of a human collectivity, 
determined like his puppet, but on a larger scale: ‘Le “nous” n ’est qu’un autre “moi”; il 
est le fruit d ’un conditionnement plus vaste; les groupes aussi sont determines, “mis en 
situation” . ’119 The language may be Sartrean, but Ionesco goes on to explore the 
spiritual aspect of human communion, relying on faith or monistic Being to unify his 
anguished individuals:
116 Royle, Peter, Sartre: L ’Enfer et la Liberte, p.226.
117 L ’Etre et le Neant, pp.484-86.
118 Ibid., p.489.
119 Journal en miettes, pp.251-52.
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L’esprit doit s ’infuser dans tous les etres et dans tout l’etre. Nous sommes 
tous ‘un’. Les barrieres n ’existent peut-etre pas, me dis-je, dans les moments 
d ’euphorie et de croyance. II m ’arrive de croire que nous sommes tous ‘un’ 
dans le multiple. Et que tout est communicable, que la pensee impregne tout 
etre, l’autre et moi. Je communique a moi. L ’alterite s’integre dans mon 
ipseite. 120
It seems that with age, Ionesco’s euphoria was strengthened, for in his last journal, the 
fusion of the Self and the Other seems finally to be complete:
Arriver a mon age pour enfin comprendre que je suis les autres, que les 
autres sont moi, que je n ’existe que par les autres, que les autres existent par 
moi. Je les cree, ils me creent: les autres, c ’est-a-dire l’autre. 121
Existons, co-existons...les uns sur les autres, ‘soyons’ . . . 122
The distance and the failed relationships experienced between the Self and the Other, 
and the individualism of Rhinoceros seem forgotten or surpassed, as the rcows-subject is 
incorporated into later Ionescan thought. But the idea is also consistent with the earlier 
theme of interchangeability, for in this fusion of existence it is to be expected that one 
individual can simply replace another. The Humanist ideal of the self-creating human 
essence is also hinted at here, and it links in with Sartre’s collective facticity which links 
all men together in a human solidarity:
La facticite s’exprime [...] par le fait de mon apparition dans un monde qui 
ne se revele a moi que par des techniques collectives et deja constitutes [...].
Ces techniques vont determiner mon appartenance aux collectivites: a 
Yespece humaine, a la collectivite nationale, au groupe professionnel et 
familial. 123
This notion o f ‘belonging to a human collectivity’ is explored in greater detail in 
L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, whose title betrays the speaker’s attempt to rescue 
his philosophy from the impasse of solipsism and to rekindle the hopes for a successful 
collective ethic:
Avant que vous ne viviez, la vie, elle n ’est rien, mais c ’est a vous de lui 
donner un sens, et la valeur n ’est pas autre chose que ce sens que vous 
choisissez. Par la vous voyez qu’il y a possibility de creer une communaute 
humaine. 124
This rare outburst of optimism is highly significant, for it affirms the possibility of 
transcending the Absurd through a personal ethic, which in turn is granted the potential 
of establishing a Humanist ethic by creating a successful and solidary community. It 
seems, then, that Sartrean thought has found in Being-for-Others an ethical solution to 
both Absurdism and solipsism that has so far eluded the individual agent; and the 
extension of the ontology of Freedom and Engagement apparently confirms this positive 
ethic:
120 La Quite intermittente, p.31.
121 Ibid., p.52.
122 Ibid., p.91
123 L 'Etre et le Neant, p.594.
124 L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, pp.89-90.
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En voulant la liberte, nous decouvrons qu’elle depend entierement de la 
liberte des autres, et que la liberte des autres depend de la notre [...] des qu’il 
y a engagement, je suis oblige de vouloir en meme temps que ma liberte la 
liberte des autres. 125
Lest we still be in any doubt, de Beauvoir’s defence o f Sartrean Existentialism supports 
the view that the philosophy is both individualistic and collective, and by equally 
stressing the mutual dependence of separate individual Freedoms, she too decries any 
charge of solipsism:
Une telle morale est-elle ou non un individualisme? Oui, si l’on entend par 
la qu’elle accorde a l ’individu une valeur absolue et qu’elle ne reconnait 
qu’a lui seul le pouvoir de fonder son existence [...]. Mais elle n ’est pas un 
solipsisme, puisque l’individu ne se definit que par sa relation au monde et 
aux autres individus, il n ’existe qu’en se transcendant et sa liberte ne peut 
s’accomplir qu’a travers la liberte d ’autrui. 126
The same balance between the individual and the collective is proposed also by Barnes, 
who poses this awkward philosophical compromise as the sine qua non for the success 
o f Sartrean Humanism: ‘Humanistic existentialism [...] balances the needs of the “We” 
with the jealous preservation of each differentiated “ I” .’127
Sartre’s philosophy of Being-for-Others appears now to be establishing the 
possibility of a «ows-consciousness and even communion. But the infamous rift with 
Camus cannot be forgotten, and this was partly due to Sartre’s refusal to accept the 
binary choice of solitaire/solidaire as a dichotomy rather than a fusion . 128 ‘Where Sartre 
sought unity, Camus spoke of harmony’ , 129 and with Sartre’s rejection of Camus’s more 
spiritual, emotional solidarity, such as that expounded in La Peste, came a rejection of 
any possibility of human communion. Sartrean Humanism was shown to reject any 
intangible human qualities as impossible repercussions of an absent human nature, and 
the distinction was thus irreparably drawn between the false idealism of communion and 
the necessary reality of solidarity:
Je compterai toujours sur des camarades de lutte dans la mesure ou ces 
camarades sont engages avec moi dans une lutte concrete et commune, dans 
l’unite d’un parti ou d’un groupement que je puis plus ou moins controler 
[...]. Mais je ne puis pas compter sur des hommes que je  ne connais pas en 
me fondant sur la bonte humaine ou sur l’interet de l ’homme pour le bien de 
la societe, etant donne que l’homme est libre, et qu’il n ’y a aucune nature 
humaine sur laquelle je puisse faire fond. 130
Freedom, then, does have its limits in the collective world of autrui. Sartre’s preference 
is for Engagement in common projects with common goals, where solidarity is totally 
dependent on each separate, concrete situation. The nature of this solidarity is thus 
political rather than idealistically Humanistic, but it nevertheless serves to unify 
disparate individuals and unite them in common action:
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126 Pour une Morale de I ’Ambiguite, p.218.
127 Bames, Hazel E., An Existentialist Ethics, p.463.
128 For a detailed account of the rift see Germaine Bree, Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment.
129 Ibid., p.248.
130 L Existentialisme est un Humanisme, pp.51-52.
197
Ainsi, puis-je dire ‘Je me bats contre 1’Autre’ en l’absence du Tiers. Mais 
des qu’il parait, les possibilites de l’Autre et les miennes propres s’etant 
nivelees en mortes-possibilites, le rapport devient reciproque et je suis 
contraint d’eprouver que ‘nous nous battons’. [...] Le projet du combat a 
germe dans son esprit comme dans le mien et, pour le tiers, il s’unifle en un 
seul projet. 131
Again, the «ows-subject is invoked by the cause o f common projects, and the boundary 
situations that arise in Sartrean theatre underline the necessity for a collective, if 
situational, ethic:
Garcin: Est-ce que nous ne pourrions pas essayer de nous aider les uns les 
autres? [...] Aucun de nous ne peut se sauver seul; il faut que 
nous nous perdions ensemble ou que nous nous tirions d ’affaire 
ensemble. 132
Garcin’s plea is not perhaps as doomed as it may appear, for when the door does open, 
the solidarity of a common project could well have led to mutual salvation. It seems that 
even in Hell, the Fundamental Choice of solidarity is the only viable means of 
progression, the only viable ethic. In the living Hell of revolution, solidarity is shown to 
be a necessity, and Sartre’s most revolutionary characters like Nasty rarely fail to incite 
collective action among the masses:
II y a deux especes de pauvres, ceux qui sont pauvres ensemble et ceux qui 
le sont tout seuls. Les premiers sont les vrais, les autres sont des riches qui 
n ’ont pas eu de chance. [...] On sert le Bien comme un soldat [...] et quel est 
le soldat qui gagne une guerre a lui tout seul? 133
The intimation here is that collective action is both more Authentic and more ethical 
than individual action, and that it is certainly more effective. Nasty’s (and Sartre’s) 
ethics of means and ends are best served by the collectivity, and Goetz extends this 
appreciation of solidarity to propose a solution to the problem of coexistence in the form 
of a redefinition of love: ‘Je voulais l’amour pur: niaiserie; s ’aimer, c’est hair le meme 
ennemi. ’ 134 Again, the idealism of Humanism, rejected in both L ’Etre et le Neant and 
L ’Existentialisme est un Humanisme, and parodied in the character of Hilda, is dashed 
as political solidarity takes precedence over emotional human harmony. As a pacifistic 
Humanist, Hilda treats all men as ends in themselves, and her conscience is most at ease 
when she feels part of the wider human community rather than marginalised as a 
political revolutionary: ‘Mes freres je ne vous reproche pas votre bonheur, mais je  me 
sentais plus a l’aise quand nous etions malheureux ensemble, car notre malheur etait 
celui de tous les hommes. ’135
With the publication of Les Sequestres d ’Altona and Critique de la Raison 
Dialectique Sartre’s Humanism became increasingly geared towards Marxism. At this 
stage, Sartrean philosophy on Being-for-Others becomes increasingly dominated by the 
politics of class and the struggle of the oppressed against the social phenomenon of 
scarcity. The earlier prospect of the rcows-subject and consciousness is diminished as the
131 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.490.
132 Huis Clos, p.63.
133 Le Diable et le Bon Dieu, p .122 and p.124.
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masses become the collective object of the permanent gaze and oppression of the ruling 
classes, which control the pratico-inerte and alienate their poorer victims. But the 
potential for this development was apparent from the very beginning:
Si une societe, de par sa structure economique ou politique, se divise en 
classes opprimantes, la situation des classes opprimantes offre aux classes 
opprimees l’image d’un tiers perpetuel qui les considere et les transcende 
par sa liberte. 136
With this political focus, the Other is finally defined as a concrete subject, and as Fretz’s 
analysis points out, Sartre’s belief in this progress provided sufficient grounds for him 
to contend that his ethics had been salvaged from the recurrent problem o f solipsism:
According to what Sartre says it is not till the Critique o f  Dialectical Reason 
that he has solved the problem of solipsism in a satisfactory way. It seems 
that this discontent at the solution of this problem in Being and Nothingness 
was also a reason not to publish the first ethics, which was inspired by this 
work. As long as he could not give an incontestable proof o f the existence of 
the other as a concrete ‘subject’, this ethics could only inevitably break 
down in an abstract and individualistic, not to say a mystifying approach, 
while according to his utterances in Existentialism and Humanism  an 
existentialist ethics should on the contrary respect the concrete subjectivity, 
i.e. the freedom of the other, in his social context. 137
This new social context serves to strengthen the unification o f the masses, for the more 
the ‘subject classes’ strive to increase the scarcity of matter, the more the ‘object 
classes’ will feel antagonised and thus forced into common action. For Sartre, this 
phenomenon shattered the seeming impasse of solipsism, and the prospect o f successful 
coexistence was finally recovered from the grave: ‘En fait, les “relations humaines” sont 
des structures interindividuelles dont le langage est le lien commun et qui existent en 
acte a tout moment de l’Histoire. La solitude n ’est qu’un aspect particulier de ces 
relations. ’ 138 This ethical development gives rise to fresh hope on two levels: firstly, by 
shifting the ontological focus from the personal individualism of L ’Etre et le Neant to 
the impersonal or historical inter-individualism of the Critique, Sartre saves Man from 
the solitude caused by the failure of all relationships; and secondly, by focusing on the 
social phenomenon of scarcity, he unwittingly intimates that conflict is contingent, for if 
scarcity, which is feasibly contingent in itself, could be abolished, then conflict, which 
is shown to arise through scarcity, must also be transcendable.139 However, this new 
philosophy must be regarded as more of a contradiction than a positive development. 
The relationships which in L ’Etre et le Neant were proven to culminate in failure have 
been salvaged by a phenomenon which is itself a contradiction:
Comment reconnaitre a la matiere le privilege d ’engendrer la reciprocity des 
relations, alors que les pour-soi ne pouvaient l’assurer eux-memes, et que la 
matiere assumee par les pour-soi semblait etre la veritable consecration du 
divorce entre les pour-soi? N ’y a-t-il pas contradiction a soutenir que la 
matiere est le lieu privilegie de la rencontre des pour-soi, alors qu’elle nous
136 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.492.
137 Het Individualiteitsconcept in Sartres Filosophie, p.243.
138 Critique de la Raison Dialectique, I, p.212.
139 For a fuller analysis of this reasoning, see Doubrovsky, J. S., ‘J-P. Sartre et le mythe de la raison 
dialectique’, La Nouvelle Revue Franqaise, 10, no.106 (1961), pp.687-98.
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etait apparue comme la source de la veritable alienation? 140
This untenable position on solidarity is seemingly even parodied by Ionesco, whose 
torture scene in La Soif et la Faim can be regarded as an attack on the ethics of Sartre’s 
Critique:
Frere Tarabas: a Brechtoll Malheureux! Vous ne croyez pas en Dieu!
Voila pourquoi vous vous imaginez que les hommes sont 
mediants. Voila pourquoi vous inventez une solidarity 
humaine improbable. 141
Disregarding, then, the attempts o f the Critique, the closest Sartre gets to 
transcending the failure of coexistence comes in the Cahiers, where we learn that 
sadism and masochism ‘n ’ont de sens -  comme d’ailleurs la lutte des consciences -  
qu’avant la conversion. Si nous avons assume le fait d’etre liberte et objet pour autrui 
(ex.: le Juif authentique) il n’y a plus aucune raison ontologique de rester sur le plan de 
la lutte. ’ 142 The conversion to pure reflection was discussed in relation to personal ethics 
and shown to represent a complex conduite magique, but in terms of autrui, it attempts 
to finally overcome the continuing problems of solipsism and conflict. Indeed, as 
Catalano reminds us, ‘Sartre consistently maintains that we have an intimate bond with 
others in the sense that “each person needs the other in order to be human” . ’ 143 If  this is 
the case, how does this collective Humanism work?
In the Cahiers Sartre was shown to link Authenticity with the unveiling of 
Being, and in the realm of autrui, he extends this conception of Being to include the 
Other: ‘Dans 1’authenticity je choisis de devoiler 1’Autre. Je vais aussi creer les hommes 
dans le monde. [...] Ceci ne peut etre [...] que sur le fondement de la reconnaissance de 
1’Autre comme liberte absolue. ’ 144 Thus the post-conversion project of creation becomes 
an authentic one which creates not only the existence of the Self, but, more importantly, 
the existence of the Other, which is then assumed as free. This project subsequently 
clears the way for successful relations with autrui: ‘En ma liberte, elle [la finitude de 
1’autre] est a l’abri: je suis celui qui voit son dos et qui detoumera de son dos le danger 
qu’il ne peut voir (ceci sans me detoumer de mes fms propres -  sinon ce serait sacrifice 
et negation de l’homme en moi) . ’ 145 There is certainly an element of altruism here, and 
Sartre’s appended qualification, though raising the question of directly opposing ends, 
does not obliterate the presumed contingency of ‘detoumera’, for which ‘peut detoumer’ 
would be a welcome replacement. However, this is perhaps not as shocking as it may 
appear, given that earlier in the notes Sartre had explicitly spelled out the successful 
relationships of understanding, help, and even love. 146 Here we learn that ‘la 
comprehension est une structure originelle de la perception de l’Autre’ (p.289) and that 
Tappel est generosite [...], refus de considerer le conflit originel des libertes comme 
impossible a depasser’ (p.293). This ‘generosite’ extends to an assumption of 
reciprocality, that the Other will actively seek ‘la libre reconnaissance de sa liberte par 
une liberte’ (p.294), and that ‘par cette reconnaissance reciproque, nous faisons 
apparaitre un certain type d’interpenetration des libertes qui pourrait bien etre le regne 
humain’ (p.302). As justification, Sartre gives the example o f the man running for a bus, 
who stretches out his hand and receives mine as a ‘moyen-liberte’ (p.299). At this
140 Presseault, Jacques, L Etre-pour-Autrui dans la Philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre, p.210.
141 Theatre IV, pp. 149-50.
142 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.26.
143 Good Faith and Other Essays, p.20.
144 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.515.
145 Ibid., p.523.
146 Ibid., pp.285-306, responses to the ‘appel’.
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moment, he maintains, the human relationship o f help comes into being (or, rather, is 
unveiled as Being), and the man discovers my freedom in the heart o f his very own.
Such optimism prefigures Sartre’s subsequent discussions on ethics with Benny 
Levy, where inter-penetrating consciousnesses are again on the agenda, but the notion of 
‘generosity’ can surely not go uncontested. In ‘refusing’ to accept the internal negation 
of consciousnesses as inevitably conflictive and in ‘assuming’ reciprocity, ‘generosity’ 
is surely a project of Bad Faith which is grounded purely in idealism; and, as Simont 
argues, its relationship with Being (here en-soi) is also idealistic:
We can question intrinsically the meaning of ‘generosity’ [...]. It transforms 
being which is what it is into being-for and affixes to the indifference of the 
in-itself a kind of finality in the second degree. We should recall here the 
operation of the artist, “mystification”: giving form to being in such a way 
as to make it point to an absent finality . 147
But Sartre continues in a similar vein, describing authentic love as a successful project 
combining the feeling of love (‘sentir’) and the pursuit o f love (‘vouloir’) with the 
‘angoisse’ that the love might cease. For this would assert our Freedom by providing a 
willed defence against the future, and thus constitute an authentic ‘amour comme 
tension’ . 148 However, Sartre had seemingly disenabled this very project less than 
seventy pages earlier:
Pas d’amour sans reconnaissance plus profonde et comprehension 
reciproque des libertes (dimension qui manque dans l’EN). Cependant tenter 
de faire un amour qui depasserait le stade sadico-masochiste du desir et de 
l’envoutement, c’est faire disparaitre l’amour, c’est-a-dire le sexuel comme 
type de devoilement de l’humain. 149
The contradictions again abound, and Sartre is tying himself in philosophical knots, 
particularly on the question of ‘devoilement’.
Sartre’s final attempt in the Cahiers to transcend the solipsism of his earlier 
work comes in the form of an ethic of leading by example: ‘C ’est la subjectivite 
concrete (le sujet isole ou le groupe, le parti) qui doit faire le Bien en face des autres, 
pour les autres et en exigeant de la diversite des autres qu’ils le fassent aussi.’ (p.575). 
The problems with this are manifest: the rcows-subject has suddenly transformed into a 
singular concrete subjectivity; the ethical aim remains gratuitous, imposed, and 
absolutist; and the means of forcing compliance remains a deliberate mystery. But 
objections are superfluous, for the failure is willing conceded:
Le Bien [...] est necessairement la quete des subjectivites concretes existant 
dans le monde au milieu d’autres subjectivites hostiles ou simplement 
diversement orientees. Non seulement il est mon ideal, mais c ’est aussi mon 
ideal qu’il devienne 1’ideal d’autrui. (p.576).
With this acceptance of double idealism, Sartre recognises once again that he has led us 
down an ethical blind alley.
The only remaining attempts to restore the viability o f a collective Sartrean ethic 
merely replicate the unworkable solutions attempted with personal ethics. The first is 
the recourse to the Kantian Categorical Imperative, invoked in L ’Existentialisme est un
147 Simont, Juliette, ‘Sartrean ethics’, in The Cambridge Companion to Sartre, pp.178-210, (p.193).
148 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.493.
149 Ibid., p.430.
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Humanisme to circumvent the problem of ethical freedom. The problems with this have 
been discussed, but the main objection here must be the obvious contradiction between 
the universality o f the Kantian model and the situational aspect o f Sartre’s own ethics 
which provided his only real potential for solidarity. The second attempt lies in the 
‘radical conversion’ of pure reflection which is said to lead to Authenticity. In the 
context of Being-for-Others, this depends on our own response to our objectification in 
the eyes o f the Other, 150 and on living out this objectification to the full. 151 The objection 
to this remains the lack of elucidation of Authenticity and the inherent contradiction of 
Sartre’s terminology. As Howells remarks, even Sartre is aware of the futility o f both 
attempts:
Sartre uses Genet both as a test-case for his view that conventional morality 
is alienating, and as a vehicle for the exploration of his interest in ethical 
inversion and paradox. In a sense, Sartre has pitted Genet against Kant in an 
attempt to reveal the inadequacies of both . 152
The only option left is thus to freely assume the failure, for as Sartre himself declares, 
‘L ’echec peut conduire a la conversion. ’ 153 This is the option favoured by both Jeanson 
and de Beauvoir, and it is potentially a solution also to the central problem of 
Authenticity, for it encourages an acceptance of the desagregation intime, thus 
providing an alternative to Bad Faith which is unaffected by Sincerity: M an’s only 
Authentic choice is to transcend what is transcendable and to freely assume what is not.
Ionesco’s attempts at securing a collective ethic are unsurprisingly multifarious. 
With Ionesco, too, there is direct contradiction with the previous demolition of human 
relationships, as love and friendship are invoked in a desperate attempt to find solace 
from the isolating pain of metaphysical Anguish: ‘La seule petite consolation au grand 
malheur d’etre ne, c’est quand meme l’amitie. ’ 154 Ionesco associates love with 
spirituality and grace, and the theme again links in with the craving for Paradise Lost. It 
was in his moments of euphoria that he transcended from the “I” to the consciousness of 
the “we”, and if his euphoria could be sustained, it seems that authentic love could 
indeed be resurrected. Man’s tragedy, perhaps, is that he has forgotten how to love, and 
that this is the true significance of the Second Fall. Ionesco’s plays are filled with the 
tragedy of the loss of love, both in the context of society at large and within the nucleus 
of the sequestered couple, and the temptation is to believe that if  only we knew how to 
love, we would be able to fly even higher than Berenger and re-enter the true paradise, 
unlike the misguided Jean. Love and evanescence are as inseparable as violent hatred 
and gravitation or sinking, and the message o f La So if et la Faim is surely that the 
Absolute craved by the protagonist is the restoration of authentic love.
On a personal level too, Ionesco clearly associates love with the plenitude of 
Being, for he refers to his life-long partner as an ‘lie d ’etre entouree par le chaos du 
rien ’ , 155 and goes on to declare his belief in the undeniable reality of love: ‘Mon amour 
n ’est pas irreel, l’amour n ’est pas irreel. La vie de l’amour est d ’une realite irrefutable. 
Je suis certain, maintenant, que 1’amour est etemellement irrefutable. ’ 156 Although again 
at odds with the pessimism of the earlier plays and journals, this re-found belief in love 
finds some consistency in later Ionescan thought. It is certainly evident in the later 
plays, where the increasing conflict actually necessitates a counterbalance in the form of
150 See Saint Genet, comedien et martyr for Sartre’s psychoanalytical exploration of the theme.
151 See Reflexions sur la Question Juive and earlier comments on Authenticity.
152 Sartre: The Necessity o f Freedom, p.44.
153 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.42. See also Chapter Two, pp.96-97.
154 Un homme en question, p.l 1.




In the later plays of Ionesco the theme of love has assumed an increasing 
importance as the answer to what he has come to recognise as in many ways 
the most distressing cause of human misery: man’s cruelty to his fellows, 
something which is not imposed upon mankind from without and the more 
terrifying for that. 157
Love is Ionesco’s answer to Sartre’s common action and pure reflection, and serves 
again to underline their very different forms of Humanism. The only authentic ‘love’ 
relationship to be found in Sartrean theatre is arguably that between Hugo and Hoederer, 
for Hugo’s love, at least in retrospect, seems selfless, genuine, and even desperate:
J ’aimais Hoederer, Olga. Je l’aimais plus que je  n ’ai aime personne au 
monde. J’aimais le voir et l’entendre, j ’aimais ses mains et son visage et, 
quand j ’etais avec lui, tous mes orages s’apaisaient. Ce n ’est pas mon crime 
qui me tue, c ’est sa mort.158
Hugo’s grief reminds us of the relative inauthenticity o f his relationship with Jessica, 
and it is surely no coincidence that the most authentic relationship is struck between two 
men, thus avoiding the inevitability of objectification and reinforcing the misogyny. 
Ionesco, on the other hand, does succeed in creating loving relationships, or at least 
loving interdependence, between members of the opposite sex: ‘Pour [Ionesco] 
1’affection existe, bien qu’elle se deteriore au fil des annees. L ’epoux, ou l’epouse, est 
un etre sur qui Ton peut s’appuyer, ou du moins avec qui Ton peut gemir. ’ 159 Although 
this deterioration from authentic love to affectionate companionship, encapsulated most 
effectively in Les Chaises, marks the general pattern of the Ionescan couple, there are 
occasions in Ionesco’s theatre where love thrives in the face of adversity and where it 
actually blossoms with age:
La Vieille: J ’ai bien appris l’amour, mon cheri. Je t ’aime de plus en
plus, chaque jour un peu plus. Tu es le seul que je  ne 
comprenne pas, c’est pour cela que je t ’aime avec une si 
grande douleur. 160
Apart from this most touching scene, the most genuine love is usually portrayed in the 
autobiographical triangular relationship of the father, mother, and daughter. Le Pieton 
de I ’Air attests to the potency of this heartfelt melange of paternal, maternal, and filial 
love, and it is taken up again in La So if et la Faim, where it is realised all too late by the 
unfortunate protagonist:
Jean: a Marthe et Marie-Madeleine Attendez-moi, vous que
j ’aime par dessus tout. La tendresse que j ’ai pour vous depasse 
les cimes des montagnes.161
Thus Ionesco’s ultimate focus on love is both romantic and spiritual, and highly un- 
Sartrean. Love is reinstated as a Humanist goal and value, and in a return to the theme
157 North, R. J., Eugene Ionesco: An inaugural lecture delivered at the University o f Birmingham, p.7.
158 Les Mains Sales, p.234.
159 Jacquart, Emmanuel C., Le Theatre de derision, p .121.
160 Jeux de Massacre, Theatre V, p.92.
161 Theatre IV, p. 170.
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of the radiance of childhood, it is appropriately another young Marthe who teaches us 
that love is the answer to the problems of human conflict: ‘Aime les gens. Si tu les 
aimes, ils ne seront plus des etrangers. Si tu n ’en as pas peur, ils ne sont plus des 
monstres. Ils ont peur aussi, eux, dans leur carapace. Aime-les. II n ’y aura plus 
d ’enfer. ’ 162 Love is then for Ionesco both the sharp tool to pierce the shell o f autrui, and 
the only means of exit from the Hell of coexistence.
The collective ethic that results from this new emphasis on love is a Humanist 
one which is characterised by treating Man as an end in himself and thus, for Ionesco, 
by pacifism: ‘Toute vie doit etre sauvee, toute vie est source de soufffance, mais aussi 
de joie et de contemplation. ’ 163 Ionesco respects the value of human life above the 
politics of, say, scarcity and alienation, and like Camus and Hilda above, his Humanism 
can be seen to be much more universal than Sartre’s:
Je dois convaincre les hommes de ne plus se detester. En somme, s’il y avait 
l’amitie entre eux, sinon 1’amour, tous les autres problemes pourraient se 
resoudre facilement. II y a deja quelqu’un qui a voulu faire cela: c ’est Dieu.
II a echoue. II faudrait etre plus fort que Dieu .164
Ionesco’s mission here is messianic, and in this respect highly uncharacteristic. But it 
clearly defines the challenges for his Humanism and invigorates fresh hope in the 
promise of solidarity. Even Ionesco’s earlier plays testify to this collective ethic of 
Humanism, and in Tueur sans gages Berenger’s attempts to convince the Killer of his 
error, despite the fact that they culminate in failure, at least provide the basis for a 
Humanist code of morality:
Vous etes un etre humain, nous sommes de la meme espece, nous devons 
nous entendre, c’est notre devoir... au bout de quelques instants, je  vous ai 
aime, ou presque... car nous sommes freres..., et si je  vous deteste je  dois me 
detester moi-meme... Ne riez pas: cela existe, la solidarity, la fratemite 
humaine, j ’en suis convaincu, ne vous moquez pas . . . 165
The same ethic is expounded by Frere Tarabas in La So if et la Faim, who points out the 
necessity of Humanism for a successful avoidance of solipsism and solitude:
Nous nous devons des services les uns aux autres. Nous sommes des 
humains. Nous avons des obligations les uns vis-a-vis des autres, a moins de 
preferer la cage de la solitude. Mais cela n ’est pas un endroit confortable.
Vous ne pouvez y tenir ni tout a fait debout, ni tout a fait assis. 166
Ionesco’s final attempt at solidarity marks a return to his obsession with the 
Absurd. Following Heidegger, Ionesco creates a ‘fraternity of Anguish’ which 
resembles the Heideggerian notion of Care, based on a perception o f the human 
condition as ‘being fated to a self and to a world of other selves and objects about which 
one cannot choose not to be concerned’ . 167 For Ionesco, though, the Anguish is 
metaphysical, and in solidarity lies the key to a better, if  admittedly not Edenic, passage 
through the turbulence of life:
162 Le Pieton de I 'Air, Theatre III, p. 181.
163 Antidotes, p. 18.
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165 Theatre II, p. 166.
166 Theatre IV,p.\6A.
167 See Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Heidegger and ‘Being and Time’, p .l 12.
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Une fratemite fondee sur la metaphysique est plus sure qu’une fratemite ou 
une camaraderie fondees sur la politique. [...] C’est le sentiment de 
l’etonnement et de l’emerveillement face au monde que nous contemplons, 
lie au sentiment que tout est, en meme temps, soufffance, c ’est cela qui peut 
constituer la base fondamentale d ’une fratemite et d ’un humanisme 
metaphysique. L ’enfer c’est les autres, est la formule celebre d ’un ecrivain 
et philosophe contemporain. Les autres c ’est nous-memes, peut-on repondre.
Si nous ne pouvons faire un paradis de notre vie commune, nous pouvons en 
faire un passage moins desagreable, moins epineux. 168
The contrasts with Sartrean Humanism are directly apparent, and in invoking the idea of 
collective suffering, Ionesco seeks an outlet from the previous failure o f any successful 
coexistence. Ionesco’s early protest at the astonishing cmelty of the human condition 
becomes collective in the world of Being-for-Others, and it seems that his characters are 
forced  into mutual understanding by the common condition which unites them:
Qu’ils le veuillent ou non, les hommes comprennent tous les autres 
hommes: la faim, la soif, la mort, 1’amour, la haine, l ’angoisse, la peur, 
l’avarice, l’envie et la jalousie, la curiosite, le desir de posseder ou de se 
retirer, le besoin de Dieu, tout se comprend, des uns par les autres. 169
La soufffance d’un seul etre est la soufffance de tous les etres. 170
O f all these sufferings and causes of Anguish the most significant for Ionesco is of 
course the outrage of mortality, for it is the fear and reality o f death above all else that 
ultimately forms the tme community o f Man. Philosophically speaking, Ionesco’s 
insistence on a universal human nature provides the strongest basis for fraternity and a 
collective human ethic. The theme is explored in L ’Impromptu de I ’Alma by the 
character of Ionesco himself:
Comme je ne suis pas seul au monde, comme chacun de nous, au plus 
profond de son etre, est en meme temps tous les autres, mes reves, mes 
desirs, mes angoisses, mes obsessions ne m ’appartiennent pas en propre; 
cela fait partie d’un heritage ancestral, un tres ancien depot, constituant le 
domaine de toute l’humanite. C’est, par-dela leur diversite exterieure, ce qui 
reunit les hommes et constitue notre profonde communaute, le langage 
universel. 171
Man’s inevitable coexistence in the world is described here as a shared experience of 
universality, and the basis for a Humanist ethic thus seems complete. But a basis is all 
that it transpires to be, for it is neither consistently upheld nor clearly defined.
As with Sartre, then, Ionesco’s attempts at establishing a collective ethic can 
only be regarded as intermittent and contradictory. His desire to unite rather than 
sequester humanity can be seen to be dependent on his mood, and the whole issue of 
coexistence is ultimately at the mercy of the Ionescan desagregation intime: when 
feeling euphoric, the emphasis is on fraternity; when sinking into despair, coexistence is 
irreparably doomed.
168 Antidotes, pp.325-26.
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Although both dramatists certainly have the will to determine a collective 
Humanist ethic, both can be seen to fail through blatant self-contradiction. Later 
Ionescan thought does reveal a persistent pursuit o f peaceful coexistence in advocating 
the value of love, but even the later plays are dominated by a cycle o f brutality and a 
violent apathy which, like that of the Tueur (sans gages), laughs in the face of 
Humanism and triumphs. In Sartre’s attempts to secure a workable morality for the 
masses, the same problems are encountered as with personal ethics: any attempt to 
install an Existentialist ethic conflicts with personal freedom and falls prey to the trap of 
Seriousness. Neither playwright finds an answer to the problem of ethical judgement, 
for in the absence of God, the role of moral arbiter lies vacant. Indeed the only potential 
judge transpires to be the crab, who judges both Sartre’s Frantz and Ionesco’s 
Josephine, and with the re-emergence of the crab, we appear to have come full circle.
For both Sartre and Ionesco, the philosophy o f nous crumbles inexorably into 
nothingness. The acknowledgements of Ionesco’s Vieux to ‘la solidarity universelle de 
tous les hommes’ 172 prove to be as empty as his room; and Sartre’s Lucie reaches the 
same conclusion as Ionesco -  that coexistence is all very well, but it is annihilated by 
the irreducible fact that she will face her death alone: ‘Notre vie, oui. Notre avenir. Je 
vivais dans l’attente, je t ’aimais dans l’attente. [...] Je n ’ai plus d ’avenir, je  n ’attends 
plus que ma mort et je mourrai seule. ’173 Even the ontology o f Sartre’s rcows-subject is 
shown to culminate in failure, and with the condemnation o f this emotional Bad Faith 
comes a final rejection of Mitsein'.
L’experience du nous-sujet est un pur evenement psychologique et subjectif 
en une conscience singuliere [...] qui n ’apparait pas sur le fondement d ’une 
relation ontologique concrete avec les autres et qui ne realise aucun 
‘mitsein’ . 174
The nous-object must also be rejected, for in the absence of God, the only permanent 
tiers, the collective’s objectivity can only possibly be transient and situational. Even 
solidarity, then, is doomed, for the Pour-soi is alienated as a stranger among autrui, and 
the Humanist ethic remains elusive:
Celui qui s’eprouve comme constituant un Nous avec les autres hommes se 
sent englue parmi une infinite d ’existences etrangeres, il est aliene 
radicalement et sans recours. [...] Ce ‘nous’ humaniste demeure un concept 
vide, une pure indication d ’une extension possible de l ’usage ordinaire du 
nous. 175
The possible morality of utilitarianism explored in the realm of personal ethics -  the 
greatest freedom for the greatest number -  is also condemned by Sartre, since even the 
attempt to ‘respect the Other’s freedom’, invoked also in the post-conversion project of 
creation, fails for the same reasons as love, and the opposite morality of indifference is 
reconfirmed as a definite impasse:
Le respect de la liberte d’autrui est un vain mot: si meme nous pouvions 
projeter de respecter cette liberte, chaque attitude que nous prendrions vis-a- 
vis de 1’autre serait un viol de cette liberte que nous pretendions respecter.
L ’attitude extreme qui se donnerait comme totale indifference en face de
172 Les Chaises, Theatre I, p. 176.
173 Morts sans Sepulture, Theatre I, p.246.
174 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.497.
175 Ibid., p.491 and p.495.
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l’autre n ’est pas non plus une solution: nous sommes deja jetes dans le 
monde en face de 1’autre, notre surgissement est libre limitation de sa liberte 
et rien, pas meme le suicide, ne peut modifier cette situation originelle. 176
Ethics and successful Humanistic coexistence prove then to be illusory and elusive for 
both Ionesco and Sartre, and in the final analysis, any attempt at securing them can only 
be regarded as a flight from the Absurd, from the failure of all relationships.
176 Ibid., pp.480-81.
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iv) Solitude and Isolation
The failure of indifference and the ontological impossibility of the ideal fusions o f en- 
soi-pour-soi and pour-soi-pour-autrui leave the Self in the Absurd position of being 
forced to live out an impossible coexistence with others. The world o f Being-for-Others 
can be seen to merely compound the Anguish of pourso i, which is fated in isolation 
never to catch up with itself, 177 and doomed in the collective to a ceaseless oscillation 
between the subject and the object of the Other:
Ainsi sommes-nous renvoyes indefiniment de TAutre-objet a TAutre-sujet 
et reciproquement; la course ne s’arrete jamais et c ’est cette course, avec ses 
inversions brusques de direction, qui constitue notre relation a Autrui. 178
Sartre’s definition of Man as a ‘passion inutile’ seems particularly apt in the light o f the 
revelations of the futile nature of attempts at coexistence. The tension or precarious 
balance which seems to characterise the relationship between the Self and the Other is 
also a feature of Ionescan thought, which acknowledges the necessary impossibility of 
life in the collective:
Chaque moi affirme et nie le groupe. Chaque moi est social-antisocial. 179
II faut etre moitie tout le monde, c’est-a-dire, un peu tout le monde, moitie 
les autres, moitie soi-meme. Le ‘tout le monde’ c ’est le ‘on’ impersonnel, 
c’est le vide. II faut etre personnel. Moi, c’est ce qui s’oppose aux autres, les 
autres sont ceux qui s’opposent a moi. C’est cette opposition, cet equilibre 
qui constitue le personnel. 180
Ionesco’s definition of ‘the personal’ is fascinating here, for it is reminiscent of Jeanson 
and de Beauvoir’s answer to the problems of coexistence, assuming, rather than 
negating or transcending, the failure and the tension, and linking once again with the 
desagregation intime. However, on the stage, the tension is assumed again as Hell, and 
Berenger’s protest at the Absurd contradiction reinforces the terrible problems which 
inevitably arise in the presence of the Other: ‘Lorsqu’il n ’y a pas un accord total entre 
moi du dedans et moi du dehors c’est la catastrophe, la contradiction universelle, la 
cassure. ’ 181 He could just as easily be the mouthpiece for Sartrean thought: ‘Ces deux 
tentatives que je suis sont opposees. Chacune d’elles est la mort de l ’autre, c ’est-a-dire 
que l’echec de Tune motive Tadoption de Tautre. ’182 Again one is reminded of the polar 
ambiguity of p o u rso i’s facticity and transcendence, an ambiguity which dominates the 
ethical and which is merely replicated in I ’etre-pour-autrui.
This permanent state of ambiguity, tension, and oscillation which is conveyed 
most powerfully in the theatre of both thinkers ceases only in death, the phenomenon 
which obsesses Ionesco and which marks the gratuitous cessation of Sartre’s 
temporality and nothingness. If the Self has been revealed as a victim at the mercy of 
autrui, then the phenomenon of death must represent not only the extinction of personal 
existence, but the victorious and inescapable triumph of the Other:
177 See L ’Etre et le Neant, p.253.
178 Ibid., p.479.
179 Journal en miettes, p.254.
180 Present passe, Passe present, p.61.
181 Tueur sans gages, Theatre II, p.73.
182 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.430.
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La mort, en tant qu’elle peut se reveler a moi [...] n ’est pas seulement le 
projet qui detruit tout les projets et qui se detruit lui-meme, 1’impossible 
destruction de mes attentes: elle est le triomphe du point de vue d ’autrui sur 
le point de vue que je  suis sur moi-meme.183
In this context, Huis Clos is an exemplary piece a these, for its dead characters are 
finally fixed in their essence, and the objectifying gaze of their two fellows is therefore 
all the more judgmental. As Garcin remarks, their Anguish is not even restricted to the 
claustrophobic Hell which they inhabit, for their essence, their past, and its significance 
lie also in the hands of their acquaintances on Earth: ‘Ils ne m ’oublient pas, eux. Ils 
mourront, mais d’autres viendront, qui prendront la consigne: je  leur ai laisse ma vie 
entre les mains. ’184 Garcin’s jeux sont faits, and he can do nothing but observe as others 
tear him apart in their judgements: ‘Etre mort, c’est etre en proie aux vivants. ’ 185
Again there is a replication between the modes of pour-soi and pour-autrui, for 
if  death is the final victory of en-soi in terms of the individual consciousness, in the 
realm of Being-for-Others, it marks the victory of the pole of facticity. Because 
transcendence extinguishes with the death of the consciousness, the Self becomes fixed, 
which is ironically and absurdly the state it craves during its lifetime. Thus Authenticity, 
like Sincerity and Good Faith, comes into play with the phenomenon of death, for 
judgements can finally be made on a finite number of projects and a complete course of 
action. In Bad Faith, of course, this judgement is precipitated, as pour-soi submits in 
advance to the objectification of autrui: ‘La caracteristique d ’une vie morte, c’est que 
c ’est une vie dont l’Autre se fait le gardien. ’ 186 For Ionesco, too, death is doubly Absurd: 
for the puppet, it is the ultimate senseless outrage o f metaphysics; and in the social 
world of coexistence, its paroxysmal proliferation in the later plays merely reinforces its 
futility, showing clearly that murder profits nobody, that it fails.
Aware of the tension brought into the world by the existence of the Other and 
the inevitable victory of autrui effected by the Absurdity o f human mortality, the Self is 
naturally disposed to seek refuge in the form of flight. As the Ionescan puppet is in any 
case inclined towards solitude and sequestration, its modes o f flight are the same 
whether fleeing coexistence or existence itself. Thus the puppet escapes from the Other 
through levitation, enlisement, metamorphosis, regression, alcohol, suicide, and the 
unconscious. The failure of these has been discussed, but the recent comments on death 
bring a fresh futility to the project of suicide; and metamorphosis, say, into a rhinoceros 
has particular poignancy in the context of Being-for-Others, since the uniformity of the 
thick skin provides the character inside with an effective barrier from the threat o f the 
regard. The most interesting development of the flight tendency, though, is the aspect of 
humour, which is used consistently by Ionesco’s characters -  especially by Berenger -  
to counteract the inevitability of future conflict. For Sartre, who is primarily concerned 
with the agent engaged in the concrete situation, flight is condemned both for pour-soi 
and pour-autrui. However, the conduites magiques uncovered in the doomed attempts 
o f pour-soi to flee from autrui are occasionally quite different from those of distraction 
-  the attempt of pour-soi to flee its own consciousness. They involve blinking (hence 
the suppression of blinking in Huis Clos), Ionescan-style sequestration behind doors, 
walls, and objects (like that of Frantz, and Pierre in Le Mur), madness, fainting, and 
suicide. But the conduite absent from the ontology of L ’Etre et le Neant but very 
evident in the plays is that of action: given that action has been shown to be superfluous
183 Ibid., pp.624-25.
184 Huis Clos, p.82.
185 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.628.
186 Ibid., p.626.
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and futile (for all acts are equivalent), then a project of action such as Goetz’s at the end 
o f Le Diable et le Bon Dieu can only be interpreted as another means of flight from the 
reality of Being-for-Others -  in this case, from Hilda.
A common form of flight for both Ionesco and Sartre is the Heideggerian flight 
into the crowd (Menge). This contradictory flight from  people into people is of course 
Heidegger’s hallmark of Inauthenticity. It is another obsession o f Ionesco, who is 
fascinated by the plight of the authentic individual pitted against the inauthentic 
collective explored so well in his Rhinoceros. But it is not exclusively an Ionescan 
theme, for the oppressive classes of Sartrean theory and theatre, such as the torturers of 
Morts sans Sepulture and the white bourgeoisie of La Putain Respectueuse, are equally 
condemned for the inauthenticity of their existence. The crowd, however, provides little 
solace, and perhaps the most distressing aspect of both dramatists’ philosophy of Being- 
for-Others is that characters are lonely especially in company:
II y a la solitude en commun. C’est celle-la qui est mauvaise. La vraie 
solitude est moins isolement que recueillement. 187
Ionesco’s characters may be isolated and lonely in a metaphysical sense, but 
they are by no means the tramps and outsiders o f Beckett and Adamov, and 
this, in some sense, increases the despair and the absurdity of their isolation 
-  they are lonely in spite of being members of what ought to be an organic 
community. 188
Ionesco thus makes a distinction between isolation and sequestered contemplation, 
declaring that true (Authentic) solitude is discovered in the latter. But it seems that 
generally, his characters are prey to the former, lonely in their drawing rooms, in their 
marriages, and even in their dreams. Indeed the wonder is that they choose to stay 
together: couples like the generic Lui and Elle may tear each other apart, both verbally 
and physically, but they appear to prefer their delire a deux to total isolation. Invariably, 
then, Ionesco’s creations are together alone, yearning for communal happiness, but 
finding nothing but collective isolation.
Sartre’s stage characters are equally lonely within the crowd. Although united in 
a common project, characters such as Hilda and Nasty, and Olga and Hoederer are 
isolated by their ethical convictions; although o f common blood, Electre and Oreste, and 
Frantz and Le Pere fight like total strangers. The occasional attempt, like that o f Lizzie, 
to join and win the favour of the crowd also culminates in failure, effecting merely an 
increased sense of isolation. Even Sartre’s heroes, rather than leading the united masses, 
tend to operate alone or even disappear completely:
La plupart des heros sartriens se heurtent a l’impossibilite de communiquer 
avec autrui, a ce mur invisible qui les prive de tout contact immediat avec 
les etres et les choses. Oreste est seul (il ne parvient pas a entrainer Electre 
dans sa liberation), Garcin est seul, irremediablement seuls Lucie, Frantz,
Goetz. 189
If any common ground can be established on the issue of Authenticity between 
Ionesco and Sartre, then it is surely in the link between Authenticity and individualism. 
If most of Sartre’s heroes find themselves alone, then so does Ionesco’s Everyman, 
kneeling at the mercy of the Killer, protecting himself from the rhinoceroses, and
187 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, p. 135.
188 Esslin, Martin, The Theatre of the Absurd, p .198.
189 Boros, Marie-Denise, Un Sequestre: L ’Homme Sartrien, p. 179.
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crawling back onto his throne to face the fate o f death. According to Sartre, it is only in 
isolation that pour-soi is in complete control of its own destiny: ‘Avec le regard 
d ’autrui, la ‘situation’ m ’echappe ou, pour user d’une expression banale, mais qui rend 
bien notre pensee: je ne suis plus maitre de la situation. ’190 It is o f course the 
Existentialist goal to be the master of one’s own situation, and if autrui poses a threat to 
this goal, then the first step to Authenticity must lie in solitude. The picture of 
Authenticity which is built up in Reflexions sur la Question Juive is also based on 
individualism. Sartre suggests here that the Authentic Jew is the one who lives out his 
condition to the full, in defiance of the Other, and in a revolt so self assured that it will 
terminate only in martyrdom; and Inauthenticity, by contrast, is characterised by the 
negative attributes of flight, distraction, and adherence to the crowd. Again, Sartre’s 
adulation of Genet springs to mind, as does Goetz’s powerful conclusion to Le Diable et 
le Bon Dieu: ‘Je resterai seul avec ce ciel vide au-dessus de ma tete, puisque je  n ’ai pas 
d ’autre maniere d’etre avec tous. II y a cette guerre a faire et je  la ferai’ (p.242). The fate 
awaiting him is surely one of lonely martyrdom.
The close connections with Heideggerian Authenticity cannot be overstated. We 
have seen, in relation to Ionesco’s fraternity of Anguish, that ‘anxiety individualizes’ , 191 
and Anguish is thus one means of overcoming Inauthenticity through the ‘recuperation 
of self-putrefied Being’ invoked by Sartre in L ’Etre et le Neant. For Heidegger too, 
Authenticity is linked with solitude, and Inauthenticity with the Tostness’ of Mitsein:
If Dasein is always thrown into a world whose roles and categories are 
structured in inherently impersonal ways, in which idle talk, curiosity and 
ambiguity predominate, then absorption in the they-self will be its default 
position. It may then be able to find itself, but only by recovering itself from 
an original lostness. In this sense, authenticity always involves overcoming 
inauthenticity. 192
Heidegger is a common source of influence for Sartre and Ionesco’s thinking on 
Authenticity, and Ionesco’s plays provide a powerful demonstration o f both the ethical 
and ontological virtues of solitude. Ionesco is particularly unequivocal in his love and 
defence of solitude: ‘Les gens [...] ont un besoin pro fond de solitude. Ce dont souffle le 
monde modeme, c’est de l’absence de solitude. ’ 193 Indeed this absence of solitude is 
shown to culminate in violence, brutality, and war, which define the Authentic Man as 
the outsider, the contemplator, and the gentle pacifist; and with the victory o f violent 
conflict over love and sensibility, the collective ethic is replaced by solitude, inertia, and 
despair:
Quand 1’amour, la bonte, la generosite, la sensibilite, l’amitie, la morale et la 
religion ont ete ecrases sous les roues des canons de la guerre et ont disparu, 
a quoi sert d’etre ecrivain engage ou de ne pas l’etre, a quoi bon parler de 
l’amour et de l’amitie? 194
Authenticity is thus the absent goal of Being-for-Others and collective ethics, and with 
its final downfall in the realm of the Other comes a severe threat to Humanism and an 
inevitable return to solipsism.
190 L ’Etre et le Neant, p.323.
191 Heidegger, M., Being and Time, 40: 235. See Stephen Mulhall, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to 
Heidegger and Being and Time ’, p. 110.
192 Mulhall, Stephen, ibid., p. 108.
193 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, p. 135.
194 Kamyabi Mask, Ahmed, Ionesco et son theatre, p.46.
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In L ’Etre et le Neant, Sartre defines ontological solipsism as ‘se debarrasser 
entierement du concept de 1’ autre et prouver qu’il est inutile a la constitution de mon 
experience’ (p.284). It goes without saying that neither Sartre nor Ionesco is guilty of 
ontological solipsism. However, Fretz’s analysis of Sartre’s concept of the individual in 
the same work leaves the philosopher guilty o f egoism, metaphysical solipsism, and 
epistemological solipsism, 195 and in the light of Sartre’s ontology of relationships and of 
his failure to construct a viable collective ethic, it seems difficult to contest this 
condemnation. The links between the modes of pour-soi and pour-autrui have been 
consistently apparent, and both transpire to be equally doomed, for if  in the former Man 
is condemned to be free, and thus devoid of personality, Authenticity, and justified 
ethics, in the latter he is condemned to be alone, and the consequences are exactly the 
same. The futile Absurdity of this reveals salvation in autrui as just another dangling 
carrot:
Comme la conscience est definie en termes de manque, neant, detotalisation, 
les relations entre les pour-soi apparaissent sur leur mode propre d ’etre et se 
voient condamnes a chercher les consciences sans jamais les atteindre . 196
It was certainly more of a utopian desire than an expressed intention o f Ionesco 
to overcome the problem of solipsism. Thus the critique o f Tynan, the champion of 
Sartre and Brecht, is doubly ironic: ‘Le danger qui menace M. Ionesco est de s’enfermer 
dans cette galerie des glaces, connue, en philosophic, sous le nom de solipsisme. ’ 197 
Ionesco is certainly well aware exactly what solipsism is, for it is a response to 
coexistence which dominates his journals and explodes with all his Anguish onto his 
stage. Ionesco’s response to Tynan makes his position unequivocally clear: ‘In his last 
bout with Tynan, Ionesco parrots his “bete noire”, Jean-Paul Sartre, to prove his point: 
C ’est un enfer le social, un enfer les autres N 9% The irony is completed with Ionesco’s 
inspired use of Sartre as a weapon of attack against his defender, and again, it underlines 
the convergence between the two thinkers, this time on the theme o f solipsism. It has 
been said that the Hell described by Sartre is dramatised by Ionesco, and when Hell 
becomes solipsism, it is not only conveyed by literality (as in Le Nouveau Locataire) 
and by the absent communication of silence (as in La Cantatrice), but verbally 
articulated by the victims themselves. Thus when Daisy informs Berenger that ‘la vie en 
commun n ’est plus possible’ , 199 this is reasoned by Josephine in a play written three 
years later: ‘Je suis abandonnee, j ’ai peur, tellement peur. Je suis egaree. Errante... On 
ne me connait pas, on ne m ’aime pas, je  ne suis rien pour les autres. Je ne compte pas 
pour eux. Je ne compte pas pour eux . ’200 Josephine’s perception of her social and 
metaphysical orphanage marks her as a victim of the solipsism of autrui, and it 
foreshadows its inversion which is established in Le Solitaire:
J ’etais le seul a etre. A mesure que les autres passaient et s’eclipsaient, je  me 
sentais unique dans ce tourbillon qui ne pouvait etre reel. Le reel devenait 
une sorte d’espace vide que je  remplissais. Une dilatation euphorique du 
moi, et plus il me semblait que ‘tout cela’ n ’existait qu’a peine, plus cela me 
confirmait dans ma certitude d’etre, (p.60).
195 Het Individualiteitsconcept in Sartres Filosophie, p.250.
196 Presseault, Jacques, L ’Etre-pour-Autrui dans la Philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre, p.9.
197 See Notes et contre-notes, p. 145.
198 Jacquart, Emmanuel C., ‘Ionesco’s Political Interplay’, in The Dream and the Play: Ionesco’s 
Theatrical Quest, ed. Mosche Lazar, p.67. The reference is to Notes et contre-notes, p. 159.
199 Rhinoceros, Theatre III, p.l 14.
200 Le Pieton de I ’Air, Theatre III, p. 181.
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The novel’s title merely reinforces the theme, and its solitary protagonist is dicing not 
only with ontological solipsism, but also with complete indifference.
At the end of their philosophical journeys, then, the Sartrean agent and the 
Ionescan puppet have reached a destination identical to the one from which they sprang: 
they have come full circle, via different routes, through an elaborate labyrinth o f vicious 
circles. Both have returned to the ontological or metaphysical sequestration which they 
encountered with their perception of the Absurd, and Absurdity becomes the final cruel 
victor. The Anguish suffered by both the agent and the puppet in isolation is merely 
compounded in their forced coexistence, as life is transposed from the solitude of 
philosophy to the rat race portrayed on the stage:
Georges: La vie, c ’est une panique dans un theatre en feu. Tout le
monde cherche la sortie, personne ne la trouve, tout le 
monde cogne sur tout le monde.201
The metaphor is particularly effective, conveying not only the pain o f being abandoned 
together alone, but also the aptitude of the genre o f theatre to elucidate the philosophy of 
life.
The final conclusion of both Sartre and Ionesco seems to be that there is 
ultimately no escape from the Absurdity of the human condition, that autrui provides 
nothing but an unwelcome distraction from the S elfs  desire to be\
Le desir d’etre, qui est en effet la structure la plus fondamentale du pour-soi, 
se traduit necessairement, sur le plan du pour-autrui, en conflit: on ne 
cherche pas a etre en-soi-pour-autrui, mais en-soi-pour-soi.202
La dramaturgic de Ionesco n ’a comme preoccupation que de rendre sensible 
l’impossibilite absolue de compter sur l’autre pour echapper aux contraintes 
primordiales de 1’existence.203
In the light of the resounding failure to construct a collective ethic and of the renewed 
failure of Authenticity, the Humanist ideal aimed at by the dramatists must be severely 
challenged. If their philosophies of Humanism succeed at all, it is only on the level of 
individualism, and ideally in sequestration, and even then they are characterised by 
insufficiency and contradiction. Both Sartrean and Ionescan Humanism prove ultimately 
to be closer to an elusive Buddhist Nirvana than to either committed collective action, or 
universal and fraternal Angst. But the revelation of the very presence and existence of 
the Other as contingent, pre-ontological, and Absurd perhaps anticipated this inevitable 
doom. The perception of life as a futile and isolated path towards death, staged to 
varying extents by both playwrights, is voiced with great poignancy by Sartre’s Sibilot: 
‘Ma vie n ’a ete qu’un long enterrement, personne ne suivait le cortege . ’204 The words 
could just as easily have been voiced by Ionesco’s Roi, and they condemn the agent and 
the puppet alike to the desperate plight of Camus’s Sisyphus, to their initial departure 
point of the Absurd.
201 Nekrassov, p.29.
202 Royle, Peter, Sartre: L ’Enfer et la Liberte, p. 138.
203 Vemois, Paul, La Dynamique theatrale d ’Eugene Ionesco, p.266.
204 Nekrassov, p. 109.
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CONCLUSION
The aims of this chapter were ambitious: they included the potential of uncovering a 
solution to the problems encountered in individual Being, the hope o f rescuing the 
ethical from the threat of solipsism, while simultaneously avoiding simplistic recourse 
to God, and the desire to find a workable definition for Authenticity in the world o f the 
collective. The ultimate ambition was to redefine Humanism in the light of successful 
coexistence and to assess the Humanist legacy left by Sartre and Ionesco.
The contrapuntal methodology has succeeded in its aim o f underlining the vast 
similarities in the two very different dramatists’ philosophies of Being-for-Others, in 
terms of outlook, themes, and even terminology. However, notable differences have also 
emerged, namely in regard to the inevitability o f collectivism: whereas Sartre draws on 
the collective for political gain and equality o f freedom, Ionesco invokes a universal 
collectivism to establish a fraternity o f Anguish and revolt, and to keep alive the 
prospect of partnership and even love. Where Sartre seeks revolutionary solidarity, 
Ionesco dreams of pacifistic communion.
On the whole, though, the philosophical convergence between Sartre and 
Ionesco, the agent and the puppet, is astoundingly strong in this new mode of Being. 
The thinkers are united in their perception o f the distance between the Self and the 
Other, o f the gratuitous Absurdity of the Other’s very presence, o f the theatrical 
symbolism of autrui, of the unavoidable failure and conflict o f all relationships, and of 
the inevitability of violence and war. Both betray an inherent disgust for women and are 
inclined to objectify her as nothing but a role; both embroil themselves in a vain attempt 
to secure a collective ethic; both dramatise the temptation of flight as a reaction to 
awareness of the Other; and both uncover an elaborate vicious circle within which the 
Self is trapped in a permanent tension with autrui, isolated within society and the home, 
and condemned to ontological, metaphysical, or physical sequestration: both the agent 
and the puppet are together alone -  Tunite avec autrui demeure irrealisable. Nous 
demeurons seuls, ensemble. ’205 There appears to be no outlet from this vicious circle 
which characterises the life-cycle of both dramatists’ stage characters, and the warning 







C’est un cercle vicieux.
Le cercle vicieux peut aussi avoir ses vertus!
A condition de s’en tirer a temps!
Ah, oui, 9 a, oui... a condition de s’en tirer.
On ne s’en tire du cercle vicieux qu’en s’y 
enfermant. Ainsi, n ’allez pas ouvrir la porte, le 
cercle vicieux se refermerait davantage... sur
vous. 206
Sequestration seems to be the only valid option, and with the privileged emphasis which 
both men place on solitude comes the indubitable failure of their hopes for collective 
Humanism.
The only valid conclusion to be drawn is that for both Sartre and Ionesco, 
Humanism and its ideal of Authenticity can only succeed, if  at all, as an individualist 
ideology or nirvana. The legacy left behind is then ambiguous: if  Humanism is to be
205 Presseault, Jacques, L ’Etre-pour-Autrui dans la Philosophie de Jean-Paul Sartre, p.228.
206 L ’Impromptu de I ’Alma, Theatre II, p. 18.
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redefined as a purely individualistic ideology, then not only is its potential vastly 
limited, but the prospects for a valid ethics look irreparably doomed. The Humanistic 
and ethical processes of both the agent and the puppet have been nothing but an 
elaborate flight, or, in Sartrean terms, the ultimate conduite magique, from the reality o f 
the Absurd. Man’s only options, apart from sequestration, are to assume or choose the 
Absurdity of his failed condition, to ‘continue’ (like Garcin), to strive (like Berenger 
and Goetz), or to laugh, along with the Tueur. If the French concierge is an 
acknowledged source of wisdom, then it is fitting to leave the final words to La 
Concierge of Ionesco, who reduces the findings of Ionesco and Sartre to two most 
humble sentences: C’est mauvais de vivre tout seul. C’est encore pire que de vivre a 
deux ou a plusieurs. ’207
207 Ce formidable bordel!, p. 175.
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Before drawing any definitive conclusions from this extensive comparative study, it 
may well be advisable to restate briefly the original aims and aspirations o f the thesis. 
The most central o f these was of course to compare and contrast the efforts o f Sartre’s 
Existentialism and Ionesco’s Absurdism to throw light on the human condition through 
a thorough examination o f both philosophers’ plays. The initial aspiration, presumably 
shared by the dramatists themselves, was to uncover some meaning to human life and so 
to determine the best way to live it.
Other stated aims included the ambition to effect a greater understanding of 
Sartrean and Ionescan Humanism, the desire to contribute to the topical debate on 
Sartrean ethics, the necessity to refocus attention on the underlying philosophy of 
Ionesco’s plays, and the determination to explore the common ground on Ionesco and 
Sartre’s philosophies of Being-for-Others. The final task projected for the thesis was to 
assess the combined achievements of both dramatists in relation to existential and 
Humanist philosophy, and the ultimate aspiration was less to provide an answer to 
metaphysical questions on the meaning of life than to reinvigorate critical reception of 
Sartre and Ionesco, and to incite further comparative analysis, which would inevitably 
hasten the rapprochement of the genres of philosophy and art.
What, then, has the thesis achieved? First o f all, it has clarified the generally 
misunderstood or even unacknowledged relationship between Sartrean Existentialism 
and Ionescan Absurdism. By focusing on the dramatists’ plays and philosophies, it has 
traced the ethical journeys of Sartre’s agent and Ionesco’s puppet, and placed the 
spotlight on the human subject and condition. It has been shown that Sartre’s 
Existentialism and Ionesco’s Absurdism share the same origins -  namely in their 
common prerequisite of perception of the Absurd -  and that Sartrean philosophy takes 
Man full circle, via Freedom, Engagement, ethics, heroism, and Authenticity, back to 
the Absurd, its original point of departure. Sartre concluded at the end o f L 'Etre et le 
Neant that Man was a useless passion, and he has been shown to have engaged himself 
in an elaborate and self-refuting conduite magique in a vain attempt to flee from the 
Absurd. In this respect, it can be concluded that Ionescan Absurdism is the more 
authentic philosophy, remaining true to its origins and consistently Absurd.
Secondly, it has outlined the origins, nature, and significance o f Ionescan and 
Sartrean Humanism. The most basic philosophical link between Sartre and Ionesco, and 
thus the underlying inspiration for a comparison of the two, is their almost obsessive 
preoccupation with the fate o f the human subject, who is placed by both back in the 
centre of his universe, and granted dramatic and ethical primacy. Nevertheless, two very 
different conceptions of Humanism have been uncovered: where Sartre’s Humanism is 
secular, Ionesco’s is religious; while Sartre views Man as a means to an end, Ionesco 
regards him as an end in himself; whereas Sartrean Humanism is defined and coherent, 
Ionescan Humanism is ill-defined, eclectic, and ambiguous. But both the Existentialist 
and the Absurdist place their faith in the Humanist ideal o f Authenticity, and both focus 
first and foremost on precisely what it means to be human.
The conclusions they reach have been discussed, but now is the time to draw 
them all together. The motifs of the agent and puppet were evoked to convey the 
philosophical polemic that exists between Ionesco and Sartre on the fundamental 
question of human freedom. Inevitably, Sartre’s agent emerged as ‘condemned to be 
free’, and the Ionescan puppet as a victim controlled by forces beyond his own control. 
But, fascinatingly, this diametric opposition resulted in philosophical accord and in a 
common human fate: the human subject was characterised by both as desperately in
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need o f an ethical code but abandoned by any objective moral arbiter, and as desperately 
craving loving coexistence but condemned to a life o f role-play and isolation.
The final main achievement of the thesis concerns its very choice of subject, for 
it has shown beyond all reasonable doubt that a comparative analysis of Sartre and 
Ionesco was not only long overdue, but inherently valid. Its technique o f ‘confrontation 
analysis’ has uncovered both thought-provoking differences in outlook and consistent 
philosophical convergence, particularly in the area of Being-for-Others, which has 
hopefully cleared the way for subsequent comparative study. The inter-disciplinary 
approach, combining philosophy with theatre, has demonstrated not only that the 
common separation of the genres is misguided, formalistic, and arbitrary, but that 
theatre is exceedingly apt in its elucidation of the philosophy of life.
But there are three questions remaining: What exactly are the legacies of 
Ionescan and Sartrean Humanism? Is there a future or possible salvation for the 
Humanist ideal of Authenticity? And if indeed we are back where we started, doomed to 
an Absurd life and an inevitable death, what can be gleaned about our potential options?
The legacies of Ionescan and Sartrean Humanism can only be said to be mixed. 
The collective Humanism explored in Chapter Four must certainly be acknowledged as 
a failure, for it produced neither a collective ethic nor even a means o f successful 
coexistence. It condemned its human subjects to live together alone, yearning for love 
and fraternity, but faced with the reality of isolation. But as individualistic ideologies, 
both conceptions o f Humanism achieved a certain degree of success. Sartrean 
Humanism succeeded in replacing God with an inspired and inspiring reinvention of 
Man, who usurps the divine role to become the creator of his own essence. This human 
agent was depicted as free and autonomous, active and responsible, and he was charged 
with the social duty to improve his world both for himself and for his fellows. Ionescan 
Humanism thrived in its universal focus on humanness, which it explored in all its 
aspects -  strong and weak, lofty and debased. It remained on the whole true to its own 
values, maintaining a consistent tone of protest, acknowledging the inherent subjectivity 
of ethics, and betraying no elaborate attempt at self-deception or even a false salvation. 
Its anti-hero emerged as an archetypal Everyman with whom all could readily identify 
and who, if  in spite of himself, emerged as a defender of Man and of the human.
However, even as philosophies of individualism, the failures of both Humanisms 
are readily apparent. By insisting on the absolute totality of human Freedom, Sartre 
deprives his Humanism of a personalised subject, for his agent is a ‘nothingness’, 
devoid o f Self and therefore of any valid code of ethics. Another repercussion of the 
elevation of Freedom is to render ethics and ontology fundamentally incompatible, 
which leads Sartre to fall into his own trap by imposing Freedom as an ethical, not just 
ontological, Value. The end result o f this is that Freedom must be pursued at all costs, 
leaving Man a pawn in an ethical game and deprived of inherent value. The failure of 
Ionesco’s Humanism lies in its shambolic lack of coherence. The Ionescan Humanist is 
unsure and self-contradictory: if he acts or resists, it is instinctively, not reflectively, and 
wherever remotely possible, he seeks to escape from all that is human. As Humanists, 
Ionesco’s puppets commit the ultimate sin of craving the divinity of a Lost Paradise 
over a better human world. Such is the legacy left by Ionescan and Sartrean Humanism, 
and the challenge for the next generation of Humanist thinkers is to build on their 
remarkable successes and to strive to overcome their deeply inherent failures.
The future of the Humanist ideal of Authenticity is thus exceedingly doubtful. 
The failure of Sartrean Authenticity on both the individual and collective level was 
again an inevitable repercussion of his ontology of Freedom. It was unelaborated by 
Sartre, plagued with self-contradiction and even mysticism, and surely subject to the 
same condemnation as its forerunning concept of Sincerity. Pour-soi can only ever be 
anything in death, and this ontological restriction must certainly apply to the state of
217
‘being Authentic’. The prospects of salvation for Sartrean Authenticity apparently lie in 
two areas. Firstly, if as a concept it can only come to life in the past, then it could in 
theory be successfully applied in retrospect, when the Pour-soi is dead and nothing but 
the sum of its choices. The problem with this is of course the lack of objective criteria, 
and the only solution to this lies in the notion o f ‘coherence’ uncovered in discussion on 
Sartrean ethics, which would ally the concept with the idea of ‘integrity’. Secondly, the 
solution proposed by Jeanson and de Beauvoir to interpret Authenticity as ‘free 
assumption’ o f the desagregation intime and of ethical ambiguity succeeds in providing 
an alternative to Bad Faith while avoiding the traps of Sincerity and Seriousness. This is 
surely the most successful interpretation o f Sartre’s Authenticity and ‘pure reflection’, 
and it is to be hoped that future progress on this elusive area o f Sartrean philosophy can 
eventually be made in this direction. Another critical alternative would be to place the 
primary focus on later Sartrean thought, based, for example, on the concept o f alienation 
uncovered in the Critique and applied to a socio-political reading of the plays. Such an 
approach lay beyond the scope of the present thesis, but the potential o f comparative 
links between social and metaphysical alienation is a fascinating one, and one which 
could well lead to very different conclusions.
The fate of Ionescan Authenticity is somewhat different. In terms o f coherence 
with its related theory, it is certainly more successful than its Sartrean counterpart, for it 
consistently upholds the dreamer, the universal, and the vanished sense o f wonder as the 
desirable criteria for an Authentic state of being. According to Ionescan thought, there is 
also a Self, an essence, and even a ‘humanness’ to which one can aim to remain true. 
The compatibility between Ionescan and Heideggerian Authenticity is also encouraging: 
in the collective environment of Being-for-Others, there is convergence on the concept 
o f Angst, which individualises, and on the Inauthenticity of Idle Talk, Curiosity, and 
Ambiguity of the Menge, which leaves the individual again in conflict with autrui. But 
again, the concept is ill-elaborated and wavering in Ionescan theatre and philosophy, 
and, like Sartre’s, it is exclusively individualistic. It does indeed show potential as a 
individualist ideal, but in leaving Man irreparably isolated, it threatens the very roots o f 
Humanism and heralds a potential return to solipsism.
Again, the only hope of escape for Authenticity from this unfortunate impasse 
lies in further, comprehensive research on the precise history, tradition, philosophy, and 
application of the concept, from its introduction to the present day. The influences o f 
Renaissance philosophy and theatre, and Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian thought, 
appear to be particularly strong, and the application of the concept on the post-war 
French stage -  in the theatre of not just Sartre and Ionesco, but o f Camus, Beckett, and 
Genet -  is undeniably among the most rich. It seems then that a certain success will be 
assured in the comparative analysis of these particular domains.
The final question remaining surrounds the ‘remnants’ o f the dramatists’ 
philosophies: What, precisely, are we left with? Whatever we are left with, answers to 
our remaining questions will presumably not be found in theatre, for another conclusion 
shared by the two men is that dramatic art, at least for them, has reached its limit: both 
Voyages chez les Morts and Les Troyennes testify to a frustrated and pessimistic sense 
of fmitude, borne out by Ionesco’s ultimate decision to express the Absurd in painting. 
However, both men’s words have profoundly revealed the Absurdity o f the human 
condition, and Sartre’s no less than Ionesco’s:
L ’homme est l’etre qui a a etre pour donner un sens a l’Etre. II ne donne pas 
ce sens a un temoin; il ne manifeste l’Etre a aucun Dieu: il le manifeste a 
soi. Mais c’est qu’il est -  sans le vouloir, sans le choisir -  par son simple 
surgissement l’etre qui fait que l’Etre pourrait bien n ’avoir aucun sens. [...] 
L ’homme est done l’etre qui, en se mettant en question dans son etre, met en
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question pour lui le sens de l’Etre. 1
The final tone can only be one of pessimism, for both dramatists have left Man deprived 
of a God, of a moral example and arbiter, and yet strangely ‘conditioned’ to a life o f 
futility, from which any escape is nothing but illusion. The Self is left in the Absurd 
position of being forced to live out an impossible coexistence with others, which merely 
compounds its Anguish, and its metaphysical questions remain unanswered because the 
Absolutes it desires are either absent, unattainable, or both. Indeed as Marie reminds her 
Roi, these unanswered questions are perhaps Man’s only Truth:
L ’impossibilite de repondre est la reponse meme, elle est ton etre meme qui 
eclate, qui se repand. Plonge dans l’etonnement et la stupefaction sans 
limites, ainsi tu peux etre sans limites, ainsi tu peux etre infiniment. Sois 
etonne, sois ebloui, tout est etrange, indefinissable.2
Like the Roi, Man is condemned to a death without salvation -  a death which marks the 
victory o f Sartre’s en-soi and facticity, Ionesco’s proliferating matter, and the final and 
ultimate victory of the Absurd itself. The situation is desperate for those who are brave 
enough to see it: ‘However we regard the prisoner o f the existential, we are bound to 
admit his tenacity and his ingenuity. Existential consciousness is like a straightjacket; it 
is, quite simply, “insufferable” . ’3
The one problem thus persisting is how to suffer existential consciousness, and it 
is a problem acknowledged by Bell in her analysis o f Sartre:
Sartre places all human beings in the frustrating position o f Sisyphus. We 
are haunted by the ‘value’, by the desire to be God, by the need to achieve 
community; yet inevitably our efforts fail as we try to coincide with our 
values, with ourselves and with others. Because of the kind o f being we are, 
an unbridgeable gap remains. The problem of futility is how to live with this 
realization.4
Her succinct gloss could equally apply to Ionesco, for both men leave the human being 
in this existential vacuum. They do, however, point towards various existential options. 
The first of these is suicide, but this project has been shown to fail by both Sartre and 
Ionesco, and must thus be disregarded. A second option is to ‘strive’ in the direction of 
our choice, following the philosophy of Fichte’s Streben. Sartre’s comments in 
Reflexions sur la Question Juive linked Authenticity with living out our condition to the 
full, and if Sartrean theatre interprets striving in the light of socio-political 
improvement, Ionescan theatre puts its energies into re-finding M an’s lost sense of 
wonder and grace. Another alternative lies in the ‘free assumption’ of the human 
condition mentioned earlier in regard to Authenticity. If  Man accepts the polar 
ambiguity of the desagregation intime, then the only workable solution is to transcend 
what is transcendable and to freely assume what is not:
II y a un type originel d ’attachement a l’etre qui n ’est pas la relation: vouloir 
etre, mais bien: vouloir devoiler l’etre. Or, ici il n ’y a pas echec, mais au 
contraire succes: cette fin que l’homme se propose en se faisant manque 
d ’etre, elle se realise en effet par lui... C ’est a dire que, dans sa vaine
1 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.464.
2 Le Roi se meurt, Theatre IV, p.41.
3 Dobrez, L. A. C., The Existential and its Exits, p.374.
4 Sartre’s Ethics o f Authenticity, p. 109.
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tentative pour etre Dieu, l’homme se fait exister comme homme, et s’il se 
satisfait de cette existence, il coincide exactement avec soi. II ne lui est pas 
permis d ’exister sans tendre vers cet etre qu’il ne sera jamais: mais il lui est 
possible de vouloir cette tension meme avec l’echec qu’elle comporte. Son 
etre est manque d’etre, mais il y a une maniere d ’etre ce manque qui est 
precisement 1’existence.5
This is presumably what Sartre meant by his cryptic T’echec peut conduire a la 
conversion’ ,6 and it succeeds in assuming the Absurd while clearing the way for a 
revisionist exploration of both Humanism and Authenticity. It is also reminiscent of 
Heidegger’s appeal to finally refocus the Humanist debate, and o f Jaspers’s linking of 
failure and the being of transcendence.7
But the most tempting alternative must be to laugh in the face of Absurdity and 
to enter into the cosmic joke along with Ionesco, Beckett, and even God: ‘II m ’est plus 
facile de croire que Dieu est, plutot que de croire qu’il n ’est pas. Cet univers et nous, qui 
en faisons partie, serait done [...] une farce enorme. Soyons-en les comediens et entrons 
dans le jeu de Dieu. ’8 Humour is paradoxically a serious option, for as Ionesco himself 
points out, it combines an existential consciousness o f the Absurd with a refusal to try 
and transcend it: ‘L’humour, c’est prendre conscience de l ’absurdite tout en continuant a 
vivre dans l’absurdite. ’9 We have then an alternative to pessimism, inaction, and 
despair, for this fundamental concept of humour can be seen to provide an exit from the 
surrounding impasses of the Absurd. Sartre too leaves us with a residual sense o f hope, 
reminding us clearly that all is not yet lost:
Dans la vie la plus miserable 
il reste au moins l’espoir. 10
Both the agent and the puppet are far from being condemned.
5 Beauvoir, Simone de, Pour une Morale de I’Ambigui'te, pp.18-19.
6 Cahiers pour une Morale, p.42.
7 See Albert Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe, where Jaspers is cited on p.51: ‘L’echec ne montre-t-il pas, au- 
dela de toute explication et de toute interpretation possible, non le neant mais l ’etre de la transcendance?’
8 Un homme en question, p. 194.
9 Ionesco interviewed in Claude Bonnefoy, Entretiens avec Eugene Ionesco, p. 152.
10 Les Troyennes, p.69.
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